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ABSTRACT
Since 1971 the Government of India has had a policy of encouraging the 
dispersal of industry to designated rural backward areas. The thesis 
attempts a critical assessment of this industrial location policy. It 
questions the extent to which the industrial dispersal that has 
occurred during the 1970s is simply a result of the policy or whether 
it was primarily prompted by other factors such as the interests of 
Indian industrial capital.
The thesis starts with a review of industrial location theory and 
policy, from which it concludes that industrial dispersal and the 
developmental impact of industrial growth poles can usefully be 
analysed in terms of modes of production theory. It is argued that one 
of the most important features of such industrial growth poles in a 
Third World context, is that they represent the organised penetration 
of the capitalist mode of production into areas which previously are in 
general characterised by pre-capitalist modes.
The next two chapters of the thesis examine the genesis of Indian 
industrial location policy and , the evolving relationship between the 
Indian state and industrial capital. They conclude that while in the 
past the Indian state has imposed restrictions on industrial capital, 
these have become less stringent since the mid 1960s. It is argued that 
the industrial dispersal policy with its package of financial 
incentives for industrialists is itself part of a new, much broader 
development planning ethos. An ethos which replaces the old emphasis on 
state led development with the view that development will result from 
the efforts of private enterprise helped by the state.
The third section, again comprising two chapters, takes the analysis 
down to the level of an individual State: Tamil Nadu. The distribution 
and development of industry in the State is discussed and the efforts 
of the State Industrial Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu in 
implementing the dispersal policy is analysed. This is followed through 
into the final section where the behaviour of firms locating in the two
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Tamil Nadu growth poles of Ranipet and Hosur is examined on the basis 
of material from a questionnaire survey. The types of firms involved 
are described and the managers' reasons for choosing the sites are 
analysed. The survey results demonstrate the validity of the initial 
hypothesis, to the extent that a certain specific section of the survey 
firms chose their new dispersed locations for reasons other than 
government policy. In addition it is suggested that the incoming firms
will have both a disruptive and developmental impact on the local
economy of the Ranipet and Hosur areas. While their advent will be of
benefit to some it will have a particularly harsh negative effect on
the lives of the many local inhabitants with no access to the jobs and 
incomes generated by the new industry. These points are drawn together 
and summarised in the concluding chapter.
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INTRODUCTION
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INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of the 1970s the Union Government of India announced a 
policy of industrial dispersal to designated 'backward areas' in 
underdeveloped parts of the country. The policy measures included a 
variety of incentives in the form of concessional finance for 
industrialists locating factories in the designated backward areas; a 
list of these areas in each State in the country and instructions to 
State Governments to implement the policy by providing infrastructure 
in appropriate places, setting up industrial promotion agencies and if 
they so desired, arranging their own incentive schemes which would be 
backed up by national public financial institutions. The aim of the 
policy was to encourage the development of the backward areas 
concerned.
In its aim, scope and design the Indian industrial dispersal policy is 
very similar to location policies instituted in various countries 
throughout the world. Such policies are common in the industrialised 
nations of Western Europe, North American or Japan. They also exist, on 
paper at least, in many Third World countries. But there are few Third 
World countries which are as industrialised as India, and therefore 
have enough industry to make a dispersal policy worthwhile or even 
possible. There are even fewer Third World countries where the policy 
has been in existence long enough and has been met with sufficient 
positive response from industrialists for there now to be enough new 
industry located in backward areas to make a policy evaluation study 
worthwhile. Given the relatively advanced nature of the Indian 
experience in this respect it is hoped that the conclusions of this 
study will be of interest to regional planners not only in. India but 
also in other Third World countries.
Even a cursory study of the Indian industrial dispersal programme 
reveals two major apparent contradictions. These are taken as the 
starting point of this enquiry. First, government industrial promotion 
agencies which administer the dispersal policy portray their work in 
terms of having to coerce reluctant industrialists to locate their new
16
factories in remote backward areas they do not wish to go to. On the 
other hand, industrialists in public statements, through their 
associations and chambers of commerce and in personal interviews claim 
to approve of and support the dispersal policy. While such 
contradictory claims may seem unremarkable in the world of realpolitik, 
the dichotomy does suggest that it is necessary to investigate more 
closely the relationship between the promoters of the policy and those 
most affected by it: that is between the state and industrial capital.
The second contradiction lies in the nature of the policy itself. The 
stated aim of the programme is to develop backward areas of the 
country. Yet already at the time the policy was adopted the 
developmental value of industrial growth poles in backward rural areas 
had frequently been called into question by regional planners 
throughout the world.' The Indian government and its planners must have 
been aware of these criticisms and yet apparently they chose to ignore 
them. What then was their intention?
With these contradictions in mind the thesis attempts to tackle two 
essentially different types of questions. First there are the questions 
about why the industrial dispersal policy exists. What is the rationale 
behind it? What are the interests of the various parties to it? Why has 
the Indian.state adopted it and why do certain industrialists at least 
fall in with it?
Answers to these questions already do much to clarify the two 
contradictions outlined above but they are not sufficient explanation 
by themselves and hence it is necessary to tackle a second set of 
questions about what the industrial dispersal policy is likely to 
achieve. What type of industry is going to backward area locations? How 
is it integrating with the local economy of these areas and what sort 
of effects, developmental or otherwise, can it be expected to have?
These questions are approached both at a general national level with a 
study of Indian industrialization, economic and planning policies and 
in more specific detail through a case study of the implementation of
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the dispersal policy in one part of South India. Preceding this there 
is also a theoretical chapter which reviews past approaches to the 
study of industrial location and discusses a number of criticisms that 
can be made of them, before outlining the approach adopted in this 
study.
The thesis argument has been arranged in a continuous flow from the 
general to the more specific, through four different levels of 
analysis. Thus Chapter 2 which deals with the theoretical arguments is 
the most general and indeed could refer to other Third World countries 
with similar levels of industrialization. The next section comprises 
two chapters, numbers 3 and 4, and takes the analysis down to the 
national level to deal with the origins of the state industrial 
dispersal policy in India, the extent of Indian industrial development 
and the relationship between the Indian state and industrial capital. 
In the third section, made up of Chapters 5 and 6, the analysis is 
conducted at a regional level with the one Federal State-*- of Tamil Nadu 
being chosen as the object for more detailed study. Tamil Nadu's level 
of industrial development and the spatial distribution of its industry 
is described in some detail. The State's backward areas are also 
examined and the work of the State Government agency charged with
implementing the dispersal policy is carefully analysed. The final
section which again comprises two chapters, numbers 7 and 8, is the 
most specific as it deals with a detailed case study of a group of 
firms locating new factories in backward areas of Tamil Nadu
State(Figure 1). This is based on the results of a questionnaire survey 
of these firms, conducted by the author in the first half of 1980. As 
well as going into the type of firms choosing backward area locations, 
it discusses their reasons for doing so and their managers' opinions of 
the government industrial dispersal policy. The importance of
environmental characteristics of the backward areas in which industrial 
dispersal is taking place is also examined. The last chapter, number 9, 
summarises the main conclusions of each section of the study and 
attempts to draw the various strands of the argument together into one 
cohesive thesis.
18
Footnote:
1. Throughout the thesis the word State spelt with a capital 
S refers to one of India's Federal States, whereas when spelt with a 
small s it is used as a collective term to cover government and its 
various agencies.
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1. Industrial Location Theory
Theoretical attempts to understand and explain the locational 
distribution patterns of industry have evolved slowly since the 
beginning of this century. Starting with models built on the 
generalized location decision concerns of firms, and moving through 
behavioural studies of individual firms, work on industrial location 
theory is now more concentrated in studies concerned with the regional 
distribution and structure of industry. Based as.it is on the study of 
Western industrial location, this theory is largely concerned with 
modern capitalist industry and not with the ’informal sector1 industry 
typical of most Third World countries, a point which will be elaborated 
at a later stage.
The classical approach to industrial location theory is usually 
associated with the name of Alfred Weber (1909) though the somewhat 
more recent work of Hoover (1948) did a lot to spread its influence to 
an English speaking readershipl . This approach was based on the 
argument that the main concern of any firm taking a location decision 
was to maximize profits by minimizing distances between the factory and 
the location of sources of materials and markets for products. This 
basic logic was then applied to all firms and built up into a general 
idealized model. Although it was accepted that physical and political 
boundaries to geographical space would have a certain recognizable 
influence many other factors were ignored. In particular this approach 
assumed free competition between firms and perfect knowledge of 
markets. Moreover it provided no framework within which to explain 
changes in industrial location, principally because it was based on the 
analysis of static snapshots of industrial distribution. These 
assumptions and omissions imposed strict limits on the usefulness of 
this approach as an analytical tool.
In reaction to this tendency to oversimplify influences on industrial 
location, later theoretical work switched to a more behavioural
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approach, examining closely all the factors influencing the location 
decisions of individual firms. The essential difference between this 
approach and the classical approach is its view of the firm, not as a 
rational optimizing decision making unit but as a body characterized by 
irrational behaviour, conflicting goals due to a variety of not always 
standard influences, and limited levels of knowledge and control over 
its environment. Frequently such studies used a methodology derived 
from systems theory to acconj/)date these various influences, and started 
their analyses of location decision making from the organisational 
structure and particular characteristics of the firms in question 
(Hamilton, 1974, p.13 & Keeble 1976, p*2).
In their attempt to recognise the individuality of firms these 
behavioural studies by and large tended to go too far in the opposite 
direction from classical work. They amassed large quantities of data on 
the specific behaviour of particular firms from which it was 
subsequently very difficult to derive any generalizations or overall 
pattern which could be applied to more than a few firms, let alone 
advance a consistent and more widely applicable theory of industrial 
location (Massey in Peet, 1977; Keeble 1976, p.3).
More recent work on industrial location theory has approached the 
subject through the study of regional development and the distribution 
of industry in and between regions. In doing so it has drawn much of 
its inspiration from core-periphery ideas explored by Third World 
development theory. There is a very extensive body of literature in 
this field sometimes referred to as 'regionalism' or regional studies 
which there is no need to review in detail here, though it is important 
to identify the various implications it has for industrial location 
theory.
The most important contribution this work has made to the study of 
industrial location is the way it has emphasised the need to look at 
the role of broader structural economic trends and social and 
historical influences on the shaping of the spatial pattern of 
distribution of industry. Thus it is not just the presence or absence
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of industry, nor only the factors influencing an individual firm's 
location which analyses must examine, but also the structure of the 
industry or industrial sector as a whole and the way its spatial 
distribution is affected by the characteristics of the socio-economic 
conjunction in which it exists.
In an extensive review of the different types of approaches adopted by 
regional study theorists, Massey (1978) identifies three basically 
different types of approach. The first of these consists of the various 
attempts to derive abstract formulations and general laws governing the 
spatial form of capitalist development. In particular various theorists 
tried to propose a necessary' tendency of capitalism towards spatial 
centralisation. Massey suggests (1978 p.108) that this was partly 
intended to counter the equal distribution tendency put forward by 
neo-classical economic theory, but she points out that neither view is 
really correct as exceptions to both generalisations can easily be 
found with empirical case studies .
The second group focuses on concepts borrowed from Third World 
development theory. Her objections to these centre around the dangers 
inherent in transferring theoretical concepts formulated to explain 
international relations to intranational relations between regions. 
First there are empirical differences between these two types of 
interrelationships and between nation states and their internal regions 
(eg: monetary union, trade and customs policies, government policies, 
political struggles) which are liable to cause problems. Secondly such 
approaches tend to reduce the problems of regions to simply smaller 
scale versions of the problems of underdeveloped countries and in doing 
so they forget that 'nations' and 'regions' are social divisions of 
territory, with only limited standardised characteristics, which may 
not easily fit such abstract notions of spatial form and scale 
(Anderson, 1975 p.15). Thirdly underdevelopment theory takes nations as 
pre-defined objects of analysis, whereas, Massey argues, regions should 
be seen as an effect of spatially uneven capitalist development. One 
particular case of this is the internal colony model which has been 
advanced for studying regions within Western capitalist nations.
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Probably the best known example of this is Hechter's 'Internal
Colonialism: the Celtic Fringe in British National Development' (1975). 
But while such a model is certainly more applicable in this case than 
in most, because the Celtic fringe countries are in fact regions with 
an identifiable national character to the extent that it makes sense to
talk for instance about the Scottish bourgeoisie and working class as
distinct social groupings with specific characteristics, the same is
not true of many of the regions to which this model is often applied.
Yet, even with the British Celtic fringe example there are limits to 
how far the parallel with international imperialism can be taken. Thus 
the ease with which the Scottish bourgeoisie have penetrated the
structure of English and British capitalism and their prominent
position within it, is in no way comparable to the relationship between 
for instance the bourgeoisie of African nations and their colonisers 
(cf. Fanon, 1967).
Massey herself proposes an approach which starts from the process of 
accumulation of capital and analyses how this process produces 
spatially uneven development without using any pre-given regional 
framework. Her essential argument is that it is necessary to examine
the ways in which capitalism organises production, rationalising it by 
dividing it up into its constituent elements or stages, each of which 
has different characteristics and requires specific conditions in which 
it can occur most efficiently. These characteristics of the elements of 
the production process may then have spatial dimensions to them, 
leading industrialists to try and locate production or stages of the 
production process in particular ideal locations. The overall result of 
all industrialists rationalising their production in this way will lead 
to what Massey terms a 'spatial division of labour'.
Massey visualises this process as a series of rounds of investment by
industrial capitalists, each round modifying the pattern of
distribution of development and setting the scene for the next round of
investment decisions. Capital's response to spatial unevei^4ss may vary 
but will always be the result of the interaction between the 
characteristics of the existing spatial environment and the current
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requirements of the particular process of production (1978, p.114).
"This new distribution of economic activity, produced by the evolution 
of a new division of labour, will be overlaid on, and combined with, 
the pattern produced in previous periods by different forms of spatial 
division. The combination of successive layers will produce effects 
which themselves vary over space, contributing to a new form and 
geography of distribution of inequality in the conditions of 
production, as a basis for the next round of investment. A spatial 
division of labour is therefore not equivalent to a 'regionalisation'. 
It is suggested on the contrary, that the social and economic structure 
of any given local area will be a complex result of the combination of 
the area's succession of roles within the series of wider, national and 
international, spatial divisions of labour". (Massey, 1978, p.116)
There is a danger in accepting Massey's conceptualisation of 'rounds of 
investment1 in too formalistic a fashion. She herself is at pains to 
emphasise that "the process of change is much more diversified and 
incremental, though certainly there may be periods of radical 
redirection" (p.115). Moreover, between rounds conditions will also 
change in ways not directly instigated by industrial capital. For 
instance developments in transport and communications may change the 
relative accessibility of different locations. Finally a new 'round of 
investment' will not affect all sectors of all industry at precisely 
the same moment. The most advanced sectors of production will be the 
first to show signs of new investment, other sectors following later 
and those in decline probably not at all. Providing one acknowledges 
these points Massey's formulation of 'rounds of investment' provides an 
easily understood model and description of the process of industrial 
location change, particularly useful because it stresses its 
non-continuous and cyclical nature.
While Massey does provide this useful descriptive model of how the 
process of industrial location change occurs, she does not spend much 
time discussing the factors which engender this process of change other 
than stating that they reside in the requirements of the process of
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capital accumulation. For this aspect a paper by Dunford (1977) is more
helpful. Dunford argues that the process of capital accumulation
entails a continual restructuring of capital (that is: reorganisation,
renewal & reinvestment) in order to ensure maximum levels of profit.
While much of this restructuring will not involve locational changes, 
being largely a question of reorganising production inside factory 
walls, every so often it will become necessary to install completely 
new machinery or to go into a new and more profitable line of 
production. Such major changes frequently involve investment in new 
factories and therefore a location decision. Industrial investment 
location decisions are therefore prompted by the desire of capital to 
maximise profits resulting in periodic decisions to restructure capital 
on an important scale.
Finally it should be noted that Massey pays no attention to the 
relationship between the capitalist mode of production, about which she 
is talking, and other modes of production that may exist in the same 
social formation. This relationship may in fact provide important 
opportunities for capitalist industrialists to make higher levels of 
profit. This is particularly so in Third World economies which are 
frequently characterised by the co-existence of. several important modes 
of production, but as various writers have pointed out this may also 
occur in Western economies heavily dominated by the capitalist mode of 
production. We shall return to this question of the interrelationship 
of different modes of production at a later stage when discussing Third 
World development theory.
From the foregoing theoretical discussion it is possible to suggest an 
approach to the study of industrial location patterns and change which 
starts from two separate angles. First it is necessary to identify and 
analyse the factors which may be causing a restructuring of capital to 
take place. What are the dominant economic trends and circumstances in 
the social formation under study? Are there any social and political 
forces that may be affecting them? And how are they responding to them 
with changes in the production process?
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Secondly it is important to build up a picture of the characteristics 
of the built environment and particularly of the way industrialists 
perceive them. How do capitalists view the built environment in terms 
of where it is possible to locate factories? Have there been any 
changes to this environment which might make them alter their 
perception of it? Does it offer them any new opportunities?
Then if (a) there are new pressures on industrial capital to 
restructure or new solutions to old problems have to be found and (b) 
there are new opportunities to be found in different locations in the 
built environment, it is likely that a completely new trend in 
industrial location will occur'.
2. Industrial Location Policy
The primary aim of industrial location theory has been to analyse and 
explain why industry located where it did in geographical space. But 
while the uneven distribution of industry certainly provided an 
interesting object of study in itself, the main material motivation was 
a desire to know how to encourage industrial development in areas where 
hitherto it had not occurred.- Logically it seems a short step from 
industrial location theory to industrial location policy, but, as with 
many types of development planning, the derivation of policy from 
theory has proved extremely difficult.
An industrial location policy usually forms part of a broader regional 
development policy, the overall aim of which is frequently given as 
being to encourage ’balanced regional development’. While the 
egalitarian connotations of such a goal no doubt seem laudable, its 
loose name makes it something of a red-herring as (a) our earlier 
discussion (cf. pp.25-26) of the process through which the built 
environment develops suggested that regional development is always 
uneven, and (b) it gives little real indication of what the authors of 
regional development plans are seeking to achieve. Of course, not all 
regional development plans are as vague. Many do state explicitly that 
they want to raise the standard of living and the level of incomes of
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the inhabitants of poorer regions to national averages. They also often 
suggest a series of measures through which they propose to achieve 
this: improved infrastructure, better services and crucially for this
study, more employment opportunities. Although the term 'balanced 
regional development' could possibly be assumed to imply all such more 
detailed proposals, there is a real danger in using such an imprecise 
term which could provide a justification for virtually any type of 
development expenditure in an underdeveloped region.
Dealing more specifically with industrial location policy, there is 
also a certain imprecision about the real reason and value of 
encouraging an even distribution of industry. It is assumed that 
industrial activity means employment and that it will generate further 
industrial and economic growth in its immediate vicinity. Although both 
assumptions are strictly correct, the use of advanced technology means 
industrial investment does not always result in many jobs being created 
and the precise role of industry in encouraging economic growth and 
development is not that clear or necessarily direct. This latter point 
is extremely important in the Third World context being dealt with here 
and will therefore, be considered in some detail below.
The difficulty involved in deriving industrial location policy from 
industrial location theory is thus due to the fact that, while the 
theory does provide some explanation for why industry locates where it 
does, it does not deal with the basic process that the policy is trying 
to encourage, namely economic development through industrialisation. 
Indeed the latter process is really the concern of economic development 
theory not industrial location theory. The danger in trying to move 
directly from industrial location theory to policy without being aware 
of the importance of economic development theory, is that it encourages 
a tendency to see the problem of uneven regional development as purely 
a quantitative question of redistributing industry through space. On 
the other hand the danger in trying to derive an industrial location 
policy directly from economic development theory, is a tendency to 
ignore the actual reasons why industry locates where it does which can 
seriously undermine the effectiveness of the policy.
29
Interestingly enough, virtually the only industrial location theory 
which also incorporates elements of economic development theory, namely 
growth pole theory, has become the theoretical basis for probably the 
most widely used regional planning policy throughout the world.
Industry in the Third World is even more heavily concentrated in urban 
centres than it is in developed, industrialised nations, so 
traditionally the study of Third World industrialisation has been 
associated with the study of urbanisation. On the basis of traditional 
economic development theory this observed correspondence between 
industrialisation and urbanisation has been built up into an extremely 
vivid and popular dualistic imhge of Third World economies. The towns 
and particularly the old colonial cities and seaports of the Third 
World were seen as industrialised islands of development in a sea of 
underdeveloped agricultural countryside. Development, or rather 
economic growth as it was then understood, was equated directly with 
the level of industrialisation. Economic development theory suggested 
that development would diffuse from these urban industrial centres,
'trickling-down' to the surrounding rural areas (Myrdal, 1968). 
Industries in these centres would encourage the growth of others around 
them through the operation of multiplier effects (Hirschman, 1958). 
Gradually the dualistic character of these economies, represented by 
this urban-rural, modern-traditional, industrial-agricultural 
developed-undeveloped split, would disappear as the modernising 
influence of the urban-industrial economic system was felt in ever 
widening circles around each town and city.
Into such a schema growth pole theory seemed to fit extremely neatly, 
based as it was on the idea that industrial growth occurred in specific 
points in space and then radiated outwards from these poles to 
encourage further industrial growth in the vicinity. Francois Perroux 
(1955), the originator of growth pole theory, started from the rather 
obvious premise that all industrial activity has to be located at 
particular points in space and cannot be evenly distributed. His view 
of space, however, was really an economic one which used the spread of 
a firm's relations with its sources of materials, subcontractors and
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markets to define its region of economic influence. But Perroux's most 
important contribution was to discuss the process of industrial growth 
and why it tended to occur in concentrated locations.
For this Perroux introduced the concepts of propulsive and key 
industries. A propulsive or motor industry was one whose growth 
encourages the growth of other industries, while a key industry is a 
propulsive industry that induces a total economic growth greater than 
its own. Growth poles are thus industrial complexes whose vitality 
depends on the presence and growth inductive effects of one or more 
propulsive industries. Perroux recognised the fact that propulsive 
industries can also decline and that when they do this results in 
drastic negative effects for the growth pole which can rapidly become a 
centre of economic stagnation.
Boudeville (1966) is usually credited with having being the first to 
translate Perroux's economic space conceptualisation into one using 
physical or geographic space. For him a.growth pole is focused around a 
key industry located in an urban area; it has a zone of influence or 
'polarized region' around it in which economic activity is organised in 
a hierarchy of satellite towns and throughout which the propulsive 
industries of the growth pole induce further industrial activity and 
development through multiplier effects. Boudeville in fact drew a 
fairly close link between industrial growth poles and urban centres, 
arguing that small towns would specialise in one or two products while 
larger towns would have a greater degree of industrial diversification. 
Thus the polarisation of industrial growth would be linked directly to 
the diversification of activities. The most diversified industrial 
economies developing in the urban area of the growth pole centred on 
the principal propulsive industry of the region.
Boudeville1 s work on growth poles has been seen as complementary to 
Central Place Theory and indeed he himself made several references to 
the German school of urban location theories (cf. Christaller, & 
Losch). While Boudeville's conception of growth pole theory explained 
industrial production distribution, the German location theorists were
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concerned with the distribution of service centres and related 
urbanisat ion.
As already mentioned growth pole theory lent itself particularly well 
to policy formulation. It provided an extremely pragmatic and 
convenient theoretical justification for government policies to 
encourage industrial development in regions where none had existed 
hitherto. All that was required was to locate a propulsive and 
preferably key industry in the centre of the underindustrialised area 
and with time it would induce the growth of a polarised industrial 
economy in the region. In particular it suggested that the return on 
the initial investment could be very high in economic development terms 
providing the right sort of key industry was chosen. Or in other words 
all the government industrial promotion or regional planning agency had 
to do was ensure the development of one industry in the right place, 
either through subsidising private industrial enterprise or by 
investing in a public sector plant. The ideal key industry was one that
produced the basic materials for a whole gamut of other industries or
lent itself particularly well to extensive subcontracting, common 
examples given are those of iron and steel mills or a car factory. The 
actual location chosen for the growth pole was directed by the need for 
it to affect as large an area as possible, physical centrality usually 
being chosen as the princijyi' criterion. Its location could, however, 
also be integrated into a settlement distribution hierarchy such as the 
Central Place theory model grid based on an equilateral triangle
(Christaller, 1933; Losch, 1954). Finally the projected size of the 
growth pole could' be integrated into lognormal rank size urban 
distribution models (Berry 1961, Linsky 1969 and Mehta 1964) which 
suggested that developed industrialised nations all tended to have a 
definite lognormal hierarchy of towns and cities measured by 
population.
The application of some of these normative and idealised models to
planning policy making has produced a selection of startlingly 
unrealistic and determinist regional plans in many countries throughout 
the world, but fortunately, for various reasons, few of these plans
have been implemented in full. Individual growth poles, however, have 
frequently been instigated and indeed growth pole policy has probably 
become the most widely used regional planning tool throughout the Third 
World and the developed world as well. Yet despite the popularity of 
the policy there are now many instances of growth poles which have not 
initiated the scale of industrial growth and regional development they 
were intended to. The continuing popularity of the concept despite its 
patent failures must in part be due to the absence of any alternative 
policy oriented theory, alluded to above, but it may also be 
attributable to the fact that the concept is so all-embracing that it 
can be used as a convenient theoretical justification for a policy 
measure which is in reality fairly inevitable. Thus when industry is 
being encouraged in an area where there has been none hitherto, it 
necessarily has to be located somewhere and it is then all too easy for 
regional planners to call that place a growth pole. While such a 
practice undoubtedly represents a misuse of the theory, it also points 
to the fact that the theory itself does little more than state the 
obvious.
Even though the idea of industrial induction through multiplier effects 
which lies behind the growth pole concept, is both logical and to a 
large extent self-evident, it is apparent that our theoretical 
understanding of this process is inadequate given the widespread 
failure of growth pole policies to work consistently. Various critiques 
(Thomas, 1972; Appalarju & Safier, 1976) suggest that this is a result 
of the still very poor understanding reached so far of how the 
processes referred to as 'multiplier' and 'trickle-down' effects 
operate.
Thus although it is necessary that multiplier effects must operate, as 
no industry exists in a vacuum, it is apparent that they cannot be 
depended on to operate where, when and even to the extent that planners 
might wish. Darwent (1969) and Moseley (1974) also point out that in 
moving from Perroux's original growth pole concept based on economic 
space to Boudeville's formulation based on geographic space, a 
fundamental mistake was made, in that although multiplier effects
33
certainly do occur in a firm's abstract economic space this cannot be 
translated straight into a prediction about where they will occur in 
geographic space. Thus an industry in a remote growth pole may well 
create multiplier effects in already well established industrial 
centres far from the growth pole rather than in its immediate vicinity. 
The whole spatially based regional development rationale of growth pole 
policy is thereby thrown into question.
In effect the concepts of multiplier and trickle-down effects are drawn 
straight from orthodox economic development theory and it would 
therefore seem logical that further theoretical advances and 
particularly critiques in the field of economic development theory 
might well throw some light on this problem. It is to a consideration 
of this theoretical work that we now turn. This is particularly 
important in a study of Third World industry as much of the debate on 
economic development theory revolves around the question of the role of 
industrialisation in Third World development.
3. Third World Development Theory & Industrialisation
Industrialisation is central to most theories of development, indeed we 
tend to equate 'developed' with 'industrialised', particularly in the 
West where our great improvements in standards of living were achieved 
at times when our rates of industrialisation were at their highest. As 
already mentioned above., this association between industrial growth and 
development was particularly strong in orthodox development theory, 
which . visualised development as a process of modernisation radiating 
out from the urban industrial centres to their undeveloped rural 
hinterland. Industry in the main urban centres would induce further and 
more widespread industrialisation through multiplier effects and the 
benefits of this industrial growth would gradually trickle-down to the 
mass of the population.
A number of theorists have developed complex 'multiplier models' (Isard 
& Kuenne, 1953; Fred, 1965; cf. Chorley & Haggett, 1978 pp.413-4) which 
purport to demonstrate the regional impact in terms of employment and
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production levels in secondary firms of the activities of one major 
industry. While such work can be useful in demonstrating the potential 
scale of impact one firm can have on others, their results are not 
easily transferable as they are usually based on individual cases of 
specific firms. Nor can they really be used as reliable bases for 
projections and forward planning, as the operation of multiplier 
effects, when and where they will occur, is entirely dependent on the 
decisions of individual industrialists. This particular aspect of 
multiplier effects: exactly how, where and when they can be expected to 
operate, is in effect the area which is most crucial to planning policy 
and yet remains the one which is most poorly understood and 
conceptualised.
The most important critique of the orthodox or modernisation theory of 
development was that made by the Latin American school of dependency 
theorists (inter alia: Frank, 1967; Dos Santos, 1969) based on Paul 
Baran's seminal work on the 'Political Economy of Growth' (1957). 
Dependency theory in effect turned the whole trickle-down, 
modernisation idea of development on its- head, suggesting instead a 
chain of exploitation running upwards from the Third World peasant 
through villages, towns and cities and ultimately abroad to the 
industrialised metropolitan nations of the West.
Dependency theory originated from a critical analysis of the 
industrialisation problems of Latin American in the 1950s $ 60s. The 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) headed by 
Raul Prebisch had advocated a policy of import substitution
industrialisation in an attempt to distance Latin American economies
from the capitalist economies of Western Europe and North America with 
all their exploitative effects. But the import substitution policy 
failed because the import of finished goods was merely replaced by the 
import of technology from the West on equally poor terms. Analysing
this situation, the dependency theorists argued that Third World
nations would never be able to liberate themselves from the domination 
of Western capitalism and develop independently. Instead they would be 
progressively 'underdeveloped'. Moreover Third World industry could
never be expected to become a dynamic, self-sufficient and developing 
force as it would always remain a link in the exploitative chain of 
Western capitalist control over Third World economies.
The dependency theorists also criticised the dualistic image of Third 
World economies presented by orthodox modernisation theories of 
development. They maintained instead that all sectors of these 
economies • were intimately interlinked and they suggested that 
industrial capitalism in the Third World actually owed its position to 
and depended on the continuing exploitation of the non-capitalist 
'informal' sector, not only in the cities but in the rural areas as 
we 11.
Although the dependency theory condemnation of Third World 
industrialisation was fairly absolute, it was not so much a 
condemnation of industry per se but resulted from the view that because 
of its close links with Western capitalism, Third World industry would 
always be used as an instrument of exploitation. Pointing out the 
existence of the links between Third World industry and Western 
capitalism and documenting their exploitative nature were extremely 
important contributions to the development debate, as indeed also was 
the way dependency theory situated the debate in a more serious 
historical and political economic context. But in many ways the 
dependency theory analysis suffered heavily from oversimplification and 
the sweeping nature of its condemnations. This is reflected in the way 
that later work on development theory has been very largely aimed at 
either trying to adjust the dependency analysis to particular case 
studies or rejecting it because of the issues it fails to confront.
One of the greatest critics of dependency theory's tendency for 
oversimplification has been Bill Warren (1973 & 1980). In particular he 
criticised the 'anti-capitalist romanticism' of dependency and 
underdevelopment theories which failed to recognise that capitalism in 
the Third World had played a substantial role in the development 
process. He maintained instead that the prospects for successful 
capitalist development in the Third World were good and that
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substantial advances had already been made in certain countries,
particularly in industrialisation. Finally he argued that much of this 
capitalism was indigenous to the Third World countries concerned and 
that as it developed it was decreasing their dependence on Western 
capitalism.
Warren’s critique of dependency theory is important, not least because 
it is argued from a Marxist stand point, thereby challenging the 
dependency theorists on their own ground. From a theoretical angle 
Warren argued that Lenin's 'Imperialism: the Highest Stage of
Capitalism' (1917), from which the dependency position and that of most 
of the widely popular Marxist theories of imperialism it gave rise to, 
were derived, was a pamphlet written for propaganda purposes and lacked 
the thoroughness and precise analysis of much of Lenin's other work. 
Indeed it largely reverses the position Lenin took on the progressive 
side effects of capitalism in his earlier work 'The Development of 
Capitalism in Russia' (1899) and it is on this text that Warren bases 
his own argument. In addition to his critique of dependency and
underdevelopment theory and the arguing of his own view from classic 
Marxist texts, Warren supports his argument with empirical data and
evidence from a selection of different Third World nations.
The value of Warren's argument lies in that it takes into account and 
does not simply attempt to explain away as dependency theory did, the 
existence of substantial industrialisation in certain Third World 
countries and the fact that this industrialisation has had certain 
developmental benefits for the population. It also recognises that 
capitalism as a mode of production is an extremely efficient mode in 
terms of increasing the absolute volume of production and its rate of 
turnover.
Not surprisingly these arguments have attracted a lot of criticism of 
their own. Broadly this suggests that Warren is advancing an 
apologist's argument in support of capitalism which differs little from 
the traditional growth oriented and 'trickle-down' ideas of orthodox 
development theory. The debate focuses perhaps most clearly around the
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issue of the definition of efficiency. Warren's critics would argue 
that the efficiency of capitalism as a mode of production that he 
refers to, is founded on its exploitative effects and moreover is only 
efficient in so far as production itself is concerned but is extremely 
inefficient in the basic inequalities it introduces into distribution 
and consumption. While they would agree that in the Third World the 
advent of external capitalism under the influence of imperialism has 
certainly improved the standard of living of a few people, they would 
also maintain that this new prosperity is not widespread enough to 
constitute real development. Indeed certain studies even argue that 
capitalist relations of production are by no means necessarily more 
'efficient' even in pure production terms than traditional modes of 
production.
The debate is obviously open to impressionistic comments on both sides, 
but aside from this, while Warren's critics are correct to condemn any 
indiscriminate and blanket approval of capitalism, this is not a true 
representation of Warren's position. In effect he is not arguing that 
capitalist development is necessarily the best or the only path to
development, rather his position is that the capitalist mode of 
production is one of the most . successful modes at reorganising 
production into an efficent system which is a necessary, but far from 
sufficient condition for development. In doing so it has also been 
remarkably successful at overriding and getting rid of other more 
traditional and less efficient modes of production which may have been 
impeding development. Warren also recognises the exploitative nature of 
capitalism and its tendency to concentrate rather than distribute 
equitably the fruits of development. At the same time he argues that it
is totally unrealistic to pretend that capitalist development has had
no positive developmental effects felt by a larger population than the 
few who benefit directly. Furthermore it is flying in the face of
readily available evidence to suggest that imperialism and capitalism 
have completely blocked the development of the Third World or the 
possibility of self sufficient" Third World industrialisation ever 
occurring. Finally, although Warren's vision of capitalism actually 
having some positive effect on Third World development may be
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interpreted as teleological, nowhere does Warren actually maintain that 
going through a capitalist mode of production stage is necessary for 
Third World development.
For the purposes of a study such as this one which is concerned with a 
Third World country with a fairly high level of industrialisation, 
Warren's contribution is particularly valuable because it puts forward 
a much less intransigent view of Third World industry than 
underdevelopment theory allowed for. in particular it recognises that 
this industry may be indigenous, not necessarily dependent on external 
capitalism and even as it develops may decrease the nation's general 
dependence on external capitalism. Finally it accepts the possibility 
that capitalist industry may, in spite of its exploitative nature and 
tendency to centralise profits, also have certain progressive 
developmental side effects.
One other point that Warren did emphasise, was the effect that the 
growth of capitalism in the Third World had on pre-existing modes of 
production. Their destruction by the capitalist mode of production was, 
he felt, a progressive step, as such modes of production tended to hold 
back the growth of production which is one important ingredient of 
development. Although Warren did not go into this question of the 
relationship between the capitalist mode of production and other 
pre-capitalist modes in any great length, it is one about which there 
has been considerable debate in Marxist circles. As this issue relates 
directly to the subject in hand, namely the development of capitalist 
industry in areas where it has hitherto not existed and pre-capitalist 
modes of production may be found, it is necessary to consider this work 
in some detail.
Discussion of the concept of the articulation of,modes of production is 
not new. In reality it goes right back to classical Marxist texts, but 
theoretical debate on the topic started really attracting attention in 
the 1960s (Wolpe 1980; pp.3-5). Authors writing on modes of production 
(cf. Wolpe, 1980; Hindess & Hirst, 1975 & 1977; Taylor, 1979) explain 
the nature of Third World economies in terms of the coexistence of
39
several different modes of production in the same social formation and 
of the ways they interrelate .
In a Third World social formation there are, it is argued, typically 
several modes of production coexisting in a particular articulation at 
any one time. Among them it is usual to find a possibly small but 
growing and frequently dominant capitalist mode of production and also 
one or more pre-capitalist modes (e.g. a feudal mode). Although the 
capitalist mode will usually be externally introduced by imperialism, 
it tends to become dominant because of its superior organisation and 
ability to accumulate in comparison with pre-capitalist modes. As the 
capitalist mode spreads through the social formation, it comes into 
contact with the pre-capitalist modes and in doing so can use certain 
of their characteristics to its advantage, even to the extent of 
producing surplus faster than it might otherwise do. Thus it will 
exploit such characteristics of the pre-capitalist modes as the cheaper 
labour, longer working hours, piece work, work carried out in homes and 
the absence of a properly formed proletarian class and trade unions to 
make higher levels of profits and accumulate surplus faster.
Ultimately, however, the organisation of the capitalist mode of 
production will create a proletarian class and encourage organised 
trade union activity. As capitalist relations of production become 
stronger they will tend to erode the other pre-capitalist forms of 
organisation and in due course the capitalist mode of production is 
likely to replace the pre-capitalist modes, though how this will occur, 
how long it will take and even if it will take place at all remains a 
function of particular conditions.
Despite the fact that this model would appear to provide a fairly 
straightforward and flexible model with which to analyse Third World 
social formations, it still contains areas which are poorly 
conceptualised and open to debate. In his editor's introduction to a 
book of essays on the subject, Wolpe (1980) points out that the actual 
definition of what constitutes a mode of production is one such area, 
while a second and related area is the conceptualisation of how the
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different modes interrelate and come to replace each other. Wolpe 
(1980, p.7) suggests that there are two different types of definition
for the concept of mode of production which are commonly used: a
restricted and an extended definition. Authors who use the restricted 
definition feel that a mode of production is adequately defined by 
specifying the relations and the forces of production. While those
adhering to the extended definition also feel the need to include the
mechanisms by which the mode of production reproduces itself^.
This is not the place to discuss the theoretical problems involved in 
defining the concept of mode of production in a restricted or extended 
form. It is sufficient for our purposes to note that some mechanism for 
the reproduction and transformation of modes must exist whether it is 
included theoretically in the concept or not. Of more importance to 
note here is that the existence of a mode of production in an area 
establishes certain norms in production organisation, for instance
levels of wages, length of working hours, forms of ownership of tools
and materials, which will not be entirely the same as another mode of 
production would use. Thus in an area with an established mode of
production, a new incoming mode which is initially used by only a few 
entrepreneurs, may adapt itself, at least at first, to certain existing 
established norms. This may or may not work out to the advantage of 
these new entrepreneurs: for instance wages may be lower than they
might be prepared to pay, but at the same time levels of skills or 
labour productivity might also be inadequate. Exploring this type of 
relationship is obviously crucial in a study concerned with the
location of capitalist industry in new areas in Third World countries 
where various modes of production as well as the capitalist mode may be 
in existence. Naturally a more fully developed theoretical framework 
than exists at present in modes of production theory would be helpful, 
but its absence need not prevent us from carrying out the study using a 
basic modes of production framework and identifying various phenomena 
and relationships which further elaboration of the theory should 
attempt to cover.
In general terms the major advantage of modes of production theory in
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comparison with both orthodox development theory and dependency and 
related underdevelopment theory is its flexibility and the way that it 
avoids the generalised statements and simplifications of both. Thus it 
does not suggest a dualist image of Third World economies where there 
is no relationship between the modern capitalist sector and a 
traditional 'informal' sector, but recognises explicitly that different 
sectors in the economy may exist (indeed there may be more than just 
two), that they interrelate and use each other in different ways and it 
defines these sectors more rigorously using the framework provided by 
the theoretical concept of mode of production. In doing so it also 
avoids the error made by some dependency theorists, notably Frank 
(1967; & cf. debate with Laclau, 1971), who argued that' once capitalism 
reached a particular nation it would virtually immediately penetrate 
all production and exchange relations and no other mode of production 
could coexist alongside it. Finally modes of production theory avoids 
the other more general tendency of, dependency theory to assume that the 
capitalist mode of production cannot develop in the Third World as it 
did in the West and permits the conceptualisation of the capitalist 
mode developing or not as the case may be and in doing so exploiting 
and possibly destroying the other modes of production it comes into 
contact with.
At this stage in the argument it is necessary to return to the central 
concern of industrial location policy and examine the various 
implications of the theoretical propositions just discussed for it in 
general, and growth pole theory and policy in particular.
4 * The Critique of Development Theory & its Implications for 
Industrial Location Theory & Policy
At an earlier stage (cf. p.34) it was noted that the basic concepts of 
growth pole theory were rooted in orthodox development theory. Now, 
having looked at various other development theories critical of the 
orthodox position, it is necessary to reassess the value of growth pole 
theory and at the same time consider the implications this critique has 
for industrial location theory and policy in general.
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As pointed out above (cf. p.35) dependency theory is very critical of 
Third World capitalist industry in general, though not, it should be 
stressed, of industry per se, because of its links with foreign 
capitalism. Relating such a position to growth poles in fact suggests a 
complete reversal of perceptions of the role of growth poles. While 
orthodox development theory saw growth poles as centres of development 
with which to initiate the development of backward regions, dependency 
theory would suggest a view of them as centres of exploitation, through 
which surplus from their rural hinterland would be creamed off for the 
ultimate benefit of external capitalism. They would thus compound the 
underdevelopment of the backward regions they were located in rather 
than encourage their development.
However, while such a view is an improvement on the orthodox view in 
that it suggests that an industrial growth pole could have a negative 
effect on the development of a backward region, it remains equally 
crude in its level of analysis. Modes of production theory, on the 
other hand, does appear to suggest a third and more sophisticated basis 
for analysing the role of growth poles in regional development.
Providing one makes the two fairly easy assumptions that the firms in a 
growth pole are likely to be capitalist industrial concerns and that in 
a Third World backward region one can expect to find various 
pre-capitalist modes of production (and possibly even a capitalist mode 
as well), then the establishment of growth poles in underdeveloped 
regions can be understood as the organised penetration of capitalism 
into an area in which it previously hardly existed. Such an 
understanding begs questions about the relationship between industrial 
capital and the state, as growth poles are by and large promoted by 
state regional planning agencies and not private capital. Moreover it 
suggests that the effects of a growth pole on wider regional 
development might benefit from an analysis of the various modes of 
production existing in the region around the growth pole and the way 
they interacted. Finally, in terms of general industrial location 
theory, it suggests that the advantages to be gained from the 
interaction with pre-capitalist modes of production may encourage
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capitalist firms to choose locations in areas not dominated by the 
capitalist mode of production. At an earlier point (cf. p.27) it was 
observed that while Massey's work on industrial location theory was 
extremely useful this was one area she neglected. In a Third World 
context, where pre-capitalist modes of production are very likely to 
exist in underdeveloped regions, the relationship between them and the 
incoming capitalist mode of production should certainly be considered.
One of the major failings of orthodox development theory and growth 
pole theory was that, though they posited the existence of multiplier 
effects, they failed to advance an adequate analysis of their
operation. Yet the critique of orthodox development theory neither 
disproves the existence of these multiplier effects nor does it provide 
a better understanding of them. All that the modes of production
analysis does is suggest a more rigorous framework within which
multiplier effects might operate in a Third World context, or in other 
words a certain rationale which may go some what further in explaining 
their operation, though it is not a full explanation.
5. The State & Regional Planning
One of the fundamental characteristics of industrial location policy is 
that it involves some form of relationship between the state 
formulating the policy and the industrial capital it is seeking to
regulate with the policy. The importance of understanding the nature of 
this relationship properly was brought out in the preceding section,
when it was suggested that a growth pole policy could usefully be
visualised as a concerted state directed attempt to encourage the
development of a capitalist mode of production in remote rural areas 
where it has hitherto hardly existed. It was also suggested that given 
particular circumstances, it might indeed benefit industrial 
capitalists to locate new factories in such areas. Such views would 
seem to imply that the state generally acts in the interests of
industrial capital. Patently, however, the relationship must be more 
complex. In formulating its industrial policy,- the state will also be 
responding to a number of.other demands and among them probably those
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for investment and employment opportunities of the inhabitants of the 
remote rural regions in question.
In a social formation dominated by a capitalist mode of production it 
would seem inevitable that the capitalist class, had most influence 
over the State's activities. However, there is considerable debate 
about just how closely the activities of the state match the 
requirements of capital. This debate has become somewhat polarised 
around two opposing positions (Holloway & Ficciotto, 1978). These 
maintain on the one hand that' the actions of the state flow directly 
from the requirements of capital, with political activity by other 
groups having little influence’and on the other hand that the state is 
relatively autonomous from capital and directed purely by political 
considerations. Both interpretations are however, really 
oversimplifications of what in effect usually occurs and they would 
easily fall foul of empirical case studies. Holloway & Ficciotto (1979 
p.1-31) themselves, while agreeing that both economic and political 
factors influence the state, go further (ibid, p.3) by suggesting that 
political influences also have their roots in the nature and problems 
of capitalist accumulation. Thus the political can be motivated by the 
economic. Indeed the whole Marxist notion of class is based on the view 
that the most important factor behind the interests and political 
activity of different groups in society is their economic 
circumstances. The members of each class thus have a shared or common 
relationship with the process of production.
This carries the discussion t.o another major area of debate: the
homogeneity of class and particularly the homogeneity of capital. While 
certain theorists would argue the existence of different fractions of 
capital, others and notably Clarke (1978), maintain that such a 
position denies the existence of class and class interests based on 
economic interests. That is a person or group's position with respect 
to the process of production determines their prime political interest. 
Accepting such a premise, does noty/ however, prevent one recognising 
that political activity is also conditioned by strategic and individual 
concerns. Thus in different economic, political and historic
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circumstances the same class can be expected to adopt different
political methods and practices. Equally, within a class, its members' 
perception of these circumstances will not always be identical and thus 
they may disagree over the political action to be taken and indeed
adopt different approaches.
In effect then, one may define a position which accepts the principle 
that classes are constituted on the basis of economic interests,
without denying that the state may be subjected to political pressures 
from the members of the same class which are not always entirely
consistent with each other.
Returning to the actual position of the state, its role is to maintain
and improve the conditions for production and the continued existence
of the social formation that supports it. While the parameters of this 
task will be those put forward by the dominant and most influential or 
powerful class in the social formation, it must also seek to acconj&date 
the interests of other classes so they do not disrupt production. The
degree to which the state has to acknowledge and act upon different
political demands will be a measure of the strength of the class making 
them. The way the state responds' to these demands will, however, always 
be premised on the need to maintain the conditions of production and 
reproduction.
In his work on modes of production theory, Taylor (1979, p.216) has 
suggested that in Third World social formation characterised by the 
coexistence of several modes of production, the state may take on 
specific or special forms of organisation. This is especially true 
during transition periods in conjunction with the emergence of 
particular forms of class structure. These different forms of the state 
will be "governed both by the changing requirements of industrial 
capitalist production on a world scale, and by the continuing 
reproduction of elements of the non-capitalist mode of production".
In essence then, the form of the state will change so that it remains 
appropriate to the needs of the existing articulation of modes of
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production. Although its principal role will remain the need to ensure 
the conditions of production and reproduction of the dominant mode, 
depending on the importance and strength of other modes in the social 
formation, it may also find itself obliged to cater for their 
requirements. Thus the activities of the state may easily appear, and 
indeed be, inconsistent and contradictory as it tries to cater for the 
requirements of different modes of production.
Finally, depending on the strength and the extent of the dominant mode 
in a social formation and the degree to which its requirements govern 
the activities of the state, it is possible that it uses the state to 
extend its domination over other modes. Indeed Munck (1979) goes as far 
as to suggest that in this regard there is a fundamental difference 
between state intervention in imperialist nations and in dependent 
social formations. While in the former state intervention grew in 
response to a crisis in capitalism, in the latter it arose as a
precondition to the rise of monopoly capitalism. Though his conclusions 
are based on the Brazilian case they would appear to be fairly widely 
applicable.
In its role of ensuring the conditions for production and reproduction 
of a social formation, one of the important areas of state activity is 
the provision of an appropriate built environment. Urban and regional 
planning is an essential element of this role in that it involves the 
organisation and adaptation of the built environment in such a way as 
to increase the efficiency of economic activity. Defined in its
broadest terms, this state function comprises first the judicial role 
of establishing and maintaining the right to private property; secondly 
the regulatory and coordinating role of establishing the guidelines of 
development and the limits within which private property holders may 
use and modify their land; and thirdly the technical role of providing 
infrastructure. The essential aim is to create the most appropriate and 
ideal built environment at any one time (this being defined in terms of
the requirements of the social formation at that time), but as
instantaneous change is impossible the process remains a constant and 
dynamic process of continuous adaption of an existing built environment
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to suit new requirements. Thus it is never ideal and will always retain 
outdated features built to cater for needs that no longer exist.
6* Summary of Theoretical Approach
To conclude this chapter it is perhaps useful to summarise briefly the 
main elements of a theoretical approach to this study which have been 
derived from the material discussed in the preceding pages.
The most basic position adopted is the decision to conceptualise Third 
World social formations as consisting of an articulation of different 
modes of production. In addition it is expected that these modes will 
probably include a capitalist mode as well as one or more 
non-capitalist modes and that it is likely that the capitalist mode 
will be, either already the dominant mode, or in the process of 
becoming dominant. Spatially this is expected to take the form of the 
capitalist mode being more dominant in cities and urban centres and 
less dominant in rural areas, particularly when these are more remote. 
Thus it is envisaged that typically the capitalist mode of production 
will be spatially extending its. area of dominance to include more and 
more of the rural territory of the social formation. It is not, 
however, intended to equate a capitalist mode of production with the 
existence of industrialisation, as capitalist farming can exist in 
rural areas just as much as non-capitalist modes can exist in 
industrial commodity production in urban areas. Nor is it taken for 
granted that the increasing domination of the capitalist mode of 
production will occur evenly, at the same speed everywhere nor indeed 
necessarily.
Regional planning has been defined as an element of the state role of 
providing the conditions for production and reproduction of the social 
formation in question. Industrial location policies should be viewed as 
one of the ways in which the state performs this function. As the 
activities of the state are governed by the requirements of the 
different modes of production and different classes within the social
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formation, to varying degrees, depending on the extent of their 
relative domination and power, it is possible to conceptualise an 
industrial dispersal programme as a state directed attempt to encourage 
the increasing domination and further spread of the capitalist mode of 
production to areas where it has hitherto hardly existed.
The thrust of this theoretical argument thus leads to the 
identification of various areas requiring analysis in a study of a 
particular industrial location policy in a specific social formation. 
Broadly it suggests the need to understand the influences on industrial 
location patterns and the possible motivations for industry to disperse 
spatially, as well as the need to understand the relationship that 
exists between the state and industrial capital.
In more detail it is proposed first to build up a picture of the 
industrial investment climate that exists in India; the various 
problems of accumulation; the possibilities and opportunities that 
exist to overcome these problems and whether the search for new 
industrial locations offers any solutions to the problems of 
accumulation as well as other additional advantages. Secondly, an 
attempt will be made to describe the relationship that exists between 
the Indian State and Indian industrial capital. While it is accepted 
that a precise characterisation of this relationship is impossible 
given its complexity and dynamic nature, it is hoped that a reasonably 
representative description can nevertheless be constructed.
In addition it will be necessary to examine the way the Indian state 
has performed its regional planning role, the type of built environment 
it has created and the changing locational opportunities this 
environment has afforded industrial capital. Thus while it is suggested 
that the industrial dispersal policy may be a response to a new desire 
of industrialists to locate in rural areas, it is also accepted that 
one of the reasons that they have not done so in any great numbers so 
far is because of the lack of infrastructural provision.
One of the central hypotheses of this thesis is then that the Indian
49
industrial dispersal programme of the 1970s was instituted, in part at 
least, as a response and to serve the requirements of Indian industrial 
capital. This in itself suggests a change in the industrialists' 
perception of what factory locations are possible and desirable, as up 
to the 1970s the trend had been one of increasing industrial 
concentration. It is also suggested, however, that such a change in 
perception will only occur gradually with particular industrialists 
experiencing the need and being able to consider such a new location 
perception sooner than others. Thus although our hypothesis posits the 
emergence of a change in industrial location trends, it is understood 
that only . the first signs of such a change may be identifiable at 
present and that many industrial capitalists may still not wish to 
conform to this new trend. Attitudes to the industrial dispersal policy 
will therefore not be the same among all industrialists, and isolating 
which industrialists have which attitudes should be particularly 
instructive.
Another major area of investigation of the study must be the effect 
that the Indian state's industrial dispersal policy can be expected to 
have. As the hypothesis presented in the preceeding paragraph 
challenges the accepted rationale of the location policy, it is 
necessary to attempt some form of evaluation of the validity of the 
developmental claims made for the policy.
The theoretical review carried out in this chapter has suggested that 
while a policy of promoting growth poles is a rational and even perhaps 
inevitable approach to encouraging industrial dispersal, the promoters 
should not be under any illusions as to the type of effect it may have 
on the development of rural areas around the poles chosen. Thus 
multiplier effects can be expected to occur in some form, but they may 
not occur where or when planners would wish. It is also pointed out 
that modern capitalist industry located in these growth poles may have 
negative effects on the local rural development, and it was suggested 
that it was useful to conceptualise these positive and negative 
multiplier effects within the framework provided by modes of production 
theory. Thus in studying the possible developmental effects of the
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industrial dispersal and growth pole policies an attempt will be made 
to characterise any links between the incoming industry and local 
economic activity in terms of modes of production theory.
Footnotes:
1. Hamilton (1978 p.6) refers to Launhardt (1882), Chisholm (1910 & 14) 
Palander (1935) as Weberians and as neo-Weberians: Hoover (1948), 
Greenhut (1952 & 56) and Isard (1956).
2. For a definition of the terms 'forces and relations of production' 
see Hindess & Hirst (1975 pp.9-11), but essentially the 'relations 
of production' refer to the way in which the means of production are 
socially distributed and the way in which surplus is appropriated 
and who by, while the 'forces of production' refer to the elements 
of the production process itself, i.e. materials, tools and labour, 
and the way they are organised in the production process.
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THE EVOLUTION OF INDIAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT & INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
POLICY
When the British left India in 1947 they left behind them no system of 
regional planning. The country was, however, very unevenly developed as 
well as underdeveloped. What little manufacturing industry did exist 
was largely located in the major cities and colonial ports. Infra­
structural facilities such as the extensive railway network or certain 
major irrigation projects that the British had built were probably 
their most useful inheritance in terms of resources for regional 
development.
The Indian National Congress and in particular its leader Jawaharlal 
Nehru, had been committed to the idea of a national development 
programme, formulated and run by the central government, since well 
before Independence. In 1938 it had set up a National Planning 
Committee and within three years of Independence the new national 
government appointed the Planning Commission chaired by Nehru as Prime 
Minister. Nehru's ideas on planning were derived from the West and 
especially from the Russian experience of five year national plans and 
these models strongly influenced the programme of successive Five Year 
Plans that the Planning Commission was to formulate over the next 30 
years.
Given the circumstances of the nation in 1947 and its tremendous 
economic -development problems it is understandable that the Planning 
Commission, initially at least, saw their role as formulating sectoral 
economic development plans rather than more spatially oriented regional 
development plans. Moreover at that time even in the industrialised 
nations of the West regional planning was still in its infancy. In 
Britain for instance, a country which was a pioneer in urban and 
regional planning and which could be expected to influence Indian 
planners, regional development planning was still relatively new in the 
1940s with its formal basis in the Barlow Report (1940) and the 
Distribution of Industry Act of 1945, although a number of regional 
plans had already been prepared in the inter-War years.
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Once established the Planning Commission and the Five Year Plan 
programme became the primary planning system in the country covering, 
as it did, virtually all aspects of national development. It is thus 
not surprising to find that regional development and industrial 
location policies have evolved out of this system and that the early 
references to and formulations of regional planning have all been 
contained in the Five Year Plans and other Plan documents prepared by 
the Planning Commission.
1• Regional Planning in the Five Year Plans
Despite this general eclipsing of regional planning by economic 
development planning the need for some form of differential treatment 
for different geographical areas of the country was already recognised 
in the First Five Year Plan (1951-56). There it was stated that:
"...if industrial development of the country is to proceed rapidly and 
in a balanced manner, greater attention will have to be paid to the 
development of these States and regions which have so far remained 
backward." (quoted in Menon, 1979, p.63-4)
But the Plan went no further than recognising the desirability and 
potential of the development of backward areas and suggesting that they 
should be given increasing preference as choices for the location of 
new industry. At the same time it noted the isolation of many of these 
areas and the difficulties many firms would have in locating in them. 
On the other hand, most of the industrial development that the First 
Plan provided for, concerned not the creation of new industry which 
would have given some potential for chobsing new locations in backward 
areas, but the expansion of existing industry in established locations. 
Moreover industrial development was not a priority of the First Plan 
and most of the planned investment in the sector was expected to come 
from private rather than public sources. Instead the Plan concentrated 
on first the development of agriculture, with nationwide policies not 
systematically adapted for the different problems of different regions 
and second, on the renovation and development of infrastructure,
54
particularly irrigation, rural electrification and railways. However, 
in connection with the latter the Government did establish the first of 
a long series of large scale, public sector, industrial plants: the
Chittaranjan Locomotive Works outside Calcutta and the Integral Coach 
Factory near Madras. It is in the siting of these that the first signs 
of an Indian industrial location policy are to be found. Thus the first 
of these two factories is some 200 kilometres North West of Calcutta up 
the Damodar River thereby representing a real dispersal of industry, 
but the latter is in Padi on the outskirts of Madras and therefore 
merely started what has now become an industrial suburb of an already 
existing industrial centre.
The Second Five Year Plan (1956-61) is an extremely important policy 
document in terms of industrial development in India. Following closely 
the Russian Five Year Plan model, on which its planning philosophy was 
based, it placed a strong emphasis on large scale industrial expansion. 
In essence it aimed to provide India with a solid industrial base in 
heavy and basic industry, iron and steel, heavy mechanical and 
electrical engineering, cement, fertilisers as well as mining and 
hydroelecftricity. A key element of this expansion, was that this basic 
industrial structure should be established and controlled by the nation 
and it opened the way to a massive expansion of public sector industry. 
It was at this time for instance, that India's three major iron and 
steel plants at Rourkela, Bhilai and Durgapur were initiated.
However, even though these were public sector projects and their 
location was controlled directly by the Central Government, decisions 
on their siting were largely related to supplies of raw materials, 
particularly coal, rather than integrated into any coherent regional 
development policy. Admittedly it was argued more or less as an after­
thought that these plants would act as growth points in the areas they 
were located in and they were, by and large, located in areas with 
hitherto little industry (though several of them were located together 
in the Damodar Valley), but in effect the Second Plan did little more 
than its predecessor for regional development and planning. It took 
note of the existing inequalities and commented that they should be
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reduced so as not to endanger the general economic development progress 
of the nation, but it proposed no policies or measures to be taken 
(Godbole, 1978 p.64; Menon, 1979, pp.85-6). Moreover, with its stress 
on rapid industrialisation which effectively meant encouraging industry 
where it would grow fastest, the Second Plan increased rather than 
decreased the variation in levels of industrial development in 
different regions of the country.
The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 which forms an Annexure to the 
Second Plan spelt out the basic .guidelines for Indian industrial 
development policy for the next two decades until another Resolution 
was passed by the Lok Sabha in 1977.' This first Resolution (1956) also 
considered regional policy mininally. Referring in particular to small 
scale industries it did, however, state at one point (p.47) that:
"Some of the problems that unplanned urbanisation tends to create will 
be avoided by the establishment of small centres of industrial
production all over the country".
This statement instigated the establishment of a whole series of 
'Industrial Estates' for small scale industries (defined as firms with 
less than Rs.1 million fixed capital) in small towns and rural areas 
all over the country. However, as R.L. Sanghvi (1979) concludes from an 
extensive study of these Estates, they have by and large only been
successful in encouraging industrial growth when located in or near 
existing towns. Thus these industrial Estates did not encourage any
substantial dispersal of industry as (a) they were dealing only with 
small scale firms and (b) they were not getting them to operate in 
places where they would not normally have gone; moreover they were not 
part of any multisectoral and integrated regional planning programme.
The 1956 Resolution also suggested that disparities in regional 
development could be reduced by the public provision of infrastructure 
to improve access to underdeveloped areas so that "industrialisation 
may benefit the country as a whole". Finally the document forms the
basis of the Central Government system of industrial licensing which
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effectively provided the administrative means by which the location of 
large scale industry was later to be fairly strictly controlled. But it 
was not for another 15 years that the licensing system was. to be used 
in this way, and initially the licences issued only gave the State for 
which they were valid and no more specific location. Nor was there any 
attempt made to get firms to locate in a different State from the one 
they had entered on their licence application. Instead the major aim of 
the licensing system at this stage was to control what sectors of 
industry produced which goods. It thereby introduced a public sector 
monopoly in certain lines of production, reserved a list of about 180 
products for exclusive production by small scale industry and subjected 
the rest to government regulation.
The operation of the Second Plan had demonstrated that a slow rate of 
growth in agriculture dragged heavily on the overall progress of 
economic growth in spite of the important advances made in industrial 
development. The Third Five Year Plan (1961-66) therefore, saw a change 
of emphasis with agricultural development being given a higher 
priority. At the same time, however, the Planning Commission did not 
wish to neglect industry and therefore continued to invest in 
industrial development and particularly basic industries which they 
still maintained were "fundamental to rapid economic growth" (Third 
Five Year Plan, 1961 p.50).
At first sight it would seem that the Third Plan also represented an 
important advance for regional planning in that for the first time it 
contained a separate chapter (IX) on 'Balanced Regional Development'. 
This spelt out a new line in the Planning Commission's development 
philosophy and stressed that the balanced development of different 
parts of the country was one of its planning aims. However, although 
this represented a certain advance in the Commission's view of the 
subject of regional development, in that it now considered it as 
deserving of formal attention, it did not represent any new departure 
in policy terms. The Plan discussed the concept of a large scale 
industrial plants, especially a basic or heavy industry plant, acting 
as a "spearhead of intensive and broad based development" in remote
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areas. While it went on to recognise that there was no direct 
correlation between the existence of such a plant and the raising of 
the standard of living of the population in the area, it still 
concluded that such projects generally do have some developmental 
effect anyway and that it was therefore worthwhile dispersing them to 
backward areas. But then the Plan pointed out that it is not always 
economically and technically feasible to take such a step and argued 
the crucial point that care must be taken so that overall economic
growth did not suffer as a result of locating industries in backward 
areas. Thus while 'balanced regional development' was important it 
should not cost the nation anything.
Ultimately then the Third Plan suggested no new policies different from 
those contained in its predecessors. The position remained that the
Central Government would continue to locate large scale public 
enterprises in backward areas if feasible and it would suggest that
private firms did likewise. The Government would also continue to make 
backward areas more attractive for industrialists by improving the 
infrastructure, though not in any systematic or carefully planned way, 
and it would continue to offer the one or two minor incentives
established under the Second Plan such as maintaining a uniform price 
for steel at all railheads throughout the country.
The general regional development planning philosophy of the Third Plan 
thus adhered closely to the emerging growth pole theory view. Balanced 
regional development could best be achieved by locating points of 
industrial development in underdeveloped areas. These would then cause 
ripples of development to radiate out around them, a process which 
would occur 'naturally' once the initial impetus was provided. It was 
easiest to provide this initial impetus with public sector plants as, 
although private industry would also be welcome in backward areas, 
there was a grave danger in forcing it to choose such a difficult 
location as any firm which did not survive would represent a set-back 
to overall industrial growth and the nation's economic development. 
Overall growth was still seen as more important than regionally 
distributed development and it was expected that the latter could be
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achieved without any cost to the former. In other words although the 
goal of balanced regional development was seen as desirable, regional 
planning was deemed unnecessary. As Misra, Sundaram & Prakasa Rao 
(1974, p.108) comment there was no recognition that regional planning 
might itself be a tool to encourage national economic development and 
the whole approach to development planning was economic and normative. 
However, the political significance of interregional equity was 
beginning to be appreciated. Moreover, the first signs of a realisation 
that an integrated regional planning system, which catered for the 
differential needs of different regions within an overall framework, 
was necessary and could contribute to national development were there, 
even though they were not seriously acted upon.
Following the Third Plan there was a period of three years, often 
referred to as the 'Plan Holiday', when no Five Year Plans were in 
force. Instead they were replaced by a series of one year plans. After 
this break the pattern of Five Year Plans was resumed, in theory at 
least, with the Fourth Plan covering the period 1969-74, but both this 
Plan and its follower, the Fifth, were never systematically implemented 
and indeed both were cancelled half way through their course. In effect 
this 'Holiday' marks the beginning of a decline in the importance of 
the Five Year Plan system in the' regulation of the economic development 
of the nation; a decline which some authors have argued is largely to 
be blamed for the lower growth rates that India has experienced since 
1965 particularly in industrial production (Shetty, 1978).
The Fourth Plan does, however, take a more committed stance towards 
regional development than the Third, stating at one point: "Even from a 
narrow and immediate economic viewpoint, society stands to gain by 
dispersed development" (p.303, 1970) or again, and more particularly
with regard to the role of the state: "It is through a continuing
programme of economic development supported by measures to attract 
industries to backward regions that the present imbalance can be 
rectified over a period of time" (p.310). The Plan was in fact 
redrafted twice and between the second draft and the final version two 
governmental Working Groups which had been examining the issues
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involved in backward area development published their final reports. 
Thus while the first draft of the Fourth Plan (1966) contains virtually 
no mention of regional development planning, the second (1969) refers 
to the work of the two Working Groups with the first real indications 
of an emerging regional development policy, and the final Plan endorses 
some of the Groups' recommendations:
"It has been decided that financial and credit institutions should 
provide certain general concessions for financing industries in all 
backward areas in the States and Union Territories. In addition, it has 
been decided that the Central Government would subsidise the 
establishment of industrial units in the backward areas to the extent 
of 1/10 of the total capital cost for projects up to Rs.50 lakhs (5 
million) both in the private and public sectors. In the case of 
projects involving larger capital outlay, the grant of subsidy would be 
considered on merits." (1970, p.310)
The Plan also announced that the Planning Commission was in the process 
of identifying the backward areas in consultation with the State 
Governments and it stressed that the latter would have an important 
role to play in providing infrastructure for industry in these areas 
once designated (p.311).
The reports of two Working Groups, known as the 'Pande' and 'Wanchoo' 
commissions (respectively the Working Group for the Identification of 
Backward Areas and the Working Group to Recommend Fiscal & Financial 
Incentives for Starting Industries in Backward Areas), are crucial in 
that they provide the basis of current Indian regional planning and 
more specifically industrial' location policies, even though their 
recommendations were not implemented in full. We shall return to 
consider them more fully after briefly completing our review of the 
Five Year Plans.
The Draft Fifth Plan (1974-79) maintained the same policies as had been 
introduced in the Fourth Plan. However, it also commented on the high 
marginal costs of providing industrial infrastructure in congested
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cities and suggested that dispersing industries spatially would 
conserve both financial and physical resources. It stressed once again 
the need to provide adequate infrastructure and remove any obstacles to 
the development of backward areas. Moreover, it emphasised the need for 
a multi-sectoral approach to backward area development with agriculture 
as well as industry being encouraged. Finally it proposed to create the 
necessary machinery to carry out techno-economic surveys and 
feasibility studies of backward areas in order to identify appropriate 
industries for development and it recommended that the State industrial 
promotion agencies should provide an integrated package of facilities 
and infrastructure in selected growth centres in their backward areas.
With the Janata Government in power from 1977 to 1979 the Draft Sixth 
Plan, which came out in 1978, made a number of criticisms of the Fifth 
Plan approach to backward area development. It argued that hitherto the 
approach had been wide ranging and non selective and it suggested that 
large scale organised industry in backward areas was not having the 
desired developmental effect. It was too capital intensive, appeared to 
result in only limited spread effects and was creating a dualism in 
certain backward areas between confined modern industrial enclaves and 
rural backwardness surrounding them. At the same time it argued that 
industrial development did have a role to play in backward areas, but 
that it required a degree of selectivity and an approach more 
integrated with other aspects of development planning.
On paper the changed attitude to regional development planning that the 
Draft Fifth and Sixth Plans represent seems extremely promising. They 
would appear to demonstrate a much greater level of awareness about the 
complexities and value of a. well integrated regional development 
planning programme. They even indicate that the planners involved in 
their preparation had doubts about the effect of locating large scale, 
capital intensive, modern industrial plants indiscriminately in 
backward areas, something which in effect had been the key element of 
the Government approach to industrial location prior to that. Moreover 
they recognised that regional planning was not merely industrial 
dispersal, but had to involve agricultural development, as well a$
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coordination between the two. However, with the decline in the 
importance of the Five Year Plan system in providing a central guiding 
force to the Indian development effort, which meant that the Fifth Plan 
was never more than a Draft Plan, and the Draft Sixth Plan was scrapped 
as soon as Mrs Gandhi returned to power in 1980, the Five Year Plans 
are no longer as important a statement of the policies actually being 
implemented by the Indian Government.
2. The Identification of Backward Areas
Apart from continued references to the need for 'balanced regional 
development' in successive Five Year Plans from the early 1950s on, the 
Indian Government took no concrete action to further this proposal 
until 1968 when it appointed two Working Groups to examine policy 
alternatives for backward area development. They both reported a year 
later in 1969 just as the Fourth Plan came out and thus though their
proposals were not included in the first 2 drafts of the Fourth Plan
they were referred to in the Final Plan document.
The first Working Group on the 'Identification of Backward Areas' 
(Pande Commission) had the job of analysing and proposing a possible 
set of criteria which could be used to select the areas throughout the 
country which deserved special attention and developmental action. From 
the start the terms of reference of the Working Group, specified that 
they were looking for criteria to identify industrially backward areas 
(Menon, 1979, p.43; Godbole, 1978, p.65). There is thus little doubt 
that the Indian Government still at this stage saw 'development' in 
terms of 'industrialisation'.
In the event the Pande Working Group recommended the following 6 
criteria should be used throughout the country for identifying
industrially backward States and Union Territories: (a) total per
capita income; (b) per capita income from industry and mining; (c)
number of workers in registered factories; (d) per capita annual 
consumption of electricity; (e) length of surfaced roads in relation to 
population and the area of the State; and (f) railway mileage in
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relation to the population and the area of the State. The criteria 
chosen were thus a set of fairly crude indicators of the aggregate 
level of development of the States. No attention was paid to the level 
of agricultural development, other than through its contribution to the 
overall per capita income. Moreover no attention was paid to variations 
in levels of development inside the State or to variations in the 
levels of income of the State's inhabitants. Thus for instance there 
was no indicator showing the proportion of the State's inhabitants with 
a level of income below an 'acceptable1 minimum which would have given 
a much better indication of levels of poverty instead of the average 
per capita income used^.
On the basis of these criteria the Working Group selected nine States 
(Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Jammu & Kashmir, Madyha Pradesh, 
Nagaland, Orissa, Rajasthan & Uttar Pradesh) as well as all the Union 
Territories apart from three (Chandigarh, Delhi & Pondicherry) as
industrially backward and therefore qualifying for special treatment to 
encourage industrialisation. Subsequently Meghalaya, Himachal Pradesh, 
Sikkim and Pondicherry were also included, after representation by
their local government bodies. These recommendations were all accepted
by the Union Government.
The Pande Commission went on, however,, to recommend that a series of 
about 20 to 30 districts throughout India should be considered for
special incentives during the Fourth Plan period. Their argument was 
that development efforts should initially be concentrated on a limited 
number of districts, so as to increase their impact. With time the 
availability of incentives could then be gradually increased to cover 
other backward districts.
These 20 to 30 backward districts were selected on the basis of rather 
different criteria from the States, First the Working Group recommended 
that the districts should be more than 50 miles from larger cities and 
large industrial projects. Secondly they wanted an indication of the 
level of poverty in the district and recommended that only districts 
with a per capita income of less than three quarters of the State's per
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capita income level should be chosen. Finally they suggested a complex 
measure of the utilisation of productive resources and employment 
opportunities in relation to the density of population, which included 
levels of employment in secondary and tertiary sectors and in the 
factory sector (levels of less than three quarters of the State average 
levels were taken to indicate backwardness), levels of utilisation of 
natural resources in the area, and adequate levels of avai^ili'ty and 
provision of electricity, water, transport and communication 
facilities.
While the Union Government accepted the Pande Commission's 
recommendations in respect of the identification of backward States 
they did not accept either the principle of choosing 20 to 30 
particularly backward districts and developing them first or the 
criteria by which they had been chosen. Instead the Planning Commission 
and the National Development Council evolved a set of criteria of their 
own and selected 246 districts spread throughout all the States, and 
not only in the most backward, as the backward districts where the 
special incentives would be available for industrial development. Their 
.criteria included measurements of both agricultural and industrial 
output, employment in all different sectors in relation to total 
population, consumption of electricity and lengths of surfaced roads 
and railways. Thus while the Planning Commission retained a measure of 
the relative importance of both agriculture and industry in these new 
criteria, it did not use any indicator to measure poverty levels. 
Ultimately then the criteria used for both the selection of backward 
States and those for backward districts were primarily concerned with 
the existing levels of industrialisation in the areas being considered. 
Although this is justifiable in terms of the original remit given to 
the Pande Working Group, there is no justification on the part of the 
Planning Commission as to why industrialisation was their primary 
concern. Moreover, as ultimately they chose to include at least one 
indicator of agricultural development in the criteria they adopted, it 
is not in the least clear what type of development they were interested 
in promoting in the backward areas. This is all the more confused as 
they chose to ignore the Working Group's recommendation that an
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indicator of poverty levels should be included.
It is also very unclear exactly how the backward districts selected 
were chosen as all the criteria the Planning Commission used are worded 
in relative terms and no indication of the precise break-off points 
below or above which areas were chosen or rejected, or of the weighting 
given to the different criteria, ever seems to have been published. This 
clearly leaves scope for possible bargaining between the State 
Government and the Union Government in the National Development Council 
(or outside it) about the number and size of the areas to be designated 
as backward.
The fact that the Planning Commission chose so many districts obviously 
diluted the programme and this could be construed as a result of 
pressure from particular States which did not want to be left out from 
a possible source of finance. Such a view would be further supported by 
the fact that the Planning Commission chose to apply its criteria on a 
State by State rather than a national basis, thus ensuring from the 
start that all States got a certain share of the cake.
One final criticism can be made of the fact' that the criteria included 
a measure of adequate levels of infrastructure. Even though it seems 
sensible to ensure that adequate infrastructure is available in an area 
before starting to encourage industrial development in it, this does 
suggest that the Planning Commission was more interested in identifying 
areas with potential for industrial development rather than in trying 
to develop the most disadvantaged areas. There is an obvious danger in 
this, of excluding really backward areas, particularly as no mention 
was ever made in connection with this programme of providing help for 
improving infrastructure in backward areas that lacked it. Obviously 
this criterion of adequate levels of infrastructure tended to benefit 
the more developed States in the country which could afford to, or had 
already improved the infrastructure of their more backward areas.
In his study of the backward area development programme . Menon (1979) 
makes many of the criticises of the identification procedure voiced 
above. He then goes on to analyse the effect of the procedure by
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looking at the areas selected as backward. He notes in particular that 
some of the most backward States have a lower proportion of their 
districts designated as officially backward then some of the more 
developed States. In addition some have a lower proportion of their 
population benefiting from the incentives (by virtue of living in 
backward areas) than some of the more developed States (p.51). He cites 
the case of West Bengal, the most industrialised State in the country, 
according to the Pande Working Group criteria, which has the highest 
percentage of districts declared as backward, while Bihar, which ranks 
tenth on the Pande criteria, has the lowest percentage^. Alternatively 
Tamil Nadu, the second most industrialised State, and Karnataka, the 
seventeenth, had a larger proportion of their population living in 
areas eligible for incentives than Orissa, Himachal Pradesh, Bihar, 
Assam, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (p.55).
The conclusion that all these points quite clearly suggest is that the 
identification procedure adopted by the Planning Commission and the 
NDC, far from being designed to help the most backward areas in the 
country, is distorted in favour of the more developed and 
industrialised States. It will therefore not come as a surprise that 
now, after the scheme has been operating for about a decade, it has 
become evident that most of the incentives and finance made available 
to private industry under the scheme have gone to firms locating in
backward areas in the most industrialised States and particularly 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal; a point discussed at 
greater length below (cf. Section 6).
3. Incentives for Backward Area Industry
For its part the Wanchoo Working Group on 'Fiscal and Financial
Incentives for Starting Industries in Backward Areas' recommended the 
use of six different incentives: (a) a higher development rebate; (b)
exemption from income tax and corporation tax for 5 years after the
development rebate; (c) exemption from import duties on plant,
machinery and components; (d) exemption from exise duty for 5 years; 
(e) exemption from sales tax on both raw materials and finished
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products for five years and (f) a transport subsidy ' for finished 
products manufactured in backward areas of outlying States (Assam, 
Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, NEFA and Andamans and 50% for goods from 
Jammu & Kashmir) transported over 400 miles to markets (mileage under 
400 miles receives no subsidy).
In the event the Central Government only accepted two of these 
recommended incentives: the income tax concession and the transport
subsidy. To these two it added several others of its own devising, of 
which the subsidy on fixed capital investment (known as the 'Central 
Subsidy') is the most important. In addition various schemes for 
concessional finance from development banks and public financial 
institutions were announced and the income tax concession and transport 
subsidy were somewhat reformulated. Confusingly while the concessional 
finance and the income tax concession applied to the notified backward 
districts discussed above and the transport subsidy applied to outlying 
States the Central Subsidy applied to a separate and fairly different 
list of backward districts and areas! The choice of areas where the 
Central Subsidy would be available was left up to the State Governments 
rather than the Central Government, but why this different procedure 
was adopted and why different lists of areas should be used is not made 
clear.
The Central Subsidy was originally announced as a 10% outright grant on 
fixed capital investment (land, buildings, plant arid machinery) in a 
new factory or in expansion of an existing factory with a ceiling of 
Rs.5 lakhs (0.5 Million) and applicable from the 26th of August, 1971. 
The scheme was revised in March 1973 to involve a 15% grant with a 
ceiling of Rs.1.5 million. Initially each of the States declared as 
backward was asked to select two districts or areas to be covered by 
the scheme and all other States one district or area. Subsequently in 
1972 this was increased to six and three district or areas 
respectively. The scheme is now applicable in 125 districts or areas 
throughout the country. Where the State Governments have.not specified 
complete districts as eligible they made up 'areas' consisting of 
several blocks and or taluks (tehsils).
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The Transport Subsidy Scheme which was notified on the 23rd July, 1971, 
consisted of a 50% subsidy on the transport of raw materials and 
finished products from factories in the selected areas to the nearest 
railhead or mainland port (Madras or Cochin as appropriate). Both new 
factories and existing factories involved in substantial expansion 
after the scheme was announced were eligible for the subsidy. The parts 
of the country it applied to were Jammu & Kashmir, Assam, Meghalaya, 
Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Sikkim, 
Himachal Pradesh, the Himalayan foothill districts of North West Uttar 
Pradesh and the islands of Andaman, Lakshadweep and Nicobar, although 
not all these areas were included straight away. However, in comparison 
with the Wanchoo suggestion of a subsidy on any transport over 400 
miles, this subsidy is considerably less substantial as most of the 
areas concerned are as much as 1,000 miles away from major urban 
markets for manufactured goods.
The Income Tax Rebate Scheme meant that 20% of the profits of 
industrial units and hotels which were located in backward areas and 
commenced operations after the 31st December, 1970, were exempt from 
income tax. The scheme came into operation in April 1974 and was 
applicable for the first 10 years of the firms' operations.
The concessional finance made available by the Central Government to 
new or substantial expansions' of existing industrial units in the 
notified backward areas are disbursed through various development banks 
and public financial institutions. These institutions operate in 
conjunction in a sort of pyramidal hierarchical structure with the 
Central institutions, such as the Industrial Development Bank of India, 
the Industrial Finance Corporation of India and the Industrial Credit 
and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. (IDBI, IFCI, ICICI), at the 
apex, underwriting the risks and refinancing the State level 
development banks and lending institutions in addition to offering 
their own loans to industrialists. All the institutions provide very 
similar facilities though some specialise in financing particular types 
of projects (eg. industrial modernisation) and they all use a common 
application procedure. Depending on the size and nature of the project
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to be financed several of them may club together to provide a 
particular package of finance but one of them will always be appointed 
to to oversee the package. Finance from these institutions is available 
to industrialists throughout India but the various loans and other 
services are all on considerably better terms when provided to a firm 
setting up a unit in a notified backward area. Thus rates of interest 
on loans are about 20% lower in backward areas (9.5% p. a. instead of 
11% p.a. for instance), repayment periods can be twice as long (15-20 
instead of 10-12 years) and the commission charged on their 
underwriting facility may be 50% lower (1.25% for shares, 0.75% for 
debentures instead of 2.5% and 1.5% respectively). In addition to lower 
interest rates, longer repayment periods and cheaper underwriting 
facilities, the banks offer an extended initial moratorium on the 
repayment of loans, participation in risk capital in certain cases, 
lower commitment charges, and lower rates for the industrialists 
contribution to project costs, as well as maintaining a fairly flexible 
attitude to other terms and conditions such as debt-equity ratios, 
margin requirements, etc,.
While the main emphasis of the Wanchoo Working Group's recommendations 
has been on fiscal incentives for backward area industrial development, 
the package finally offered by the Central Government consisted mostly 
of financial incentives, including both a fairly considerable outright 
grant and various loans on advantageous terms, though admittedly one 
fiscal incentive, the income tax concession, was carried through. The 
primary effect of such a switch in emphasis is that the Government is 
placing much more stress on helping industrialists get started on a new 
project rather than on encouraging continuous production. This emphasis 
would seem to work to the advantage of industrialists who have trouble 
in raising capital for new projects rather than those worried about the 
long term, continuous costs of operating in a remote location. 
Admittedly such costs should go down as a firm becomes established and 
also it is important that new projects should be encouraged, but it is 
possible that such a structure of incentives will tend to attract 
projects which are economically unsound in the longer term. The only 
longer term production— related incentive in the package is the income
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tax concession for 10 years.
It is also important to note at this juncture that nowhere in any of 
the conditions laid down about the eligibility of projects for the
incentives, does the Government make any attempt to regulate the type
of industry it is encouraging in backward areas. This implies an
assumption that all industry will be equally beneficial in development
terms for the backward areas concerned, or alternatively, it suggests 
that the primary interest of the Government remains the encouragement 
of the maximum absolute industrial growth possible.
4. State Government Industrial Promotion
The responsibility for the execution of the industrial dispersal and 
backward area development -policies lies with the State Governments. 
Most of these have created industrial promotion agencies to execute the 
policy and administer the various incentives. In addition many of them 
have created industrial finance corporations to act as local 
coordinators of the All-India industrial finance institutions. As well 
as administering the programme of incentives formulated by the Central 
Government, most of the States provide additional incentives for 
backward area industrial development. These usually include facilities 
such as land and infrastructure, often at concessional rates, and 
financial incentives such as loans, capital participation and 
frequently the refund of sales tax paid by the firm either as an 
outright grant or as a low-interest loan (Indian Investment Centre, 
1979).
Although there are differences in the incentives offered by the 
different States, they are broadly comparable and thus though there is 
a certain amount of competition between States to attract industry to 
their State in particular, this competition often turns on non-material 
considerations like the efficiency of the industrial promotion agencies 
rather than on the level of incentives they offer. Obviously, however, 
a . rich State with a lot of experience of industry like Maharashtra can 
usually offer a higher level of incentives as well as having an
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industrial promotion agency finely tuned to the needs of industry, 
while a poorer, more remote and underindustrialised State like Tripura, 
though it can offer the incentives provided by Central Government, can 
do little to supplement them. The package of incentives provided by the 
Central Government does nothing to correct such imbalances.
The incentive package offered by the State Governments typically 
contains financial incentives in the form of term loans and a sales tax 
loan or subsidy and infrastructural facilities such as developed land, 
factory buildings and services at cut rates. The conditions on term 
loans vary but they are usually available up to a maximum of Rs. 3 
million, repayable in about 10-years, though some States offer them up 
to 15 years, with a moratorium on repayments frequently set at 2 years 
and interest rates varying anywhere between about 7 and 15 % p. a. 
depending on the scale of the firm and whether the loan is being 
underwritten by the IDBI.
Exemption from sales tax was one of the original incentives suggested 
by the Wanchoo Working Group and which the Central Government decided 
not to offer. Many of the State Governments have however, taken up the 
suggestion though not usually in its original form. A smattering of 
States offer complete exemption from sales tax for a period of about 3 
to 5 years, others only do so to certain sizes of firms. Most however, 
offer an 'interest free sales tax loan' by which they mean that for the 
first few years the firm is in production, it is anually offered an 
interest free loan equivalent to the amount of sales tax it paid during 
the preceding year. Those loans are then repayable over anything up to 
20 years.
Just about all States offer a certain level of infrastructural 
facilities to industrialists in their backward areas. Typically this 
can include developed plots of land in industrial estates or complexes, 
factory buildings and sheds on hire purchase, long lease or outright 
sale terms at competitive and often subsidised rates. Water and 
electric power are also often provided at cheap rates for the first few 
years. The conditions for eligibility for such incentives vary
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enormously, though they are usually more favourable for small scale 
industry than large scale. Some States make them particularly 
favourable for people with technical expertise who want to set up their 
own business.
There are also various States which offer less common incentives such 
as their own capital subsidy on top of the Central Government one, or 
participation in a firms share capital, or grants and loans for 
technical feasibility studies, or technical assistance. Finally a good 
number of the State industrial promotion agencies try to sell 
themselves as efficient management consultancies. They undertake to 
provide a comprehensive back-,up service to a firm from the initial 
proposal stages till it is finally in full production: providing it
with a complete package of incentives, sorting out all licensing and 
other official details and negotiating a complete schedule of loans and 
grants from various public lending institutions. Given the complexity 
of the various licences and official sanctions required to set up a new 
factory, there is no doubt that such a comprehensive service is 
attractive, but equally there are few industrialists who would rely 
entirely on a single government agency to perform such a service 
properly and very few of the State industrial promotion agencies, if 
any, match up to their promises in this respect.
In view of the basic similarity of the incentive packages offered by
just about all the States and also given the complexity of the
variations in the terms and conditions each State places on their 
incentives, it would seem that there is little for the industrialist to 
choose between one State and the next. Indeed making such a choice on a 
strict cost-benefit basis would be an extremely intricate and involved 
exercise. This being the case it seems logical to presume that an 
industrialist faced with the situation of having to choose between 
States for a location for his new factory would be more influenced by 
the reputation for good incentives and an efficient promotion agency 
that the .States have, than by the actual level of the incentives. Once
again this would tend to act as a bias enabling those States which have
already got the most industry, to attract the most new industry to
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their backward areas.
5. National Impact of Backward Area Incentives Disbursed by Central 
Institutions
After a decade of operation of the Union Government's backward area 
industrial development scheme it is possible to arrive at some
assessment of its impact at least in terms of the incentives being
disbursed. Data are, however, only available for two of the incentive
schemes: the Central Subsidy and the concessional finance offered by
the IDBI and other industrial development banks. Unfortunately no data 
are available to the public on the operation of the income tax rebate 
scheme.
Table 1 gives the total funds disbursed by the IDBI to industry in each 
State annually from 1970. For each year both the total amount of
assistance disbursed and the amount disbursed to firms in backward 
areas is given. The same data have been arranged differently in Table 2
and 3 to make them more easily readable. The data are derived from the
IDBI's annual Operational Statistics. The percentages in Table 2 show 
for each year how much of the IDBI's assistance to industry in each
State went to firms in backward areas of the State. The States have
been grouped into the Advanced and Backward categories used by the 
Central Government (cf. p. 64*). In Table 3 the States have once again 
been arranged in this way; the figures for the annual distribution of 
assistance to firms in backward areas throughout the country are given, 
both in absolute amounts and in percentages of the total disbursed that 
year.
The first point that should be noted from Table 3 is the assistance 
disbursed to advanced States is always over half the total assistance 
disbursed nationally, except for the first year 1970-1. Moreover, and 
this is even more indicative of the overall way the policy is going, 
despite a few annual fluctuations the proportion of assistance 
disbursed to advanced States is actually increasing, with in 1977-78, 
63.5% of total disbursed nationally going to encourage industry in the
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backward areas of these already more Industrialised States!3 At a 
greater level of detail the four most industrialised States in the 
country, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat are 
frequently among the recipients which do best. In 2 years (1977-79) 
Gujarat in fact got over 25% of funds disbursed to backward areas. 
Karnataka, another advanced State, also does well fairly consistently. 
Whereas among all the other States and particularly the more backward 
there is only one Union Territory which over a number of years has got 
a high proportion, that is the tiny Goa, Daman & Diu (which for its 
size gets some extremely high levels of assistance) and three other 
States that have done well in a couple of years: Assam, Orissa and
Uttar Pradesh. At the other end of the scale, some of the most 
tinderindustrialised and poorest States such as Bihar, or some of the 
most remote such as Jammu & Kashmir or the north eastern States have 
received extremely low proportions of assistance.
Table 2 gives an indication of how the IDBIs overall assistance to all 
firms in each State is distributed within the States between backward 
and more advanced areas. As one would expect some of the most 
industrialised States such as Maharashtra have fairly low proportions 
of assistance received going to backward hreas in the State, although 
Gujarat, Punjab, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu all have average 
proportions as high as 30%. Such low proportions are understandable as 
these States have more restricted areas designated as backward than the 
other backward States do, but it also means that in these advanced 
States the IDBI is putting a lot of money (albeit at less advantageous 
rates to the firms concerned) into developing industry,in areas which 
are not backward. Among the backward States, Table 2 also points to a 
few, such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, where nearly 80% of the IDBI 
assistance is not going to backward areas and others like Assam and 
Meghalaya where most of it is, though the latter State in particular 
has received so little assistance (Table 1) in all that such a high 
proportion may result from only one or two projects. All those States 
or Union Territories which have 100% figures are of course States which 
are designated as entirely backward (at both levels of designation).
77
Finally it is worth noting from Table 2 that the total assistance 
disbursed by the IDBI to firms in backward areas as a proportion of its
total disbursement to industry, rose steadily from 17.3% in 1970-71 to
a peak of 51.7% in 1977-78 and dropped only slightly the following year 
to 50.8%.
The IDBI is by far the most important term-financing institution in 
India. Since its inception up to March 1979 it has disbursed 
Rs.19,724.6 million of assistance which constituted about 40% of the 
total assistance disbursed by all the term-financing institutions in 
India, both national and regional, up to the same date. In addition it 
disbursed a further Rs.6,059.7 million in refinance to back up the 
State level institutions (IDBI Annual Report, 1978-9, p.132). The two 
other national industrial financing institutions of any importance, the 
IFCI and the ICICI disbursed Rs.5,995.5 million and Rs.8,121.1 million 
respectively up to the same date. Their shares of the total disburse­
ment of assistance are therefore 12% and 16% respectively.
While unfortunately no reliable data on the regional distribution of 
the assistance from the IFCI and the ICICI, nor on the relative
proportion going to backward area industry each year, is readily
available, the figures in the last paragraph indicate that such data 
are not as essential a consideration as the IDBI data already discussed 
in this section. At the same time, however, it is possible to complete 
this rather scanty picture of the IFCI and the ICICI's operations with 
the information that in 1978-79 the IFCI assisted 94 firms in backward 
areas (out of a total of 214 firms assisted) with sanctioned funds up 
to Rs.664 million representing 43% of their total sanctioned assistance 
that year. Similarly the ICICI sanctioned Rs.638.3 million in 
assistance to firms in backward areas, which represented 34% of their 
total sanctioned assistance that same year. Thus as well as providing 
considerably less finance for industrial development than the IDBI, the 
IFCI and ICICI allocated proportionately much less to projects in 
backward areas (43% and 34% respectively, relative to the IDBI's 50.8% 
for 1978-79) (IDBI Annual Report, 1978-79. pp.127-8).
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Data on the granting of the Central Investment Subsidy is given in 
Table 4, and the number of firms which had received the Subsidy up to 
the 30th June 1978 in each district is shown on Figure 1 with the 
corresponding figures in Table 5. From these it was again evident that 
on average the more industrialised States are receiving higher levels 
of disbursement. Admittedly Bihar, a backward State, has the highest 
number of firms (1,525) which have received a Subsidy, but the amount 
disbursed to them is fairly small (Rs.13.2 million), while Gujarat with 
1054 recipient firms received Rs.71.3 million and Tamil Nadu with 921 
recipient firms received by far the highest level of disbursement at 
Rs.116.5 million.
Figure 1 shows both the districts where the Central Investment Subsidy 
is available in grey (In some of these grey districts the Subsidy is 
not available for the entire area of the District, thus in Madurai Dt. 
the area of the city of Madurai is not eligible.) and the number of 
subsidies disbursed up to 30th June 1978. One dot represents two
disbursed subsidies. The highest number of subsidies went to
Surendranagar District in Gujarat (557), Kerala also has two districts 
with a very high number of subsidies disbursed but Bihar has the 
highest number spread over 6 districts. Nagaland has two districts 
which have received a very high number of subsidies. However, as the 
list in Table 5 indicates only a very small amount of money has 
actually been disbursed to the State as a whole and no figures for 
disbursements to district level were available. Given this lack of 
information and the remoteness of the area it seems likely that these 
figures are not entirely representative.
One further point that should be noted from Figure 1 is the extent of
the eligible areas in each State. The grey areas on the map are not
entirely correct as in some districts only part of the district is 
eligible for the subsidy (cf. note previous para.), but it is evident 
that the areas designated vary a lot in size and remoteness from State 
to State. Thus a State like Uttar Pradesh where districts are very 
small entities gets a much smaller eligible area than Andhra Pradesh 
for instance. Among the more industrialised States, Tamil Nadu appears
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FIGURE 1: No. OF 'CENTRAL SUBSIDIES' DISBURSED TO FIRMS IN EACH DISTRICT UP TO JUNE 1980
557 Firms 
381 Firms 
359 Firms 
348 Firms 
345 Firms 
322 Firms 
240 Firms 
177 Firms 
122 Firms 
107 Firms
Districts Eligible for Subsidy 
2 Subsidies per Dot 
High Density Districts:
Surendranagar, Gujarat: 
Alleppey, Kerala: 
Mekokchung, Nagaland: 
Kohima. Nagaland: 
Bhagalpur, Bihar: 
Cannanore, Kerala:
Goa. Goa. Daman & Diu: 
Pondicherry:
Solan. Himachal Pradesh: 
Una, Himachal Pradesh:
Scale 1 :17 ,000 ,000  Source: M inistry of Industry, Government of India
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TABLE 5 - No. of 'Central Investment Subsidies' Disbursed to Firms in
Each District up to 30th June, 1978 - Source: Ministry of
Industry, GO I
No. Rs. M No. Rs. M
ANDHRA PRADESH ASSAM
1. Srikakulam 53 1.21 1. Goalpara 50 5.03
2. Prakasam 6 0.04 2. N.C. Hill - -
3. Chittoor 88 6.77 3. Kamrup 110 6.29
4. Cuddapah 92 6.18 4. Nowgong 44 0.47
5. Kurnool 85 5.69 5. Cachar 41 2.12
6. Anantapur 45 2.,01 6. North Lakhimpur 3 0.01
7. Mehbubnagar 49 2.33 7. Karbi Anglong 5 0.36
8. Nizamabad 59 2.31
9. Karimnagar 75 2.86 Total 253 14.28
10. Khammam 112 7.52
11. Warangal 32 0.92 BIHAR
12. Medak 111 22.49 1. Bhagalpur 345 2. 62
13. Nalgonda 158 4.31 2. Darbhanga 165 2.52
3. Champaran E. 115 1.58
Total 965 64.63 4. Champaran W. 121 1.42
■ 5. Palamau 309 0.92
GUJARAT 6. Saharsa 170 1.23
1. Panchamals 294 19.22 7. Santhal Parganas 156 1.57
2. Baroach 203 36.59 8. Madhabani 38 0.17
3. Surendranagar 557 15.49 9. Samastipur 106 1.13
Total 1,054 71.30 Total 1,525 13.17
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No. Rs. M No . Rs. M
HARYANA HIMACHAL PRADESH
1. Hissar 57 7.98 1. Kangra 114 1.5
2. Bhiw*ani 29 3.65 2. Una 107 4.83
3. Mohindergargh 12 1.01 3. Harimpur 19 0.05
4. Jind 14 3.31 4. Solan 122 21.65
5. Sirmur 100 4.37
Total 112 15.94 6. Chamba 13 0.07
7. Kulu 40 0.23
JAMMU & KASHMIR
1 J ammu Total 515 32.71
2. Srinagar
3. Anantnag KARNATAKA
4. Dodo 1. Mysore 193 20.90
5. Baramulla 2. Raichur 68 6.04
6. Poonch 3. Dharwar 116 . 8.12
Total - - Total 377 35.06
KERALA
1. Alleppey 381 14.07 MADHYA PRADESH
2. Malapuram 180 5.69 1. Raipur 81 6.16
3. Cannanore 322 8.05 2. Bilaspur 36 5.14
3. Sh ivpuri 19 0.32
Total 883 27.81 4. Dat ia 10 0.08
5. Bhind 19 0.17
MEGHALAYA 6. Mo re na 19 2.28
1. Kha.si Hills 51 2.48 7. Rewa 12 0.84
2. Garo Hills 14 0.06 8. Sidhi 1 0.0006
3. Jantia Hills 8 0.03 9. Sarguja 17 0.16
10. Sagar 10 2.66
Total 73 2.57 11. Tikamgarh 1 0.04
12. Vidisha 11 0.35
13. Chhatarpur 5 0.03
14. Dewas 85 16.21
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No. Rs. M No. Rs. M
NAGALAND MADHYA PRADESH (continued)
1. Kohima 348 15. Shajapur 10 0.23
2. Mekokchung 359 16. Rajgarh 6 0.11
3. Tuensang 19 17. Guna 9 0.12
18. Jhabua 11 0.09
Total 726 6.13 19. Dhar 26 0. 39
20. West Nimar
PUNJAB (Khargone) 11 1.80
1. Bhatinda 153 5.55 21. Rat lam 53 6.51
2. Sangrur 121. 4.44 22. Mandsaur 19 0.17
3. Hoshiapur 130 5.2,3
4. Faridokot 87 3.85 Total 473 43.86
Total 491 19.06 TAMIL NADU
1. North Arcot 270 48.80
UTTAR PRADESH 2. Ramanathapuram 322 35.79
1. Jhansi 81 4.53 3. Madurai 68 13.85
2. Ballai 15 1.74 4. Dharmapuri 175 15. 68
3. Rai-Barelli 39 6.81 5. Pudukottai 86 2.96
4. Faizabad 31 2.97
5. Basti 29 1.26 Total 921 116.55
6. Almora 16 2. 58
MAHARASHTRA
Total 211 19.89 1. Aurangabad 276 33.08
2. Ratnagiri 174 13.83
MANIPUR 3. Chandrapur 85 6.66
1. East District 1 0.22
2. West District 1 0.22 Total 535 53.57
3. North District 1 0.22
4. South District 1 0.20
5. Tengudal 1 0.22
Total 5 1.08
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No, Rs. M No . Rs. M
RAJASTHAN ORISSA
1. Bhilwara 135 6.29 1. Kalanandi 44 0.45
2. Alwar 78 8.86 2. Dhenkanal 98 4.91
3. Churu 22 0.16 3. Keonjhar 45 0.46
4. Nagaur 66 1.00 4. Koraput 66 3.08
5. Udaipur 70 4.60 5. Bolangir 31 0.35
6. Jodhpur 151 4.82 6. Mayaurbhanj 51 1.71
Total 522 24.74 Total 335 10.96
WEST BENGAL TRIPURA
1. Purulia 73 3.82 1. North District 14
2. Midnapur 100 9.22 2. West District 71
3. Nadia 104 9.47 3. South District 4
total 277 22.51 Total 89
ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS ARUNACHAL PRADESH
10 0.04 1. Loh i t 1 0.92
DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI GOA, DAMAN & DIU
10 0.84 1. Goa 240 14.84
2. Daman 12 0.44
LAKSHADWEEP _ 3. Diu 5 0.29
MIZORAM - Total 257 15.57
PONDICHERRY 177 5.22
N.B.The presence of a District's name on this list does not imply that 
the whole area of the District is eligible for the Central Subsidy.
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to have done well with parts of five districts designated instead of 
the straight three districts allowed. The four States which have not 
kept to district boundaries to designate their areas for eligibility 
are: Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Haryana. Also for 
Goa and Pondicherry the areas of the Municipalities of their capital 
towns are excluded.
One last table, Table 6, shows the distribution of Central Subsidies 
disbursed amongst firms of different sizes. First it is interesting to 
note that over 90% of the Subsidies go to small scale firms with fixed 
capital investments under Rs. 1 million. This proportion is slightly 
lower among the more industrialised States and higher among the 
backward States. At the same time these SSI firms only get about 20% of 
the funds disbursed while the 1.4 percent of large scale industry 
recipients get 30% of the funds. This is understandable given that the 
Subsidy is calculated as a percentage of the fixed capital investment 
of each firm, but it does indicate just how much the larger firms are 
costing the scheme relative to the number of small scale projects that 
are set up.
A second point of interest is that there are relatively few firms in
the Rs.l to 1.5 million bracket, while there are a good deal more in
the brackets on either side. Thus when the Union Government changed the 
definition of what constitutes a small scale firm in late 1980, moving 
the maximum fixed capital limit from 1 up to Rs.1.5 million it would 
apparently only be including a fairly small extra number of firms. But 
the fact that there are more firms in the categories on either side of 
this one could lead to the hypothesis that small firms were 
deliberately keeping their fixed capital down below the 1 million mark 
to benefit from all the extra incentives given to SSIs^. Taking this 
idea further one might suggest that this has led to some 
undercapitalisation in the small scale sector which may in itself be 
partly to blame for the .high incidence of financial problems
experienced by firms in this sector. It is doubtful whether this 
problem, if it really exists as a result of the SSI limit, would be
solved by moving the limit up as this would only encourage a different
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bracket of firms to keep their fixed capital expenses down.
Third, in the more industrialised States there does seem to be a 
sizeably higher proportion of medium scale firms (particularly the two 
categories from Rs.1.5 to 10 million) than in the backward States, 
although the proportion of large scale firms is fairly consistent
throughout. Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat (three of the four most 
industrialised States) have relatively large numbers of medium scale 
units and the two former also have many large scale units. In this they 
are joined by one backward State: Andhra Pradesh. It is interesting
that the other important industrial State, West Bengal, has relatively 
few larger firms and a high proportion of SSIs (Maharashtra & Tamil 
Nadu have the overall lowest percentages of SSIs) while Gujarat, though 
it has many MSIs, tends to have fewer the larger they get and 
culminates with a well below average percentage of LSIs (0.6%).
Apart from the Central Subsidy and the term finance disbursed to firms 
in backward areas there is little other publicly available information 
on, the national results of the industrial dispersal programme. No 
information on the operation of the Income Tax Rebate scheme is
available for instance. The only other scheme for which operational
details have been released is the Transport Subsidy scheme, and even on 
this there is very, little.
Godbole (1978, p. 70) states that from the commencement of the Transport 
Subsidy scheme in 1971 till 1975 the Union Government only received two 
very small claims from Tripura. More recent figures from the GOI 
Ministry of Industry indicate a slightly higher level of uptake:
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TABLE 7: Disbursement of Transport Subsidy
1976-77 1977-78 1978-79
Rs. Rs. Rs.
1. As s am 181,589 176,969 14,399
2. Himachal Pradesh - ~ 46,029
3. Jammu & Kashmir - - 155,463
4. Manipur _ 30,081 -
3. Tripura - 199,567 -
To t a 1 s : 181,589 406,607 215,891
Grand Total: Rs.804,087
Even though there does appear to be more use being made of the Scheme 
the level remains very low considering the number of units (judged on 
the basis of Central Subsidies disbursed to the eligible areas), which 
are eligible to make claims. Surprisingly the figures in the above 
table make no reference to sums disbursed under the scheme before 197 6 
so it is impossible to check Godbole’s mention of two earlier claims 
particularly as he himself gives no reference for his information. 
Finally, no mention is made of claims from firms in island territories 
(Andamans etc.). The data in Table 7 are however, derived straight from 
Central Government Ministry of Industry internal circulars (mimeo; date 
20. 10.78; D.O. No .4/1/78-RD), as are all the figures in Tables 4, 5 &
6 on the Central Subsidy.
6. Assessment of Impact of National Backward Area Incentive Schemes
Overall it would appear from the operational details of the various 
backward area incentives schemes outlined in the previous section, that 
their impact has not been as great as might have been hoped. First over 
a period of nine years assistance has gone to about 10,000 firms in
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backward areas (Central Subsidy figure). Not all of these will have 
been new firms, and about 9,000 of them are small scale units with
fixed capital levels of below Rs.1 million. At a rough average of 50 
jobs per firm that means only about half a million were created, or an 
increase of 8% in the total number of industrial jobs in the country. 
In terms of the Central Subsidy a total disbursement of Rs.625 million 
encouraged a total capital investment outlay of some Rs.7 billion, when 
the year before (1976-77) the total fixed capital invested in the
factory sector in India stood at about Rs.162 billion (Tata Services, 
1980 p.68). This Rs.7 billion was therefore only about 4% of the total 
and that same year the rate of fixed capital investment was 15% (Tata 
Services, ibid). Even these fairly crude and highly aggregated figures 
show the amount of industry being encouraged to locate in backward 
areas was still a small proportion of total industrial growth in the 
country, and assuming that most other industrial growth would still be 
occurring in established centres actual spatial dispersal can only have 
been minimal.
At the same time it is clear that, while the public financial 
institutions like the IDBI have increasingly been funding firms 
locating ,in backward areas, it is still the case that nearly half of 
the IDBIs loans go to firms which are not in backward areas. Thus the 
government's effective commitment to backward area industrialisation 
and general industrial dispersal is not as high as it could be. This 
impression is further reinforced by the evidence that even within the 
backward area incentives schemes, it is the most industrialised States 
which fairly consistently seem to be getting the most out of them in 
terms of the levels of funds allocated to their firms. The backward 
States on the other hand appear t'o be benefitting most in terms of the 
total numbers of firms receiving incentives but then again there are a 
higher proportion of small' scale units amongst these than in the
advanced States. Arguably with the tendency to a higher level of
financial insecurity and failure among smaller units, their 
developmental value to these states is not as high as their numbers 
might indicate.
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In sum the entire backward area incentive scheme does not appear to be i
i
encouraging as much backward area industrialisation as might be
expected. Furthermore, the advanced States are benefitting more than j
the backward States both in terms of the funds allocated to them and \
possibly even in the quality of industry being encouraged in them
(quality in terms of both viability of projects and their developmental
effect: jobs created, possibilities for subcontracting, etc. though no
real judgement could be made on this without more extensive evidence). j
It
f
7. Recent Changes to the Government's Industrial Policy 1
The two years of Janata Government rule in the late seventies (1977-79) f
produced some changes to the prevalent industrialisation policy. For 
the most part these changes were contained in the 1977 Industrial 
Policy Resolution which superseded the earlier Resolution of 1956. The j
i
main emphasis of this new document was to encourage further the growth 
of small scale industry which the Janata Government believed had a 
primary role to play in the development process. Thus the list of 180 
items which had been reserved for exclusive production by small scale 
industry in the 1956 Resolution was increased to include over 800 
products. Large scale industry was expected to concentrate on basic 
industries, capital goods industries, high technology industries and a 
number of other important areas not covered by the SSI reserved list 
such as machine tools and chemicals. Apart from this shift in emphasis [
i
in favour of small scale industry, the 1977 Resolution introduced no
other major changes but reiterated existing industrial policy J
committments.
For industrial location policy the two years of Janata Government also j
marks a threshold as in 1977 the first prohibitive industrial location j
policy measure was introduced. This consisted of a ban on the location j
of new industrial undertakings and on the substantial expansion of 
existing units in major cities. The ban covered the metropolitan areas 
of all cities with more than 1 million inhabitants and the municipal or 
corporation area of all cities with half a million inhabitants or more 
(as defined in the 1971 Census). Providing the ban is strictly
91
implemented it represents the single strongest measure in the whole 
Indian industrial location policy package.
Although the ban has now been in operation for several years a precise 
assessment of just how effective it has been is hard to make. 
Impressionistic evidence would suggest that contrary to many government 
rules in India it is being applied fairly strictly. There are, 
certainly cases of industrial expansion in or near cities which do 
appear to have escaped the ban but it would seem that they are few and 
far between. Moreover, industrialists as well as government planners 
talk about the ban as if it is a real one. The ban is applied through 
the industrial licensing system already in existence. All industrial 
licences issued since 1977 specify a fairly precise location for the 
licensed factory. The location is usually specified in terms of a 
district but can also be as precise as to state a particular taluk 
(tehsil) within a district. The ban also applies to industries which do 
not require a licence although here the authorities are not in such a 
good position to impose the ban though they will deny assistance to any 
firm contravening it.
8. Conclusion
Although it is apparent from the Five Year Plans that there has long 
been a certain awareness in Central Government planning circles in 
India of the problem constituted by the tremendous regional disparities 
on levels of development in the country, the above policy review shows 
that it took over 20 years of development planning before concrete 
steps were taken to try and solve this problem. Even now, while there 
undoubtedly exists a coherent and reasonably effective industrial 
location policy, this policy package is not part of a broader and well 
integrated regional development planning mechanism. Certainly 
individual State Governments pay lip service to regional planning and 
prepare documents detailing the problems and resources of the different 
regions within their State boundaries. But these exercises remain 
within the confines of individual States and the development proposals 
they suggest are not part of an integrated development strategy, but
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rather lists of things that might be done to encourage the development 
of the area in question, nor are they backed by any serious commitment 
and financial power from either the State Governments or the Union.
In the absence of any more serious regional development planning effort 
the industrial location policy package assumes a role of primary 
importance among the efforts being made to reduce regional disparities 
of development. Yet this policy package is not entirely suited for this 
role and moreover, it suffers from problems of its own. First, and
perhaps partly because of this role that has been foisted on it, the
industrial location policy suffers from a lack of clarity about its 
aims. Is it intended simply to,encourage the maximum industrial growth 
possible in areas where there has hitherto been little industry? Or is 
this industrial growth supposed to achieve a specific purpose, namely 
to encourage the broader development of the area in question? If so, is 
not some industrial development more appropriate than other sorts and 
anyway isn't there more to development than just industrial growth? 
Essentially the policy seems to have been formulated with merely the
first aim in mind, but then the second has been tacked on as an added
theoretical justification though, unfortunately, the further questions 
it raises have not been properly considered.
The second area of problems is in the formulation of the policy package 
itself. Various elements of the policy do not seem to be working quite 
the way they were expected to. Thus while the package may be achieving 
a certain amount of dispersal of industry within individual States, it 
is also assisting more industrial development in industrialised States 
than in underindustrialised States. Again, however, the assessment of 
this failure depends on what the basic aim of the policy is. If 
encouraging maximum industrial growth in new places is the main 
objective then providing assistance for expansion in industrialised 
States is very likely to be more rewarding than providing it only in 
the most backward States. The confusion surrounding the Planning 
Commission's intentions in drawing up the industrial location policy 
package as they did is fairly deep because there is no explanation 
provided as to why the recommendations of the Pande and Wanchoo Working
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Groups were changed the way they were. The only argument that seems to 
be consistent with their behaviour is that they did not want to 
disadvantage any particular State Government with the policy, or any 
particular section of the industrial community, as their political 
support was essential to the stability of the Union Government.
Footnotes:
1. Though often attempted, defining a 'poverty line' is an extremely 
difficult exercise as there is no absolute measure of poverty or 
even of 'adequate' nutrition standards, but nevertheless some 
indicator of poverty levels, would have been an extremely valuable 
addition to defining backward areas.
2. Though West Bengal is the most industrialised State in India by many 
criteria, it also has a very concentrated spatial distribution of 
industry. Thus most of the districts outside Calcutta could be 
described as industrially backward. Nevertheless Menon's criticism 
remains valid as a policy which aims to disperse industry should not 
just encourage its movement outwards in concentric rings from 
existing industrial centres, but should also involve States with 
little or no industry.
3 In 1978-9 this proportion was slightly lower (62.2%) than the 
previous year, but as this is the only small drop in the four years 
1975-9 it is no indication of a real downward trend.
4 To a certain extent the uneven distribution will also be a result of 
firms declaring lower fixed capital investment levels than they 
really had so as to benefit from the special facilities given to 
SSIs.
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INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE INDIAN STATE
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INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE INDIAN STATE
This Chapter has two principal. aims. First it is intended to provide 
the background to explain how Indian industry has reached the state of 
development it has and the problems it faces as a result. This is in 
order to be able to suggest what motivates industrialists to take
particular location decisions. Secondly it provides an account of the
relationship between industrial capital and the Indian State, as a 
basis for judging what influence the former may exert on policy
formulation by the latter.
To do this an essentially historical framework has been adopted which 
traces the roots of Indian economic development planning back to the 
early years after Independence and forwards to the present time. The
account becomes more detailed for the late 1960s and the 1970s, the 
period during which industrial location policy was properly formulated 
and implemented.
1. The Early Years After Independence & the First Five Year Plan
Given its importance for Indian industrialisation the Second Plan might 
appear to be a more obvious starting point for this account. However, 
it is in the early years after Independence that the Planning 
Commission was established and rapidly became the most important 
economic development policy making body in the country. It was also in 
these years that it was ascribed the authority which made the ambitious 
size and scope of the Second Plan possible. As was indicated in the 
previous chapter (Ch.3 p.53) the power of the Planning Commission was 
in large measure due to its close association with Jawarharlal Nehru. 
Nehru believed strongly in the importance of a central state planning 
system, and he lent the Commission the authority of his personal 
political stature.
Planning did however, have its critics. Even though the Indian Congress 
Party as a whole was committed to the principle of centralised planning 
of economic development, conservative interests within the Party were
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more doubtful about it. These interests were represented in the Cabinet 
in the person of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who was deputy prime 
minister and exercised considerable power over government policy. 
Sardar Patel died in 1950 but in the three years before his death a 
series of economic policy measures were introduced which created a 
favourable environment for private investment (a good account of this 
period is provided by Frankel, 1978, pp.74-77, cf. also Desmukh, 1957, 
pp.43-63). These included the lifting of wartime price controls on 
certain essential foods commodities and a reduction of direct taxes on 
personal and corporate incomes (1949-50 Budget).
This was also the time when the first Industrial Policy Resolution
(1948) was issued by the government. This Resolution was probably the 
most lenient towards private industry of the three (others in 1956 and 
1977) issued since Independence. It did provide for a state monopoly to 
cover new enterprises in certain fairly restricted industrial sectors 
(coal, iron and steel, minerals, shipbuilding, aircraft, telephones and 
telegraph equipment) but it also indicated that there would be no
nationalizations of existing enterprises, and that foreign firms could 
continue to operate in the country on the same terms as indigenous 
firms. (Frankel, 1978, p.77)
As Frankel explains (1978, pp.75-6 & 84-86) Nehru tried at several 
points to establish the Planning Commission during these years, but the 
idea was resisted by Sardar Patel and senior government officials.
However, in 1949 with no improvement to the continuing economic crisis 
and increased ba,eking from certain sections of the Congress he was more 
successful. Even so Sardar Patel's restrictive influence affected the 
terms of reference of the Commission and relegated it to an advisory 
status. The Draft Outline of the First Plan was thus fairly
conservative and warned against the dangers of hasty implementation of 
drastic measures to reduce inequalities in society. Also the limited 
extent of the taxation measures that it proposed meant that there were 
insufficient funds to finance any large scale industrial development 
programme. Industrial development was to be left in the hands of 
private enterprise. Instead the Draft Outline emphasised agricultural
97
and infrastructural development including in particular irrigation and 
electrical power.
The final version of the First Five Year Plan retained this emphasis on 
agriculture and infrastructure, with industrial development being left 
to private initiative and resources (Gol, First Five Year Plan, 1952, 
p. 71). There was however a slight change in emphasis which Frankel 
ascribes directly to Sardar Patel's death and the increased authority 
of Nehru (Frankel, 1978, p.94). The percentage of the total outlay of 
public funds in the Plan which was allocated to industrial development 
increased from 6.1% in the Draft Outline to 8.4% in’ the final Plan
(Gol, First Five Year Plan, 19.52, p.70). Most of this was to be spent
on the development of basic industries including among other things a
new iron and steel plant. In addition, as Frankel (1978, p.94) puts it:
"The broad outlines of an indirect attack on the prerogatives and 
position of private enterprise were, moreover, beginning to emerge. 
First, the planners announced their intention to increase central 
supervision and control over the private sector. Private enterprise 
would subsequently have to operate within the framework of the new 
Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, which provided that 
no new industrial unit or substantial expansions to existing plants 
could be made without a license from the central government. ...Second, 
there was a new emphasis on overtaking the private sector as the 
preeminent agency of industrial development. The planners gave notice 
of a much larger role for the public sector in basic industries in 
future plans."
This then was the first indication 
sector/pro-public sector reputation that the 
earn among industrialists in later years.
To a large extent this approach to economic development and planning 
can be associated with Nehru, particularly in so far as its practical 
implementation is concerned, but the ideological and philosophical 
commitment behind it lie deeper in the roots of the Indian National
of the anti-private 
Indian Government was to
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Congress itself. This is not the place to explore these roots in 
detail. Suffice it to say that they derive from the socialist political 
orientation of many of the Indian intelligentsia that joined the 
Congress in its early days. They are also to be found in the Gandhian 
roots of the Party. While Mahatma Gandhi stressed that heavy industry 
should be subservient to agricultural and rural craft development, he 
did accept the need for some heavy industry in development and he fully 
agreed with the socialist element of the Party that this industry 
should be kept firmly in public hands (Frankel, 1978, p.16). It was 
this synthesis of Gandhian and socialist ideas that was to be the 
primary influence on Congress economic and planning policy during the 
Nehru years (Frankel, 1978, p.15). But as the Sardar Patel hiatus from 
1947 to 1950 shows there were other interest groups within the Congress 
as we 11.
The Congress also received considerable support from the business 
community and increasingly after Independence from rural propertied 
classes as well (Chaudhuri, 1978, p.214). Frankel, describes at length 
(1978, Chapter 2, pp.28ff.) how the Congress went about mobilising
support. Thus although the leadership of the Party in pre-Independence 
and immediate post Independence days was largely in the hands of upper 
caste Hindus with a Western style education and usually a training in 
the professions (p.29) which can be described as the 'Indian 
intelygentsia1 (cf. also Kochanek, .1974, p.265), the lower levels of  ^
the Party organisation tended to be controlled by business classes in 
urban areas and landowning castes in the countryside (p.30). Merchants 
and important industrialists such as .J.R.D. Tata also provided a good 
deal of the Party's funds (p.34).
Inevitably perhaps, for a party whose original raison d'etre was to 
wage a nationalist struggle, the Congress grouped within it a whole 
variety of interest groups whose diverse interests started to conflict 
once Independence had been achieved and the unifying ideology of 
nationalism lost its primary importance. As the Congress party has 
remained in power in India in one form or another for virtually the 
entire 35 years since Independence this conflict of interests amongst
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the party's broad membership continues to be the main source of 
contradictions in the policies it pursues. (This, of course, is the 
main theme of Frankel's book on 'India's Political Economy1, 1978; but 
it is also noted by other writers, for instance Patnaik, 1975, 
pp.57-8).
2. The Heyday of Planning: the Second & Third Five Year Plans
The First Plan had not been too ambitious in its targets and in certain 
areas these were indeed surpassed. This meant that the Second Plan was 
formulated in an atmosphere which was both more optimistic about the 
rates of economic development the nation was capable of achieving and 
better disposed to the contribution that planning might make to growth 
(Datt & Sundharam, 1979, p.172; Bettelheim, 1968 p.160). Equally, 
however, the position of the Planning Commission had been strengthened. 
The Lok Sabha passed resolutions (Dec. 1954) declaring that the 
objective of economic policy should be a 'socialistic pattern of 
society' and calling for the stepping up of the rates of economic and 
particularly industrial growth. The reference to a 'socialistic pattern 
of society ' which has remained a catch phrase in Indian economic 
planning, implied that the aim of development should be social gain 
rather than private profit and private interests should not be allowed 
to gain control of the direction of development (Bhattacharya, 1973
p. 165). In addition Nehru was able to use his now preeminent position 
in the government and the Congress Party to ensure that the Planning 
Commission had an authoritative, instead of a purely advisory, role in 
economic policy formulation and implementation. (Frankel, 1978, p.113).
The Second Five Year Plan was thus more ambitious in what it set out to 
achieve and more self-assured in the strategy it adopted, than its 
predecessor. Its two main planks were: first a major effort at rapid
industrialisation emphasising in particular the need to develop the 
nation's basic industrial capacity with a whole range of heavy and 
capital goods industries; and second a strong commitment to keeping 
much of this new industry in the public sector so that the state would 
have a direct control over the 'commanding heights of the economy' and
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1thereby the ability to regulate the direction of economic development.
Understandably this much more assertive Plan aroused considerable 
debate. Bettelheim (1968, p.159) suggests that to a certain extent 
India's big industrialists were in favour of the state investing in the 
more high cost, high risk and slow return sectors of basic capital 
goods industry, because they were reluctant to do so themselves. While 
this may have been true of a number of industrialists the dominant view 
would seem to be more correctly represented by Frankel (1978, pp.128-9) 
who maintains that from 1955 the Plan 'was the target of a steady 
barrage of criticism from the business community'. She quotes the 
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) who were 
in effect arguing for a complete reversal of roles between the public 
and private sectors, with the state concentrating on the improvement of 
social and overhead capital.
Despite these criticisms the Second Plan was not substantially altered 
and the government further consolidated its position with the 1956 
Industrial Policy Resolution. In comparison with the 1948 Resolution 
this one greatly expanded the list of industrial sectors where the 
state would have a monopoly with additions to the list including 
several capital goods industries such as heavy plant and machinery 
required for iron and steel production, mining or machine tool 
manufacturing and heavy electrical plant (Gol, Industrial Policy 
Resolution 1956, Schedule A). There was also a new list (Schedule B) of 
industries which were to become progressively state-owned but where 
private capital was expected to supplement the state effort. Schedule B 
included remaining minerals, non-ferrous metal industries, machine 
tooling, many chemical and pharmaceutical industries and fertilisers. 
All remaining industries were left open to private enterprise subject 
to state control. This set the stage for a much broader scale and scope 
to state involvement in industry and ascribed it a primary role in the 
establishment of new industries. In doing so it openly rejected the 
FICCI view of the state's role in economic development.
The Second Plan strategy was also criticised outside India. Most of the
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Western aid-givers, including the World Bank, were alarmed by the 
increasingly radical rhetoric used by the Indian planners; but it was 
the United States in particular which was most opposed to the 
development strategy placing such an emphasis on industrialisation 
(Frankel, 1978, p.179; Patnaik, 1975, p.59). Indeed West Germany and 
Britain were sufficiently in favour of the principle of Indian 
industrialisation to collaborate directly in the building of major iron 
and steel mills at Rourkela and Durgapur. The American criticism which 
favoured a major emphasis on agriculture rather than on industry and 
the use of modern inputs to increase production levels rather than a 
reliance on the reorganisation of farming, was one of the factors which 
contributed to a change in the Planning Commission's approach in the 
Third Plan. It was, however, by no means the only factor.
During the course of the Second Plan period it became apparent that 
levels of agricultural production were not increasing sufficiently 
fast. Indeed it was recognised that this failure was becoming a major 
limiting factor in the nation's economic development which ultimately 
could be expected to hold back industrial development as well (Datt & 
Sundharain, 1979, p.175). This realisation prompted the planners to 
change their strategy somewhat for the Third Plan. While they did not 
decrease the proportion of public funds to be channelled into industry 
in the Third Plan they did increase substantially the funds going into 
agricultural development. Given the large scale and capital intensive 
nature of many of the industrial projects started during the Second 
Plan and the time required to get them into production a retreat from 
these commitments was difficult. In effect this therefore ruled out any 
major changes in the level of finance allocated to industry. One 
interesting point to note, however, is that while the Commission had 
originally intended the ratio of public to private investment in 
industry to be somewhat higher in the Third Plan than in the Second, 
the final Plan used the same target ratio of 60:40% (instead of the 
intended 67:33%) as had been adopted in the Second Plan. (Frankel, 1978 
p. 181). This represented a slight retreat from the planners' aim of 
achieving an ever higher proportion of industry under public control. 
More radical policy changes, however, were to take place before the
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Third Plan had completed its term (1961—66).
3. Industrialization under the First Three Five Year Plans
By 1966 India had gone through nineteen years of Independence and 
fifteen years of Central Government economic planning. These years had 
also seen some of the most dramatic industrialisation the country had 
and still has ever experienced. The following table, taken from 
Chaudhuri's book on the Indian economy, gives some indication of the 
scale of change:
Table 1: Indexes of Industrial Production - 1951, 1955 and 1965 
(Base 1960:100)
Industry Weight 1951 1955 1960 1965
Mining 9.72 66.6 74.6 100.0 131.7
Manufacturing 84.91 54.6 73.8 153.8
Food Processing 12.09 66.9 75.9 122.2
Textiles 27.06 79 • 7 94.1 114.8
Chemicals 7.26 42.4 60.1 153.9
Petroleum 1.34 ' 11.0 56.1 158.7
Basic Metals 7.38 46.5 53.3 180.1
Machinery 3.38 22.2 35.5 316.0
Transport Equipment 7.77 19.6 99.2 206.3
Source: Chaudhuri,, 1978, p.6 6; Reserve Bank of India, Report on
Currency & Finance
It highlights the particularly dramatic increases in production that 
took place during the periods of the Second and Third Five Year Plans 
in such basic and capital goods industries as Basic Metals, Transport 
Equipment and especially Machinery. Consumer goods industries such as 
Food Processing or Textiles, on the other hand, showed much smaller
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increases, a pattern which reflects the priorities of the various 
Plans. Basic and capital goods industries in fact showed annual growth 
rates of 12 and 13% during the Second Plan period and 10 and 19% 
respectively during the Third Plan period (Shetty, 1978, p.9), while 
the overall growth rate in industrial production rose from 5.7% per 
annum under the First Plan, 7.2% under the Second Plan to 9.0% under 
the Third Plan (Shetty, 1978, p.9) which represents very impressive 
industrial development rates.
By way of comparison agricultural growth rates were much more modest 
during these years. Between 1952 and 1965, total agricultural 
production grew at a fairly steady linear rate of 3.42% per annum, made 
up of a annual 2.75% growth rate in non-foodgrain production and a 
4.79% rate in foodgrain production. At the end of the period, in 1966, 
agricultural production levels experienced a marked drop, largely as a 
result of the long drought of 1965 to '67. To put these rates into 
perspective it is worth noting that throughout this period the 
population of India was growing by over 2% per annum. Agricultural 
production growth was therefore only just managing to keep ahead 
(Chaudhuri, 1978 pp.57-9).
Employment in the organised industrial sector, that is in factories 
covered by the 1948 Factories Act, rose by an average of just over 3% 
per annum between 1950 and 1965. But this overall average obscures a 
faster rate of growth in later years, thus from 1950 to 1955 the 
average annual employment growth rate was 1%, from 1956 to 1960 3.5%
and from 1961 to 1965 4.3% (Shetty, 1978 p.28). By 1966 there were some
4.5 million workers employed in organised manufacturing industry or 3.8 
million in private industry and 0.7 million in public sector industry 
(Shetty, 1978 p.29).
The proportion of public to private sector investment in industry is 
difficult to gauge, as comparable data are not available, but some idea
of the growth and extent of the public sector can be had from the
following figures. In 1951 there were 5 Central Government undertakings 
involving a total investment of Rs.290 million. By the end of the 1st
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Plan this had risen to 21 units with Rs.810 million investment; by the 
end of the Second Plan: 41 units and Rs,9,560 million and by the end of 
the Third Plan there were 74 units involving Rs.24,150 million in 
investment (Tata Services, 1980, p.80).
The final consideration in this brief review of the state of Indian 
industrialisation at the end of the Third Five Year Plan must be an 
indication of Indian industry's position vis a vis foreign capital and 
the extent of the economy's dependence on foreign assistance. During 
the entire fifteen years the value of imports was higher than that of 
exports. The gap between the two widened appreciably between 1955 and 
1957, that is at the commencement of the Second Plan industrialisation 
programme which depended to a significant extent on foreign inputs. The 
Government reacted to this rise in imports and the resulting balance of
payments crisis in 1957 with a regime of strict import controls.
However, even after these measures the value of imports continued to 
rise, though not unduly relative to the level of exports. This 
continued until 1964 when there was another more dramatic widening of 
the balance of payments deficit (Chaudhuri, 1978 pp.71-2).
The,level of external assistance was much higher under the Second and 
Third Plans than under the 1st. During the Third Plan the level of 
total net aid rose to just under Rs.30,000 million (30 billion) which 
was nearly fifty percent higher than the level during the Second Plan 
and ten times as high as under the First Plan (Total net aid over the 
five years of each Plan) (Shetty, 1978, p.40). Finally as a small 
indication of foreign capital involvement in India the level of
remittances abroad by foreign companies operating in India stood at 
Rs.683 million (0.51% of GNP) in 1960-61, five years later in 1965-66 
this had risen to Rs.1,383 million (0.67% of GNP) and the year after it 
increased substantially again to Rs.2,186 million (0.92% of GNP)
(1966-67) (Tata Services, 1980 p.125 & Chaudhuri, 1978 p.51).
Thus by the end of the first three Five Year Plans India had made some 
major steps forward in its economic development but at the time it was 
faced with some important problems. It had expanded, its industrial
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capacity and particularly its basic and capital goods industry capacity 
quite substantially. Industrial production levels had risen 
dramatically but they had not been matched by similar rises in 
agricultural production and the 1965-67 drought showed that the economy 
was still extremely vulnerable in this crucial area. It was evident 
that agricultural production would have to increase if the economy and 
industrial development were not to suffer. Elsewhere the rises in 
industrial employment, while not dramatic, did look hopeful. The other 
major problem area was the balance of payments situation and the high 
level of external assistance. The imposition of strict import controls 
had not narrowed the gap between exports and imports. Foreign companies 
were removing remittances from the country at a rate equivalent to 
about one fifth of the total net aid coming in, and the level of these 
remittances was growing at an alarming rate towards the end of the 
period. Finally the level of external assistance itself was extremely 
high, to the extent that it financed a third of the actual outlay of 
public funds in the Third Plan (Tata Services, 1980, p.185).
The rise in industrial production capacity had been impressive but its 
price was a highly increased dependence on foreign capital, and 
continued industrialisation, seemed to be threatened by inadequate 
growth in agriculture.
4. Shifts in Economic and Planning Policy (1964-1969)
Criticisms of the policy orientation of the Five Year Plans continued, 
and indeed such events as the 1962 Indo-China War were used by the 
Plans' opponents to suggest the need for a reorientation of government 
spending away from public sector industry, Nehru, however, on the whole 
succeeded in defending the Plans even though in doing so he effectively 
increased the level of criticism. Thus by refusing to rechannel public 
funds earmarked for industrial development into defence spending he 
created the need for higher levels of taxation in the 1963/4 budget 
which infuriated the business community (Frankel, 1978, pp.215-219). 
Nehru was being criticised on other matters as well and his personal 
political authority and power was beginning to suffer, but he died in
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May 1964 before he was forced to make any major concessions on planning 
policy. His death left the control of the Congress Party and the 
government in more conservative hands. With this new political 
evironment and with the evident failure of the Second and Third Plans 
in certain areas, such as in raising agricultural production, the 
Planning Commission was unable to perpetuate the planning tradition of 
the Nehru years.
There followed a period of more liberal economic and planning policies 
which reflected the political orientation of those in power but also 
resulted from the political instability and changes in government that 
characterised the late 1960s. From 1964 to 1966 Lai Bahadur Shastri was 
Prime Minister and then Mrs Gandhi succeeded him. Mrs Gandhi's 
premiership did not immediately result in major policy changes, 
however, as it was not until 1969 that she had enough political 
standing of her own to implement more radical measures, such as the 
bank nationalisation, which marked the start of a renewal period of 
stronger state intervention in the nation's economic affairs.
It is worth examining the political and economic policy changes that 
took place in this period in some detail as it is during these years 
that the foundation stones for the industrial location policy of the 
1970s were laid. The IDBI and the other industrial finance lending 
institutions started disbursing funds from 1965 onwards. The Pande and 
Wanchoo Working Groups were set up to make studies of backward area 
identification and incentive policies in 1968 and they both reported in 
1969. Another crucial feature of this period is that it marked the 
onset of a prolonged economic recession and much slower industrial 
growth rates. All these changes (the liberalisation of economic policy 
including the decline of planning; the emergence of industrial location 
policy and the fall in industrial growth rates) took place during the 
same years. It is important, therefore, to try and establish what 
connections exist between them. The single most useful source for such 
an inquiry is Frankel's book on 'India's Political Economy 1947—77 ’ 
(1978) upon which much of the following discussion is based.
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When Nehru died in 1964 there was no obvious successor in the Congress 
Party. Political manoeuvring within the Party resulted in the 
appointment of Lai Bahadur Shastri as the new Prime Minister. Although 
not one of the most senior party members, Shastri had been in the 
Cabinet as home minister for a number of years in the early sixties. 
Politically he belonged to the more conservative side of the Congress 
and was generally critical of public sector industry and unsympathetic 
to what he saw as the Planning Commission's hostile attitude towards 
private business. Although he was not a particularly powerful 
politician, nor his period in office that long, his ideas did have an 
important impact on economic and planning policy. Indeed, Frankel sees 
this period as crucial:
"During the brief twenty months of Shastri's tenure, a series of 
undramatic initiatives in economic policy that went virtually unnoticed 
at the time cumulatively altered the entire approach to India's 
development strategy. Among the results of decisions taken during this 
period were the eclipse of the Planning Commission as a policy making 
body; a shift from controls to incentives as major instruments of 
development planning; a reorientation of public investment from basic 
industries to agriculture; a new agricultural strategy to concentrate 
modern inputs in irrigated areas of the country; and an enlarged role 
for private domestic and foreign investment in the development of the 
industrial sector. In sum, in less than two years, the key pillars of 
Nehru's strategy of self reliant growth and social transformation 
through expansion of basic and heavy industries in the public sector, 
and land reforms and cooperative reorganization in agriculture, were 
virtually overturned." (Frankel, 1978, p.246-7)
Shastri took a number of steps to downgrade the authority of the 
Planning Commission and shift the focus of power on questions of 
economic policy to the ministries. In particular he distanced himself 
from the Commission by separating its secretariat from that of the 
prime minister's office and at meetings of the National Development 
Council he invited the Chief Ministers to criticise the Commission's 
proposals (Frankel, 1978, pp.251, 255-6). As a result the business
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community became able to disregard the Commission and built up 
alternative access routes to the prime minister through his own 
secretariat and the Congress party (Frankel, 1978, p.267). Shastri 
himself created two new bodies which gave industrialists additional 
access to the Commission and its work; the National Planning Council 
which consisted of 17 non-official expert members from industry, trade 
unions and farmers was intended to support the Commission in their 
work, while the Business Advisory Council made up of a dozen 
representatives from Indian and foreign business were expected to act 
as a panel of consultants (Frankel, 1978, p.268).
In addition to the effect that Shastri was having on the Planning 
Commission were the criticisms of the World Bank which hitherto had 
been somewhat disregarded. The Bank disapproved of both the public 
sector involvement in industry and the industrial, as opposed to 
agricultural emphases of the Second and Third Plans. The 1965 report of 
the Bank's Economic Mission to India recommended a package of reforms 
which included a relaxation of licensing controls on industry, a 
programme to liberalise imports and the devaluation of the Rupee to 
improve India's poor balance of payments position. This report was on 
the whole well received in the Ministry of Finance and the Prime 
Minister's Secretariat (1978 pp.271-2). The Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture was also keen on the Bank's proposals regarding a new 
agricultural policy involving modern inputs and direct incentives to 
•farmers (Frankel, 1978 pp.274-5 & ff.).
Given the importance of external assistance to India by the e,nd of the 
Third Plan, the aid givers' views were telling and at the September 
1967 meeting of the National Development Council Shastri directed the 
Commission to formulate an Annual Plan for 1966-67, in advance- of the 
delayed Fourth Plan, in which they were to 'emphasize quick-yielding 
schemes in agriculture and better utilization of industrial capacities 
already created' (Frankel, 1978 p.285).
Shastri died suddenly in January 1966. The full implementation of the 
World Bank's recommendations was thus left to the next government under
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Mrs Gandhi, who became the prime minister again as a result of 
political manoeuvering within the Congress. The conservative elements 
within the Party were doubtful about her left-leaning views but there 
was little choice and they were persuaded by Kamaraj, one of their 
leading members. (Frankel, 1978 pp.288-92). However, with no real power
base of her own Mrs Gandhi was not in a position to make major changes
to the policies already embarked upon by Shastri's government.
It was Mrs Gandhi who had to take the unpopular decision to devalue the 
Rupee in June 1966 in the face of continuing reluctance of foreign 
aid-givers, principally the United States, to continue their 
assistance. The ensuing public criticism slightly strengthened the hand 
of the Planning Commission which made one last attempt to return to
Nehru's planning philosophy with the Draft Outline of the Fourth Plan 
published in August 1966. In this they reasserted the prime importance 
of industrialisation and argued that previous plan failures had been a 
result of poor implementation rather than poor policy (Frankel, 1978, 
pp.298-301).
The Draft Outline met with strong opposition particularly from the 
business community but also from the Chief Ministers of the States who 
wanted a more devolved planning system with a more equitable 
distribution of resources between States. Mrs Gandhi attempted to
defend the Plan but in the end had to give way to pressure, 
particularly as the Lok Sabha itself was extremely critical. In the 
months leading up to the February 1967 General Elections leading 
industrialists such as J.R.D. Tata and G.D. Birla mounted a concerted 
attack on the Draft Outline ^and suggested that it would cause the 
Congress to lose much of their support in the elections. Whether or not 
that was prime reason the Congress and Mrs Gandhi did poorly and were 
returned with a substantially reduced majority in the Lok Sabha. Their 
position also deteriorated drastically at the State level.
The 1967 Elections result had a number of effects on Mrs Gandhi and the 
policies she was able to promote. First it strengthened the position of 
Chief Ministers relative to the Central Government. Second to improve
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the government's p'olitical stability Mrs Gandhi was forced to accept, 
Morarji Desai, one of the .most senior conservative Congress MPs, into 
her Cabinet as Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. Thirdly, it 
was the parties on the right which gained most from the Congress 
losses: the Swatantra and the Jan Sangh. This was encouraging for the
business community, the Swatantra in particular having long advocated a 
free enterprise approach to industrialisation with the government 
restricting itself to infrastructure development. Finally, Mrs Gandhi, 
unsure of herself in the face of widespread criticism and facing the 
electorate for the first time, indicated she was going to reconstitute 
the Planning Commission even before the election and afterwards was in 
no position to oppose such a move (Frankel, 1978 pp.306-8, 351).
Morarji Desai thus emerged as the person with the main influence over 
economic and planning policy and this was immediately apparent in the 
composition of the new Planning Commission appointed later that year. 
The new deputy chairman was D.R. Gadgil, an economist who saw the body 
as a purely advisory body of experts and who disapproved of the 
'unnatural prestige and importance' which had been attached to its 
decisions in the past. Gadgil made a good many changes to the 
Commission amongst which a new formula for a new system of direct 
untied block grants and loans to each State effectively meant that the 
States became free to formulate their own Plans, while the national 
level of planning was essentially reduced to spending on central sector 
projects. Thus, Frankel concludes:
"On the eve of the Fourth Plan, the Planning Commission's role was so 
reduced in scope as to virtually satisfy the demands of the business 
community, reiterated since the mid-1950s, that the proper sphere of 
activity for the public sector was to promote social overheads and 
incentives supportive of private investment. In most other aspects as 
well, the economic programs endorsed by the planners carried the 
impression of a reversion to policies predating the Second Plan in an 
almost total obliteration of Nehru's approach." (Frankel, 1978 p.313)
The new Commission decided to completely rewrite the Draft of the
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Fourth Plan and in the interim prepared a third Annual Plan, thereby 
delaying the start of the Fourth Plan period to 1969. The Annual Plan, 
reflecting the new approach to planning, only provided funds to already 
existing industrial projects, delicensed various industries and allowed 
existing industrial units to produce up to 25% above their licensed 
capacity without obtaining a new licence (Frankel, 1978, pp.310-315).
It was in the context of these changes and this new approach to 
economic and planning policy that the Pande and Wanchoo Working Groups 
were appointed in 1968 to look into proposals for backward area 
development and financial incentives for industrial development. While 
it was a logical step for the Congress government of Mrs Gandhi and 
Morarji Desai to appoint a Working Group to look into the question of 
financial incentives for industry, given the orientation of their 
economic and planning policy, the reason for their concern with 
backward area development seems less obvious. Backward area development 
had of course been discussed in the earlier Five Year Plans and notably 
the Third Plan (cf. Chapter 3) and it is possible that this policy was 
retained because it was one element of the previous planning philosophy 
that could easily be associated with financial incentives for industry. 
Indeed, in a combined policy package, forcing industry to disperse to 
backward areas could make the increased levels of financial assistance
from the state to private industry appear more acceptable to a wider
political audience. Interestingly the first draft of the Fourth Plan 
(1966) contains no reference to the need for a backward area policy 
while the second draft (1969), prepared by the new Gadgil Commission 
contains numerous references to it. It would thus seem that industrial 
dispersal to backward areas was an idea favoured by Gadgil and not by 
the previous Commission. It is however, strange that the earlier 
Commission did devote a whole Chapter of their previous Plan, the 
Third, to balanced regional development and then ommitted this subject 
entirely in their next piece of work, the first draft of the Fourth 
Plan.
The new Draft Fourth Plan when it appeared in 1969 put forward an
economic development strategy which explicity included as one of its
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major planks the use of incentives to private investment. The target 
for private investment in industry and minerals was more than twice 
that proposed in the Third Plan, while the actual total public sector 
outlay of the Plan was only 60% higher. Indeed the level of public 
sector outlay was lower than that proposed in the earlier Draft 
Outline, the justification provided being that it was necessary to 
limit inflationary financing and the dependance on foreign aid 
(Frankel, 1978 pp.326-9).
By 1969 there were, however, also a number of signs of an impending 
crisis, both on an economic front where there was no indication of a 
recovery from the stagnation that had. set in in 1966 and on a political 
front where there was increasing instability in the higher echelons o£ 
the Congress Party^-. It was clear that the more liberal economic 
policies of the Shastri years had not resulted in any upturn in 
economic development and the emasculated licensing system which was 
supposed to encourage the freer flow of market investments into 
industries where it was needed had failed to prevent the growth of 
capacity in less essential sectors. Equally there were indications of 
increasing economic concentration with a disproportionate share of new 
licensed capacity belonging to the larger business houses, such as
Tata, Birla and Shri Ram. At the same time the Gadgil Commission made
no recognition in the new Draft Fourth Plan that these problems were 
associated with the new entrepreneurial approach to economic 
development planning (Frankel, 1978 pp.323, 334 & 388).
The years from 1966 to 1969 were therefore marked by increasing 
liberalisation of economic and planning policies but in the last months 
of 1969 the tide turned. Because of the nature of the power struggle 
within the Congress and the fact that Mrs Gandhi's victory over the
party leadership had been based on the support of the younger more 
radical Forum members, her rhetoric and the government's actions
towards the end of 1969 became distinctly more radical. How much this 
new found radicalism was really part of Mrs Gandhi's personal political 
convictions is les^ sure. While she was known to support many of her 
father's ideas on economic policy it would also seem that she was less
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ideologically committed to socialism than Nehru. With the benefit of 
hindsight it is evident that her most radical years in government were 
not( to last long and to move away from them she was able to use the 
newfound political base of widespread and enthusiastic personal popular 
support which she first acquired in the Congress power struggle of late 
1969.
5. Renewed Radicalism and Contradictions of the 1970s
By the end of 1969 Mrs Gandhi was in much stronger command of the 
Congress Party and the Government than she had ever been before, but to 
achieve this position she had had to align herself with the young' 
socialist members of the CFSA within the Party and to acquire their 
support she had had to radicalise her political rhetoric and the 
economic measures she was prepared to implement. Already she had 
nationalised 14 of the major commercial banks in the country, achieved 
the election of a left- wing oriented president and passed the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP Act).
At the same time she was starting to build up her own political power 
base in a broad popular tjiovement of support for her leadership. But 
this popular support was to a very large extent a result of such 
dramatic actions as the bank nationalisation which could be linked to 
Mrs Gandhi personally, and to retain and build on this support her 
actions would have to continue to appeal to the masses. On both 
accounts therefore, 'Mrs Gandhi was pushed into the continuing use of 
populist appeals that promised radical social changes' (Frankel, 1978 
p.435). But in doing this there was also the risk of raising popular 
hopes beyond a point where she was able or willing to go.
Differences between Mrs Gandhi's new party leadership and the 
socialists in the Forum appeared fairly soon after the Party split. One 
of the main bones of contention was the issue of the role of private 
enterprise. While the Forum advocated the nationalisation of many of 
the larger business concerns in the country, the Government was 
reluctant to go so far. Though its actions in this respect were
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certainly radical in comparison with the policies of the Shastri years, 
they fell far short of the Forum's programme.
The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, required all 
companies with total assets over Rs.20 crores (200 million) to register 
with the Government and apply for permission for any proposed expansion 
in their operation. Legislation was passed to abolish the old managing 
agency system, limit the number of managing directorships an individual 
could hold at the same time to one and to restrict the level of 
salaries that could be paid to company directors and managers. But the 
most radical new policies were derived from the recommendations of the 
1969 report of the Industrial Licensing Policy Enquiry Committee. In 
February 1970 the Government announced a new licensing policy which 
'entirely reversed the trend towards decontrol s.tarted in the mid-1960s 
and endorsed by the Planning Commission in the Draft Outline of the 
Fourth Plan' (Frankel, 1978, p.437). All the exemptions to licensing 
which had been made during those years were withdrawn and new 
restrictions on the activities of large industrial houses 
(conglomerates), those in a dominant position with regard to particular 
products and foreign companies and their subsidiaries were announced. 
Finally the concept of 'joint sector' undertakings involving both 
public and private equity capital was accepted in principle and public 
financial institutions were directed to 'insert conversion clauses into 
loan agreements, allowing them to exercise an option of converting 
loans and debentures either wholly or partly into equity within a 
specified period of time' (Frankel, 1978 p.438), The new administration 
set up to handle all these applications and impose these restrictions 
was formidable, particularly as most of the licences had to be 
scrutinised and approved by several different ministries, including in 
particularly important cases the Cabinet itself. 'A procedure that in 
the last analysis required the larger business houses to get personal 
approval of the prime minister and her closest advisers for new 
ventures' (Frankel, 1978 p.438 & 436-438).
Inevitably such measures met with considerable criticism. 
Understandably the business community were opposed, seeing in them the
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first steps of a government takeover. But equally so were radicals in 
the Congress critical, as the measures fell far short of the 
nationalisations they would like to have seen. Indeed the nearest the 
government got to nationalisation was in its decision to make it 
possible to convert public loans to private companies into equity. 
Moreover, by endorsing the principle of the 'joint sector' for large 
scale heavy investment projects the government seemed to be saying that 
only the larger business houses had enough capital to invest in major 
projects (Frankel, 1978 pp.438-9).
As Frankel herself says there is little evidence to indicate just how 
radical an interpretation to read into the intentions of the Congress 
Party leadership behind these changes (1978, pp.434 & 439). She
concludes that despite their radical rhetoric and the legislation to 
control the private sector they never had any serious intention to
substantially curtail its activities (cf, also Shetty 1978, pp.41 & 
70-1). In support of this view she cites not only the way the changes 
introduced fell far short of the more radical demands of the Forum 
members but also points to the policies of the final version of the
Fourth Plan. Published in July 1970 the Plan proposed a public sector 
outlay which, though above the level indicated in the second 1969 draft 
of the Plan, was still below the original level suggested in the first 
draft prepared by the old Planning Commission. The estimate for the 
level of private investment in organised industry and mining remained 
twice that in the Third Plan, even though it had been slightly reduced 
from the 1969 draft level. 'The revised figures, in fact, did little 
more than accomplish the public relations goal of demonstrating an 
apparent gain in the public sector's share of new industrial investment 
now accounting for about sixty percent...' (1978, p.439).
Thus although the legislative measures and other changes instituted in
1969/70 represented a renewed high degree of control over private
sector industry they did not herald the start of a second period of 
industrialisation based primarily on public sector projects. The 
emphasis still remained on private capital pulling the nation out of 
the industrial slump that had set in since the mid-60s. The
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contribution of the state was to be that of providing extensive 
financial incentives to encourage growth in private investment and 
equally to control and regulate this growth through the elaborate new 
licensing system. The licensing system itself was a direct product of 
Mrs Gandhi's political power base which had to be shown that radical 
measures were being taken to encourage economic development with 
increased equity.
It is against this background of economic policy measures that the 
backward area industrial location policy was first introduced (cf. 
Chapter 3). The industrial location policy conforms well to the overall 
pattern of these wider economic policy measures. It brought in a 
package of incentives to encourage private industrial investment and at 
the same time it imposed conditions which were redistributive in intent 
and appearance. It specified that to benefit from the incentives 
industrialists would have to go to the more underdeveloped parts of the 
country, a stipulation which could be presented as direct evidence of 
the government's intention to encourage greater social equity and to 
bring the benefits of development to the rural poor. The degree to 
which the policy was politically motivated rather than seriously 
.expected to achieve these aims can already be partially judged from the 
conclusion reached in the previous chapter.
The 1971 General Election further strengthened Mrs Gandhi's position 
within the Congress. The Party was returned with a clear two thirds 
majority of the seats in the Lok Sabha. Their success was in very large 
measure due to her efforts and the strenuous personal campaign 
programme she undertook, speaking to literally hundreds of crowds all 
over India. Her message was simple and had a direct populist appeal, 
evident in the main slogan she used: 'garibi hatao' or remove poverty.
Immediately after the election the entire Planning Commission including 
D.R. Gadgil, resigned because of Mrs Gandhi's reversal of the liberal 
economic policies they had earlier instituted. Mrs Gandhi reconstituted 
the Commission under the deputy chairmanship of C. Subramanian, who as 
her Minister for Agriculture in 1966 had instituted the new
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entrepreneurial approach to agriculture development. The next two plan 
documents this Commission produced, the 1972 'Towards Self-Reliance 
Approach to the Fifth Five Year Plan' and the 1973 'Draft Fifth Five 
Year Plan', were in some ways very similar to the earlier plans of the 
Nehru years. This was all the more evident in the latter of the two 
documents which was prepared under the deputy chairmanship of D.P. Dhar 
who replaced C. Subramanian in August 1972. (Datt & Sundharam, 1979 
p.504). The documents contained proposals for widespread social
transformation (including again: land reform) reminiscent of the Second 
and Third Plans. But their basic approach was more oriented towards a 
minimum needs programme stressing in particular increased production of 
mass consumer goods and widespread employment creation (Gol, Draft 
Fifth Five Year Plan, 1973, p.7). This was carried through into the 
industrial policy with several references to the need to promote 
industrial development in rural and backward areas (Gol, Draft Fifth 
Plan, 1973 pp.20, 21, 134, 282).
Dhar's belief in the need for high levels of public investment in heavy 
industry showed through in an increase of the share of the public funds 
outlay going to industry and mining. In the Draft Plan this rose to
26%, considerably higher than the 18% of the Fourth Plan and in fact
higher than it had ever been before (Datt & Sundharam 1979, p.185 &
179; Gol, Economic Survey 1979-80, 1980 p.106). The Draft however,
suggested no major changes with respect to the role of the private and 
public sectors in industry. It stated that the public sector would 
continue to make a major contribution to essential consumer industries 
and the private sector was invited to invest in core industries and 
export oriented industries. Foreign collaboration had to be of benefit 
to the country and not involve the import of technology already in 
India. Concessional finance would continue to be available in backward 
areas (Gol, Draft Fifth Plan 1973, pp.134-5).
Although the Draft Fifth Plan did represent some return to the planning 
ideas of the 1950s and early 1960s, it did not reestablish the public 
sector in its earlier role of the prime mover of industrial development 
and it did not get rid of the entrepreneurial incentives to private
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industry approach of the intervening years. Moreover, as Frankel
stresses (1978, p.506), although the documents did recommend major 
social transformations there was no indication that the government 
would be in any better position to carry them out than before. Finally 
it was evident that the Fifth Plan was going to run into major problems 
with funding and resource mobilisation (Frankel, 1978 pp.504-8).
The next major piece of economic legislation that Mrs Gandhi introduced 
was the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA). This restricted 
the proportion of equity in any company operating in India that could 
be owned by foreign interests. While it certainly did result in some 
reduction of foreign capital involvement in Indian industry, other 
foreign companies chose to dilute their equity participation by selling 
off shares to small shareholders thereby only nominally decreasing 
their control on the firms operations (Chaudhuri S., 1979). The most
important effect for Indian capital, however, was to improve their
relative position to that of outside capital and possibly increase
their chances of entering into collaboration agreements for foreign 
technology.
1973 also marks the start of a more reconciliatory note in Mrs Gandhi's 
attitude and policy towards big business. Her Industrial Policy 
Statement of that year introduced a major departure from the 1956 
Industrial Policy Resolution (Siddharthan, 1979) as it followed the 
lead given by the Draft Fifth Plan, deemphasized the public sector's 
primary role in core sector industries and openly invited large
industrial concern (with assets of not less than Rs.200 million^) to 
participate in the development of a whole list of basic industries. 
This included, metallurgy, heavy machinery, electrical equipment, 
machine tools, agricultural machinery, chemicals, drugs, and cement. 
Equally it announced the liberalisation of the licensing policy which 
was widely welcomed by the business community (Datt & Sundharam, 1979, 
p.136).
Equally by this time, the end of Fourth Plan period (1969-74), it was 
becoming increasingly evident that the government's ability to
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implement a planned development programme and particularly to achieve 
its dual aims of growth and greater distribution of wealth was 
declining. Growth rates in both industry and agriculture were still 
well below the rates achieved during the Second and Third Plans and it 
was clear that very little real distribution of wealth was occulting. 
Indeed, Frankel goes as far as to conclude:
"... the clear outlines of an enclave pattern was emerging that 
threatened to harden into a permanent separation between a small 
high-productivity sector, both in industry and agriculture, and a vast 
agricultural hinterland in which the majority of the work force 
struggled with primitive techniques to meet their subsistence 
requirements." (1978, p.510)
At the same time there was an increase in the level of social protest. 
In industry, 1974 saw a record number of strikes and lockouts with over 
40 million mandays lost during the year (Tata Services, 1980 p.133) as 
workers protested at the fall in the real level of their wages due to 
inflation (Frankel, 1978 p.510). Widespread discontent was also 
becoming more evident in rural areas where several years of poor 
harvests had reduced food availability (Shetty, 1978 pp.11 & 27). 
Moreover, agricultural development policies, though successful in some 
areas, did not result in any pronounced improvement in food production 
and by and large had failed to improve the lot of smaller farmers and 
agricultural labourers.
The credibility of Mrs Gandhi's government was also declining with the 
failure of her economic policies and increasing evidence of corruption. 
The combination of these factors coupled with the growing dissent in 
organised politics finally led Mrs Gandhi to react with the declaration 
of Emergency on 25th June, 1975.
On the whole the two years of Emergency represented a fairly good time 
for Indian industrial capital. There was a dramatic drop in the number 
of strikes, though significantly not of lockouts, to levels about one 
tenth of those in 1974 (Tata Services, 1980 p.133). Equally production
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levels in industry and particularly in certain public sector industries 
rose dramatically so that the industrial production growth rate for
1975-76 topped 8%. However, the improvements were not evident 
everywhere and most consumer goods industries, and especially textiles 
remained stagnant (Frankel, 1978 pp.556-7).
On the economic policy side a further round of liberalisation in the 
licensing regulations was introduced in October 1975 and one month 
later the procedure for getting unauthorised excess production capacity 
regularised was eased. The number of licences issued increased rapidly: 
already in 1974 after the first liberalisation 1,099 licences were 
issued as against 597 the previous year, and in 1975 this was repeated 
with 1,027 issued (Datt & Sundharam, 1979, p.137).
The Emergency was, however, relatively short and in 1977 the Janata 
coalition succeeded in displacing Mrs Gandhi in a resounding election 
victory. In December of the same year the Janata Government announced 
its New Industrial Policy. Its most important feature is the emphasis 
it placed on the development of small scale industry. In what it 
claimed to be a return to the Gandhian philosophy (Singh, 1978) of 
industrial development it downgraded the importance to be given to 
large scale industry, stating:
"The government will not favour large scale industry merely for 
demonstration of sophisticated skills or as monuments of irrelevent 
foreign technology. The role of large scale industry will be related to 
the programme for meeting the basic minimum needs of the population 
through wider dispersal of small scale and village industries and 
strengthening of the agricultural sector." (quoted in Datt & Sundharam, 
1979, p.139)
Large scale industry was to be restricted to certain fairly specific 
sectors where small scale production was impossible or unrealistic; the 
growth of large business houses was to be reversed; licensing, 
particularly for expansions in capacity, was to be severely restricted 
and , public financial assistance for industry was to be channelled
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primarily into small scale projects. The public sector was to produce 
important and strategic goods, maintain essential supplies and to try 
and promote as much as possible the decentralisation of production by 
encouraging subcontracting to a wide range of ancillary units and by 
making its expertise and technology available to small scale and
cottage industry.
Instead a whole series of measures were taken to encourage small scale 
and even 'tiny' sectory industry. Most importantly the list of 
industrial production sectors reserved for small scale units was
greatly increased. During Mrs Gandhi's government it had included 180 
items but under Janata it was increased to at first 500 and then in 
1978 to over 800 items. On top of this moreover, a series of special 
incentives for SSIs were instituted and special government small scale 
industry promotion agencies offering a wide range of financial, 
technical, material and marketing assistance were established (Datt & 
Sundharam, 1979 pp.137-40).
The restrictions on large scale industry certainly had some effect as 
is evident in the dramatic fall in the number of industrial licences 
i s s u e d ^  . From the peak of over 1,000 licences issued in 1974 and 1975
the number fell to 662 in 1976, 518 in 1977 and as low as 348 in 1978
(Tata Services, 1980 p.118).
The other restrictive measure of the December 1977 New Industrial 
Policy is the final element of the industrial location policy. This was 
the ban on large scale industrial development or expansion in major 
urban areas. To a large extent the ban was the idea of George Fernandes 
the Janata Minister for Industry. It formed part of his economic 
philosphy which saw decentralisation of industry as a means of 
improving the living conditions of workers in industrial cities. But as 
well as the improvements to the congestion and growing pollution in 
urban areas, that it could be expected to encourage, the ban was a 
means to ensure that a higher proportion of investment, bqth public and 
private, was spent in rural areas on creating jobs, infrastructure, 
services and other developmental improvements. (Personal interview
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with erstwhile personal assistant to George Fernandes). Indeed, it 
seems that Fernandes was personally more interested in a New Towns 
policy, but this was too expensive for the government and had to be 
replaced with a simple decentralisation policy.
The ban imposed in 1977 was slightly liberalised in 1978 to allow for 
certain types of expansion on existing industrial premises in urban 
areas, but it still remained a fairly strict and easily applied policy 
measure. The main exemption to it was, of course, for small scale 
industries which would have anyway been much more difficult to impose 
but also fitted in with the Janata's government's overall policy to 
favour small scale rather than .large scale industry.
The Janata Government anti-large scale industry stance and the renewed 
inefficiency that crept back into many public. sector undertakings 
during its period in office meant that it was on the whole not popular 
with the Indian business community. Its industrial policy was also seen 
as unrealistic and idealist. Thus Mrs Gandhi's return to power in 
January 1980 was by and large greeted with enthusiasm by the 
industrialists who felt that she could be expected to provide a 
decisive, strong government better disposed towards large scale 
industry (personal interviews with industrialists in 1980; Paranjape, 
1980 & News Items, EPW 12 & 26 Jan 1980).
In sum the 1970s saw more major fluctuations in the relationship 
between the Indian state and industrial capital. The key figure 
throughout the decade is of course Mrs Gandhi. Her rise to the 
preeminent position in the Congress government in 1969 with the backing 
Of the more radical elements in the Party and a certain amount of 
personal popular support set the scene for the economic policy of the 
first part of the decade. A number of potentially strict measures were 
introduced including the MRTP Act, 1969 and the complex licensing 
procedures of 1970. But in the following years these measures were 
gradually liberalised, either formally or simply through the degree of 
strictness with which they were applied. Thoughout, however, they gave 
the continued appearance of strong government control over private
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tenterprise which was essential to maintaining Mrs Gandhi's political 
image as a champion of the poor. But by 1974-75 the situation was 
getting out of hand. The economy was still stagnant, both industrial 
and agricultural growth rates had failed to pick up and inflation was 
eroding the standard of living of industrial workers, agricultural
labourers and the poor. As a result social protest and political 
criticism increased and in June 1975 Mrs Gandhi felt obliged to declare 
the Emergency.
The Emergency brought limited benefits to industrialists in the form of 
greater efficiency in public sector industry and therefore more 
reliable supplies of certain , key materials to the private sector. 
Equally a sharp decline in industrial disputes improved production. The 
situation was reversed in 1977 with the end of the Emergency and the 
coming to power of the Janata Government. The latter with its 
pronounced anti-large scale industry attitude was not so popular 
amongst the nation's big industrial capitalists. Moreover, a renewed
incidence of inefficiency in public sector undertakings made life more 
difficult for private industrialists. Thus the return of Mrs Gandhi in 
1980 was welcomed in the expectance that she would be better disposed
towards big industrialists and would restore some sense of purpose and
direction into the nation's economic development.
Despite these fluctuations in the political arena and the changes in 
economic policy they induced, there are some more consistent lines 
which run right through the decade. Chief amongst these is the fact 
that the main emphasis in industrial policy was no longer on the public 
sector as it had been during the Second and Third Plans. Rather the 
approach became entrepreneurial. Industrial development was to be the 
product of private initiatives encouraged by public incentives, both 
financial and material. In to this the industrial dispersal policy 
fitted well. It provided a framework for the disbursement of incentives 
to industrialists and by stating that dispersal was a condition for the 
incentives it presented the incentives programme in a light that made 
it possible for the government to retain its populist appeal so 
essential to Mrs Gandhi's political survival.
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6. Economic Growth since the Mid-Sixties
Earlier in this Chapter (pp.103-106) the growth of India's economy 
under the first three Five Year Plans was discussed. It was noted that 
while growth throughout the period had been dramatic, by the end of it 
a number of major problems had come to light. Chief amongst these was 
the way low agricultural production growth was holding back growth in 
other sectors and the poor balance of payments situation.
This second period is characterised by more disturbing features. In 
particular while overall growth rates had been steady and fairly high 
up to about 1965, after that year they fell dramatically and have 
remained a good deal lower ever since. The few years which have seen a 
fairly high growth rate have been those when there occurred 
particularly good crops (Shetty, 1978 p.7; Chaudhuri, 1978 p.50-1). 
The decline in growth rates then has been most noticeable in industry. 
While industrial output had grown under the first three Plans, reaching 
an average of 9% growth per annum under the Third Plan (cf. above p.8), 
between 1966 and 1976 it dwindled to an average of 4,1 % per annum and 
this is including a high point of 10.6% per annum in 1976 (Shetty, 1978 
p.8). As Shetty demonstrates the decline in rates of growth of output 
was accompanied by low levels of investment, heavily underutilised 
production capacity and meagre employment growth (cf. also Frankel, 
1978 p.510). Equally there were a number of shifts in the 
characteristics of output. Thus while capital goods industries had done 
well under the Second and Third Plans, since then they have performed 
much more poorly. Instead there has been a marked rise in the output of 
consumer durables (Chaudhuri, 1978 p.68-9; Shetty, 1978 p.14). In 
addition production of mass consumption goods, something which had been 
deferred under the Second and Third Plans but which was seen as 
important during this latter period with the Fourth Plan, failed to 
register any major increase (Shetty, 1978 p.14). A final disturbing 
feature in industry has been the tendency towards investment in more 
capita.l intensive production methods since 1965 (Shetty, 1978 p.65).
Agricultural production growth has done slightly better than industry.
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Growth in output has continued at a relatively slow, but at least 
steady rate of around 2% per annum (1964 to 1972) (Chaudhuri, 1978 
p.58). The effect of the introduction of Green Revolution techniques 
has helped but the results have been patchy and there has been no 
significant reduction in regional inequalities in production 
(Chaudhuri, 1978 p.65). Thus the problem of increasing levels of 
agricultural output still remains an important one for the Indian 
economy.
The balance of payments situation has on the other hand improved. 
Exports have done much better since the devaluation of the rupee in 
1966 and equally there has been a dramatic decline in imports since 
then (Chaudhuri, 1978 pp.71-4). However, Chaudhuri concludes it is 
unlikely that the devaluation was the major reason for this 
improvement, instead he ascribes it to the overall low level of
economic activity during the period and also to the continuous net 
decline in foreign aid. Equally there has been a significant degree of 
import substitution in India's industrialisation during the period. 
Since 1973, on the other hand, the rise of oil prices has placed a new 
burden on the balance of payments so the problem has not been
completely eliminated and hence the continued government emphasis on
producing goods for export (Chaudhuri, 1978 p.74). Indeed this policy 
emphasis has had some effect and the composition of exports has 
considerably changed. While the proportion of traditional exports such 
as tea and jute have steadily declined, manufactured goods have taken 
their place, with steel products, engineering goods and minerals 
particularly prominent. The composition of imports has been more stable 
with very little consumer goods apart from food grains and high
proportions of intermediate and capital goods, representing the 
nation's continued dependence of foreign technology in more advanced 
fields (Chaudhuri, 1978 p.74-5).
The much slower growth in industrial employment is perhaps one of the 
most disappointing features of the period, Shetty sees this as part of 
a whole picture of widening inter class disparities, declining 
percapita availability of consumer goods and chronic inflation since
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1966 (Shetty, 1978 pp.26, 34, 36 & 39), indicating how the economic
recession and the failure of industrial growth have t r a n s l a t e d  into 
reality for the Indian population.
Finally Shetty studies in some detail the pattern that investment in 
the private industrial sector has taken. His conclusions are worth 
quoting at some length:
"First, a preponderant part of private industrial investment in recent 
years has been financed by loans from public sector financial 
institutions. The contributions from share capital and internal savings 
of the companies have been meagre. The promoter's contributions to the 
project costs have been allowed as a policy, to be kept at unusually 
low levels. Secondly, the colossal amounts of loans granted by the 
term-financing institutions have been palpably disproportionate to the 
meagre impact seen in industrial investment and output growth in real 
terms and particularly in employment. Thirdly, the easy availability of 
investible funds at relatively cheap cost, accompanied by the low 
personal stake of the promoters, seems to have induced higher capital 
intensity, siphoning off of funds, and general lack of cost 
conciousness. Lastly, this phenomenon of capital wastage and diversion 
accompanied by distortions in the patterns of investment and production 
has been encouraged by an atmosphere of laxity in governmental 
discipline and regulations for the private sector." (1978 p.67)
The Janata Government failed to make any impression on these problems 
and while, since the return of Mrs Gandhi the confidence of 
industrialists seems to have been restored (Lalbhai, 1982) and, 
industrial growth rates do appear to be increasing once more, there is 
however little indication that the structural problems identified by 
Shetty and other economists will be corrected.
7. Conclusions
The main point that this chapter has made apparent is that the 
relationship between the Indian state and industrial capital is a
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complex and fluctuating one. The state has been heavily involved in the 
nation's industrialisation since the mid 1950s, both directly through 
public sector industry and indirectly through planning, the licensing 
system and the incentives it provides to private sector industry. Thus 
the relationship has also been an intimate one.
Certainly it is impossible to portray this relationship in simple black 
and white terms. The Indian state has never been simply pro or anti 
industry. Its actions have combined measures that industrial 
capitalists have welcomed with many that they have resoundingly 
criticised. Indeed it has also often favoured some industrialists at 
the expense of others and frequently what have appeared to be its most 
restrictive policies have been toned down by not being applied as 
strictly as they might. This complexity makes it extremely difficult to 
decide just how much one particular state measure such as the 
industrial dispersal policy of the 1970s should be seen as a measure 
restrictive of industry.
It is also hard to associate the genesis of the industrial dispersal 
policy with any particular government or ideological position among the 
national leadership. This is because it appeared at one of the points 
of Indian post Independence history when political alignments amongst 
the leadership were changing constantly. This in turn was causing major 
changes in economic planning and policy formulation. Just as there was 
no smooth transition on the political side, the precise ramifications 
and overall direction of the economic policy changes are difficult to 
unravel even now with the benefit of ten years hindsight.
As was described in the previous chapter the subject of industrial 
dispersal was first discussed seriously in the Third Five Year Plan. At 
this point however, no mention was made of incentives to encourage 
dispersal, but the problem of uneven development was recognised and it 
was recommended that wherever possible both public and private industry 
should try and locate in backward areas. This Plan was of course 
prepared at the height of the Nehru planning era but while, the 
Planning Commission considered the issue at some length, they did not
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propose any serious measures to implement the dispersal they proposed. 
Interestingly the first draft of the Fourth Plan (1966) which was 
prepared by the same Commission ignores the subject completely.
Whether this change was a result of the ideas of the new government 
after Nehru's death in 1964 is unclear, but certainly other economic 
policies changed, becoming much more liberal in their attitude towards 
private industrial capital throughout the two years of Shastri's 
government. The liberalisation trend started by Shastri was carried on 
by Mrs Gandhi. Initially her personal political position was not strong 
and economic and planning policy was primarily influenced by the views 
of Morarji Desai the finance minister and deputy prime minister. It was 
during these years that the Planning Commission was reshuffled and D.R. 
Gadgil brought in as its chairman, thereby removing the last vestige of 
Nehru's approach to planning from the higher echelons of government. 
The two crucial Working Groups under Pande and Wanchoo which laid the 
groundwork for the industrial dispersal policy were also commissioned 
at this time and it is therefore reasonable to assume that, initially 
at least, they were strongly affected by the economic planning views of 
Gadgil and Desai. Indeed this would conform with the fact that the 
Gadgil Planning Commission's redraft of the Fourth Plan (1969) was the 
first official document to outline the entrepreneurial approach of 
industrial growth and dispersal encouraged by financial incentives from 
the public purse, that the industrial dispersal policy was to adopt. 
This second draft of the Fourth Plan was published a few months before 
the Pande and Wanchoo reports appeared and further elaborated this same 
approach.
However, at this point the course of events was interrupted by the
split in the Congress Party which put Mrs Gandhi and Morarji Desai in
opposing camps. Mrs Gandhi remained in Government and consolidated her
position with the important electoral victory of 1971. Shortly 
afterwards the Gadgil Commission resigned. The two intervening years 
(1969-71) are however, extremely important as this is the time when 
some of Mrs Gandhi's most radical economic policy measures were 
enforced in the face of much criticism from the business community.
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Amongst them the industrial dispersal policy was also put into force 
and throughout the period Gadgil, though increasingly critical of Mrs 
Gandhi's actions, remained deputy chairman of the Planning Commission.
As a result of this complex history of events the industrial policy 
emerged as a combination of a whole string of different influences. The 
original idea and the principle of dispersal as a means to fight 
underdevelopment was derived from Nehru's Planning Commission. This was 
blended with a method of implementation based on the entrepreneurial 
approach to economic policy formulated by the more conservative and pro 
private enterprise elements of Congress represented by Shastri, Morarji 
Desai and Gadgil. Finally on top of this it received a radical image as 
a policy involving strict state control of industrial capital through 
direct association with the other radical measures Mrs Gandhi was 
pushing through at the time it was implemented. A few years later in 
December 1977 the industrial dispersal policy package received its 
final element, the ban on industrial development in major cities. This 
measure, which in many ways is the strictest element of the package, 
seems to have been a direct result of the Janata Government's fairly 
clear anti-large scale industry stance and its Gandhian view that large 
scale industry should serve village development combined with a concern 
for living conditions of the poor and of workers in congested 
industrial cities.
Before ending this chapter we must also consider its other concern and 
that is the problems faced by industrialists which might encourage them 
to choose new dispersed locations for their new factories. Again this 
is a vast and complex subject and this chapter had been able to do no 
more than touch on the main problems of Indian industry in the various 
stages of its post Independence development. Unfortunately also, while 
there exist a good number of economic analyses of these problems there 
is very little material on how the industrialists themselves viewed 
their problems- throughout 1970s, the period we are most interested in.
The first major point that emerged from the preceding study is that 
for the entire period from 1966 to the start of the 1980s, industrial
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growth in India has been limited, with very restricted levels of 
industrial investment. Moreover, what investment has occurred has 
tended to favour capital intensive technology and has been increasingly 
in the sectors of consumer durables and production for export. 
Production, of mass consumption goods has been neglected, however. 
Because of low production rates and poorly regulated investment there 
also emerged considerable unused capacity in many industrial sectors.
These trends imply first that there can only have been a strictly 
limited amount of new industrial plant which could be located in
backward areas during the period. Secondly, the tendency towards the
use of more capital intensive technology suggests a certain degree of 
deskilling and the possible desire on the part of industrialists to
employ unskilled or even new labour which they could train themselves 
to the required levels. Thirdly, the fact that there was an increasing 
tendency to produce consumer durables and articles for export, both 
goods for which the Indian market is restricted and highly competitive, 
suggests that productivity and keeping production costs down would be 
an important consideration for industrialists throughout the period.
Both these latter points suggest that industrialists would be coming 
into confrontation with the industrial trade union movement, and 
certainly there was a good deal of industrial unrest in India during
the 1970s though this was also related to inflation and falling real
wage levels.
A study of the 1970s issues of Indian economic and business journals 
such as Commerce and the Economic and Political Weekly which report 
statements made by prominent industrialists and chambers of commerce
and industry suggests that there are five problem areas about which
industrialists complained more frequently than others. Three of these 
involve the' government directly: uncertainty about the government's
intentions for private enterprise (particularly strong after a number 
of nationalisations in the early 1970s), delays in obtaining licences 
and other permits (particularly after the establishment of the 
Monopolies Commission in 1969 and the strengthening of industrial 
licensing in 1970) and shortages of materials from the public sector,
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particularly steel and electricity but also railway wagons. The fourth 
major problem was labour unrest manifesting itself in increasing 
numbers of strikes and lockouts. There is little doubt that 
industrialist see this as one of the most important problems they face, 
as is evident from one of the FICCI's statements shortly after Mrs 
Gandhi's return to power in January 1980: "labour indiscipline has been 
the root cause of economic malaise." (quoted in EPW 16.1.80) The final 
problem referred to at various points was the lack of credit or finance 
which is more difficult to understand given the increasing levels of 
financial assistance to industry provided by the public lending 
institutions.
Out of all these problems faced by industrialists the only one that can 
have any direct impact on industrial location decisions is labour 
unrest as India's trade unions are not surprisingly heavily 
concentrated in the major urban industrial centres. But it is also 
important to note that industrialists ascribed a lot of their problems 
to state actions and that they were also heavily dependent on finance 
from the state at a time when otherwise finance was felt to be 
restricted. These intimate links with the state meant that it was 
crucial for industrialists to keep on the good side of the various 
government departments they had to deal with. In sum it would seem that 
there were both practical economic reasons related to productivity and 
profits, and a certain degree of political expediency or diplomacy 
which prompted industrialists to fall in with the industrial dispersal 
policy of the Indian state.
Similarly, on the side of the. state while there was a certain political 
mileage to be gained from pushing a policy which appeared to increase 
state regulation of private enterprise. Moreover, this policy also made 
it possible for the state to finance private enterprise on an important 
scale without appearing to be giving something for nothing or seeming 
to favour unduly one already fairly privileged group in Indian society. 
To a large extent then the interests of the Indian state and Indian 
industrial capital could both be accommodated in a policy of industrial 
dispersal to backward areas.
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Just how important the various factors outlined above were in 
encouraging industrialists to locate new factories in backward areas 
will now be studied in more detail in the context of a single Indian 
State and one of the nation's more industrialised States: Tamil Nadu.
Footnotes:
1 The power struggle in the Congress was essentially a feud between the 
older conservative group of senior Congressmen who had put Mrs Gandhi 
in power and a group of younger socialist radicals in the Congress 
Forum for Socialist Action (CFSA). As it became apparent that the 
conservative group wanted to replace Mrs Gandhi as the party leader, 
she in turn was offered support by the Forum which she gradually 
accepted and came to depend on. Ultimately the conflict led to a 
split in the Party in November 1969. Mrs Gandhi and her followers 
from the Forum were labelled the Congress (R) (Requisition) while the 
more conservative members, among them Morarji Desai, were referred to 
as the Congress (0) (Organisation).
As Mrs Gandhi depended for her support during this conflict on the 
members of the socialist Forum her statements and actions became 
noticeably more radical during the latter half of 1969 leading up to 
the split. A good indication of her thinking on economic issues is 
offered by an Economic Note she presented to a Congress Parliamentary 
Party Meeting in Bangalore in July 1969. This Note included proposals 
to appoint a monopolies commission; to ban the entry of big business 
into consumer goods industries; to restrict foreign capital 
investment to sectors in which technology was not available in the 
country; to build up a professional management cadre for public 
sector industries; to nationalise banks; and crucially, to reorient 
the credit policies of financial institutions to favour new 
entrepreneurs in less developed regions of the country. While Mrs 
Gandhi's Note conflicted with many of the ideas of the conservative 
■ Party leaders and drew on another Note that members of the Forum had 
drawn up, it nevertheless was based on the least radical proposals of 
the latter. Mrs Gandhi's Note was accepted at the Bangalore meeting
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but then the conservative wing of the Congress managed to put forward 
their candidate as the Party candidate for the forthcoming 
presidential election, displacing the person Mrs Gandhi favoured. Mrs 
Gandhi responded quickly, sacked Morarji Desai as Finance Minister 
(he then resigned as Deputy Prime Minister) and before the end of 
July announced the nationalisation of 14 commercial banks by 
presidential ordinance. Nor was that all. With the help of her 
supporters she removed party whips from the presidential election and 
managed by a narrow margin to get another candidate of more left wing 
sympathies elected: V.V.Giri. Both the bank nationalisation and the
election of V.V. Giri were seen by the public to be largely Mrs 
Gandhi's personal doing and they sparked off widespread 
demonstrations of public support which for the first time gave Mrs 
Gandhi an evident popular political base of her own. (Frankel, 1978 
pp.417-429)
2 This was in effect the same group of firms as were covered by the 
MRTP Act, thereby somewhat negating the point of the Act.
3 It is, however, widely accepted by both industrialists and government 
officials that many large firms got round these restrictions by 
setting up or sponsoring small scale firms to produce the items they 
would previously have applied for a licence to produce themselves 
(based on personal interviews).
134
CHAPTER 5
TAMIL NADU AS AN INDUSTRIAL REGION
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TAMIL NADU AS AN INDUSTRIAL REGION
Tamil Nadu is the third most industrialised State in India, ranking 
after Maharashtra and West Bengal in terms of industrial employment and 
value added, coming third equal with Gujarat in terms of gross output 
and fifth in terms of invested capital (after Bihar as well as 3 other 
States just mentioned) (cf. Tata Services 1980, p.72). The roots of 
this third place in Indian industry go right back to the beginnings of 
modern industry in the subcontinent. Both Bombay and Calcutta had a 
head start of 20 to 25 years over Madras where the first cotton mills 
only opened in 1875 (Saunders 1975, p.5).
Cotton spinning and weaving have remained Tamil Nadu's most important 
industry, though in the years since Independence a wide selection of 
other industries have developed, giving the State a diversified 
industrial economy known as much as for its engineering and chemicals 
as for its cotton. The State's industrial products make an important 
contribution to national production levels. To quote an official State 
government publication:
"The place of Tamil Nadu in the. industrial map of India can be judged 
from the fact that today it accounts for 31.2% of hides and 
skins - chrome tanned; 28.1% of the power driven pumps; 23.1% of flour 
milling and grinding products; 21.1% of caustic soda; 20.9% of 
bicycles; 18.8% of asbestos cement products; 16.7% of cement; 16.6% of 
yarn; 16.0% of superphosphate; 14.3% of power transformers and 13.1% of 
tea manufactured in India."
(GoTN, Tamil Nadu an Economic Appraisal 1971, p.22)
This list indicates the variety of the State's industry and while there 
is no need to give a detailed account of all its different sectors 
here, a few notes on some of the more important ones are necessary to 
put the later discussion on industrial location into an economic 
context.
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/1. Major Industries of Tamil Nadu
To start again with cotton, this textile industry is now mostly located 
in the cotton growing country of western Tamil Nadu around Coimbatore 
and stretching southwards to Madurai and Ramanathapuram. This is 
particularly true since the recent closure (1980) of the last big old 
mills in Madras, the Buckingham & Carnatic Mills. Of the 1,000 odd 
cotton textile factories in the State, over half are in the taluks 
around Coimbatore and eastwards from there to Tiruchengode and Salem 
(cf. Maps 17-8, Mackie, 1981). The mills vary considerably in size, the 
largest employing up to two or three thousand workers. As an industry, 
one of the problems it is facing, and the one to which the B. & C. 
Mills fell prey, is the lack of modernisation of outdated machinery in 
the older mills. Modern and fully automated looms are readily available 
however, and indeed are manufactured in Coimbatore itself. These are 
being installed in most newer mills. While handloom cotton weaving is 
also important in the State in the cottage or household industry 
sector, competition between the modern and traditional sectors is not 
too intense as each have their own fairly distinct market for their 
produce. There is however, an inadequate supply of raw cotton to meet 
the demand from the installed' capacity in mills. Thus a number of 
producers are switching to use a proportion of non-cotton fibre such as 
viscose and polyester. The Indian Government is encouraging them to do 
so with duty-free import of viscose and better credit facilities to 
meet higher costs. (GoTN, Economic Appraisal 1978, p.37-8) As a result 
of this trend new machinery being installed in mills is usually 
designed to cope with both cotton and non-cotton fibres.
The other major agro-based industry in the State is sugar refining. 
There are about 20 large sugar mills in the State, of which about half 
are privately owned. The other half are cooperatives, with a few public 
sector mills holding the balance. Although the industry already existed 
in the State before Independence it only expanded rapidly since the 
1950s with a few annual setbacks from bad droughts or particularly 
severe cyclones. The Tamil Nadu Government encourages the growth of the 
cooperative sector and several new mills have been opened recently or
137
are expected to open shortly. Most mills are located in villages and 
small towns in the middle of their sugarcane production area. 
Regionally they are dispersed throughout central, northern and eastern 
Tamil Nadu. (GoTN, Policy Note on Industrial Development, 1978)
Tamil Nadu and particularly the northern part of the State, Madras and 
North Arcot to the west of it, is probably the most important tanning 
centre of the whole of India. Traditionally tanning was carried out as 
a cottage industry and the tanned or semi-tanned hides were exported to 
London iri bulk from where they were distributed to leather goods 
manufacturers throughout Europe. Since Independence the industry has, 
however, gone through some major changes. First of all production has 
expanded so much that skins and hides now have to be brought from all 
over India for finishing and tanning, local supplies having become 
inadequate. The scale of production has also led to larger units being 
organised and more modern methods being used. Finally the nature of the 
export trade, which has remained important, is currently changing with 
more finished or partially finished leather goods being exported and 
fewer hides. Curiously while this is an important industry in the 
State, it is one that receives scant attention in government reports on 
industrial development. This may be partly due to the fact that the 
industry is virtually entirely controlled, originally for religious 
reasons, by the small and closely knit Moslem community in northern 
Tamil Nadu. The fact that the industry is still expanding would seem to 
indicate, however, that the community is reasonably self-sufficient 
with enough economic muscle of its own to finance expansion.
The chemical industry in the State includes the production of a variety 
of inorganic industrial chemicals and petrochemicals as well as having 
branches in pharmaceuticals and fertilisers. Again this is an industry 
with pre-Independence roots (in North and South Arcot) which has 
expanded a lot in the 1960s and latterly, in the 1970s, with a number 
of joint sector plants. The industry is mostly concentrated around 
Madras with the Central Government Madras Refineries (petrochemicals) 
and Madras Fertilisers dominating the sector in the city. The other 
major concentration is in the Tuticorin-Tirunelveli area in the south,
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are
where recent joint sector petrochemical and fertiliser projects have 
been located near local sources of raw materials (salts). Smaller 
chemical and pharmaceutical units are located throughout the State in 
or near the more important towns. (TIDCO Annual Report 1979; Maps 21-4, 
Mackie, 1981). Two other important Central Government factories in the 
sector are located in the Nilgiris hills: Hindustan Photo Films and a 
cordite factory. These are major employers in this otherwise 
underindustrialised area. Finally the traditional matchmaking industry 
in the Sattur-Sriviliputtur taluks in the south is a major employer^ 
within Sattur alone, some 200 units employing up to 40,000 workers 
^//tegistered on the Inspector of Factories List (Mackie, 1981). Many of j
these units, however, only operate seasonally, without power and with 
little, machinery.
Cement production, which used to be largely a North Indian industry, is 
now carried on in the State in half a dozen private plants and in two 
major Public Sector plants at Alangulam, Ramanathapuram Dt. and 
Ariyalur, Tiruchirapalli District. Both these plants were only built in 
the 1970s and the latter one is not yet in operation. The location of 
cement plants is largely related to deposits of raw materials in 
different parts of southern and' central Tamil Nadu. Cement is a basic 
material which is still very much in short supply in India and even 
though both Madras and Tuticorin ports handle imports of cement, 
supplies of cement in the State are inadequate (GoTN, Economic 
Appraisal 1978; TANCEM Annual Report, 1978).
Tamil Nadu is also well known for its metal based engineering
industries. These consist primarily of transport equipment 
manufacturing and industrial machinery manufacturing with related 
ancillary industries and in particular a well developed foundry
industry. The first engineering firms appeared in Madras before the 
First World War (Saunders, 1975, p.6) while the autoindustry started in 
the inter War years (Dupuis, 1960, p.250). With large firms such as 
Ashok Ley land producing commercial vehicles, the Enfield India Co. 
producing motorcycles and numerous smaller firms producing related rj
ancillaries, the autoindustry is now one of the most important in the
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city. The Public sector Integral Coach Factory set up on the outskirts 
of Madras in the mid-1950s and the Tube Investments bicycle factory 
also make the city an important centre in other transport equipment 
industries. With a few important exceptions the transport equipment 
industry has dispersed very little from Madras to other parts of the 
State, though motor repair workshops exist in all major cities and most 
towns. The exceptions consist primarily of major railway workshops in 
Arkonam due West of Madras and in Tiruchirapalli further south. In the 
1970s Enfield India also started a new plant for motorcycle 
manufacturing in Tirupattur taluk in Ramanathapuram. Finally again in 
the 1970s a joint sector shipbuilding yard was started at Mandapam in 
Ramanathapuram taluk (Mackie/ 1981 Maps 25-8) (TIDCO Annual Report 
1979).
While transport equipment manufacturing has remained very concentrated 
in and around Madras, general engineering industries have dispersed 
more widely as well as retaining their base in the State capital. Of 
particular importance is Coimbatore which has become one of the 
foremost foundry and industrial machinery manufacturing centres in 
India. The initial impetus was provided by the location of cotton 
textile mills in the city in the late 19th Century. These required 
repair and maintenance work which gradually developed into a fully 
fledged cotton textile machinery manufacturing industry. Parallel to 
the textile machinery manufacturing, the production of agricultural 
pumpsets became extremely important in the city, and when the demand 
for these began to decline in the 1970s the industry broadened its 
scope to cater for all kinds of foundry work. There are now a wide 
range of foundries in the city that attract orders from all over India 
and even abroad (The Economists Group, 1980, p.16). Apart from 
Coimbatore and a number of small engineering firms scattered around the 
major towns, Madras still retains some of the more major structural 
engineering firms of the State such as Best & Crompton, Shardlows or 
TVS. TVS also maintains major workshop facilities in a number of other 
cities such as Coimbatore, Madurai or Tiruchirapalli.
Electrical engineering is another established industry in the State.
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Again while largely concentrated in Madras it is also important in 
Coimbatore, where the manufacture of electric motors originated as part 
of the pumpset manufacturing industry. Finally Tiruchirapalli is a 
centre of major importance due to the location there of the public 
sector Bharat Heavy Electricals (BHEL) heavy boiler plant. The BHEL 
plant which employs about 11,000 workers itself has also encouraged the 
development of up to 60 smaller ancillary firms around it. Though the 
electrical engineering industry may be fairly well developed in the 
State, there has been very little movement into electronics. The one 
major exception to this is the public sector Hindustan Teleprinters 
plant in Madras and a smattering of small firms producing individual 
electronic components. This is in sharp contrast to the neighbouring 
State of Karnataka, where Bangalore, traditionally a centre for 
defense-related and strategic industries such as aeronautics and 
telecommi^ications, is fast becoming the most important electronics 
centre in India. Many of the small electronic components units that are 
beginning to appear in Tamil Nadu are orienting their products towards 
the Bangalore market.
Tamil Nadu has very little basic industry or mining. Mention should be 
made, however, of the government Neyveli Lignite Corporation which is 
one of the State's most important thermal power stations based on a 
lignite mine. Neyveli is in South Arcot District 50 kilometres South 
west of Pondicherry. The Mettur Aluminium plant at the Mettur Dam North 
west of Salem is also important as it is one of the few aluminium 
plants in India. Finally the new government Salem Steel Plant should 
shortly be providing the only local source of cold rolled stainless 
steel sheets and strips. Apart from these sources all mineral and 
metallic raw materials have to be imported from other parts of India.
2. Materials for Industry
Inadequate supplies of electric power are possibly one of the biggest 
obstacles to faster industrial growth in Tamil Nadu. The State has half 
a dozen major hydroelectric power stations (GoTN, Economic Appraisal 
1978 p.50) as well as a number of smaller ones, and hydroelectricity
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accounts for about two thirds of the power generated in the State. In 
addition there are thermal power stations at Neyveli (cf. above), 
Ennore near Madras and Tuticorin in the south. The Neyveli Power 
Station, however, is a Central Government project and the State 
Electricity Board has to buy the power it uses from the station. As 
well as this the Board imports electricity from Kerala to meet the 
shortfall of generation in relation to consumption, and for the last
few years consumption has exceeded generation by about 25% (since
1976-7; cf. Table from pp.52-4, GoTN Economic Appraisal 1978).
Industry uses nearly 50% of the electricity consumed in the State and 
with severe power cuts being imposed on industry for various periods 
since 1976, latent demand, though virtually impossible to estimate 
precisely, must be a good deal higher still. It is hoped that the 
expansion of the Neyveli lignite mine and the commissioning of the 
Kalpakkam Nuclear Power Station in the next few years will enable the 
Board to meet this excess demand.
Tamil Nadu is not particularly rich in mineral raw materials for 
industry. It has to import most of its requirements in basic metals as 
well as coal and petroleum for fuel. There are, however, a few 
exceptions and on the whole these are taken full advantage of: most of
them forming the basis for industrial production in the State as well
as the initial extraction industry.
The Neyveli lignite mine and power station, the Mettur aluminium plant 
next to bauxite reserves, the graphite deposits in the Sattur match 
production area, the various cement factories near limestone deposits 
hnd the alkali chemical industry next to salt pans in Southern Tamil 
Nadu are all examples of industrial growth based directly on mineral 
deposits in the State. By and large these industries are some of the 
newer and relatively less important industries in the State, but they 
do illustrate the increasing emphasis being placed on the availability 
of local materials guiding industrial expansion and the location of new 
factories. To a large extent this is a definite and cor^cious policy, 
evident from the fact that many of these industries are implemented or
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at least actively encouraged by government industrial promotion 
agencies.
3. Employment in Industry
Employment data in India are always somewhat imprecise and selective 
but data on employment in organised industry are better than most. The 
State Directorate for Employment and Training figures for 1978 list 
442,400 people as employed in manufacturing industry in the State,
351,500 in the private sector and 90,900 in the public sector. The 
Inspector of Factories List for the 1st of January 1979, however, 
suggests the level is about' 788,000 (Mackie, 1981). Two factors 
probably account for most of the difference, besides of course the fact 
that the Inspector of Factories List is not a precise account of the 
number of employed but an indication of the maximum number of people 
employed in each factory throughout the year. First the Inspector's 
List also includes workers in Electricity, Gas and Water Supply, which 
in the Directorate's List would set the comparable figure at 524,300. 
The rest of the difference must be largely, due to the fact that the 
Inspectors List includes all factories with 10 or more workers (20 or 
more without power) while the Directorate of Employment only covers 
those with 25 or more (GoTN Economic Appraisal 1978 p.56).
Given that the Inspector's List therefore covers a larger proportion of 
smaller units the figure of 788,000 can be taken as a more helpful 
indication of the level of industrial employment in the State, despite 
the fact that it is not collected for this purpose and may slightly 
exaggerate employment levels in each factory. With a total population 
of approximately 50 million in 1979, Tamil Nadu State therefore had 
about 1.5% of its population employed in organised industry which is 
somewhat higher than the national average of 1%. As with the All-India 
case industrial employment in Tamil Nadu grew throughout the 1970s at 
an average rate of 2%, or slightly more slowly than the overall 
population was growing (GoTN, Economic Appraisal 1978).
143
4. Small Scale Industry
The biggest problem facing analysts of small scale industry is data. 
There is no one source of existing data that is comprehensive in its 
coverage. The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) covers only registered 
factories that employ 50 or more workers with the aid of power and 100 
without power. The Directorate of Employment starts its register with 
firms of 25 or more workers, while the Inspector of Factories List 
starts from factories with 10 or more which makes it, given the 
limitations just discussed in the previous section, the most 
comprehensive of the three. In addition the Directorate of Industries & 
Commerce, a department of the State Government, maintains a register of 
small scale units but, unlike the other three sources just mentioned, 
registration on this is not compulsory unless the firm is requesting 
some form of government assistance. Thus even this source is far from 
comprehensive and would tend to have an overrepresentation of firms 
which are either just starting up or are running into trouble, and 
fewer well established and financially sound units.
Kurien & James (1979) in their discussion of small scale industry in 
Tamil Nadu in the 1960s (pp.122-126) point out that while the ASI for 
1960 lists 225,000 workers employed in large scale industry on its 
register 'for Tamil Nadu, the 1961 Census included 848,000 persons 
employed in 'manufacturing industry' in the State. As they suggest the 
difference between the two figures gives some indication of the 
importance of the small scale industrial sector, both unorganised and 
organised (registered). Above all it indicates that anything up to 
three quarters of the industrial labour force in Tamil Nadu is employed 
in small scale industrial units. However, considerable doubt is thrown 
on this estimate by the figures from the Inspector of Factories List 
for 1979, unfortunately nearly twenty years later but no earlier year 
was available (Mackie 1981); nevertheless the change is so dramatic as 
to be of relevance. The Factories List for 1979 indicates 788,000 
people as employed in industry in the State; of this 170,000 are in 
factories of between 10 and 50 workers with power and 20 and 100 
without, and therefore below the limit of the ASI. This means that in
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1979, 618,000 workers would have been covered by the ASI, a nearly
three-fold increase in 19 years but quite possible since in 1970 the 
ASI figure was 483,000 (Kurien & James, 1979 p.108). What is more 
surprising is that of the 623,000 (848,000 minus 225,000) workers in 
manufacturing industry in 1960-1 which fell below the ASI limit only a 
very few can have been employed in units of between 10 and 50 workers 
(or 20 and 100 without power) as by 1979 this section only employed
170.000 workers, and from all other indications it would seem that 
small scale industry grew fairly steadily in the intervening years
(Kurien & James, 1979 p.124-5). In the absence of the ASI figures for 
1979 and until the 1981 Census data become available, it is impossible 
to check these figures more effectively, but as they stand they would 
seem to indicate that a very high proportion of people listed as 
employed in 'manufacturing industry' in the Census are employed in 
small scale units with less than 10 workers.
In effect this latter conclusion is entirely possible as the national
Census of Small Scale Units taken in 1972 indicated that Tamil Nadu had
the largest number of small scale units of all States in the Union,
16.000 units employing 215,200 workers, figures which themselves are 
already a good deal higher than the Inspector of Factories figures of
5,500 units (below 50 workers) employing 170,000 workers in 1979.
Allowing for increases in the intervening seven years there are 
obviously still many units, falling below the remit of the Inspector of 
Factories.
One final data problem that Kurien & James themselves raise is that
there is a change in the definitions used for 'worker' between the 1961
and 1971 Censi (1979, pp.123 & 65). The effect of this they argue, is 
to exclude a higher proportion of workers in unorganised industry from 
the 1971 Census than from the 1961 Census. Subject to these various
definitional problems they do propose some tentative suggestions about
trends in the small scale sector during the 1960s; to these it is 
possible to add a few equally tentative suggestions about trends during 
the 1970s.
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First, Kurien & James (1979, p.123) point to a striking decline in the 
absolute size of the small scale sector in Madras during the 1960s, 
with employment plummeting from 90,000 to 19,000. They suggest 
therefore that there has been a major shift from employment in the 
small scale sector to the large scale sector during the decade. 
Interestingly, the comparable figure from the Inspector of Factories 
List for 1979 (i.e. firms with 10-50 workers and power, and 20-100
without) is 23,000 which suggests a 21% increase in employment in the 
small scale sector during the 1970s in Madras City. At 2.1% per annum, 
this growth rate compares favourably with the overall industrial 
employment growth rate for the State of 2% quoted above (cf. p.143).
Secondly, Kurien & James (1979, p.124) suggest the reverse happened 
during the 1960s in Coimbatore District with employment in the sector
increasing from 72,000 to 143,000 while the large scale sector
registered a decline. Here the comparability of their figures with the 
Inspector of Factories List data seems to break down entirely, the 
comparable figure for 1979 given by the List being 25,000 workers. The 
only apparent explanation for such a major difference would seem to be 
that Coimbatore Dt. has a very high proportion of factories outside the 
Factories Act (i.e. not included’ in the Inspector's List). Certainly it 
has been established elsewhere (The Economists Group, 1980, p.22) that 
there is a high incidence of units deliberately employing less than 10 
people in the foundry industry in Coimbatore. The sample survey of this 
particular study set the proportion as high as 53% (ibid, p.22) of
'units, and there are at least 350 foundry units in Coimbatore (ibid,
p.5). It also indicated that there were teams of specialist foundry 
workers moving on contract from one unit to another to handle specific 
tasks that required more labour. According to the definition of 
'factory' in the 1948 Factories Act (Mackie 1981 p.11) such behaviour 
should include these units in the Inspector's List, but since they 
operate like this precisely in order to avoid inclusion in the List 
they must apparently be succeeding. However, even if we accept that 
there may be’ as many as 175 to 200 foundry units in Coimbatore which 
have escaped inclusion in the List, they can only be employing under
2,000 workers between them plus some more in the mobile specialist
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teams. In no way can these few thousand explain the 118,000 difference 
between the figures we have for 1970 and 1979. The only other way this
might be explained is if employment in cotton mills in the District,
which is very high (about 119,000 in 1979 according to the Inspector's
List) but which is mostly concentrated in large units of one thousand
or more workers, is somehow listed differently in the ASI and the 
Census upon which Kurien and James base their figures. No other 
industry in the District employs enough people to make up the 
difference.
The Inspector of Factories List in fact suggests that Madras has more 
factories with few workers, while Coimbatore has more large scale 
employers (Mackie, 1981, p.8) though nearly all of these are cotton
textile mills. Otherwise the List suggests that the Coimbatore to Salem 
industrial belt in Tamilnadu is made up mostly of small scale employers 
and that the same is true in the Tirunelveli-Tuticorin area and around 
Madurai, while Tiruchy has a more even distribution of large and small 
scale employers.
The major point to emerge from this section on small scale industry is 
the confusion that exists about its nature and size. It is obvious that 
small scale employers are important in the State economy as at the 
highest estimate they employ up to three quarters, of the industrial 
workforce. It is also apparent that small scale units exist not only in 
rural areas but make up a large proportion of the urban industry in the 
-State. Finally it would appear that in employment terms the sector is 
providing new jobs at a very similar rate to the average rate for all 
industry.
5. The Spatial Distribution of Industry in Tamil Nadu
According to Kurien & James (1979, p.112) the most striking feature of 
industrialisation in Tamil Nadu during the 1960s is the way in which 
the spatial concentration of industry increased dramatically during the 
decade, thereby leaving much of the State totally unaffected. Madras 
was the focus for most of this industrialisation:
147
"Hence, it can be stated that the city of Madras and two of its 
neighbouring taluks together came to have by the beginning of the 
seventies close to two thirds of the productive capital employed in 
large scale industry in the State, over half of the value added, a 
little less than half of the workers and almost a third of the number 
of factories" (ibid, p.112).
Again without any directly comparable data it is impossible to draw any 
strict conclusion about possible spatial changes during the 1970s. 
However, the Inspector of Factories' List for 1979 does give a more 
recent and detailed picture of the distribution of factories in the 
State and indeed seems to indicate that there may have been some 
changes in the spatial trends since the sixties.
Table 1: Concentration of Industry in and around Madras
Number of Factories With 50 or more workers With 10 or more
1960 1970 1979 1979
Madras City 165 247 222 998
Saidapet ) 30 • 230 ( 210 795
Sriperumbudur ) ( 14 38
Total Madras region 165 477 446 1,831
idem as % of State 20.8 29.6 16.3 22.1
Total for State 793 1,612 2,728 8,286
Number of Workers
Madras City 38,758 160,116 72,261 94,671
Saidapet ) 10,000 60,000 ( 62,838 80,268
Sriperumbudur) ( 12,726 13,436
Total Madras region 48,758 220,116 147,825 188,375
idem as % of State 21.7 45.6 23.9 23.9
Total for State 225,000 483,000 618,022 788,127
Sources: Kurien & James , 1979, pp .108-110 (columns 1 & 2); Mackie, 1981
pp.12-14 (columns 3 & 4)
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Table 1 documents the concentration of factories and workers in Madras 
that Kurien & James refer to in the above quotation. Evidently they are 
correct to point to the increasing spatial concentration of industry in 
the city during the 1960s, however, on the basis of the Inspector of 
Factories data this concentration appears to have been reversed during 
the 1970s. As the Table shows the concentration of large factories in 
and around Madras dropped from 29.6% of the State total to 16.3% by 
1979, though the drop is not so remarkable if the smaller factories on 
the Inspectors List are included as well (Column 4: 22.1%). This drop 
is in relative terms only, the absolute number of factories remains 
similar, indicating that industrial growth during the 1970s occurred 
mostly outside Madras. The proportion of workers in large factories in 
the City has also nearly halved from 45.6% to 24% by 1979. These latter 
figures for the number of workers will of course be affected by the
apparent difference in coverage between the ASI and the Inspector's
List referred to earlier (cf. p.146) in connection with Coimbatore, as 
a high proportion of the big employers on the list are located in 
Coimbatore. Even so, the absolute number of workers in large factories 
in' Madras has also dropped suggesting that large factories are 
employing fewer workers, possibly as a result of rationalisation or 
increased mechanisation.
However, even allowing for a fairly wide margin of error to take 
account of the differences in data bases used for 1970 and 1979, it 
would seem possible to conclude that there has been some
deconcentration of industry in the State away from Madras during the 
1970s and thus a reversal of the trend noted by Kurien & James in the 
1960s. In passing it is also worth noting from Table 1 and the 
differences between columns 3 and 4 in the Table, the way the presence 
of smaller firms (employing less than 50 workers) pushes up the level 
of industrial concentration in the city. This indicates, as already 
referred to above (cf. p.145) , how small industry is more heavily
concentrated in the city than large scale industry.
There are two principal advantages in using the Inspector of Factories 
List as a source of data on the spatial distribution of industry in
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Tamil Nadu. The first, which has already been alluded to several times, 
is the fact that it includes a larger proportion of small scale firms 
than most other sources. Secondly, however, it also lists a precise 
location for each factory and the data can therefore be conveniently 
used at taluk level instead of district level thereby giving a more 
accurate picture of the actual spatial distribution of industry. 
Referring to taluk maps of Tamil Nadu (Mackie, 1981) prepared on this
basis it is immediately apparent that despite the deconcentration trend 
discussed above, Madras and Saidapet taluk around it still have much 
the heaviest concentration of factories in the State (Map 3, Mackie 
1981). Coimbatore also stands out but it is a good deal further behind. 
Looking at the lower end of the scale where most of the taluks are
found (Maps 3 & 4, Mackie 1981) several pockets of more industrialised
taluks emerge. The Madras pocket is very localised indeed, whereas in 
the western parts of the State two fairly large pockets emerge: first 
the Coimbatore - Salem belt in which about a dozen taluks can be
included; secondly a triangle based on Sattur - Tirunelveli - Tuticorin 
in the south which contains half a dozen taluks. These three pockets 
include most of the taluks in the upper deciles of the distribution of 
taluks by number of factories, the remaining taluks in these deciles 
all being connected with major towns: Madurai, Tiruchy, Thanjavur,
Dindigul and Vellore.
Breaking up the data into three groups by factory employment levels (10 
to 49 workers; 50 to 249; and 250 and over) (Maps 7 to 12, Mackie 1981) 
a few more details about these industrial pockets can be deduced. 
Looking at Madras first it is evident that most of the large employers
are as one might expect on the outskirts of the City in Saidapet taluk.
In the Coimbatore - Salem belt, the larger employers are, the more they 
tend to be located near or in Coimbatore itself whereas the smaller 
employers are more evenly distributed throughout the belt. In the
southern industrial triangle, Sattur taluk stands out as being the only 
one with large employers (match making industry). Of the individual
industrial urban centres only Tiruchy and to a lesser extent Madurai 
stand out as having many moderate sized employers and neither have 
really large employers, the one exception being BHEL (Bharat Heavy
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Electricals Ltd) in Tiruchy which employs 11,000 workers.
On the whole then the overall factory distribution map of Tamil Nadu is 
fairly similar to the map based purely on the distribution of small 
scale employers with the addition of peaks in a few' taluks with a 
significant number of large employers. This is not too surprising as 
out of the 8,286 factories included in the 1979 List, 5,269 employ less 
than 50 workers, and a further 289 employ betwe'en 10 and 100 workers 
but without power (i.e. they therefore are also excluded from the ASI 
data coverage). Of course the picture changes slightly when the 
distribution of factory workers is considered (Maps 5 & 6, Mackie
1981). However, it is still possible to pick out the three main pockets 
of . industry referred to above, although now within these pockets the 
taluks comprising urban centres stand out more dlearly. Understandably 
enough the map of the distribution of factory workers in the State 
looks much more similar to a map showing the distribution of urban 
population. This is not to say that there is little or no industry in 
rural areas of the State, as Map 4 indicates most rural taluks do have 
a few factories, indeed only three taluks have no factories listed at 
all (Mackie, ,1981, pp.12-14), 10% h ave up to three factories, 10%
between 3 and 8, 10% between 8 and 13, 10% between 18 and 24 and
another 10% between 24 and 38 factories, while most of the taluks in
the higher deciles include sizeable urban settlements. (Map 4, Mackie
1981).
6. Tamil Nadu Government Industrial Policy
6.1 General Policy
As the Tamil Nadu Government 1978 'Policy Note on Industrial 
Development' states in its introductory comments: "The Industrial
Policy of the State Government is by and large in agreement with that 
of the Government of India", (p.l) and it also suggests that the
increased emphasis placed on small scale industry in the 1977 
Industrial Policy Resolution of the Union Government is in part at 
least, due to recommendations made by the Government of Tamil Nadu. The
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essential point to note, however, is that the State Governments have 
little scope to deviate from the industrial policy formulated by the 
Union Government, though, as here with small scale industries, 
individual State Governments may wish to increase their emphasis on 
certain elements of the overall policy. Thus the Tamil Nadu Government 
puts a good deal of effort into encouraging small scale industry with 
finance, advice, technical assistance, marketing, facilities and 
feasibility studies to identify new sectors or opportunities which 
small scale units might tackle. It also pursues this type of industrial 
promotion work with regard to medium and large scale industry, though 
at this level it provides more financial backing and infrastructural 
facilities and less expertise and advice. In effect then the promotion 
of absolute industrial growth, including virtually any kind of 
industrial growth that will occur, is the essence of the Tamil Nadu 
Government's industrial policy. There is no attempt to encourage 
industrial growth in particular sectors rather than others and no 
attempt to assess whether particular types of industrial growth might 
be more useful for the State's development than others. Efforts are 
made to encourage the further growth of specific industries already in 
the State (e.g. the efforts made to encourage the growth or the cotton 
or the sugar industries) and new industries to take advantage of local 
deposits of mineral raw materials have been encouraged, but in both 
cases the rationale has been one of encouraging maximum industrial 
growth rather than the development of particular sectors which the 
State was lacking. As the 1978 'Policy Note' puts it succinctly:
"The major task of the Government in the Industries sector is 
promotion, development, provision of finance and development of 
infrastructure." (p.2)
6.2 Industrial Promotion
The State Government's industrial promotion activities are largely 
carried out by promotion agencies organised as public limited 
corporations. The four principal. ones are the Tamil Nadu Industrial 
Investment- Corporation (TIIC), providing finance for small and medium
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scale projects; the State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil 
Nadu Ltd. (SIPCOT) which provides all types of assistance to medium and 
large scale industry; the Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development 
Corporation Ltd. (SIDCO) which assists small scale industry and the 
Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (TIDCO) which 
manages State level public sector projects and joint sector projects 
with private capital (GoTN, Industrial Policy Note 1978 & IIC 1979a).
The Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation has the distinction of 
being the oldest State level industrial finance institution in India, 
having been set up soon after Independence in 1949 (GoTN, Industrial 
Policy Note 1978, pp.57-61). It is a purely financial institution and 
as such is integrated into the national system of public industrial 
development banks and lending institutions headed by the IDBI and 
discussed in the previous Chapter. It provides a range of loans and 
guarantees similar to those provided by the other institutions in the 
system on very similar terms. The maximum amount available on loan is 
Rs.3 million for companies with limited liability, and Rs.1.5 million 
for others. Guarantees for up to Rs.3 million and underwriting of stock 
up to Rs.2 million are also available within an overall limit of Rs.6 
million per case. The period of repayment of loans is 10 years with a 2 
year moratorium. The TIIC also has various special schemes for 
assisting small scale industry, technocrats wishing to start their own 
firms, foreign currency loans and loans for the purchase of electricity 
generators, which usually involve lower interest rates and longer 
repayment periods.
The State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu is the second 
industrial finance institution in the State approved by the IDBI and 
therefore able to offer the full range of financial services provided 
by the national industrial finance system. SIPCOT deals with medium and 
large scale industries and does not provide finance or other assistance 
to small scale units. Thus although its role overlaps somewhat with 
that, of the TIIC it is not the same. Moreover, in addition to financial 
assistance, SIPCOT provides a range of infrastructural facilities and 
advice services. As well as industrial promotion work SIPCOT has a
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specific remit to encourage industrial dispersal to underdeveloped 
parts of the State (GoTN, Industrial Policy Note 1978, p.51).
The key element of SIPCOT's package of financial incentives is the 
Central Government Investment Subsidy of 15% on fixed capital assets 
which it administers. On top of this Central incentive SIPCOT offers a 
State Government interest free Sales Tax Loan available to both 
existing and new industries in backward areas (For existing units: 
equal to Sales Tax paid over last 3 years, repayable after 12 years in 
3 annual instalments; for new units: equal to Sales Tax paid each year
for first 6 years of operation, repayable after 18 years in 3 annual
instalments). Of less significance are concessional water and power 
tariffs which are available to new industries in backward areas. In 
addition to all these incentives SIPCOT, being affiliated to the IDBI, 
can arrange the full range of concessional finance and loans already
discussed in detail above.
Although SIPCOT offers these incentives to firms starting new factories 
in any part of the designated backward areas in Tamil Nadu, it has also 
started two specific growth centres at Ranipet in North Arcot District 
near Vellore and at Hosur in the north western part of Dharmapuri
District. At these two centres it has bought land, laid out equipped 
plots with road access, electricity, water and in some cases sewerage. 
It is at these two places, where it is able to provide infrastructural 
facilities as well as financial incentives, that SIPCOT is having the 
most success at encouraging industrial growth.
The third industrial promotion agency in Tamil Nadu, SIDCO, is at its 
name suggests entirely devoted to the promotion of small scale 
industry. As such it offers to its clients the widest range of services 
of all the industrial promotion agencies in the State. For financial 
assistance it cooperates with the TIIC, but it also administers the 15% 
Central Investment Subsidy and the State interest free Sales Tax Loan 
to SSIs. On the infrastructural side it is in charge of 33 industrial 
estates scattered throughout Tamil Nadu, in ‘which there are 
approximately 800 purpose built sheds which it rents out to small scale
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firms. SIDCO was only set up in 1974, but some of these industrial 
estates have been going much longer, the oldest at Guindy near Madras 
having been started in 1957. While initially the SIDCO sheds were 
mostly rented out to entrepreneurs, the agency now prefers to allocate 
them on a hire-purchase agreement.
SIDCO also helps small scale firms with the bulk buying and 
distribution of certain key raw materials, special loans for the 
purchase of machinery, technical consultancy and feasibility studies 
and marketing and export assistance. Finally it budgets a certain 
proportion of its funds (1% in 1980-81 budget) specifically for 
'nursing sick units'. Overall then it provides a range of services 
which attempts to cater for most of the problems small scale firms may 
encounter (SIDCO Annual Report 1979 & GoTN Industrial Policy Note 1978 
pp.25-29).
The fourth major industrial promotion agency in Tamil Nadu is TIDCO, 
the Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation which deals purely 
with industries that the government have a financial interest in, 
either public sector firms or joint sector firms, though it does not 
deal with small scale industries. It was originally set up in 1965 to 
implement State level public sector projects; the Alangulam cement 
project (Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd: TANCEM) and a continuous 
steel casting plant at Arakonam, North Arcot Dt. (Tamil Nadu Steels). 
Since then, the Tamil Nadu Government, in a fairly major policy change, 
has decided to stop promoting public sector industry virtually entirely 
and has instead introduced the concept of joint sector industry. The 
joint sector concept is based on the principle that the State 
Government, in the form of its agency TIDCO, would provide 26% of the 
equity capital for any given project, another 25% would come from one 
or several private industrialists and the remaining 49% would be raised 
in shares sold to the general public. TIDCO thus retains control of the 
firm and appoints the Chairman of the Board of Directors. As a result 
of this new,policy TIDCO has set up only one other public sector plant, 
the Ariyalur cement works (also part of TANCEM), and has instead 
concentrated on starting some 20 joint sector plants (cf. Figure 1). By
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1979, 13 of these were already in production and a further 11 were in 
various stage of implementation (TIDCO Annual Report 1979) (cf. also
GoTN Policy Note, 1978 pp.43-9). As noted earlier in this Chapter 
(p.138) the government has done a lot to encourage the growth of the 
chemical industry in the State and 13 of these joint sector plants are 
producing chemicals and related products (e.g. drugs and batteries).
All the TIDCO firms are of some importance as the Corporation's 
guidelines stipulate that it should only involve itself in projects 
with a capital outlay above Rs.10 million.
6.3 Backward Areas in Tamil Nadu
Two different sets of areas are classified as backward in Tamil Nadu.
There is first a set of backward areas where new and expanding 
industries are eligible for the Central Government 15% Investment 
Subsidy, these comprise a list of 28 taluks in the Districts of North 
Arcot, Dharmapuri, Madurai, Ramanathapuram and Pudukottai. Then all the 
other industrial incentives offered by the State promotion agencies are 
available in the following backward districts: Dharmapuri, North Arcot, 
South Arcot, Thanjavur, Tiruchirapalli, Madurai, Ramanathapuram, 
Pudukottai and Kanyakumari. This second list therefore entirely 
includes the first and covers an area considerably larger. In effect it 
consists of the entire State apart from the Districts of Madras, 
Chingleput, Salem, Coimbatore, Nilgiris and Tirunelveli (cf. Figure 2).
Table 2 gives an indication of the relative levels of industrialisation 
of the districts for 1960, 1970 and 1979. The first two years' data is 
taken from Kurien & James (1979, p.Ill) and is therefore derived from
the Annual Survey of Industries, while the data for 1979 is based on
the Inspector of. Factories' List (Mackie, 1981, pp.12-14). The 
difference of coverage of these two sources has been discussed in 
detail above (cf. p.143-147), but in the preparation of Table 2 it was 
felt to be more useful to include the entire data for 1979 and not just
the factories that would appear on the ASI, as the purpose of this
Table is to demonstrate relative levels of industrialisation and not 
absolute changes over time.
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FIGURE 1: TAM IL NADU INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PROJECTS {1979)
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Examining the second list of nine districts designated for concessional 
finance and other incentives and their relative rankings in Table 2, it 
is evident that by and large the list does consist of1 the least 
industrialised districts. Nilgiris stands out as an exception, however, 
as it one of Tamil Nadu's least industrialised districts and yet has 
not been designated as backward. This is probably due to its being 
entirely hill country with a low level of infrastructure and was 
therefore excluded on the grounds that it lacked potential or was 
deemed unsuitable for industry. It is also possible to question the 
rationale of designating the districts of Ramanathapuram and Madurai 
(and possibly even North Arcot and Tiruchirapalli by 1979) as backward 
on the basis of their percentage share of the total number of factories 
and workers in the State. Indeed a comparison of the percentage shares 
with Tirunelveli, the least industrialised district of those not 
designated, ■ shows a remarkable similarity and in some cases, 
Tirunelveli‘ even seems less industrialised than these other two. Why 
then have Madurai and Ramanathapuram been designated as backward and 
Tirunelveli not?
The answer would seem to be that the industry in the two former 
districts is more heavily concentrated in towns than it is in 
Tirunelveli Dt. and therefore apart from the towns the rest of the 
Districts are industrially backward. In effect designating the entire 
District as backward excludes the large towns like Madurai which are 
over the half million limit imposed by the ban on industrialisation in 
urban areas. This is certainly the case for Madurai Dt., where nearly 
50% of the factories in the District were concentrated in the city of 
Madurai in 1979 (Mackie, 1981, 13-14), while Tirunelveli taluk has only 
about 18% of the firms in Tirunelveli District, and the other factories 
in the district are fairly well spread out.
In the case of Ramanathapuram, the only major concentration of industry 
is in Sattur taluk, and by 1971 Sattur town had well below half a 
million inhabitants and therefore .is not excluded by the ban. However, 
Sattur has over 50% of the factories in Ramanathapuram Dt. and the rest 
of the district can therefore be taken to be very poorly industrialised.
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FIGURE 2: DESIGNATED BACKWARD AREAS IN TA M IL  NADU STATE
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Thus with the exception of the Nilgiris, the districts designated as 
backward are indeed the districts where industrialisation is either 
lowest, or if not so low, is very poorly distributed through the
district. Furthermore it is apparent that in 1979 these designated
districts included all the districts with less than 8% of the factories
in the State, again with the exception of the Nilgiris. Unfortunately 
the picture is not nearly as clear cut if relative industrialisation is 
measured in terms of number of industrial workers, for though the
designated list contains all the districts with less than 12% of
industrial workers in the State, Tirunelveli is also included with a
lower percentage share of workers than Madurai, Ramanathapuram, or 
Tiruchirapalli (again excluding' Nilgiris).
The other list of backward areas, that is those qualifying for the
Central Subsidy, is composed of three 'areas', each made up of a number 
of taluks. These taluks are all in the five districts of North Arcot, 
Dharmapuri, Madurai, Ramanathapuram and Pudukottai and are therefore 
all included in the list of backward districts just discussed. Only the 
Districts of Dharampuri and Ramanathapuram, however, qualify in full. 
In North Arcot, of the four taluks included (Tirupattur, Vaniyambadi,
Vellore and Wala.jahpet) three are among the most industrialised taluks 
in the District while some of the least industrialised taluks (e.g. 
Chengam, Cheyyar, Polur and Wandiwash) have been left out. The same 
thing is true with Pudukottai where the one taluk left out, Arantangi, 
has only 6 factories while one of the three included has 30 (Alangudi). 
In Madurai District, admittedly the two Madurai city taluks have been 
omitted, but Dindigul, the next most industrialised taluk in the 
district, has been included as backward while at the other end of the 
scale the taluk of Nilakottai with only 13 factories has been excluded.
At a broader level it is apparent from comparing Maps 2 and 4 in Mackie 
(1981) that the Central Subsidy backward areas (shown in Map 2) do not 
include some of the taluks with the lowest number of factories (e.g. 
below 3 or below 8 factories in the bottom two deciles shown on Map 4) 
in the Districts of South Arcot, Tiruchirapalli and Thanjavur as well 
as the ones just mentioned in the previous paragraph.
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To conclude this section it would seem that the districts designated as 
backward in the State are consistently the districts with the least or 
the most poorly distributed industry, but the list of areas designated 
as backward for the granting of the Central Subsidy, though a good deal 
more selective and smaller, is not nearly as good a selection of the 
taluks with the least industry. One final criticism that may be made 
which was also a criticism made about the selection of backward areas 
at a national level, (cf. Chapter 3 p.65) is that the designated areas 
are too large: arguably the incentives would be more effective in
encouraging the industrialisation of particular areas if the effort was 
more concentrated.
7. Trends in Industrial Location in Tamil Nadu
In the preceding pages the main features of industrialisation in Tamil 
Nadu and the State Government's measures to promote it have been
outlined. On the basis of this exposition it is now possible to
summarise the principle industrial location trends taking place in the
State.
Kurien & James concluded from their statistical analysis of ASI data, 
that one of the major characteristics of industrialisation in the State 
during the 1960s was its increasing concentration in the Madras area. 
Data for the 1970s discussed above (cf. p.149) indicates a reversal of 
this trend during the latter decade, although without the same data 
base as Kurien & James it is difficult to evaluate the true extent of 
this, reversal. However, the data for 1979 show that even given the 
reversal of the concentration trend, the Madras region still dominates 
the distribution of. industry in Tamil Nadu. There are also two other 
areas of- industrial importance. The first of these is a belt stretching 
from the second industrial city of the State, Coimbatore to Salem 
passing through Tiruppur and Erode as well as including a northern spur 
to»Mettur. This belt is also of considerable importance in the spatial 
configuration of the Tamil Nadu industrial economy. The third pocket of 
importance is the triangle formed by Sattur - Tuticorin - Tirunelveli
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in the southern part of the State. This triangle combines the 
traditional matches and fireworks industry of the Sattur area with the 
newer chemical industry of Tuticorin.
Apart from these three major pockets any other concentrations of 
industry in the State are all, as could be expected, based directly on 
towns and one should mention Madurai, Tiruchirapalli, Thanjavur, 
Dindigul and Vellore in this context, though not all these centres are 
equally important.
It was also noted (Table 1) that two thirds of the factories in the 
State are small scale units employing- less than 50 workers and that, 
apart from a few taluks with a significant number of large scale 
employers, the distribution of industry parallels closely the
distribution of small scale industry. Large scale employers can
principally be found in Coimbatore and Sattur and to a lesser extent in 
Madras (mostly on the outskirts of the city), the taluks immediately 
adjacent to Coimbatore and Sattur, Vilavancode near Kanyakumari, 
Tiruchirapalli, Madurai and Dindigul.
By and large this pattern of spatial distribution of industry resembles 
fairly close to the pattern that existed earlier in the 1960s. Where 
then has the new industrial growth which has resulted in the
deconcentration of the 1970s occurred?
It is difficult to answer this question with reference to small scale 
industry without better data, so one has to assume that growth in this 
sector has been fairly prevalent throughout the areas in which it is 
found. For medium and large scale industry, however, it is easier to 
build up a reasonably detailed picture as the number of projects in 
question is limited and they are well known. To start with there are 
the projects promoted by TIDCO (cf. Figure 1) and while many of these 
are still in the Madras region there are also small pockets in Ranipet, 
Arkonam and further afield in Tuticorin. Then there are the two TANCEM 
cement plants at Alangulam and Ariyalur as well as several other 
projects in outlying locations. But what is more interesting perhaps is
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the way the dispersal trend among the TIDCO projects alone is 
increasing with the majority of projects under implementation being 
well dispersed, and most of them going to districts designated as 
backward. Indeed although TIDCO in the past may have promoted projects 
in the Madras area, it has never done so in the Coimbatore - Salem area 
and only projects based on raw material deposits in the Sattur - 
Tuticorin - Tirunelveli triangle.
This last point brings us to the fact that a fair number of major 
projects which have dispersed to non-traditional industrial locations 
in Tamil Nadu in the last 10 to 15 years have done so on the basis' of 
raw material deposits. The TANCEM cement plants are a case in point, as 
are the new TIDCO alkali chemical plant in Tuticorin, the Neyveli power 
station and the Mettur aluminium plant. A similar trend is evident in 
the location of new sugar mills in sugar cane production areas rather 
than in towns.
Both the cases of Neyveli and Mettur have resulted in some secondary 
industrial growth. At Neyveli this is strictly limited to public sector 
units related to the mine and the power station, so this should not be 
seen as a growth pole type of effect. On the other hand at the Mettur 
hydroelectric power station, half a dozen large units have appeared in 
a variety in industrial sectors (Chemicals, Engineering and Cotton 
Textiles) as well as about 20 smaller units. Only a few of these are 
government promoted or directly related to the operation of the power 
station.
Two other noteworthy growth pole type effects have occurred in the
State in the last decade. First the BHEL plant at Tiruchirapalli has 
actively and successfully encouraged the emergence of a whole string of 
small engineering subcontracting units and second the new Enfield India 
motorcycle plant in Tirupattur taluk in Ramanathapuram has occasioned 
the development of a much smaller group of a dozen or so
subcontractors. Although the BHEL case is more important in terms of 
absolute numbers and scale, the Enfield case is more important in
dispersal terms as it is in a remote rural location rather than on the
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outskirts of a major town.
As for the industrial promotion efforts of SIPCOT, by the end of the 
1979-80 financial year it had disbursed funds to 267 firms under the 
15% Central Subsidy scheme, 83 firms under the Sales Tax Loan and
another 87 under the term loan or concessional finance schemes. By 
definition all these firms have to be located in the appropriate 
backward areas and while not all are new projects but also include 
expansions and diversifications, these figures do represent a fairly 
comprehensive account of industrialisation in backward areas. In 
relation to total industrial growth, the Inspector of Factories' List 
included 6,341 factories in 1973 and 8,286 in 1979, that is a growth of 
1,945 units in the same six year period as covered by the operation of 
SIPCOT's Central Subsidy disbursements. It would thus seem that only 
about 10% of new factories coming up in the State during the 1970s have 
been located in backward areas, provided one accepts that the Central 
Subsidy is disbursed fairly comprehensively to most new factories 
eligible to receive it. Seen in this light, despite the decreasing 
concentration of industry in the Madras region and despite the 
industrial dispersal efforts of the government agencies, much of the 
new industrial growth in the State is not occurring in backward areas 
but in established industrial areas like the Coimbatore - Salem belt 
and the Tuticorin area in the south.
It should however, also be stressed that SIPCOT's promotion work is 
increasing and that by January 1st 1979 when the last Inspector of 
Factories List was compiled (the last available that is ) only a few of 
the firms it was encouraging to locate in Hosur were listed although 
most of the Ranipet ones were. With the rapid growth of Hosur it is 
reasonable, to expect that an increasing proportion of new industry in 
the State will be located in backward areas.
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CHAPTER 6
THE STATE INDUSTRIES PROMOTION CORPORATION OF TAMIL NADU
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THE STATE INDUSTRIES PROMOTION CORPORATION OF TAMIL NADU
The State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu (SIPCOT) was 
set up in 1971 as Tamil Nadu's prime government industrial promotion 
agency for large and medium scale industry. Legally it is incorporated 
as a Public Limited Company wholly owned by the Government of Tamil 
Nadu. Originally its authorised share capital was set at Rs. 50 million 
but subsequently (1979) this limit was raised to Rs. 60 million. Paid 
up capital stood at Rs. 46.5 million in 1979 (SIPCOT, Annual Report 
1979).
As well as being in charge of- the Tamil Nadu Government's efforts to 
promote large and medium scale industry, SIPCOT's remit includes a 
specific reference to a duty to 'hasten the industrial dispersal to 
underdeveloped areas of the State' (GoTN Industrial Policy Note, 1978 
p.51). SIPCOT also acts as the local executive agent for the Central 
Government's industrial promotion and dispersal policies: it
administers the Central Government 15% Subsidy and it is recognised by 
the IDBI as a state financial institution eligible for refinance from 
the Bank on its loans to industry in Tamil Nadu, In both these roles 
SIPCOT only deals with large and medium scale industry; small scale 
industry is provided for by other institutions in the State (i.e. TIIC, 
& SIDCO). Although set up in 1971, SIPCOT only commenced operations in 
January 1972.
1• SIPCOT's Package of Incentives
The main featur.es of the incentive package have already been mentioned 
above (Chapter 5) so it is only necessary to give some additional 
details here on the precise modalities of each scheme and outline those 
schemes of minor importance that have not already been referred to.
To deal first with the national schemes, the Central Government Subsidy 
operates in the same way as elsewhere in the country. The amount which 
each firm is eligible to receive is calculated as 15% of the firm's 
fixed capital assets subject to a maximum of Rs. 1.5 million. The
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Subsidy is available to industrial units of any corporate nature and 
any industrial sector located in one of the list of 32 designated 
taluks in Tamil Nadu (cf. Figure 2 in Chapter 5). New units, units 
moving into one of the backward taluks from a major city and units 
already established in these areas but which are undertaking
substantial expansion are all eligible. Substantial expansion is 
defined as an 'increase in the value of Fixed Capital Investment by not 
less than 10% for the purpose of expansion of capacity* (SIPCOT, All 
about SIPCOT, p.10). The Fixed Capital Investment includes land, 
buildings, plant and machinery. All applications for the Subsidy are
considered and sanctioned by a special State Level Committee which is 
independent of SIPCOT. Once sanctioned they are then disbursed in 
installments of up to 85% before commencement of production and the 
balance afterwards. Initial disbursements are made as bridge loans 
which carry an interest rate of 12t%* This is until reimbursement by 
the Union Government is made, at which point no more interest is
charged. Once the firm has started receiving the Subsidy it is not 
allowed to change the location of whole or part of the industrial unit 
involved, or reduce or dispose of a substantial part of its total 
'Fixed Capital Investment', within a period of five years from the date 
of going into production and without prior permission of the State 
Level Committee. Also if the unit goes out of production within these 
five years the Subsidy has to be refunded. Finally for the first five 
years of production the firm has to submit annual progress reports to 
SIPCOT and allow for the inspection and verification of its accounts.
These conditions of acceptance of the Subsidy are intended to provide 
the disbursing agency with a degree of control over industrial units 
and in particular to prevent firms from- setting up units in backward
areas, obtaining the Subsidy and subsequently moving out again. 
However, the period of five years of production over which these 
controls extend is not long in relation to the time it takes for an 
industrial concern to set up local subcontracting and supply links, and 
it may well be that a longer period of say ten years might force firms 
to establish themselves more thoroughly in the economy of the backward 
area.
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With regard to the IBDI's Refinance Scheme, medium scale firms are 
provided with loans through both TIIC and SIPCOT, while large firms 
deal exclusively with SIPCOT, but the conditions of the loans remain 
the same in both cases. The rate of interest on loans is 9i% in the 
nine designated backward districts (cf. Figure 2 in Chapter 5) and 122% 
in other areas. There is a moratorium on repayment of up to 4 years and 
an amortization period of up to 12 years.
The minimum level of a promoter's contribution to a project is set at 
20%, though in backward areas this goes down to 17?% and for projects 
sponsored by technician entrepreneurs down as low as 15%. Applicants 
seeking a loan, pay an investigation fee of 0.5% of the amount applied 
for, subject to a minimum and maximum level of Rs. 2500/“ and Rs. 
10,000/-. A commitment charge of 1% (0.5% in backward areas) of the 
loan is made if it is not taken up within 3 months of sanctioning.
SIPCOT also handles the IDBI Seed Capital Scheme for new entrepreneurs. 
This is intended to provide finance to professionally qualified or 
experienced people who want to start a firm but have only limited 
funds. The promoter's contribution is of the same order (20%, 17i% &
15%) as under the general loan refinance scheme, but where the seed 
capital is given as a loan it comes interest free and with a repayment 
moratorium of 5 years. The capital can also be given in the form of 
preference shares or equity. Under this scheme the total project cost 
must not exceed Rs. 10 million and the amount given will not be more 
than 10% of the project cost.
With the underwriting of capital issues, SIPCOT will also underwrite up 
to 10% of the issued share capital of a company setting up a unit in 
one of the nine designated backward areas. This service carries a 
charge of 2i% of the amount underwritten. In a similar vein SIPCOT acts 
as the agent of the Government of Tamil Nadu in guaranteeing the loans 
medium and large scale industries may wish to obtain, from commercial 
banks. Such loans must have been obtained, however, for fixed capital 
investment and are not to be used as working capital. The final loan
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scheme that SIPCOT operates in conjunction with other financial 
institutions is the Loan for Employing Repatriates, formulated in 
association with the Repatriates Cooperative Finance and Development 
Bank Ltd. It is available for firms already assisted by SIPCOT and 
located in SIPCOT's Complexes at Ranipet, Hosur and Maraimalainagar for 
the employment of Sri Lanka repatriates. Loans of Rs. 10,000/- per
repatriate with an interest rate of 11% and a 5 year repayment period, 
including one year's moratorium, are available under this scheme.
As well as acting as an agent for national incentive schemes SIPCOT 
also has its own direct package of incentives. This includes first of 
all a scheme to assist entrepreneurs with feasibility studies. SIPCOT 
will commission feasibility studies from consultants at the request of 
entrepreneurs and will help with their finance. The promoter pays an 
initial 25% of the cost of the study. SIPCOT also pays 25% if the study 
is accepted and implemented, the promoter paying the balance in this 
case, or if the study proves the project to be unfeasible SIPCOT pays 
50% of the cost and the promoter the remaining 25%.
The second and most substantial element of the SIPCOT 'house' package 
is the Interest Free Sales Tax Loan. This is available to firms 
locating anywhere in the nine backward districts and at Maraimalainagar 
near Madras. For new units the Loan is equivalent to the amount of 
Sales Tax paid by the unit in the first 6 years of production, subject 
to a maximum of 8% of the gross fixed assets of the unit. The Loan is 
disbursed quarterly against a certificate of payment from the govenment 
Commercial Taxes Department. The Sales Tax Loan is also available in a 
slightly different form to existing units undertaking expansion or 
diversification provided they are located in the same specified areas. 
In their case the value of the loan is equivalent to the sales tax paid 
in the 3 years prior to the application and subject to a maximum of 25% 
of the fixed asset investment of the expansion or diversification 
programme. Repayment of the loan is made in 3 equal annual installments 
after 18 years for new units and after 12 years for expanding and
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diversifying units. The provisions for firms undertaking expansion and 
diversification also apply to existing firms located anywhere in Tamil 
Nadu setting up new units in the designated backward districts. For 
expanding and diversifying firms the loans should only be used for the 
creation of fixed assets, whereas for new firms they can be used for 
either the implementation or the running of the project. A commitment 
charge of 1.5% per annum is levied on undrawn amounts after 6 months 
from the date of final sanction of the Loan.
There are also a number of minor incentive schemes offered by the 
Government of Tamil Nadu. New industries set up anywhere in the State 
are charged a concessionary power tariff for the first few years of 
operation. For the first three years this stands at 66.6% of the normal 
HT power rate, then it is 80% for the fourth year and finally 90% for 
the fifth year. Similarly for water royalties new industries set up in 
the nine backward districts are allowed indefinite water supplies for 
the first 6 years of operation upon payment of a flat Rs. 200/- per 
annum royalty.
Finally through its Industrial Escorts Service the Government of Tamil 
Nadu will help industrialists obtain the necessary Industrial Licence 
from the Union Government and any other clearances required from 
government agencies.
2. Growth Pole Policy
From the early days of its existence SIPCOT decided on a policy of 
promoting a few well chosen growth poles as one of the most effective 
means to encourage industrial dispersal to backward areas. It was 
argued that if the agency was "to achieve measurable results with the 
available limited resources, it would be better to concentrate (our) 
attention on a few .selected Growth Centres in the Backward Districts" 
(SIPCOT, All About SIPCOT, p. 12). Sites for the Growth Centres^ were to 
be chosen in places which were deemed to have the potential for 
development. These were then to be equipped with full infrastructural 
facilities and SIPCOT would encourage firms to locate their new units
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in them rather than elsewhere in the backward districts. In effect this 
policy meant that SIPCOT would provide infrastructural facilities only 
in a few selected locations in backward areas, so that firms choosing 
alternative locations of their own would, in the main, have to organise 
their own infrastructure.
2.1 Ranipet Industrial Complex
The first site chosen for a growth pole was at Ranipet near Vellore in 
North Arcot District. In 1972-73 SIPCOT acquired 712 acres of fairly
poor quality agricultural land adjoining the Madras - Bangalore
National Highway a couple of kilometres to the west of Ranipet. This 
was divided up into about 80 plots of varying sizes which were then all 
provided with tarred road access. The Electricity Board built an 
electricity sub-station in the complex and provision was made to bring 
water from the nearby Palar River through infiltration wells,
reservoirs and a mains network pumping system.
In addition SIPCOT built an amenities block to house their own site 
office, a branch of the Indian Overseas Bank, a first aid centre, a
canteen, a shop and a Post Office. Telephone facilities were provided 
and arrangements were initiated to provide Telex connection facilities 
at a later date. In addition a few small blocks of flats were built for 
firms to rent for their key workers and some land was set aside for 
house construction.
The site was in fact bordered by the main Madras - Bangalore railway 
line for a short stretch along its north-western edge, but the nearest 
railway ' station was at Katpadi Junction about 17 kilometres further 
west. Ranipet town has a railway siding and station of its own which 
had originally been built, probably over 50 years previously, for the 
EID Parry fertilisers and ceramics factory. However, although SIPCOT’s 
plan for the Ranipet Complex included an extension of this siding right 
into the Complex, this has not yet been built and seems unlikely to be. 
As services to Ranipet station are extremely restricted the nearest 
useful railway’ station to the Complex is Katpadi Junction which is
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fairly well served by both express and local trains.
The advantages of the Ranipet site lie chiefly in its location. The 
presence of the National Highway, which places it 130 kms west of
Madras and 200 kms east of Bangalore, is particularly important. The 
railway, if it were made better use of, is also potentially 
advantageous. But in addition the site is near the junction of the 
Ponnai and the Palar Rivers which guarantee it a year round water 
supply and make it a particularly suitable location for industries like 
chemical firms which are dependent on adequate water availability.
Finally there is already a certain limited amount of industry in the 
area (Eg: EID Parrys and the North Arcot leather industry) implying the
existence of a certain level of skilled industrial labour.
2.2 Hosur Industrial Complex
The second industrial growth pole to be designated by SIPCOT was
located near the small town of Hosur in Dharmapuri District. The site 
is to the north-west of the town, sandwiched between it and the State 
boundary, on the main National Highway from western and Central Tamil
Nadu to Bangalore. In effect .the site is within 40 kilometres of
Bangalore: as near as one can get to the city without leaving Tamil
Nadu.
The development of the Hosur Complex was initiated in 1974. It is
somewhat larger than the Ranipet site, consisting as it does of about 
1200 acres with 131 industrial plots. The facilities provided are 
comparable to those at Ranipet though a somewhat higher allocation of 
land for housing has been made. One major difference between the two 
sites is the availability of water and Hosur is much more poorly 
situated in this respect. The site is some 7 kilometres from the upper 
reaches of the Ponnaiyar River, the nearest perennial watercourse. 
While there is a proposal to dam this river and pump water from the 
reservoir to Hosur, the immediate water needs of the Complex are being 
catered for with wells and overhead tanks. Due to this restriction 
SIPCOT has had to discourage chemical firms from locating on the site;
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instead it directs them to Ranipet.
While the higher altitude of the area around Hosur and its dry climate 
do present problems for water supplies to the site, they are also an 
advantage for certain industrial processes which require a drier, more 
dust-free atmosphere than is available in Ranipet. The altitude of 
around 950 metres above sea level also means a cooler climate, similar 
to that of Bangalore, an added attraction to many industrialists.
From the point of view of communications, the 40 kilometres to 
Bangalore along the National Highway is the main attraction of the site 
chosen. In the other direction the National Highway goes to Krishnagiri 
some 50 kilometres away. From there it is 260 kilometres to Madras, 270 
to Coimbatore and about 300 to Madurai. Thus although Hosur is tucked 
away in a north-western corner of Tamil Nadu it does have reasonably 
good access to most of the State's major cities as well as being very 
close to Bangalore. There is also a small and infrequently served 
railway line running through Hosur from Salem to Bangalore. Although 
the station is in the town of Hosur, some three kilometres from the 
Industrial Complex, services are very infrequent and it is a metre 
gauge line which goes no further than Bangalore and is thus of little 
use for the shipment of goods to and from the Complex. Finally, on the 
telecommunication side, a new automatic telephone exchange is being 
built in Hosur which will provide STD telephone services to the whole 
of India and to a limited extent abroad as well.
2.3 Maraimalainagar New Town
The third industrial growth centre which SIPCOT promotes is the New 
Town of Maraimalainagar. In this, however, SIPCOT is not the sole 
promoter, as M.M.Nagar was planned and is being developed by the Madras 
Metropolitan Development Agency (MMDA) and SIPCOT only acts as the 
joint promoter for industrial growth in the town. M.M.Nagar is also 
different from SIPCOT's other two growth poles at Ranipet and Hosur in 
that it is not located in a designated backward area. This means that 
firms choosing the town are not eligible for the 15% Central Subsidy.
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The Government of Tamil Nadu, however, did extend the provisions of its 
backward district designation to cover M.M.Nagar, even though the
district of Ghingleput in which it is sited is not designated as
backward (cf. Figure 2 Chapter 5). In effect then, even though 
Maraimalainagar is not in a backward area, all the various incentives 
for backward area industrial development are available with the 
exception of the Central Subsidy.
The location of Maraimalainagar is 43 kilometres down the National 
Highway from Madras to southern Tamil Nadu. Twelve kilometres further 
south is the small district headquarters town of Chingleput. The site 
is also next to the main metre gy/Sge railway line from Madras to 
Madurai which runs parallel to the National Highway at this point. At 
present there is a small railway halt not too far from the site, but 
only slow local trains stop at this halt. A water supply system has 
been installed with a large capacity overhead tank and a pumped supply 
from the Palar River some 12 kilometres away.
The development of Maraimalanagar was first proposed in the Madras
Metropolitan Plan 1971 - 1991 (Rural Development & Local Administration 
Dept, GoTN, 1971) where it was suggested that the urban growth of 
Madras should be concentrated along the three main radial transport 
routes out of the city. A number of existing small settlements along 
these corridors would be expanded as 'Urban Nodes' and at a greater 
distance from the city (35-40 kms) three 'Satellite Towns' would be 
built, one on each corridor. It was hoped that these Satellite Towns 
would act as countermagnets to Madras and help to reduce its growth by 
attracting migrant population to them instead of to the city. The
commitment to this Satellite Town policy was carried through into the 
next Madras planning policy document, the 'Madras Urban Development 
Project' which was published by the MMDA in 1974 and which listed the 
preparation of New Town Development Plans for the Satellite Towns as 
one of the five main tasks requiring immediate implementation. This 
task was subsequently embarked upon with the preparation of the 
Maraimalainagar New Town Master Plan as the first of the three. The 
actual implementation of the M.M.Nagar project has been extremely slow,
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to the extent that by 1980, five years after the plans for the New Town 
had been prepared, only a few of the basic services had been installed, 
some land had been acquired, a few of the minor roads laid and only a 
very little housing construction work had been started.
In terms of industrial development, by 1980 the MMDA had compiled a 
list of some 40 industrialists interested in locating in the New Town. 
These were allocated plots of land and some had already made the 
initial downpayment for the purchase of their plot. However, few firms 
had begun their construction work and the first firm to go into 
operation only started trial production in January 1980. Compared to 
SIPCOT's two industrial growth poles at Ranipet and Hosur, 
Maraimalainagar showed much less encouraging signs of development.
3. SIPCOT's Allocation of Subsidies and Incentives
The overall extent of SIPCOT's financial assistance to firms during the 
first seven years of its existence and the proportions in which this
was allocated under the three main schemes is shown in Figure 1.
Aggregate figures for the amounts sanctioned and disbursed by financial 
year up to 1979 are given in Tables 1 to 4. More detailed data have 
been drawn directly from the SIPCOT registers relating to the 
sanctioning of the Central Subsidy, the Sales Tax Loan and the Term
Loans. In these, data are available on a firm-wise basis and have been
aggregated by location and are presented here in Tables 5 to 7.
From all these tables and the histogram it is immediately apparent that 
the amount of industrial assistance allocated by SIPCOT, although it 
has certainly increased over the years, has not done so steadily nor 
quite as dramatically as the levels of assistance disbursed by the 
All-India financial institutions such as the IDBI. Thus there was a 
very low level of assistance sanctioned and disbursed in 1975-76, 
fairly steady levels of about twice as much in the years on either side 
and a big increase in 1977—78 to new higher levels which were again 
duplicated in 1978-79. The reason for this dramatic fall in the level 
of assistance in 1975-76 is unclear, but it may be related to
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disruptions in the dispersal procedures in the months leading up to and 
following the declaration of the State of Emergency in June 1975. 
Equally the subsequent major rise in 1977-78 is possibly a result of 
the Janata Government's level of commitment to the industrial dispersal 
programme and the institution of the ban on industrial development in 
large cities in December 1977. However, as these variations are not 
apparent in the national IDBI incentives or the overall Central Subsidy 
allocation figures, one would have to argue that events of national 
importance had more dramatic repurcussions in Tamil Nadu than in the 
nation as a whole. This could possibly be the case, as Tamil Nadu 
experienced direct Central Government Presidential Rule during the 
Emergency making the disruption to the State administration even 
greater than in most States.
TABLE 1: SIPCOT* Details of Sanctions and Disbursements of Term Loans
Year Sanctions Cancellations Net effective Disbursements
sanctions
Thousands of Rupees
1972-73 10,850 - . 10,850 2,611
1973-74 19,789 755 19,034 3,390
1974-75 19,128 799 18,329 11,761
1975-76 2,708 725 1,983 16,287
1976-77 14,075 4,725 9,350 8,215
1977-78 34,055 6,948 27,107 12,382
1978-79 23,396 1,000 22,396 14,185
124,001 14,952 109,049 68,831
Source for Tables 1-4: SIPCOT Annual Report 1978-79
177
TABLE 2: SIPCOT: Details of Underwriting Sanctions, Public Issues Made
and Shares Taken Up
Year Sanctions Cancellations Public issues Shares
made/request taken up
for direct
subscription
Thousands of Rupees
. 1972-73 2,320
1973-74 2,430 3,320
1974-75 500 250 55
1975-76 1,650 300 129
1976-77 1,100 1,850 200 200
1977-78 1,600 1,330 150 113
1978-79 500 500 37
10,100 3,180 4,720 534
TABLE 3: SIPCOT : Details of Sanctions and Disbursements of Sales Tax
Loans
Year Sanct ions Reductions/ Disbursements
Cancellations
Thousands of Rupees
1972-73 7,919 1,219
1973-74 5,772 - 3,156
1974-75 7,363 - 9,148
1975-76 282 - 5,760
1976-77 7,944 59 7,858
1977-78 11,330 182 9,123
1978-79 15,329 10 15,304
55,939 251 51,568
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TABLE 4: SIPCOT: Details of Sanctions 
Capital Assistance
and Disbursements of Seed
Year Sanctions Disbursements
Thousands of Rupees
1977-78 400 -
1978-79 915 400
1,315 400
Looking at the extent of SIPCOT's assistance to industry in more 
detail, Table 5 gives data for the distribution of Central Subsidies 
sanctioned from 1972-73 to 1979-80. The first thing to note from this 
table is that two districts of the five which include eligible areas, 
are each receiving over one third of the grants made: North Arcot and 
Ramanathapuram. When one remembers that only about a third of the area 
of North Arcot is eligible for the Subsidy this seems to be a quite 
remarkable concentration. However, this should be offset against the 
fact that this area includes the first SIPCOT growth pole at Ranipet. 
When one deducts the Subsidies going to the firms starting operations 
in the Ranipet Complex, the North Arcot totals are nearly halved. The 
remaining subsidies in North Arcot are going mostly to tanning and 
leather industry firms in a belt from Walaj.aphet to Vaniyambadi.
In Ramanathapuram District, industrial growth appears to be doing well 
especially as there is no SIPCOT growth pole in this area. While the 
Central Subsidy is available to firms throughout the district a close 
examination of the register shows that a large part of the Subsidies 
are going to the western taluks of Sattur, Srivilliputtur and 
Aruppukottai and many of them to printing firms in the Sattur area.
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FIGURE 1: EXTENT & MODE OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 1972-1979
70 —i Financial Assistance in 
Rs. M illions
1972 -7 3  1 9 7 3 -7 4  1974 -7 5  19 7 5 -7 6  19 76 -7 7  19 7 7 -7 8  19 78 -7 9
Term Loan ft Underwriting  
Sales Tax Loan 
Central Subsidy
Source: S IPCO T Annual Report 19 78 -7 9 , p.2
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After Ramanathapuram with 101 Subsidies, North Arcot with 98, 
Dharmapuri comes third with 33, leaving 22 and 9 to Madurai and 
Pudukottai respectively. The Dharmapuri recipients are nearly all in or 
near the SIPCOT growth pole at Hosur, which is also apparent from the 
way sanctions to the district only really started in 1976-77 at the 
time the Hosur Complex was designated, Madurai has a fairly steady 
trickle of a few sanctions each year since 1973-74, while sanctions to 
firms in Pudukottai only really start ,as late as 1979-80.
Overall there is a fairly regular pattern of slightly more Subsidies 
going to expansions of existing firms than to entirely new projects. 
This is replicated in all the districts apart from the two in which the 
SIPCOT. growth poles are located (North Arcot and Dharmapuri), where 
there are more new firms than expansions. Indeed, if the firms in 
Ranipet and Hosur are removed from the data for their respective 
districts, the two districts conform much more closely to the general 
pattern. As to the distribution between large and medium scale 
industry, there are generally a few more large firms than medium firms 
in each district with the two exceptions once again of North Arcot and 
especially Ramanathapuram. Ramanathapuram's high score is largely built 
on the 52 Subsidies going to the expansion of existing medium scale 
units. This latter point has the effect of making the actual amount of 
subsidy sanctioned to Ramanathapuram firms slightly below one third of 
the total sanctioned, even though the number of firms receiving it is 
well above one third of the total number of recipient firms. Apart from 
this point the actual rupee amount of subsidy sanctioned to firms in 
each district relates fairly closely to the number of firms, though 
firms in Madurai and Dharmapuri get a slightly higher average level of 
Subsidy per. firm because of the somewhat higher proportion of large to 
medium scale firms locating in these two districts.
As for the level of jobs being created in the recipient firms in each 
district, this matches very closely the levels of Subsidy being 
received, except again in Ramanathapuram where the large number of 
existing medium scale recipient firms means that the district’s firms 
are creating 33.1% of the jobs while only getting 29.5% of the cash
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being sanctioned. This is probably exaggerated by the fact that for 
expansion of existing units the register does not specify whether the 
firms are declaring the number of existing jobs or the number of new 
jobs being created and some no doubt do the former. Because of this the 
data for jobs created should be treated with some caution. As a very 
rough estimate of the number of jobs being created in new firms as a 
result of the Central Subsidy, it would seem that for every Rs. 1,000 
in Subsidy, large scale firms create on average 5.1 jobs, while medium 
scale firms create 5.6 jobs.
Turning next to the sanctioning of assistance under the Sales Tax Loan 
scheme, Table 6 gives the full details again aggregated by eligible
district. Compared to the 263 Central Subsidies sanctioned by SIPCOT
between 1972 and 1980, the total number of 81 Sales Tax Loans
sanctioned is very small. Some part of this difference may lie in the
fact that, the Sales Tax is only disbursed after a firm has gone into 
production but this can hardly account for such a large difference. It 
would therefore seem that, assuming that knowledge of the Sales Tax
Loan scheme is widespread amongst industrialists and there is no reason 
to suspect that it is less well known than the Central Subsidy scheme, 
SIPCOT may be impeding or dragging their feet over the scheme.
Table 6 does confirm, however, the pattern noted in Table 5 of the two 
districts of North Arcot and Ramanathapuram receiving the largest
number of sanctions. In this case they do not have quite such a 
remarkable lead over the other districts and they are followed fairly 
closely by Dharmapuri with 15 sanctions compared to Ramanathapuram's 18 
and North Arcot's 27. Madurai, Tiruchirapalli and South Arcot all get 
half a dozen to 8 while Thanjavur and Pudukottai only get a couple
each. Of the 27 sanctioned for North Arcot, nearly half (12) went to
the Ranipet growth pole firms while in Dharmapuri 11 out of the 15 went 
to firms operating in the area around Hosur but not. in the SIPCOT 
growth pole itself. Again there is a general tendency for more Loans to 
go to existing firms undertaking an expansion, rather than to new 
firms. This is however, reversed in the case of Ranipet though not, 
interestingly enough, in the case of firms establishing themselves in
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the Hosur area. This latter point, which would seem to be in conflict 
with the undoubted newness of the plants in question, is explained by 
the fact that these firms are by and large subsidiaries of already 
existing firms from urban centres such as Madras and are therefore 
classified as expansions under the Sales Tax Loan scheme. It should be 
noted that new projects are getting over twice as much in cash terms 
per unit under the scheme as expansions of existing firms do. The major 
increase in sanctions in 1977 is readily apparent in Table 6.
The third SIPCOT incentive on which detailed records are available is 
the Term Loans scheme. Data drawn from these are summarised in Table 7. 
In total 86 term loans were sanctioned in the years from 1972 to 1979 
and once again’a large proportion of these went to firms in North Arcot 
(37) and Ramanathapuram (14) and of the former group 24 were to firms 
in the Ranipet Complex. Madurai and Dharmapuri were the other two 
backward districts to receive several loans (8 & 7 respectively) while 
the others received no more than a couple each and South Arcot and 
Kanyakumari none. The Term Loan scheme is also open to firms in the 
more advanced districts, though on less favourable terms (cf. above). 
Table 7 also shows these districts, demonstrating how all of them, 
including Madras City, have received one or two each. Chingleput alone 
stands out with 7 Term Loans granted, emphasising the concentration of 
industry around but outside Madras.
To conclude this section on the allocation of SIPCOT's incentives, it 
should first be emphasised that overall the incentives have only 
reached some 260 firms. In a programme covering seven years and in a 
State with some 8,000 factories listed by the Inspector of Factories
this is a fairly insignificant number. Unless SIPCOT is
able to increase the extent of its programme dramatically it will be 
many years before it manages to substantially alter the spatial 
distribution of industry in Tamil Nadu. Moreover, the extent to which 
it is doing this even among the firms it has been assisting is open to
question as more detailed analysis of the data on these firms shows.
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Thus over half, and with some schemes two thirds, of the recipient 
firms are located in just two districts: North Arcot and
Ramanathapuram. Indeed closer analysis shows that they are located in 
fairly specific parts of these two districts: the Walajahpet
Vaniyambadi belt in North Arcot and the western taluks of 
Ramanathapuram. Admittedly many of the firms in the North Arcot case 
are firms locating in the SIPCOT growth pole at Ranipet, but otherwise, 
as is also true in Ramanathapuram, SIPCOT appears to be funding already 
existing industry in these areas or new units in established industrial 
sectors in these areas. If one remembers (cf. Chapter 5 p.161) that 
these two areas are the most industrialised parts of the designated 
backward areas in the State, it is apparent that the actual disperal 
effect of the incentives is minimal. It is also arguable on this basis 
that the choice of the Ranipet location for the first SIPCOT growth 
pole is not contributing significantly to the actual dispersal of 
industry.
Apart from these two areas incentives have gone to firms dotted around 
the designated backward'areas, but their number is strictly limited and 
the only other concentration of some significance is in the Hosur area 
of Dharmapuri District where the second growth pole is located. The 
Hosur firms do represent a real dispersal of industry in Tamil Nadu 
terms (though whether they do in inter-State terms given the proximity 
of Bangalore is more doubtful). There was no industry in the Hosur area 
before the dispersal programme started, indeed there was virtually no 
industry in the whole of the district, so to the extent that SIPCOT is 
assisting industrial growth in this area it is really fulfilling the 
'encouragement of industrial dispersal' clause of its remit.
Thus overall it would seem that 'SIPCOT has only managed to encourage a 
minimal amount of industrial dispersal during the first seven.years of 
its existence. Instead much of its assistance has been going to helping 
existing industry in backward areas, which though not a bad thing in 
itself, is not a particularly encouraging trend for the 
industrialisation of really underindustrialised backward areas. 
Moreover, the absolute number of firms the agency has been able to
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assist is disappointing. If this is the sum total of large and medium 
scale industrial growth in the backward areas of Tamil Nadu during the 
1970s and there is little reason to suspect that other firms are coming 
up which haven't made use of SIPCOT's services, real industrial 
dispersal in the State is a long way from been achieved.
4. SIPCOT Relative to other State Industrial Promotion Agencies
To put SIPCOT's achievements more sharply into focus it is perhaps 
simplest to compare its programme with that of other similar agencies 
in other Indian States. Of particular interest in this context are the 
agencies in the other more industrialised States: the State Industrial 
and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd (SICOM), the Gujarat 
Industrial Development Corporation (GIDC), the West Bengal Industrial 
Development Corporation Ltd. (WBIDC), and finally, the promotion agency 
in one of Tamil Nadu's somewhat less industrialised neighbours the 
Karnataka Industrial' Areas Development Board (KIADB) . It is also 
important to have some understanding of the nature and scale of 
operations of these particular agencies because, to the extent that 
firms are persuaded to cross State boundaries in search of a new 
location, they represent in .effect SIPCOT's main competitors in 
industrial promotion in India. While inter-State industrial movement is 
not that common a phenomenon, it does exist and certainly for Madras 
based firms, .locating in Karnataka State near Bangalore is a real 
temptation (IIC 1979a,b & c).
4.1 SICOM: the State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra
SICOM was founded in 1966 with the dual remit of industrial promotion 
and of acting as the industrial investment bank for Maharashtra State. 
Unlike SIPCOT, SICOM does not handle infrastructural work but leaves 
this to the MIDC (Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation), with 
which it works in close cooperation. From 1966 to mid-1979 SICOM 
assisted 2,045 industrial units to go into production, and at the end 
of the period had a further 900 units on its books which were in 
various stages of going into production (proposals and under
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construction). Over the last five years of this period SICOM was adding 
on average 200 units per year to its books (Figure 2). The cumulative 
amount of financial assistance disbursed to firms in developing areas 
stood at Rs. 836 million on the 30th June 1979, while financial
assistance sanctioned was as high as Rs. 1,477 million (Figure 3)
(SICOM, Annual Report 1979).
Thus SICOM started its industrial promotion work some time before the 
national industrial dispersal and backward area policy was properly 
formulated. The effect of this is perhaps most evident in the choice of 
sites chosen for growth poles. These are all based on existing towns 
and over the years have been -chosen progressively further away from 
Bombay. Some of the earlier ones are therefore not even inside 
designated backward districts or in the three districts eligible for 
the Central Subsidy (Ratnagiri, Aurangabad & Chandrapur; cf. Figure 4). 
The first growth pole to be chosen by SICOM was Nasik in 1967, then 
each year in succession after that: Roha, Nagpur and Aurangabad.
Tarapur and Ahmednagar followed a few years later (1973 & 75) and at 
the end of the seventies Chandrapur and Jalgaon were taken up. While 
SICOM deals with the promotion of these centres and arranges the 
incentives and finance for the firms it persuades to go to them, MIDC 
handles the infrastructural side of their development. In addition MIDC 
provides infrastructure in a number of smaller industrial estates 
throughout Maharashtra (Figure 4). Depending which district these are 
located in firms choosing them are eligible for various incentives.
Bombay is one of the large cities in India with the worst congestion 
problem, because of its restricted geographic location on a small 
peninsula. The problem is not a new one and already in the early 
sixties Bombay industry had started to disperse to locations on the 
fringe of the city to the north where the peninsula connects with the 
mainland at Thane. The next step was to move up the steep mountain 
slope of the Western Ghats to the Deccan city of Pune. These trends had 
already started by the time SICOM and MIDC were established in the mid­
sixties. With this in mind and considering the pattern in which the 
SICOM growth poles have,been chosen, that is: progressively further and
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farther away from Bombay, always near major towns, and only lately in 
really backward areas, it would seem that SICOM has done little more 
than encourage an already established dispersal trend in concentric 
rings progressively further from Bombay. Some of SICOM's strongest 
critics go as far as to suggest that this is the main reason for the 
agency's phenomenal success along with the real dynamism of Bombay's 
industrial economy (based on personal interviews).
Amongst Indian industrialists SICOM has the reputation of being one of 
the most dynamic and efficient industrial promotion agencies in the 
country. Certainly it prides itself on providing a complete and 
personalised service, helping- industrialists at every stage of the 
lengthy process of setting up a new factory. SICOM's head office in 
Bombay also houses a department known as Udyog Mitra or 'Industry's 
Friend' which consists of one representative from each of the State's 
industrial promotion agencies, including SICOM and MIDC. Udyog Mitra 
staff make a point of handling all business in person or over the 
telephone and they will fly to sites all over the State to visit 
locations with industrialists, or go themselves to Delhi to sort out 
licences and other administrative details with the Central Government 
Ministries. All their travel costs are met by the Maharashtra State 
Government. This type of personalised and business-like service would 
seem to pay off with industrialists who apparently value it highly 
(based on personal interviews).
With the success of the SICOM programme a number of their older 
industrial estates are now full. Even before these estates were 
absolutely full MIDC started to raise the price of plots of land within 
them. Thus in 1979 the cost of land in the estates ranged from a 
maximum of about Rs. 250/- per m^ near Bombay to Rs. 2.50 in remote
backward area estates. Likewise, SICOM discontinued their promotion of 
the more popular estates, instead pushing the newer more remote ones. 
At a certain point promotion work is completely discontinued for 
particular estates and incentives are no longer available at them 
though industrialists may still locate in or near these towns on their 
own terms. By the end of 1979 SICOM had stopped promoting Nasik and
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Aurangabad and were instead concentrating their efforts on their two 
new growth poles at Chandrapur and Jalgaon. The ban on industrial 
development imposed in 1979 applies to the metropolitan areas of both
Bombay and Pune and has been applied strictly through the granting of a
'No Objections Certificates' by SICOM to all industrial units which 
register with the State Industries Department. As well as encouraging 
industries to go to growth poles they are currently promoting most 
heavily, SICOM tries to direct particular types of industry to
particular estates. Thus Nasik specialised in electronics, Roha in 
chemicals, Nagpur and Tarapur in engineering and Ahmednagar in 
pharmaceuticals, although each one has a variety of different types of 
industry as well.
4.2 GIDC: the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation
The GIDC is also one of the oldest State industrial promotion agencies 
in India. Set up in 1962 it unites in one agency both the functions of 
industrial promotion and of the provision of industrial infrastructure, 
it does not however handle the sanctioning and disbursement of
incentives. It is thus organised differently from both SIPCOT in Tamil 
Nadu which handles all three functions together and SICOM in Maharastra 
which handles both promotion and incentives but not infrastructure. In 
Gujarat financial incentives are dealt with by the Gujarat Industrial 
Investment Corporation Ltd (Menon, 1979, p.210).
GIDC1s main work therefore consists of setting up industrial centres at 
different locations in the State. For each of these it carries out 
feasibility studies, purchases the land, provides the infrastructure 
(roads, power, water and in some estates street lighting and drainage), 
constructs a limited number of houses for key workers (on some estates 
only) and constructs a variety of different types and sizes of sheds 
for smaller industrial units. At first these estates were chosen around 
the main cities of Ahmedabad, Baroda, Surat and to some extent Rajkot. 
The choice of locations was largely dictated by the availability of raw 
materials. Saurashtra, the western part of the State, was more 
neglected because of water supply problems and because of its general
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remoteness from the main areas of industrial activity. It was only at a 
later stage that the GIDC started dispersing its industrial estates 
more. It is fair to say that industrial dispersal and the 
industrialisation of backward areas has never been one of GIDC's main 
aims; instead it has concentrated on encouraging as much absolute 
industrial growth as possible. During the 1970s the agency has of 
course been influenced by the national industrial dispersal policy and 
it has certainly started industrial estates in designated backward 
districts eligible for the Central Subsidy (Panchamals, Baroach and 
Surendranagar) but it has not put any particularly concentrated effort 
into promoting these estates at the expense of others (GIDC Annual 
Report 1978 fir GIDC, All About GIDC, 1980).
The main emphasis of the GIDC's industrial promotion efforts has been 
based on altogether different premises. Foremost amongst these is the 
attitude that GIDC is essentially in competition with Maharashtra 
State. Industrial promotion has been primarily directed at getting 
Gujarati industrialists to leave Bombay, as they are being pushed to do 
anyway, and to locate their factories in Gujarat rather than elsewhere 
in Maharastra. This is a result of the fact that Gujarat and 
Maharashtra used to be one State and before that were the main 
constituent elements of the Bombay P'residency. It was only in 1956 that 
Gujarat was made into a separate State. Up till then many of the more 
enterprising Gujaratis, traditionally a very enterprising race, moved 
to Bombay to go into business. Now it is a question of luring them back 
and given the congestion in Bombay, the ban on industrial development 
there and the strong ties most Gujaratis have retained with their 
family and background in Gujarat, this is not too difficult. The 
problem is not one of finding new entrepreneurs, but one of encouraging 
existing entrepreneurial talent in the State and of bringing back home 
the talent that has left.
There are other advantages to locating in Gujarat as well. The trade 
unions in the State are known for their belief in negotation rather 
than confrontation (e.g. The Gujarat Majoor Mahan, textile union, has 
only had one or two strikes in its 50 year history) and Gujarati
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businessmen working in the State rather than in Maharashtra have better 
connections in their home State and are therefore more powerful in 
State level politics^.
These considerations are reflected in the locational distribution of 
GIDC's industrial estates. Of the 82 estates existing in 1975 (Menon, 
1979 p.152) only 38 were located in the 10 designated backward 
districts (19 districts in whole State). The estates with the most 
successful firms are all located either near Ahmedabad or in South 
Gujarat, and the most successful estate of all, Vapi, is virtually on 
the border of the State with Maharashtra. One of the three Central 
Government declared backward districts for the Central Subsidy is the 
district of Baroach again in South Gujarat on the road between Bombay 
and Ahmedabad. The other two, Panchamals and Surendranagar, are 
slightly more out of the way in the east of the State and just west of 
Ahmedabad but the really remote parts of the State to the north and 
west are not eligible for the Central Subsidy. A glance back at Map 1 
in Chapter 3 shows the very highly concentrated way the Central 
Subsidies have been disbursed with firms in Surendranagar receiving 
over 500 Subsidies, the highest number going to any one district in the 
whole of the country. Against this, however, should be set the fact 
that the GIDC estates have by and large catered more for small scale 
units. Thus by the end of 1978, 3474 small scale units were operating 
in the estates against only 128 large and medium scale units. Similarly 
total investment figures were Rs. 9,604 million and Rs. 523 million
respectively and employment 51,331 workers and 1,097 workers 
respectively.
To sum up, industrial promotion efforts in Gujarat have concentrated 
mostly on encouraging the highest possible absolute growth of industry. 
This has involved mostly small scale units and a lot of the effort has 
gone into encouraging Gujarati industrialists to return from Bombay. 
Location policy has taken second place in the State's priorities and 
much of the industrial growth has been concentrated around Ahmedabad or 
around the towns on the main communication routes south to Bombay. 
Industrial estates have been started in more remote northern and
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western districts, but fewer of them, fewer firms have chosen them and 
the rate of industrial 'sickness' and closures is much higher in these 
estates than elsewhere. Thus although Gujarat is certainly one of the 
most industrially dynamic states in India the nature of the industrial 
development occurring there is restricted and the State agencies have a 
tendency to sacrifice policy commitments such as locational 
considerations to their main priority of encouraging the maximum 
absolute industrial growth possible. (This is also true in terms of the 
level of services provided in the estates: e.g. little consideration is 
given to pollution).
4.3 WBIDC: the West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation
The organisation of industrial promotion, agencies in West Bengal
parallels fairly closely -that in Maharashtra. The WBIDC, set up in 
1967, handles both promotion work and financial assistance and
incentives for medium and large scale firms. The provision of 
infrastructure is left to the WBIIDC, the West Bengal Industrial 
Infrastructure Development Corporation, which was established somewhat 
later in 1973. Here however the similarities end as the WBIDC does not 
promote dispersed growth centres as SICOM does nor does it provide
quite the same range of incentives (WBIDC, Assistance to
Entrepreneurs).
The WBIDC has been disbursing financial assistance in the usual forms 
of shares and loans with a certain amount of refinancing by the IDBI 
since its establishment; the annual amount disbursed under these 
schemes, however, remained fairly low until 1974 when there was a 
dramatic increase in both sanctions and disbursements (Table 8).
The incentive scheme was, however, only started somewhat later in 1971 
and it was revised in 1978. Disbursements under the incentive scheme 
took off seriously a few years after the announcement of the scheme in 
1975.
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The incentive scheme is of some interest as it is organised differently 
than in other states. Firstly it applies to the whole State, though in
varying forms depending which part of the State. Thus developed areas
(Group A), which consists of the Calcutta Metropolitan Development 
Authority Area excluding the parts in Nadia District, get some of the 
incentives (though not the 15% capital investment subsidy, the power 
subsidy, rent subsidy and 15% development loans) while the rest of the
State, classified as backward areas (Group B) is eligible for all the
incentives. It would appear that the ban on industrial development in 
large cities is not applied strictly to the whole of the CMDA area. 
Effectively however, there is very little land left available for 
industrial development in this- area. Secondly the incentive scheme is 
interesting because it has a number of unique subsidies. First amongst 
these is a subsidy related to employment under which firms with a fixed 
capital investment ratio of less than Rs. 70,000 per worker are
eligible for three years for a 15% annual wage subsidy for all new
workers employed (Rs.0,1 million in backward areas), provided the 
recruitment of workers is made through government employment exchanges. 
The other note-worthy feature is that the WBIDC will provide a 15%
capital investment subsidy equivalent to the 15% Central Subsidy in all
backward areas (Group B areas) .which are not covered by the Central 
Government scheme. This means that a 15% Subsidy is available in all 
the districts of the State and not only in the three districts of 
Nadia, Purulia and Midnapore covered by the Central Government, 
excluding of course the CMDA area. Finally because of West Bengal's
acute power shortage the WBIDC has a special 15% subsidy on the cost of
installation of captive diesel driven power generation equipment for 
firms willing to install their own dynamos.
Although the WBIDC does not have a distinct policy to encourage firms 
to. locate in particular places it does cooperate with the WBIIDC which 
has a limited growth pole policy. Since its establishment in 1973 the 
WBIIDC has already started work on three growth poles at Kalyani (Nadia
Dt), Haldia and Kharagpur (both Midnapore Dt) and has plans for a
further six at Siliguri (Jalpaiguri Dt), Bajbas (24 Parganas Dt), 
Farakka (Mushidabad Dt), Kolaghat (Midnapore Dt), Durgapur and Asansol
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(both Burdhwan Dt). However the last two are in some doubt because of 
the shortage of suitable land near Durgapur and Asansol. All these 
growth poles are however fairly small with an area of about 300 acres 
each and they are all located near major towns so are really more in 
the nature of industrial estates than industrial growth poles- Their 
size and location does not show any sign of a real attempt to disperse 
a substantial amount of industry from existing centres, but rather 
seems to indicate an attempt to encourage what little indigenous 
industrial growth might be expected to occur in each of the towns 
chosen.
The scale of the WBIDC's whole programme can be judged from Table 8 but 
it is worth indicating as well that only 85 firms registered for help 
under the 1971 Incentive Scheme; 65 of these were in backward areas. 
Under the new 1978 scheme a further 52 firms registered in the first 18 
months of its operation (up to May 1980). In addition 56 firms received 
financial assistance (share capital & loans) from the inception of the 
scheme until the end of March 1979. These figures are not high when 
compared with the extent of industrial promotion programmes in some of 
the other States examined above.
Thus the scale of the industrial promotion programme for large and 
medium-scale industry is not large in comparison with the work of SICOM 
in Maharashtra, nor has it included as many firms as the SIPCOT 
programmes in Tamil Nadu, but it is comparable with the 128 large and 
medium scale firms assisted by the GIDC in Gujarat. Out of the four 
agencies the WBIDC seems to be the one making least effort to encourage 
industrial dispersal and it is the only one not promoting an important 
growth pole strategy plan. In one way the WBIDC does stand out as being 
more progressive or at least thoughtful in their approach to industrial 
promotion and that is in their use of an incentive related to 
employment creation. With this incentive they are explicitly 
recognising that the aim of their work is not simply to encourage 
maximum absolute • industrial growth but is also a question of 
encouraging wider development through raising popular standards of 
living with increased employment opportunities.
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4.4 KSIIDC: the Karnataka State Industrial Investment & Development
Corporation
The two industrial promotion agencies in Karnataka have a similar 
distribution of responsibilities to -the agencies in Maharashtra and 
West Bengal. The KSIIDC is responsible for industrial promotion and 
finance; it is eligible for refinance from the IDBI and has been in 
existence since 1964. The KIADB (Karnataka Industrial Areas Development 
Board) provides infrastructure in selected industrial areas spread 
around the State and it has existed since 1966 (KIADB, Annual Report 
1978 & KSIIDC, A Development Catalyst,& Annual Report 1978).
The State has three districts where firms are eligible for the 15% 
Central Subsidy (Mysore, Raichur and Dharwar). In addition it provides 
a similar 10% Subsidy in a further eight districts. Firms in all eleven 
districts thus designated as backward are eligible for financial 
assistance from the KSIIDC and the All-India financial institutions.
The State's industrial location policy includes first of all the ban on 
industrial development in large cities which covers Bangalore. No more 
industrial development is thus allowed in the taluks of North and South 
Bangalore except in the already laid out industrial areas which are now 
nearly full. The promotion agencies are therefore encouraging 
industrial development to locate in the Mysore area (Various industrial 
areas around the town and out along the Mysore Bangalore Highway), at 
Hubli-Dharwar, Raichur, Mangalore, (the State's main port), and 
Belgaum. In addition there are a number of small industrial areas set 
up by KIADB in other places. The overall allocation of land to firms in 
the industrial areas of each district is given in Table 9. It is 
expected that with the completion, of the conversion of the Mangalore- 
Mysore railway line from metre to broad gauge, Mysore will develop even 
more rapidly as an important industrial centre.
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Table 9: Number of firms allocated land in industrial areas in each
district: up to March 1978.
Source: KIADB Annual Report 197 6-78 pp.39-40
In backward districts eligible 
for 15% Central Subsidy:
Mysore
Raichur
Dharwar
57 firms 
22  "
11
In backward districts eligible 
for all other incentives:
Belgaum 18
Bidar
Bijapur -
Gulbarga 1
Hasan
North Kanara 2
South Kanara 70
Tumkur -
' (incl. 
Mangalore)
Advanced districts (no incentives) Bangalore 449
Bellary 1
Chickmagalur -
Chitradurga 1
Ko 1 ar 1
Mandya 7
Shimoga -
Total: 639 firms
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Although the KSIIDC and KIADB have an industrial dispersal policy they 
have made an exception to it in the face of the establishment of the 
Hosur SIP,COT Complex in Tamil Nadu. They have started a new industrial 
area at Bommasundra, half way between Bangalore and Hosur, where all 
the State industrial promotion incentives are available (including the 
State 10% Subsidy) even though this site is not in a backward area but 
in Bangalore District. The justification advanced for this exception is 
that the proximity of the Hosur Complex to Bangalore (40 kms) make it 
the nearest industrial location to the city where attractive incentives 
are offered and the Karnataka promotion agencies argue they are losing 
industry to Tamil Nadu State. With the establishment of Bommasundra 
they hope to prevent or at least reduce this drift. The demand for 
sites at Bommasundra is apparently very high even though the industrial 
area is only just ready.
Unfortunately no data are readily available to show the number of firms 
which have received the KSIIDC's various incentives and so the success 
of their industrial promotion programme must be judged on the data in 
Table 9. From this it appears that the number of firms locating in 
KIADB industrial areas in backward districts (181 in all) is similar to 
the levels of success achieved by the agencies in Gujarat and West 
Bengal with regard to large and medium scale industry. The Karnataka 
data presented here, however, includes some small scale industry as 
well as large and medium and unfortunately the precise proportions of 
each is not known, so these data are not strictly comparable and the 
KSIIDC's promotion work must be seen as less extensive than the GIDC's 
and the WBIDC's with regard to1 large and medium scale industry.
5. Conclusions
Although the SIPCOT industrial promotion programme started later than 
those in some of the other more industrialised States in India it 
compares reasonably well with them. This is .true with regard to both 
the overall extent of the programme and to the degree of industrial 
dispersal achieved, even though on both these counts SIPCOT's
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performance does not look so good when examined from a purely internal 
State point of view.
Thus although the SIPCOT incentive package has only benefited some 260 
large and medium scale firms in Tamil Nadu, this is higher than in all 
other States. Even in Maharashtra where in 13 years SICOM assisted over
2,000 firms many of these are small scale firms. Moreover,as was 
apparent from Table 6 in Chapter 3, at least with the Central Subsidy,
153 large and medium scale had been assisted in Tamil Nadu up to June 
1978 while only 88 had received it in Maharashtra and 81 in Gujarat, 
thus as SIPCOT only deals with large and medium scale industry the 
extent of its promotion work- is fairly impressive relative to the 
promotion agencies in all other States in India.
SIPCOT also compares relatively favourably with the other agencies with 
regard to its industrial dispersal efforts. Here again at the State 
level it is true that the incentive programme has had most effect in 
fairly restricted parts of the designated backward areas. The 
Walajahpet to Vaniyambadi strip in North Arcot and the three western 
taluks of Ramanathapuram are the two areas which have seen the most 
assisted industrial development, but there is also the pocket in ^ 
Dharmapuri Dt. centred around the Hosur growth pole. As is usually the 
case with area based development policies it is the most developed 
parts of the designated underdeveloped areas which benefit most from 
the designation and the related subsidies. This is what has happened 
with North Arcot and Ramanathapuram but SIPCOT would seem to be 
successfully counterbalancing such a trend by concentrating its efforts 
on another different location: Hosur. With Hosur SIPCOT is effectively 
creating a dynamic new industrial centre in Tamil Nadu. Admittedly with 
respect to Bangalore, Hosur does not represent so much of a dispersal 
and it is possible that SIPCOT might have created as successful a 
growth pole and achieved a greater degree of industrial dispersal had 
it chosen a site further south than Hosur on the road to Krishnagiri.
In Maharashtra, SICOM has indeed also achieved some industrial 
dispersal but it has done so slowly in a way which has not attempted to
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go against what might be called a 'normal' pattern of dispersal in 
concentric rings outwards from Bombay. Thus the most remote and 
backward parts of Maharashtra have as yet experienced little 
industrialisation. Similarly in Gujarat GIDC has done little more than 
encourage industrial expansion in the areas of the State where it could 
be most expected to develop. GIDC's most successful growth pole, Vapi, 
like Hosur is located on the very edge of the State as near as possible 
to Bombay. The WBIDC in West Bengal has even less of an industrial 
dispersal policy; while the KSIIDC in Karnataka is following a similar 
policy to SICOM, encouraging industry on the outskirts of the secondary 
cities of the State.
All the State industrial promotion agencies in fact have a location 
policy which to a greater or lesser degree falls in line with what 
industrialists might be expected to do if they decided to disperse on 
their own. While such pragmatism is undoubtedly essential if their 
location strategies are not to be completely ignored, it is also 
important that the agencies do not entirely compromise their policies 
in doing so.
Footnotes; •
1 Although SIPCOT uses the term 'growth centre' for its Industrial 
Complexes, their design concept conforms closely to the industrial 
growth poles of the original growth pole theory. Thus the more 
specific designation of 'growth pole' has been used to refer to them 
in this thesis.
2 In a personal interview,Dr. Atul Sarma of the Sardar Patel Institute, 
Ahmedabad, suggested that while the industrial lobby in India is 
strong at the Central Government Level, it is weak at the State 
level. It is therefore important for the industrialist to make 
the most of what connections he has at the State level.-
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CHAPTER 7
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH POLES: RANIPET AND HOSUR
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INDUSTRIAL GROWTH POLES: RANIPET AND HOSUR
This chapter is the first of two in the fourth section of the thesis. 
Together with the next chapter it takes the analysis one step further 
down to a level of even more detailed examination. The thesis began 
with a theoretical discussion about industrial location and then 
embarked on a progressively more detailed analysis of the Indian case. 
First the policy, its genesis, implementation and the place it occupied 
in the relationship of the Indian state to industrial capital was 
discussed at a national level. Then the actual spatial distribution and 
extent of industrialisation in one State and the measures the State 
government was taking to implement the dispersal policy were reviewed. 
Now it is necessary to conduct a more thorough examination of exactly 
what industrial dispersal is taking place. Thus this chapter describes 
the nature of the industry moving to the two SIPCOT industrial growth 
poles of Ranipet and Hosur and the characteristics of the physical, 
social and economic environment in which they are locating and 
indicates what type of impact it can be expected to have, while the 
next one tries to explain the reasons for the dispersal occurring. Most 
of the material for this discussion is derived from a survey of the 
firms moving to Ranipet and Hosur conducted in the first half of 1980 
(cf. Appendix for survey methodology).
The two industrial growth poles of Ranipet and Hosur have already been 
introduced in the previous chapter on SIPCOT's industrial dispersal 
programme. There it was noted that a number of firms had in fact opted 
to set up factories on the two sites and a number were locating in the 
area surrounding the Hosur site. It was also indicated that these 
factories constitute the most significant result of the SIPCOT 
programme and indeed a very high proportion of the industrial dispersal 
that has occurred in Tamil Nadu State since the national dispersal 
policy was properly instituted at the beginning of the 1970s. As a 
result the behaviour of these firms represents the most important 
industrial location trend in Tamil Nadu's recent history and an 
extremely important object of study. Moreover, as all these firms have 
dealt with the one agency, SIPCOT, they make up an easily identifiable
206
and approachable survey population.
The survey was also prompted by the need to obtain some up to date and 
detailed information on firms responding to the government dispersal 
policy, as there is very little such information readily available in 
India. In addition, what data are available on the results of the policy 
are compiled by the government industrial promotion agencies themselves 
and published to demonstrate the effectiveness of their work. It was 
thus important to obtain independent information direct from the firms 
concerned. Among other things this could include details of what the 
industrialists themselves thought of the government policy and their 
reasons for choosing the dispersed location for their factories.
Essentially the aims of the survey centred around two basic hypotheses. 
First, that firms would not be locating in remote backward areas unless 
they saw some material advantage in it for themselves or because for 
some reason they had no other alternative. In saying this it was
accepted that the government incentives might not necessarily 
constitute a sufficient material advantage to induce firms to choose a 
dispersed location. The second hypothesis was that the industrial 
dispersal policy might not have the simple positive developmental 
effect on the backward areas that the Indian planners seemed to expect, 
a view prompted by the less than satisfactory performances of other 
industrial dispersal policies elsewhere in the world. It was hoped that 
clues to the developmental effect that the firms might have, could be
derived from detailed information about the types of firms involved in
the 'dispersal programme.
The survey was therefore intended to provide answers to the following 
questions: What type of firms were responding to the dispersal policy? 
Given their characteristics what sort of developmental effect could
they be expected to have? Why were the managers choosing the new back­
ward area locations for their factories? To what extent had the govern­
ment policy and incentives programme prompted and helped them to do so? 
What was their general opinion of the government policy and industrial 
promotion programme? How effective did they expect it to be?
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The sample of firms chosen for the survey consisted mostly of firms
from Ranipet and Hosur, as already explained, but to this were added 
firms locating factories in the area of Dharmapuri District around 
Hosur and a few from the joint SIPCOT-MMDA satellite town of
Maraimalainagar (M.M.Nagar) just outside Madras. Finally, a number of 
major firms setting up new factories in other backward areas of Tamil 
Nadu were approached, but there were few of these and even fewer 
responded. In all, 114 firms were approached and information was
collected on 82.
Precise details of the' numbers of firms approached and responding are 
given in the methodological appendix at the end of the thesis, but it 
is worth noting here that of the 82 respondent firms 28 were locating 
in the Ranipet Complex, a further 33 in the Hosur Complex, 12 in the
area of Dharmapuri around Hosur, another 8 in M.M.Nagar, while the last 
one was building a factory near Sholingur in a designated backward area 
of North Arcot District. This represents about 75% of the firms, in 
Ranipet, 50% of those in Hosur, 85% of those in the area of Dharmapuri 
surveyed and 21% of the firms on the SIPCOT list for M.M.Nagar at the 
time of the survey.
The methodological appendix also includes a copy of the survey 
questionnaire and details about its design and its administration. It
is therefore sufficient to indicate here that at least the opinion
section of the questionnaire and frequently the complete form was 
completed in personal interviews with the managing director of each
firm or other senior executive party to the location decision.,
1• Basic Characteristics of the Firms Surveyed
The factual information collected on each firm permits the 
classification of the sample population in a number of different ways. 
The results of these classifications are reviewed here as an 
introduction to the survey firms. In each case the variable concerned 
is crosstabulated against location as this is the variable of most
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basic concern to the thesis.
Just over 50% of the sample firms were medium scale industries 
according to the Indian government definition at the time (1980) which 
defined MSIs as involving between 1 million and 10 million rupees fixed 
capital. Approximately 30% were large scale industries (LSIs) and a 
further 10% small scale industries (SSIs). These proportions were 
reproduced fairly evenly in each of the locations except in Dharmapuri 
District (outside the Hosur Complex) where there were 60% LSIs and only 
40% MSIs (Table 1).
Table 1 : Scale of Firms Surveyed
Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Sholingur Total
Small Scale
(SSI) 2 3 2 7
Medium Scale
(MSI) 17 21 5 5 48
Large Scale
(LSI) 9 8 7 1 1 26
No Reply   _1 _  __ 1
28 33 12 8 1 82
Classifying firms according to the Indian National Industrial 
Classification (NIC) to two digits resulted in 16 different 
manufacturing classes being represented, most of them by just a few 
firms (Table 2). However, five classes were more heavily represented 
ranging from Chemicals & Products with 17 firms to Metal Products with 
8, through Machinery (13), Base Metal & Alloy Products (11) and 
Transport Equipment (9). Table 2 shows that the distribution of Ibjse in 
the different locations is very uneven, but it would seem that Ranipet 
specialises strongly in chemical industries, while Hosur is well 
represented among a variety of metal based and engineering industries; 
this is particularly true if the Dharmapuri firms around Hosur are 
taken into account. Ranipet's specialisation reflects the fact that it
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Table 2 Firms by National Industrial Classification1
NIC
Code Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Tot;
Fruit & Veg. Products 20 - 1 1 - 2
Food Products 21 1 - - 1 2
Drinks & Tobacco Prods. 22 - 1 - - 1
Cotton Textiles 23 - 2 1 - 3
Wood & Prods. 27 - _ - 1 1
Paper, Printg. & Publshg. 28 1 - - - 1
Leather & Products 29 2 - - - 2
Rubber, Plastic & Petrochmt. 30 2 2 - - 4
Chemicals & Products 31 12 4 _ 1 17
Ametal & Mineral Prods. 32 1 1 - - 2
Base Metal & Alloy Pds. 33 2 4 2 2 11
Metal Products 34 2 6 - - 8
Mach inery 35 5 5 3 _ 13
Electrical Machinery 36 - 4 1 - 5
Transport Equipment 37 - 2 4 3 9
Other Manufacturing 38 - 1 - - 1
28 33 12 8 82
has a good water supply and is generally recommended by SIPCOT as the 
most appropriate location for chemical firms. Overall the sample firms 
reflect the existing specialisation of Madras in particular industrial 
categories which suggests strong ties between the sample firms and the 
current structure of Madras and Tamil Nadu industry.
The attempt to classify firms according to their corporate structure 
met with some difficulties in view of the varying legal status of firms 
and a survey question which in the event proved to have been 
inadequately worded. However, it was possible to check the responses 
with other sources such as the Madras Stock Exchange Yearbook (1980)
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and it did prove possible to establish that a high proportion (60%) of 
the sample firms have close connections with already established 
industrial companies. Another 8.5% of firms had whole or partial 
government backing. Thus only slightly more than a quarter (28%) were 
independent new companies (Table 3). These proportions vary slightly 
between the different locations with the greatest variation occurring 
among the Dharmapuri firms where the percentage of independent new 
companies drops to 17% and the proportion of direct subsidiaries or 
branches rises in relation to that of members of company groups. Thus 
Dharmapuri firms seem to be even more closely controlled by firms 
external to the area than those in other locations. Finally, it is 
worth noting that there are no new industrial units 'indigenous' to the 
backward areas; all have connections with promoters if not firms from 
towns outside the area.
Table 3: Corporate Status of Firms
Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total
Expansion Existing Firm 1 2 - 1 4
Subsidiary or Branch 6 3 6 16
Member Company Group 9 16 3 4 32
Independent New Firm 8 11 2 2 23
Joint Sector Firm 3 1 1 - 5
Public Sector Firm 1 - - 1 . 2
28 33 12 8 82
The question on the date or expected date of commencement of production 
resulted in a distribution of firms over dates from 1974 to 1984 with a 
heavy concentration in the year or so immediately following the survey: 
1980-81. Table 4 demonstrates how Ranipet started as an industrial 
growth pole a few years before Hosur, and how M.M.Nagar is only just 
taking off. Several firms in Dharmapuri started up even before the 
Hosur Complex was designated, suggesting that SIPCOT may in fact have 
chosen the location of Hosur precisely because firms were already
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locating there themselves, thereby suggesting it would make a popular 
location for a growth pole. It is also interesting to note that there 
has been a slow decline in the number of firms choosing Ranipet since 
the announcement of the Hosur Complex, suggesting that the latter is a 
more appealing location.
Table 4: Year of Starting Production (Actual or Expected)
Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M. M.Nagar Total
1974 ' 3 - 1 - 4
1975 3 1 1 - 5
1976 4 - 1 - 5
1977 4 2 3 - 9
1978 4 1 1 - 6
.1979 2 4 - - 6
Total up to 1980 20 8 7 - 35
Survey point: 1980 6 14 4 4 28
1981 1 8 1 1 12
1982 1 1 - 2 4
1983 - - - - -
1984 - 1 - - 1
Unsure - JL 1 _2
28 33 12 8 82
Taken in conjunction with the last question information on whether 
firms were already1 in production or not shows that only 10% of the 
firms which gave 1980 as their year of commencment of production had 
actually gone into production at the time of the survey. Another 20% 
would be made up of those in trial production. Table 5 also shows that 
while overall about 50% of the sample firms are in production, in 
Ranipet this rises to 75% and in Dharmapuri to 66%, which is offset by 
only 27% in Hosur and none in M.M.Nagar. Moreover, it brings out that 
two of the firms in the survey had cancelled their projects. This is 
symptomatic of a much larger number of cancellations at all stages of 
production and project preparation, though it was impossible to
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discover exactly how many, as both managers and government officials 
were understandably reluctant to discuss them.
Table 5: Stage of Project
Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total
In production 21 9 8 - 38
Trial production - 2 2 1 5
Not in production 7 21 2 6 37
Cancelled 1 — 1 2
----- -- -- — —
28 33 12 8 82
Table 6: Labour Employed (Unskilled 
No. Unskilled Ranipet Hosur
and Skilled Workers) 
Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total
.Workers Employed: 
1 - 49 18 20 5 5 , 48
50 - 99 ' 5 4 5 2 17
100 - 149 1 4 - 1 6
150 - 199 - 1 - - 1
200 - 249 - 1 1 - 2
250 plus 4 2 - - 6
No Reply - 1 1 - 2
No. Skilled Workers: 
1 - 49 20 22 10 6 58
50 - 99 3 4 1 1 10
100 - 149 2 2 - - 4
150 - 199 1 ' 1 - - 2
200 - 249 - 1 - 1 2
250 plus 2 3 1 6
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Apart from the scale classification (LSI/MSI/SSI) discussed above (cf. 
Table 1), various other measures of the size of firms are available, 
one of these being labour employed. From Table 6 it is evident that the 
majority of firms employed less than 50 unskilled or skilled workers: 
indeed 58% of them employ less than 50 unskilled workers and 70% less 
than 50 skilled workers. At the other end of the scale there are a 
smattering of firms which employed anything up to 900 unskilled and 900 
skilled workers. The table also shows that the distribution of small 
and large employers is fairly similar in Ranipet and Hosur but in 
Dharmapuri and M.M.Nagar there are very few large employers.
Another measure of the size of firms .is the amount of capital involved. 
The large, medium, small scale classification gives some idea of how 
the sample firms were grouped by fixed capital investment. This can be 
supplemented with the information that fixed capital investment ranged 
from Rs. 0.3 million to Rs. 141 million, while working capital invested 
ranged from Rs.80,000 to Rs. 45 million for working capital, showing a 
concentration of firms in the lower end of the Medium Scale bracket.
Finally,, it is interesting to look at the number of firms receiving the 
major government incentives. Th.is information was collected indepen­
dently of the survey, direct from the SIPCOT registers. Table 7 gives 
the number of firms at each location (no M.M.Nagar firms had received 
any financial incentives from SIPCOT by June 1980) which had received 
sanction for the three major financial incentives available: the Sales 
Tax Loan (STL) the Central Government 15 Subsidy (CS) and the Term 
Loans (TL). It shows that only' 46 out of the total 82 firms surveyed 
had actually had a Central Investment Subsidy approved, only 23 were 
getting Sales Tax Loans and 17 Term Loans by the end of June 1980. 
However, this should be set against the figure mentioned earlier of 
only 38 firms actually being in production at the time of the survey. 
This means that some of the firms not yet in production had already 
been sanctioned or even given a Central Subsidy and two thirds of the 
firms in production were receiving a Sales Tax Loan. The Term Loan 
figures are a good deal lower, but then this incentive is usually 
reserved for helping firms at a later stage when hidden items of
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expenditure emerge.
Table 7: Number of Firms Receiving Major Financial Incentives 
STL: Sales Tax Loan 
CS: Central Government 15% Subsidy
TL: Term Loans
Year Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri Total
Sanctioned STL CS TL STL CS TL STL CS TL STL CS TL
1972 1 1
1973 1 4 4 1 4 4
1974 1 4 3 1 4 3
1975 2 2 1 1 2 2
1976 1 6 3 1 4 2 13
1977 6 1 4 2 1 3 2 9 5 5
1978 2 3 1 2 1 1 4 7 2
1979 2 1 4 1 2 3 7
(1st 1)1980 2 2 4
11 22 15 2 15 2 9 8 23 46 17
Source: SIPCOT Registers as on 30th June 1980
1.1 Summary Description of Sample Population
It is apparent first of all that the sample is predominantly Medium 
Scale Industry and some Large Scale Industry. These industries are 
distributed differentially over the four locations covered, with a 
tendency for LSIs to choose more remote locations in Dharmapuri, while 
the MSIs appear to prefer growth pole locations, suggesting perhaps 
that remoter locations are perceived as a riskier proposition only 
suitable for firms with adequate financial backing. The NIC 
distribution indicated a strong resemblance between the industrial 
structure of these new industrial centres and the existing structure of 
established Madras and Tamil Nadu industry with chemicals and metal
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based engineering industries, among them transport equipment 
manufacturing, particularly well represented. This would suggest that 
while the government industrial location policy seems to have had some 
success in dispersing established industry, it has not yet been 
particularly successful in encouraging new lines of industrial 
production, let alone the emergence of new firms indigenous to the 
backward areas.
These strong links with established industry are further borne out by 
evidence on the corporate structure of the sample firms which 
demonstrates that nearly two thirds of the firms have connections with 
already established companies' and a further 8.5% have government 
backing, leaving only a quarter as independent new firms. Again these 
proportions vary from location to location and tend to confirm our 
earlier hypothesis that remote locations are usually chosen by firms 
with sound financial backing: the Dharmapuri firms are nearly all
direct subsidiaries or branches of existing companies.
A more careful look at levels of capital investment shows that the 
majority of the sample firms are concentrated at the bottom of the MSI 
bracket with an overall average fixed capital investment of Rs.12.3 
million. The other indicator of project size that was examined was 
employment levels, which revealed that a majority of firms employed 
less than 50 unskilled and 50 skilled workers. Even more interestingly 
it is apparent that some of the firms classified as Large Scale with 
respect to capital investment were in fact quite small employers. This 
was particularly obvious among the Dharmapuri firms where there are 
very few large employers though levels of capital investment are high. 
Thus it would seem that there may also be a tendency for the more 
capital intensive firms to choose remote locations.
Looking at the sample firms over time it was noted that Ranipet has its 
first firms going into production as far back as 1974. One or two firms 
also started in Dharmapuri about the same time. Hosur on the other hand 
only really started taking off in 1977, while M.M.Nagar only had its 
first firm going into trial production at the time of the survey in
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1980. Looking at the number of firms expecting to go into production in 
the next few years the development of Hosur looks particularly 
promising, while Ranipet may even be experiencing a decline, possibly 
brought about by the competition from Hosur. The fact that firms had 
already started operating in Dharmapuri in the area around Hosur even 
before the Hosur Complex was started gives credence to the suggestion 
that SIPCOT chose the site because it realised the area was popular 
with industry rather than, therefore, because it felt the area needed 
developing.
Finally while it seems that most firms are awarded a Central Subsidy 
before they even go into production, both the Sales Tax Loan and the 
Term Loan seem to be awarded a lot less freely. Admittedly the 
Dharmapuri firms in production all seem to be receiving a Sales Tax 
Loan, but in both Ranipet and Hosur less than half of them are.
This introduction to the survey firms has outlined their main 
characteristics and has also indicated that there exist a number of 
differences in the overall character of the firms locating in the 
different places surveyed. In 1980 the development of Hosur was moving 
faster than that of the Ranipet growth pole and the firms in 
Dharmapuri, that is those that have chosen to locate outside the SIPCOT 
growth pole seem to have a number of special characteristics not found 
so frequently in the other locations. Finally, M.M.Nagar is apparently 
a lot less attractive to industry despite its proximity to the 
traditional industrial city of Madras. Given these location-related 
differences our next concern with the survey firms must be to analyse 
these differences in greater depth, but before we embark on that task 
it is appropriate to consider more carefully the environmental 
characteristics of these different locations. At a later stage (Section 
3) we can then return to the consideration of the survey returns with a 
sounder basis for understanding the firms' locational behaviour.
2. The Nature of a Backward Area Environment
The next five sections of this chapter describe the physical, social
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and economic environment which the backward areas of Northern Tamil 
Nadu present to industrialists. As well as identifying the advantages 
and disadvantages of the area as a location for industry it is also 
intended to provide the basis for considering the type of impact the 
incoming firms are likely to have on the area.
What then are the features of these backward areas which might be 
expected to affect the location decisions of firms? First there are 
infrastructural considerations: the availability of adequate
communications and transport facilities, other industrial services such 
as power and water supplies and also social services for the firm's 
employees: housing, schools, medical facilities and shops. Secondly
firms are likely to consider the accessibility of the markets for their 
products and the sources of the raw materials: if these are not local,
how easily can they be reached and what will transport cost? Finally 
there is a set of more diverse inputs which are all related to existing 
economic activity in the area and how the incoming firms will integrate 
with it. These include the availability and cost of labour and the 
opportunities for getting repair and maintenance or even minor
subcontracting jobs done locally.
Most of these considerations have been identified by the industrial 
location theories reviewed in Chapter 2. The classical or cost
minimisation approach to the study of industrial location, for 
instance, put most stress on the distance to markets and raw material
sources. While the relevance of these issues was not dismissed it was
suggested that it was also necessary to look at how incoming firms 
would relate to the local economy of their new environment. Chapter 2 
concluded that the crucial feature to examine was the articulation of 
modes of production in the area concerned, as it was in the interaction 
between this articulation and the capitalist mode of production of the 
incoming firms that clues as to both why the firms had chosen the 
location and what sort of impact they would be likely to have, might be 
found. Unfortunately, only a limited amount of material on the modes of 
production in Northern Tamil Nadu exists, as little research has been 
done on the subject and it was too major a task to be undertaken as
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part of this thesis. However, some indications from published 
information on the area do exist and a general impression of the 
articulation of modes of production in these backward areas can be 
formed.
It should be noted at this stage in the discussion that there has been 
a long standing debate in the Indian journal 'Economic & Political 
Weekly', on the nature of the mode or modes of production currently in 
existence in India. Essentially it is a discussion on the emergence of 
capitalist relations of production in Indian agriculture, though 
participants have also developed various ways of conceptualising what 
type of other relations of production they felt existed^. 
Unfortunately, none of the empirical case studies conducted as part of 
this debate relate to the two districts of Northern Tamil Nadu 
discussed here.
The analysis will cover the backward areas around the Ranipet and Hosur 
growth poles as this is where the large majority of the sample firms 
are located. The area designed as backward for the purposes of the 
Central Government 15% Subsidy comprises the whole of Dharmapuri 
District and four taluks of North Arcot (Tiruppatur, Vaniyambadi, 
Vellore and Walajahpet). However, much of the published information on 
the area covers the whole of both Districts, and this will be reflected 
in the coverage of this analysis, (it should be remembered that for the 
purposes of the Tamil Nadu State incentives, the entire area of both 
Districts is considered as backward). In addition a good deal of the 
information given below is derived from the Vellore-Dharmapuri Planning 
Region Draft Plan (1973-4,- Directorate of Town Planning, GoTN), which 
again includes all of Dharmapuri District but not quite all of North 
Arcot, the three easternmost taluks being excluded (Cheyyar, Arkonam 
and Wandiwash). To avoid confusion the extent of these different areas 
are all represented on Figure 1.
The analysis does not consider the environment of the M.M.Nagar growth 
pole, as it is of only minor importance in the survey, and because it 
is so near to Madras and not in a designated backward area it would
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require extensive special treatment. However, in any later 
consideration of the M.M.Nagar firms it should be remembered that the 
satellite town can be expected to be very heavily dominated by the
economy of Madras, to the extent that many of the workers that may
eventually work in its industries can be expected to commute from the 
southern suburbs of the city.
2.1 Physical Geography and Topography of North Tamil Nadu
Figure 2 gives an indication of the physical features of the country 
around Ranipet and Hosur in Northern Tamil Nadu. From this map it is 
clear that Ranipet is located in the valley of the Palar River a few
miles downstream from the point where this valley emerges from the
Javadi Hills and broadens out into the Coromandel Coastal Plain.. The 
altitude at this point is about 200 metres above sea level. Hosur on 
the other hand is located much further inland on the head-waters of the 
Ponnaiyar River in the South Deccan Plateau. The altitude of this area 
is around 800 to 900 metres above sea level. The general slope of the 
whole region is from west to east with drainage into the Bay of Bengal 
through the Cauvery River sysfem as well as through the systems of the 
Palar and Ponnaiyar already mentioned. The Cauvery and its Stanley 
Reservoir behind the Mettur Dam forms the south-western frontier of 
Dharmapuri District. The only other reservior of importance in the 
region is the Krishnagiri Reservoir on the Ponnaiyar some 40 km south­
east of Hosur.
A large variety of minerals are to be found in the area but to date 
only granite, limestone and iron ore deposits have been considered 
sufficiently important to attract commercial exploitation. The Draft 
Regional Plan (pp.7-9) however, suggests that it may be possible to 
exploit other minerals commercially in the future.
Given the hilly topography of the region, much of the land is 
uncultivated. Only 41% of the area is used for farming compared to 46% 
at the Tamil Nadu State level. On the other hand 31% of the region is 
classified as forests against 15% of the State as a whole (Table 8).
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Table 8: Regional Land Use in 1970 for the Area of the Vellore-
Dharmapuri Planning Region and the State of Tamil Nadu
Source: Draft Regional Plan for the Vellore-Dharmapuri 
Planning Region 1973-4, Govt, of Tamil Nadu, 
Directorate of Town Planning page 10, Table 2.2
Land Use
Region
Area in 
'000 ha
% to tot. 
area
Tamil Nadu____
Area in % to tot 
'000 ha area
Geographical area as 
per village papers 1,949 100.0
Forests 615 31.5
Barren & uncultivable land 132 6.8
Land put to non-agricultural use 160 8.2
Cultivable waste 58 3.0
Permanent pastures 
& other grazing lands 23 1.2
Land under garden & tree crops 13 0.7
Current fallow land 66 3.4
Other fallow lands 68 3.5
Net Area Sown , 814 41.7
13,011
2,000
842
1,448
553
278
250
969
602
6,069
100.0
15.4
6.5 
11.1
4.3
2.1
1.9
7.5
4.6 
46.6
The climate of the whole region is dominated by the monsoons which 
usually start in early June. At the same time, however, the western 
part of the region with its higher altitude is generally cooler and 
experiences less variation in temperature than the eastern taluks of 
Vellore, Arni and Walajahpet. Temperatures vary between a maximum of 
42°C in May down to about 18°C in December. The mean average rainfall 
in Dharmapuri is 850mm while in North Arcot it is higher at 970mm.
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2.2 The Population
Table 9 gives the levels and variations of population for the whole 
region in census years since 1901,as well as the levels and variations 
for the two districts and the State of Tamil Nadu as a whole for 
comparison. While broadly the pattern of growth in the region matches 
that in the State, with faster rates of increase in the last thirty to 
forty years than before, population growth in the region seems to have 
started a decade sooner than in the State. This is particularly marked 
in Dharmapuri District, where after a declining population between 1911 
and 1921 subsequent growth was very fast indeed (16.73% in the 1920s as 
compared with 8.52% in the State). Since that date the population 
growth rate in Dharmapuri has been consistently higher than in the 
State or even in North Arcot, apart from during the 1940s when there 
was another slump in the District growth rate.
As • well as different population growth rates through the 
Vellore-Dharmapuri Planning Region there are some major variations in 
population density. Of the 1971 total population of 4,652,526 only a 
little oyer one third lives in Dharmapuri (1,677,775) while the ten 
taluks of North Arcot with a similar surface area accomodate a 
population of 2,974,751 inhabitants. The highest population densities 
in the . region are found in .the taluks of Vellore with 447 persons per 
square kilometre, and Walajahpet with 420; thus in the immediate 
vicinity of the Ranipet growth pole. In Dharmapuri on the other hand 
densities fall as low as 100 persons per km^ and don't go above-the 214 
persons registered in Uthangarai. In Hosur taluk itself the density is 
170 persons per km^. The main concentrations of population are thus 
spread out along the valley of the Palar River, with densities rising 
lower down the valley as it broadens out into the coastal plain.
Not surprisingly the Palar River Valley is also the area where most of 
the towns of the region are located. In terms of Tamil Nadu as a whole, 
both Districts have low levels of urbanisation. Indeed Dharmapuri has 
the lowest level of urbanisation in the whole State. There are however 
a number of important towns. Vellore is the largest, and with 139,082
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inhabitants it is the only Class 1 (as per Census classification of 
towns) in the region. Gudiyatham, Ambur, Vaniyambadi and Tiruvannamalai 
are all Class II towns (50,000-99,999). The largest towns in Dharmapuri 
District are Dharmapuri itself with 40,086 inhabitants and Krishnagiri 
(34,359), both therefore qualify as Class III towns along with about 
half a dozen towns in North Arcot. Ranipet is a Class III town with
29,281 inhabitants, while Hosur ranks as a Class IV with 16,591
inhabitants. The difference in the population levels around the two 
growth pole sites is further emphasised by the taluk levels: while
Walajapet taluk around Ranipet has 253,329 inhabitants, the Hosur taluk 
has only 163,826. Their respective population densities excluding urban 
population are 310 and 155 per km^ (420 and 170 total population
density, i.e. rural and urban), and while Walajahpet has three towns 
over 10,000 inhabitants Hosur taluk has only one (Figure 3).
Table 10 gives the number of inhabitants in a selection of the major 
towns in the two districts for the census years since 1901, and Figure 
4 gives the same information in graph form. Both figures do not however 
include all the major towns in North Arcot (e.g. the two Class II towns 
of Ambur and Tiruvannamalai and Class III towns have been omitted); 
those chosen are either the most important in terms of size or are the 
nearest to Ranipet. From these two figures it is apparent that while
there are fewer and smaller towns in Dharmapuri District, these are the 
fastest growing towns in the region, as during the 1960s Dharmapuri 
(town), Krishnagiri and Hosur all had decadal growth rates of well over 
40%. In North Arcot most of the towns had decadal growth rates of 
between 20 and 28%. Interestingly it would appear that the fastest 
growing town in North Arcot during the 1960s is Ranipet, and this is 
before the arrival of the SIPCOT Complex.
2.3 Ranipet and Hosur Towns
Table 11 lists the various facilities and civic amenities existing in 
Ranipet and Hosur at the time of the 1971 Census or shortly before. 
While this gives a fairly good idea of the type of towns Ranipet and 
Hosur are, there are also a good number of changes and improvements to
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FIGURE 4: GROWTH OF MAJOR TOWNS IN DHARMAPURI & NORTH ARCOT (1901-1971)
Source: Censi of India (1901-1971)
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the facilities they offer which have taken place since 1971. Until the 
District Handbooks for the 1981 Census are published it is difficult to 
update the information contained in Table 11 comprehensively, but a 
good number of important improvements can be listed here based on other 
sources such as the Draft Regional Plan and personal observation.
To deal first with the medical facilities the two towns offer, the 
general point to remember is that while both towns have only limited 
medical facilities they are both within fairly easy reach of major 
urban hospitals with highly sophisticated facilities. In the case of 
Ranipet, the Christian Medical College hospital in Vellore is one of 
the most advanced teaching hospitals in the whole of India, while for 
Hosur good hospitals are available in Bangalore. Though the number of 
beds and the level of care available in the Ranipet and Hosur hospitals 
may have improved since 1971, there have been no major improvements to 
these facilities in the towns themselves.
On the educational side mention should be made of the Industrial 
Training Institute in Hosur which has existed since 1965 but seems to 
have escaped the attention of the Census enumerators. A similar 
institute exists in Vellore although there is none in Ranipet. The 
Hosur ITI awards certificates in various skilled industrial trades 
(e.g. fitters, turners, machinists, electricians and welders) to 
between 100 and 200 graduates every year and there are plans to expand 
its capacity in the near future.
Banking facilities have also improved in both Ranipet and Hosur with 
two different banks having branches in the towns themselves and the 
Indian Overseas Bank additional branches at the SIPCOT Complex office 
buildings. In Hosur the State Bank of India has also opened an extra 
branch at the Industrial Complex.
The transport and communications facilities of Ranipet and Hosur have 
already been covered in the previous chapter and here the national 
highways and main railway lines in the area are given on the map of 
population density and urbanisation (Figure 3). Both towns are on
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Table 11: Facilities and Civic Amenities in Ranipet and Hosur as per
the 1971 Census
Source: Census of India, 1971, District Handbooks for 
Dharmapuri and North Arcot Districts. Town Directories: 
Statements I - VII
 Ranipet_____   Hosur
Functional Category 1961 Census Industry Services/Primary
1971 Census Industry 
Civic & Other Amenities, 1969
Activities/Indus try 
Industry/Services 
Primary/Activities
Latrines 
Water Borne 
Service 
Other
Protected Water Supply 
Overhead Tank 
Surface Reservoir 
Fire Fighting Service 
Electrification (No.Connections) 
Domestic 
Industrial 
Commercial 
Road Lighting 
Others
163
3,377
100
1-234,000 litres 
8-28,800 litres 
Yes
1,346
180
476
819
84
212
50
2-30,150 litres
534
37
438
3/281
12/1024
Medical, Educational, Recreational & Cultural Facili ties, 1969
Hospital (Walajahpet: 32 beds) 15 beds
(Vellore: 1,455 beds)
Dispensaries 2 -
Other 1 with 5 beds
Colleges:
Arts, Science,
Commerce (Walajahpet) (Krishnagiri)
Medical (Vellore)
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Table 11 (Continued):
Engineering 
Polytechnic 
Vocat ional 
Higher Secondary School 
Junior Secondary School 
Primary School 
Others
Stadia and Parks 
Cinemas
Auditoria and Drama Halls 
Public Libaries/Reading rooms
Ranipet
Shorthand & Typing (1) 
3 
14 
2 
1 
2 
1
Hosur
Typing (2) 
2
6
1
Trade, Commerce, Industry and Banking,1969
Names of 3 most Important Comodities 
Imported Sulphur, Wattle Extract
& G.S. Powder 
Exported Sanitory Ware, Tanned
Hides & Skins
Manufactured Fertiliser, Sanitory Ware,
Tanned Hide and. Skins 
Number of Banks 1
No. of Agricultural Credit Socs.
No. of Non-Agric. Credit Socs. 4
important national highway routes and both have somewhat poor access to 
the railway system, Ranipet because it is about 17 kilometres from an 
important station and Hosur because, although it has its own station, 
this is on a minor metre gauge railway line.
Though Ranipet is by far the larger of the two towns, Hosur is perhaps 
more important in the role it plays. Ranipet is really part of a 
complex of three fairly large towns, of which the other two, Arcot and
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Walajahpet, are both administratively more important, even though the 
latter is considerably smaller (both are taluk headquarters) in size. 
Moreover these three towns are overshadowed by the proximity of an 
urban centre of major regional and even some national importance: 
Vellore. Considerably more urban development would have to occur before 
these four towns could be seen as part of one agglomeration, as Vellore 
is some fifteen to twenty kilometres away from the other three, but 
there is no doubt that the existence of particular urban facilities in 
Vellore does discourage their provision in Ranipet/Arcot/Walajahpet as 
we 11.
With the presence of the old EXD Parry factory in Ranipet, the town has 
long been the one out of the four with the most industrial character in 
terms of modern industry; this has of course been reinforced by the 
establishment of the SIPCOT Complex just outside the town. However, 
Arcot and Walajahpet have.also been industrial centres for many years 
given the position they enjoy in the traditional leather industry along 
with Gudiyatham and Vaniyambadi further up the Palar Valley.
Hosur on the other hand is much more remote than Ranipet, despite the 
fact that it is only 35 kilometres from Bangalore. It is the only town 
in the taluk of the same name and apart from Bangalore the other towns 
nearest to it are 24 and 50 kilometres away (Denkanikotta and 
Krishnagiri respectively). But precisely because of this remoteness it 
is perhaps more important in local terms than Ranipet is in its area. 
First of all Hosur is the administrative centre of the taluk and in 
this capacity, as, well as because there are no other towns in the 
taluk, it accon^ dates all government extension offices which are 
located at taluk level. In addition it is the only services, medical 
and. educational centre and it is the main market town of the area. Thus 
despite its relatively small size in comparison with Ranipet, in a 
remote and sparsely populated area, Hosur assumes a much greater 
importance in local life than its larger counterpart in North Arcot 
District.
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2.4 Educational Levels, Occupation Structure & Economic Activity
The 1971 Census of India Primary Census Abstract for Tamil Nadu State 
gives a detailed acount of the education levels and occupation 
distribution of the population in each taluk of the State. These data 
for the taluks of North Arcot and Dharmapuri Districts have been 
collated in Table 12. As well as the basic data for each taluk and 
district the table gives the rural-urban breakdown for the districts 
and the data for selected towns in the area. The towns were selected on 
the basis of their proximity to one or other of the SIPCOT Complexes.
The first thing to note from this table is the much higher level of 
literacy and education in North Arcot District than in Dharmapuri. That 
this is related to the level of urbanisation in North Arcot District is 
evident from the even higher levels in urban areas and in the most 
urbanised taluks. The more urbanised taluks in Dharmapuri also have 
higher levels of literacy but these never quite attain those in North 
Arcot. As an example, 55% of Ranipet's population is classified as 
literate or educated while in Hosur this level is only 46%. Some of the 
more remote parts of Dharmapuri such as Denkanikotta Taluk and Palacode 
Sub-Taluk (part of Dharmapuri taluk adjacent to Denkanikotta) have very 
low levels of literacy indeed; only one taluk in North Arcot, Chengam, 
has a level anywhere comparable. These low levels of 20% literacy or 
less is one good indication of the backwardness of these taluks.
Both districts have similar labour force participation rates of about 
36% rising to 37% in rural areas and standing at 29% in urban areas, 
(interestingly’ the towns of Hosur and Ranipet have the lowest 
participation rates among those registered on the table: 27.9% and
25.3% respectively). The proportion of workers involved in agriculture 
is also very high in both districts but it is noticeably higher in 
Dharmapuri than in North Arcot. There is also a higher proportion of 
people classified as cultivators rather than agricultural labourers in 
Dharmapuri, while in North Arcot the levels are much more similar (57.2 
and 26.3 in Dharmapuri and 38.3 and 31.2% in North Arcot) indicating a 
more commercialised farming system in North Arcot with larger farms and
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more paid labour. This seems to be particularly marked in the taluks of 
the Palar Valley, nearly all of which have more workers classified as 
agricultural labourers than as cultivators; the exceptions are the two 
taluks of Vellore and Walajahpet which have very few agricultural 
labourers indeed (20.6% and 22.8% respectively). This latter tendency 
may be due to the higher levels of urbanisation in these two taluks and 
the decision by underemployed agricultural labourers to try and find 
work in towns.rather than in the countryside.
In both North Arcot and Dharmapuri there tends to be a higher 
proportion of cultivators to agricultural labourers as one moves 
further west into the more remote and backward areas of the region, and 
in the case of North Arcot as one moves south into the more hilly 
taluks of the District. The consistency of this trend would seem to 
confirm that the ratio of cultivators -to agricultural labourers in a 
particular area can give us some indication of the level of 
commercialisation or capitalisation of agricultural practices in the
area.
In their work on changes taking place in the Tamil Nadu economy between 
the two Census years of 1961 and' 1971, Kurien & James (1979) identify a 
very striking trend of increasing proportions of agricultural labourers 
to independent cultivators. The trend is apparent throughout the State 
and is so dramatic as to force them to conclude that it is evidence of 
a real change taking place in the organisation of Tamil Nadu f a r m i n g ^ .  
They report the existence of this trend in both North Arcot and
Salem/Dharmapuri.
In North Arcot paddy is increasingly important in agricultural
production, gradually challenging the traditional dominance of millet 
crops. To some extent this is also true in Dharmapuri (Kurien & James 
■ 1979 pp.86-87 & p.106).
The next two occupation categories in the table: III, Workers in
Livestock, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting and Plantations and IV, Mining 
and Quarrying are not significant in North Arcot and Dharmapuri. In
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both districts they employ about 1% of the workers each. Category V, 
Manufacturing is, however, a good deal more important. This category is 
broken up into Household and Non-Household manufacturing, a division 
which is extremely useful to indicate the relative importance of the 
informal sector and the modern industrial sector as employers.
Overall, Manufacturing only employs 11% of the workers in North Arcot 
and 3.3% in Dharmapuri. This confirms the largely rural-agricultural 
character of both districts. Within these overall .figures there are 
some major variations. Thus 33% of the workers in urban areas of North 
Arcot are employed in manufacturing and 17% in Dharmapuri . Within this 
again about three quarters of these urban manufacturing workers are in 
Non-Household manufacturing. In most taluks in both districts there are 
generally more workers in Non-Household than in Household 
manufacturing. The exceptions to this are the taluks of southern North 
Arcot. In the five towns shown in Table 12 there is consistently a 
higher percentage of workers in Non-Household manufacturing except in 
Walajahpet where the proportions are completely reversed (38.6% of 
workers in Household manufacturing as opposed to 13.7% in 
Non-Household). According to' the Chief Inspector of Factories List for 
1979 this must be related entirely to the concentration of the leather 
industry in the town as there are some 60 leather firms in the taluk, 
nearly 50% of which operate without power, suggesting that much of the 
leather industry is still organised on traditional rather than modern 
capitalist lines. Ranipet is the town with the highest proportion of 
workers in Non-Household manufacturing (35% as opposed to only 3.7% in 
Household manufacturing). Hosur is the town with the smallest 
proportion of workers in manufacturing: 13.2% in Non-Household and 6.4% 
in Household manufacturing.
The next four categories of Construction (VI), Trade and Commerce 
(VII), Transport, Storage and Communications (VIII) and Other Services 
(XI) all employ relatively few workers in both taluks. Together they 
employ only 17.8% of the workers in North Arcot and 11.6% in Dharmapuri 
and in both cases half of this is made up of workers in the last 
category of Other Services and about one third in Trade and Commerce.
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Not unexpectedly, however, the pattern changes if urban workers alone 
are considered. Thus 16.9% of the urban workers in North Arcot are 
employed in Other Services while a further 23.1% are in Trade and
Commerce; in Dharmapuri. the comparable figures are 21.1% and 27.7%. 
Looking at the five towns listed in Table 12 Trade and Commerce are 
very important employers in Hosur, Arcot and Vellore while Other 
Services is important in Hosur, Ranipet and Vellore. (In all these
cases the category in question employs between 20 and 30% of the 
workers in the towns referred to).
Data from the Chief Inspector of Factories List on organised sector
industry include only nine taluks which in 1979 had over 10 factories. 
Six of these are the North Arcot taluks in the Palar Valley and among 
them is Walajahpet where Ranipet is located which has the second 
highest number of factories (84) after Vaniyambadi with 130. The
remaining three taluks are the south-eastern taluks of Dharmapuri: 
Harur (14), Dharmapuri (14) and Krishnagiri (10). Hosur and 
Denkanikotta taluks only have 8 factories listed between them (Table
13).
Maps 4 and 6 in Mackie (1981). show this distribution of numbers of 
taluk and the number of workers they employ and demonstrate clearly the 
concentration of factories in the taluks of the Palar Valley. Table 13 
also gives the distribution of factories by size according to the 
number of workers employed. Again the taluks of the Palar Valley stand 
out as being the only ones with large scale employers, with the
exception of Dharampuri taluk where there is one factory employing 393
workers (a sugar refinery).
As for the different industrial branches represented, Figure 5 shows 
the distribution of some of the major industries. To this should be 
added the note that two thirds of the 338 factories in Arcot, 
Walajahpet, Gudiyatham, Vellore and Vaniyambadi are manufacturing 
leather or leather products. There are also 8 cotton mills and about 20 
chemicals factories in the Palar Valley taluks, a few of which are in 
the Ranipet Complex. In Arni taluk there are 31 factories in the silk
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industry and spread all over both districts there are 35 grain mills 
and 15 edible oil mills located in various towns.
2.5 The Ranipet & Hosur Environment: Summary
By now a fairly clear picture of the physical and socio-economic
environment of Northern Tamil Nadu is apparent. By a number of criteria 
the area is certainly backward and becomes more so as one moves further 
west through Dharmapuri and up into the Mysore Plateau. Though 
agriculture is the main economic activity in the area it is not highly 
developed or particularly productive. Industry is virtually 
non-existent except for the important leather industry in the North 
Arcot taluks of the Palar Valley. Indeed the Palar Valley is the part 
of the area where most of the population and economic activity is
centred. Ranipet is on the Palar just at the point where the valley 
opens out from its more restricted course behind the Javadi Hills into 
the Coromandel Coastal Plain. Hosur on the other hand is in one of the 
most remote and underdeveloped parts of the region up in the more arid 
zone of the Mysore Plateau. Thus the environment presented by the two 
growth poles to incoming industrialists is markedly different.
Ranipet is already an industrial town of sorts with its old EID Parry
ceramics factory and the leather industry of North Arcot spread, around
its, area. It is also in the most urbanised part of the region, with a 
fairly high population density and a range of urban facilities of its 
own, and is within easy reach of Vellore the only really major town of 
the region. With less than 17,000 inhabitants in 1971, Hosur is only 
half the size of Ranipet and it is much more remote with no other towns 
nearer than Bangalore at 35 kilometres. It is essentially a market and 
administrative centre serving the taluk of the same name and also to a 
certain extent that of Denkanikota next to it. Given this role it does 
have a fairly wide range of services but the actual facilities are 
limited and of inferior quality. It has no industry to speak of other 
than the survey firms which have located in its neighbourhood since the 
mid-1970s. Agricultural production in its hinterland is also much more 
limited than in the.area around Ranipet. Hosur1s one redeeming feature
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from an industrialist's point of view must be its relative proximity to 
Bangalore.
To what extent do Ranipet and Hosur provide the sort of environment 
industrialists seek? On page 218 a list of features that could be 
expected to interest industrialists when taking a location decision 
was outlined. This included first a series of infrastructural 
considerations. In terms of social services Ranipet offers 
industrialists a better environment than Hosur, except of course if 
Bangalore is also taken into account. The same is true of transport and 
communications. Though both towns are readily accessible by road, Hosur 
is again more accessible than Ranipet because of the proximity of 
Bangalore. Hosur will also be better off than Ranipet in communications 
terms once the new telephone exchange being built in the town is in 
service. Neither growth pole offers significant markets for produce or 
sources of materials, unless firms are intending to produce mass 
consumer goods on a fairly small scale in which case the urban 
population of the Ranipet area might offer a reasonable market. Again 
therefore the relative proximity and accessibility of the two growth 
poles to other major urban centres assumes greater importance and then 
Hosur is the more attractive, though Ranipet is better if accessibility 
to both Madras and Bangalore is sought.
Finally there is the local economy and the way in which incoming firms 
will relate and integrate with it. In terms of labour availability and 
the prospects of finding labour already used to industrial work, 
Ranipet has more to offer than Hosur. Also with the higher proportion 
of agricultural labourers to cultivators in the Ranipet area than 
around Hosur, there would seem to be a greater chance of getting labour 
to move out of agriculture and into industry with greater ease. But on 
the other hand if this is simply an indication of less developed and 
less prosperous farming in the Hosur area, there is a higher chance of 
labour being keen to leave a rather poor living in subsistence farming 
and move into secure jobs with wage incomes in industry and moreover 
willing to do so at lower wage levels than labour might expect in the 
more prosperous Ranipet area.
241
The chances of getting repair and maintenance and simple subcontracting 
jobs done locally is certainly higher in the Ranipet area than in 
Hosur, but then again Hosur's proximity to Bangalore makes it possible 
to get such jobs done in the city by a much wider range of more 
experienced and specialised subcontractors. Equally, for highly
specialised repair work on sophisticated machinery it would be easier 
to get a specialist to travel the 35 kilometres from Bangalore to Hosur 
than the 130 from Madras to Ranipet.
It is thus clear that despite the absence of any other towns in its
immediate neighbourhood Hosur has certain distinct advantages over 
Ranipet. To a large extent ' these derive from its much greater 
accessibility from a major South Indian urban centre. But it would also 
seem to be possible for industrialists to gain certain advantages from 
the more undeveloped character of the Hosur economy relative to that in
the Ranipet area. Thus the poor quality of agriculture and the absence
of any other industry in the area is likely to mean that incoming firms 
can pay lower wages than they might in Ranipet and obtain workers more 
prepared to do any work that is on offer. The counterpart of that is 
however, that they are much less likely to be able to find skilled 
labour in Hosur.
Given the lack of raw materials, the restricted or non-existent market 
for many products and the generally low level of industrial development 
in both the Ranipet and Hosur areas, it would appear that the field in 
which the incoming firms will have most contact with the local economy 
is that of employment and the provision of cash incomes. The way these 
firms deal with local labour therefore takes on a crucial importance. 
The creation of several thousand industrial jobs in each area will have 
a major impact on their local economies. Obviously it will boost retail 
trade and the provision of services paid for in cash. In more general 
terms it will ensure that a wider proportion of the local population is 
drawn into a cash economy. Those people who do not have direct access 
to cash incomes either through their own employment in the new firms, 
or through one of their family member's employment, or alternatively 
through the provision of goods and services to wage earning families
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are likely to find themselves increasingly marginalised in the local 
economy.
Such tendencies are indications of the interaction that takes place 
between a growing capitalist mode of production and pre-capitalist 
modes in a situation where the latter have been predominant in the 
past. As the capitalist mode gets stronger and more prevalent it will 
tend to disrupt the operation of the pre-capitalist mode through the 
imposition of a cash economy and the increasing marginalisation of 
those with no access to it. In doing so capitalist firms will be able 
to accumulate higher levels of profit than they would otherwise, by 
taking advantage of the special conditions of production, such as low 
wage levels, that the precapitalist modes and the relative scarcity of 
wage jobs permit (cf. Chapter 2, pp.40-41).
The features of the local economies of the Ranipet and Hosur areas that 
have just been outlined do not permit a clear or definite 
characterisation of the modes of production prevalent in these two 
areas’. But it is apparent that the capitalist mode of production is 
more developed in the industry and agriculture of the Ranipet area. It 
is suspected however, that pre-capitalist modes still do exist in the 
area as the work of other authors (Harriss J. in Farmer, 1977) in the 
agriculture of North Arcot seems to indicate. Also personal observation 
and interviews with people in the Tamil Nadu leather industry as well 
as the Census data quoted above (p. 19) suggest that many of the tanning 
and leather product manufacturing units in North Arcot are not 
organised on capitalist lines, though no specific investigation into 
this area has been carried out. In Hosur and its surrounding area the
picture seems more clear cut. There is very little evidence of a
developed capitalist mode of production and the high incidence of 
independent cultivators in the area may indicate a farming system still 
predominantly organised on pre-capitalist lines.
.It thus seems likely that the- advent of capitalist firms to the two
SIPCOT growth poles is likely to have a much more disruptive and
■traumatic effect on the local economy of the Hosur area than on that of
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Ranipet, though even here the impact is likely to be significant. At 
the same time the fact that the capitalist mode of production is as yet 
still very poorly developed in the Hosur area compared to Ranipet 
should make the more remote and backward growth pole the more
attractive one for industrial capitalists.
3. Questions about the Locational Behaviour of Firms
The previous two sections have raised a number of questions about the 
behaviour of the sample firms. Particular types of firms seem to be 
choosing particular locations. Furthermore the areas they were locating 
in seem likely to be affected by their nature and behaviour in a number 
of fairly specific ways. The rest of this chapter is devoted to
enquiring into these issues in greater depth.
First, there is the traditional issue in industrial location studies of 
how the location of factories relates to markets. It was concluded 
above that neither Ranipet or Hosur had much to offer firms in terms of 
markets or sources of raw materials, though the potential of the 
Ranipet area was expected to be slightly better than that of Hosur. 
Data on where the sample firms .are sending their products and buying 
their materials will therefore be looked at carefully. Following on 
from this concern with how the firms relate to the local, and regional 
economy, the actual spatial distribution of the firms' offices, and 
factories other than just those on their new site, will be examined. 
This provides a further indication of whether the firms are as closely 
integrated with the Tamil Nadu industrial sector as they seem to be at 
first sight.
The third issue to be examined will be the labour and employment
practices of the firms. It was suggested above (p.242) that this would
be the most crucial way in which the firms will affect the local 
economy of their new environments. Finally, the financial 
characteristics of the firms will be examined in fuller detail as this 
should shed light on the .questions of just how capital intensive the 
firms were, the implications of this for their integration into a local
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rather than a wider regional economy and also a further indication of 
their links with established Tamil Nadu industry.
3,1 Markets for Materials and Products
Information was collected on the materials used and products made by 
the sample firms: the quantity, value and the percentage coming from
each source or going to different markets. In aggregate these figures 
produce the following picture (cf. Tables 14 & 15). Although the
absolute values of these data have to be treated with a certain amount 
of caution given that they are often derived from managing directors' 
memories rather than the firms1 records, they can nevertheless be seen 
as indicative of the markets the firms deal with and the scale of their 
dealings. It is rapidly apparent that there are very few direct 
transactions between the sample firms and local sources of materials or 
markets for productions. Indeed, the bulk/materials in value terms
seems to be purchased in the nearest urban areas or nationally. 
Likewise most of the products are distributed to national markets with 
nearby urban markets coming a close second. Just over 10% of raw 
materials- are imported from abroad and a slightly higher percentage of 
products are exported. In fact., between them the sample firms are 
earning over Rs. 76 million per annum in foreign exchange, which
represents 22% of the total value added earned by all the sample firms 
put together. This remarkably high percentage is indicative of both the 
types of markets the firms are trying to compete in and the Indian 
Government's continuing desire to encourage the production of goods for 
export.
Aggregating the value of materials coming from different sources by 
regional provenance (South India, All-India and Abroad) and doing the 
same for products (Figure 6), it appears that the firms have a good 
base in the South Indian economy, while at the same time maintaining a 
reasonable position in the All-India economy. The M.M.Nagar firms, 
which are virtually entirely linked to the South Indian economy, are an 
exception to this pattern.
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FIGURE 6: MARKET LINKS OF FIRMS BY REGION
Percentages of total value of materials brought from and products sent 
to different places, by firms in each industrial growth pole or area.
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By modifying the aggregation classes somewhat (Figure 7), a slightly 
more precise picture of the types of markets in which the firms operate 
is obtained. This second method of aggregation (by Local, Urban South 
India, National Distribution and Overseas) demonstrates the very low 
level of linkages between the firms in the growth poles and the local 
economy in the districts surrounding their locations and even amongst 
themselves. Instead it becomes clear that most of the linkages that the 
firms have in South India are with South Indian urban markets, after 
which come national markets which inevitably also tend to be urban 
('market' is used here as the place where firms both buy their 
materials and sell their products.) One may conclude from these 
histograms therefore, that for' the most part the sample firms operate 
predominantly in an All-India urban market system with a natural 
tendency to concentrate on urban markets closer to their own locations 
rather than further away.
A further exercise was carried out with the materials and products 
data. Each firm was allocated a single value on the basis of its most 
important material source, defined as the source from which two thirds 
or more of its materials came. The possible material sources were 
grouped from very specific local places to wider regional and national 
areas, so that even firms which dealt with widely spread out sources of 
materials could be coped with in the analysis. In the same way each 
firm was allocated a single value for the market to which it sold most 
of its products. By crosstabulating these two variables against the 
firms' locations it emerged that the Hosur firms deal with a greater 
variety of sources and markets than firms in any of the other 
locations (Table 16).
Aside from that there are very few Dharmapuri firms which buy materials 
predominantly in Madras, unlike firms in all the other centres and 
despite the fact that taken' together (Table 14) Dharmapuri firms still 
buy more of their materials from Madras than from any other single 
place. Also both the Hosur and Dharmapuri firms tend to deal more with 
the broader market of Urban South India while the Ranipet and M.M.Nagar 
firms deal more specifically with Madras, but this is only to be
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FIGURE 7: MARKET LINKS OF FIRMS BY TYPE OF MARKET
Percentages of total value of materials brought from and products sent 
to different places, by firms in each industrial growth pole or area.
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Table 16: Number of Firms Dealing Predominantly with each Market or 
Market Area
No. of Firms Getting
Materials From: Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total
Overseas ' 4 5 1 10
Inside Complex
Local Districts 3 1 .  4
Complex & Districts 1 1
Madras 6 6 1 3 16
Bangalore 1 1  2
Urban S. India 1 5  2 8
South India 5 4 1 10
N.W. & E. India 4 4  1 1 11
All-India 3 5 3 3 14
No Reply 2 2 2 6
No. of Firms Sending 
Products To:
Overseas 3 5 1 9
Inside Complex 1 1
Local Districts
Complex & Districts 1 1
Madras 2 1 3
Bangalore
Urban S. India 6 2 8
South India 4 4 3 11
N.W. & E. India 7 8 5 1 21
All-India 7 7 4 3 22
No Reply _4 _2   _ 6
Totals 28 33 12 6 82
N.B. Each firm is listed only once in each of these two distributions 
according to the market it deals with predominantly.
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expected given the former's' greater proximity to Bangalore. Finally 
there is a marked tendency in all locations for firms to deal 
predominantly with South Indian sources of materials while selling more 
to North, West & East India and All-Indian markets. This is entirely 
consistent with the image these statistics create of firms producing 
goods for sale on national but predominantly urban markets, for in 
India such markets are relatively restricted and national level 
distribution becomes necessary to reach large enough markets.
There is, of course, one reservation to these last comments in that 
these data cannot show exactly how far products are distributed and 
whether these urban markets act only as centres for wider and perhaps 
more rural distribution to consumers. This can only be answered by a 
careful examination of the type of products the firms are 
manufacturing. Briefly, although the firms produce about as many 
different finished goods as intermediary goods (and this is true in 
each location), apart from a few mass consumption articles (e.g.: food 
products, cotton cloth, paper, cigarettes, rubber slippers, soap and 
some of the drugs and tools) most of the finished goods are 
sophisticated tools, machinery, auto-engineering parts and vehicles not 
destined for general consumption. There are also a number of luxury 
consumption articles amongst them: canned foods, .rnopeds , televisions,
water treatment plants, pressure cookers and other cookware.
3• 2 Spatial Distribution of Firms* Factories and Offices
All firms were asked to specify where their principal offices
(Registered Office, Head Office, Purchase & Sales Office, Managing 
Director's Office) were located and. where the firm carried out its 
other principal functions (Main Factory, Manufacturing, Assembly,
Research & Development) if applicable.
The main point that emerged from this question is that a very high 
proportion of firms maintain offices in Madras, on average well over 
50% for all offices, though this proportion is higher for firms in 
M.M.Nagar and Ranipet and somewhat lower for firms in Hosur and
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Dharmapuri which also have offices in Bangalore in the first case and 
Coimbatore in the latter. Dharmapuri and Ranipet firms also had a very 
low proportion of their offices located on site while in Hosur this was 
higher, possibly because the latter location is within easy commuting 
distance of Bangalore making on site offices cheaper and possibly 
easier.
Surprisingly, no firms at all seemed to be manufacturing on one site 
and assembling on another, but this may have been partly hidden by the 
managers' interpretations of how close links with other firms in the 
same group were.
<r
Indeed it would seem that even though transport and communications have 
improved tremendously in India making 'backward area' industrial growth 
poles much more feasible, the situation has not yet improved to the 
extent that such spatial distributions of different functions of a 
firm, common in the West, are economical. Obviously if a factory is 
remotely situated it is still essential to maintain administrative 
functions requiring contact with the outside world such as purchase and 
sales, registered office and even the managing director's office in a 
city. Larger firms which can afford to install their own telex (as some 
of the Sample firms have done) can get around this to some extent, but 
STD telephone services are not yet adequate to allow easy communication 
between remote locations and urban centres, and firms see it as being 
more important to be in easy reach of the people they do business with 
than for the administration to be right next to the factory, although 
such separations do cause problems. In Hosur the situation is slightly 
better. The Complex is in easy commuting ' distance of Bangalore and a 
new telephone exchange is being built so expectations of better 
communications in the near future are high. Firms seem to have 
responded to this by more of them locating their offices on site. That 
firms are not splitting up manufacturing and assembly onto different 
sites may also be a function of the development of transport and 
communications as it is essential that these should be efficient and 
fast to permit well coordinated and smooth operation. Despite this, 
however, a number of cases were noted of firms subcontracting to other
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firms in very different locations which would suggest that such 
contractual arrangements over a distance are seen as more feasible than 
ones internal to the same firm. However, this could also be a result of 
government licensing and monopoly restrictions reducing the chances of 
finding manufacturers of particular components nearer by, or
alternatively, simply a result of established and satisfactory 
contractual arrangements being easier to maintain than to start afresh.
Finally, it is worth noting that few firms have their registered
offices elsewhere in India than Madras, Bangalore or Coimbatore; even 
elsewhere inside Tamil Nadu is rare. This would confirm that most of
the firms are Tamilian or at least South Indian firms. Only a few cases
of North Indian firms trying to penetrate South Indian markets or even 
of North Indian firms being attracted to South India by incentives or 
government promotion were discovered. These points also support the 
earlier hypothesis that a majority of the firms have close links with 
established South Indian and especially Tamil or Madras industry.
3.3 Labour Employed by Sample Firms
Some comments on the scale of employment have already been made (Table 
6); it was noted that most firms employed less than 50 unskilled and 50 
skilled workers. Hosur firms employ on average more people in all five 
categories of employees but this is partly due to the presence of a few 
very large employers pushing the averages up (Table 17). Ranipet firms 
employ a much lower number of skilled workers than is common amongst 
the other firms, though the proportion of unskilled workers they employ 
is similar to elsewhere. This would suggest that the Ranipet firms use 
technology requiring less skilled labour, explainable perhaps by 
Ranipet .being the oldest industrial centre of those surveyed and 
therefore the firms there may use less sophisticated production 
methods.
Data collected on the wages paid by sample firms (Table 18) does on the 
whole seem to be fairly representative of the levels one might expect, 
which suggests that it is reasonably accurate despite the sensitiveness
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Table 17: Average Number of People Employed by Category by Firmsi in
.Each Place
Average Number of Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar To t a 1'
People Employed as:
Unskilled Workers 56.65 75.44 56.83 44.13 63.00
Skilled Workers 37.81 75.09 58.67 46.75 57.02
Clerical Staff 11.00 26.88 12.75 12.29 17.96
Technical Staff 10.44 22.34 11.92 8.25 15.45
Managerial Staff 3.20 7.34 3.17 5.13 5.13
Table 18: Average Wages Paid by Sample Firms
Average Wages Paid To: Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri
(Rs. per 
M.M.Nagar
month)
Total
Unskilled Workers 242.26 236.74 242.11 217.50 242.39
Skilled Workers 389.78 ' 421.48 368.80 481.25 409.35
Clerical Staff 363.73 440.64 397.00 636.25 422.31
Technical Staff 817.38 1073.68 932.22 1595.25 994.63
Managerial Staff 1681.25 2097.05 2109.37 3133.75 2001.43
of the question. Firms may of course have consistently been answering 
with figures representing what they felt they should be paying rather 
than what they actually were paying, but it would have been difficult 
to crosscheck this systematically and accurately. The data for the 
M.M.Nagar and the Dharmapuri firms are however, more open to doubt as 
only 4 firms from the first place and 3 from the latter responded to 
this question. Moreover as the M.M.Nagar firms were not yet in 
production their replies would be more susceptible to exaggerations. 
Certainly the M.M.Nagar averages are virtually all higher than the 
others, the one exception being the extremely low Rs. 217/- per month
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paid to unskilled workers. Otherwise the Hosur levels are the highest 
and the Ranipet and Dharmapuri levels are more comparable, though the 
higher up the scale one goes the better the Dharmapuri firms pay their 
employees. This would suggest that the Dharmapuri firms are having to 
pay fairly high wages to managers to get them to work in their more 
remote locations, but with their unskilled and skilled workers they can 
get away with fairly low levels. The same would seem to be true in 
Hosur though there the differential between the levels for unskilled 
and skilled labour is more acute. With higher wages to unskilled labour 
being paid in Ranipet than in Hosur our earlier hypothses (pp.242-3) 
about the differences in the nature of the local economies in these two 
places, and the lower wages that industrialists would be able to pay in 
the area where the capitalist mode of production is least developed, 
would seem to be supported. However, these data are insufficiently 
systematic to prove this point.
The figures yielded by the attempt to discover whether labour was hired 
locally or from further afield are, it is feared, somewhat 
impressionistic. However, some credence may be given to them as the 
results are reasonably logical. Ranipet firms hire a higher percentage 
of their staff locally than other firms, except for clerical.staff, 
where Hosur firms seem to be able to find more clerical staff locally. 
Dharmapuri firms hire the lowest percentage of employees locally except 
for skilled labour where Hosur firms hire even less locally. Overall 
the. proportion of workers and clerical staff hired locally is high 
while for technical and managerial staff it is low. The fact that 
Ranipet firms hire more of their skilled workers locally than firms in 
the other places conforms with the fact that there already existed some 
industry in the Ranipet area and therefore presumably a certain pool of 
industrial labour. It is also possible that the relative proximity of 
Bangalore to Hosur and Dharmapuri made it easier to attract outside 
labour than it would have been in Ranipet where Madras, the nearest 
major industrial centre, is much further away.
The next question concerned the number of workers the firms had brought 
with them. Overall and consistently, the opposite proportions to the
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percentages of workers hired locally emerged, which does suggest a 
certain degree of accuracy in these two sets of data. Ranipet firms 
recorded no use of imported labour at all, which seems dubious; 
however, as Ranipet also has a higher proportion of independent new 
firms than other centres, these can certainly be expected to have 
'brought' fewer workers with them from elsewhere.
Regarding the adequacy of the locally hired labour's training, the 
majority of firms felt their unskilled and skilled labour was 
inadequately trained while the rest of the staff were usually 
adequately trained. Clerical staff in particular were usually expected 
to be competent even when hired locally. The main exception to this 
pattern was in M.M.Nagar where the workforce was generally felt to be 
adequately trained, presumably because the 'local' workforce here 
included Madras labour. Apart from this it was the Ranipet firms which 
were most satisfied with the level of training of locally hired labour, 
supporting once more the hypothesis that they had more of an existing 
pool of industrial labour to draw on than firms in Hosur and 
Dharmapuri.
Not surprisingly, the majority of firms do provide training for their 
workers but on the whole not for their higher echelons of employees. 
The big exception once again is M.M.Nagar, where 75% of the firms do 
not intend to provide training. The other general exception are the 
Dharmapuri firms, a lower proportion of which provide training in all 
categories than firms in either Ranipet or Hosur. This would correspond 
to the fact noted earlier that these firms bring in a higher proportion 
of their labour from outside than others and if labour is imported it 
can reasonably be expected to be adequately trained.
Taken together the evidence, from, the last two questions suggests that 
Dharmapuri and M.M.Nagar firms do least to improve local levels of 
industrial training. For M.M.Nagar firms this has been explained in 
terms of the satellite town's proximity to Madras, but for the more 
remote Dharmapuri firms one might expect them to have greater problems 
finding trained labour and therefore more likely to provide training.
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They seem to get round this problem partly by bringing in labour but 
another explanation is also possible. Thus it may be that the levels of 
training of local labour are in fact adequate for these firms' purposes 
because they are also equipped with technologically advanced production 
methods which do not require skilled operators. Although the 
questionnaire provides no specific evidence of such deskilling relative 
to the production methods these firms might have used in their earlier 
factories, such an explanation would square with the earlier 
indications of more capital intensive technology being used by the 
Dharmapuri firms.
Finally the question on the residence of firms' employees shows that in 
Ranipet workers and other staff all tend to live nearer to the 
factories than in Hosur and Dharmapuri. In the latter two centres 
workers and clerical staff still tend to live nearby, but a high 
proportion of technical and managerial staff actually live in 
Bangalore. Thus it would seem that if a growth pole is located within 
commuting distance of an established urban centre, employees of the 
industries in the growth pole will tend to live in the city. The number 
and classes of employees that do is related directly to the actual 
distance and cost of commuting, as among the Dharmapuri firms, which 
are that bit more remote than the Hosur firms, only the managerial 
grades could afford to live in Bangalore, while among Hosur firms many 
of the technical staff did as well.
The labour position thus seems to vary substantially from centre to 
centre, though the information gathered with the questionnaire about 
the firms' employment practices does appear to fit the labour market 
characteristics outlined earlier. M.M.Nagar firms can be seen basically 
as drawing on the Madras labour market and though this may make the 
wages they have to pay slightly higher than elsewhere, it should also 
mean that they have fewer recruitment problems. Ranipet, on the other 
hand, does seem to be characterised by its own restricted pool of 
industrial labour which already existed before the advent of the SIPCOT 
Complex. Again this means that wages among these firms are slightly 
higher than among other sample firms, but training is also not too much
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of a problem. In Hosur and Dharmapuri the picture changes. There was 
obviously little industrial labour in this area before the sample firms 
came in. They had to bring much of their labour with them and they have 
had to do a good deal of their own training. In Hosur in particular 
this is important, though the Dharmapuri firms seem to manage with 
less.
It is possible that these differential rates for the provision of 
training are also related to the types of technology being used by 
different firms and here the Dharmapuri firms in particular come under 
suspicion. They are for the most part capital intensive with high 
levels of investment and low- levels of employment; they have also
brought a fair proportion of their workers with them, hire few locally 
and provide little training. It is probable that some of them are 
fairly highly automated requiring only a few skilled operatives who 
know the machines well; certainly at least one of them is and employs 
so few workers that it falls outside the control of the Factories Act.
It is also important to note the different spatial distribution of
employees’ residences in each of the different centres, varying as it 
does with the distance from the growth pole to a major city such as 
Madras or Bangalore. In Ranipet, the centre furthest away from any 
major city, nearly all categories of employees live within a 20 
kilometre radius of the factory. In Hosur only the workers and the 
clerical staff tend to, technical and managerial staff commuting from 
Bangalore in many cases. Amongst Dharmapuri firms, which are somewhat 
further and more inaccessible from Bangalore, only the managers with 
private cars were able to commute.
Before concluding this discussion on labour it is necessary to make a 
few comments on labour migration to the growth poles. No systematic 
evidence was collected on this, but from enquiries in each place there
appeared to be little or no migration in the Ranipet area, whereas in
the Hosur and Dharmapuri area there were several reports of labour 
immigration already starting. Coimbatore seemed to be one place where 
this labour was coming from. As the overall number of jobs being
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created, in Hosur is high (5,000 unskilled and skilled jobs being 
created by the 33 Hosur sample firms alone), and as many of these jobs 
were still only in the pipeline at the time of the survey, immigration 
to the area can be expected to increase. This is especially likely as 
even though the firms concerned did bring a number of workers with 
them, they still expected to hire a majority of their labour locally 
and without a massive switch by local inhabitants from agriculture 
to industrial jobs, this labour does not yet exist in the area.
3.4 Financial Characteristics of Firms
The absolute and average levels of fixed capital (taken as investment 
in land plant and machinery) and working capital investment have 
already been noted, but little was said about variations between 
different locations. Statistical details for the levels of fixed 
capital investment are given in Table 19, those for working capital in 
Table 20. It was noted earlier that the overall average fixed capital 
investment was Rs. 12.3 million and for working capital Rs. 4.4
Million. Dharmp/auri firms had an average fixed capital investment 
nearly three times as large as the overall average at Rs. 34.6 million, 
conversely M.M.Nagar firms were much smaller with an average fixed 
investment of Rs. 3.4 million. Ranipet and Hosur firms fit the overall 
average much more closely. The figures for working capital investment 
show very similar variations to those of fixed capital investment, 
tending to be about one third of the latter. This ratio however,
changes slightly from place to place with its lowest level at 1:3.5 in 
Dharmapuri and rising to 1:1.6 in Ranipet. Once again these data point 
to much more capital intensive production methods amongst Dharmapuri 
firms and in Ranipet, to a lower degree of fixed capital investment in 
relation to total investment.
The SIPCOT registers on incentives issued also yielded a figure 
labelled as 'Total Investment. Catalysed' in relation to each Central 
Subsidy allocated. This figure was found to correspond reasonably 
closely to the data for the fixed capital investment given by the firms
themselves and thus served as a useful crosscheck. However, there is a
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Table 19: Details of Fixed Capital Investment by Firms
(Rs. '000s)
Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total
Mean 8,184 9,884 34,597 3,427 12,285
Median 4,000 4,483 10,287 1,300 4,500
Minimum 500 300 1,800 300 300
Maximum 50,000 70,000 141,100 10,300 141,100
Sum 204,591 306,405 345,974 27,420 921,390
Valid Cases 25 31 10 8 75
Missing Cases 3 2 2 0 7
Table 20: Details of Working Capital Investment by Firms
Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar
(Rs. '000s) 
Total
Mean 4,964 3,390 9,886 1,250 4,389
Medium 1,600 1,217 2,875 962 1,502
Minimum 200 80 1,200 300 80
Maximum 35,000 22,683 45,000 2,900 45,000
Sum 124,104 101,697 69,200 8,750 307,251
Valid Cases 25 30 7 7 70
Missing Cases 3 3 1 1 12
marked tendency for firms to quote a lower figure to SIPCOT than they
did in the survey which is; interesting and might even indicate that
they had been more frank in the survey than to government officials!
Turning to the incent ives the firms are receiving, it was stressed
above that the number of incentives sanctioned corresponds closely to 
the number of firms actually in production. However, on closer 
examination it becomes apparent that although the Central Subsidy seems 
to be distributed fairly equitably, the Sales Tax Loan sanctioning is
far more erratic. While in Ranipet about half the firms in production 
are receiving a Sales Tax Loan, in Hosur only one quarter are and in 
Dharmapuri 9 firms are while only 8 are in production! It would seem 
that Dharmapuri firms are benefitting far more from this incentive than 
any of the other groups of firms in the sample. To investigate this 
question further, the STL distribution was crosstabulated against the 
scale of firms, from which it emerged that about 50% of LSIs are 
receiving a Sales Tax Loan while only 23% of the MSIs and none of the 
SSIs are. Taking this even further, a crosstabulation of scale against 
stage of project shows that about half of both LSIs and MSIs are in 
production and therefore presumably eligible for the Sales Tax Loan, 
thus it would seem that LSIs are twice as successful as MSIs at 
actually obtaining the Loan.
Looking at the sanctioning of the different incentives through time, 
one or two interesting points emerge. First, no Term Loans have" been 
approved since 1978 (i.e. for 18 months: 1979 plus first half of 1980) 
which is strange as since 1972 some were sanctioned every year apart 
from 1976. Secondly, since 1978 incentives to Ranipet firms seem to 
have been slowing down, which would confirm the suggestion made earlier 
that Ranipet is witnessing a decline in popularity as a location in the 
face of competition from Hosur.
Certain irregularities seem to exist in the sanctioning and 
disbursement of incentives and these are concentrated among those which 
are the responsibility of the State Government, while the Central 
Government 15% Subsidy is apparently being sanctioned regularly and 
smoothly to all firms about to go into production. That this 
discrepancy should exist is all the more strange as the Central 
Subsidy, though provided by the Government of India, is also 
administered by the State Government industrial promotion agencies. 
Possibly such State agencies are more careful with their own money than 
with that which comes from the Centre, but certainly it would seem that 
the frequent complaints made by industrialists about the State 
industrial promotion agencies do have some founding in reality, though 
obviously they affect some groups of firms more than others.
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4. Conclusion
This chapter has tackled two distinct subjects. First, it has described 
the characteristics of the sample of firms locating new factories in 
the backward areas of Northern Tamil Nadu and secondly it has tried to 
described the environment they are locating in and particularly that of 
the immediate areas around the two industrial growth poles of Ranipet 
and Hosur where most of them are going. As well as a simple rundown of 
these firms' characteristics the chapter has sought to identify certain 
patterns and variations in the nature of firms going to the different 
locations. A number of such differences were identified and for the 
most part these could be related to the environmental characteristics 
of the firms' locations.
Of particular interest in this respect were the group of a dozen firms 
which had chosen locations in Dh^napuri District in the vicinity of 
Hosur but not in the Hosur SIPCOT Complex itself. This group seems to 
have a number of distinct characteristics. In particular they seemed to 
use more capital intensive production methods, have closer links with 
established Madras companies and be more adept at obtaining the Sales 
Tax Loan incentive than the majority of the other sample firms. In 
addition they had deliberately chosen extremely isolated locations and 
paid relatively low wages. But what is even more crucial is that to a 
certain extent they can be regarded as trend setters because they chose 
their location independently of SIPCOT and many of them even before 
SIPCOT had announced the Hosur Complex. In the next chapter the views 
of these firms ' managers will therefore be analysed with particular 
care.
However, the main value of this chapter is that it has identified a 
number of factors which give a indication of the type of impact that 
firms can be expected to have on the development of the backward areas 
centred on Ranipet and Hosur. In this regard the question of labour and 
employment were isolated as the area in which and through which the 
firms would probably have the greatest impact, it having been 
demonstrated that on a materials and products basis the firms dealt
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with much wider national urban markets and not with the local economy 
of their immediate surroundings. It was felt that the creation of such 
large numbers of industrial wage jobs was likely to gradually affect 
the whole economy of the area around the new factories. The immediate 
direct effect would be felt by the workers themselves and their 
families but gradually through their spending the effects would be felt 
more widely by those involved in trade, the provision of services and 
the housing market. Moreover, the effect was likely to be greatest in 
the places where these new industrial jobs presented the greatest 
change from existing employment patterns in the area. Thus the impact 
was likely to be more dramatic in the Hosur and Dharmapuri area than 
around Ranipet, where the population was a good deal larger and where 
some capitalist industrial jobs already existed.
What the exact effect will be is hard to predict precisely, but it 
seems likely to be extremely disruptive at least in the short term. The 
new industrial jobs will for the first time be introducing a fairly
large number of cash incomes into the local economy, but their number 
will still be restricted so that not all local people will find an
industrial job or be closely related to someone who does. Of those who 
don't there will be a certain, number who will be able to provide 
services or sell everyday goods to those that do and these people will
also benefit immediately. The remainder, and in an economy which has
included a large number of small independent farmers many of them 
involved in subsistence farming there are likely to be many of these, 
seem.likely to find themselves increasingly marginalised as prices rise 
in response to the higher wages of the industrial workers, thereby 
making them relatively poorer. Again the impact will probably be 
greatest where a cash economy and the capitalist mode of production are 
least developed and the proportion of new jobs to existing population 
is highest. Thus in Hosur there was already evidence of rapidly rising 
prices for food and housing at the time of the survey, rents being 
close to Bangalore levels, while in Ranipet such inflation was not 
referred to by local residents.
This chapter has also set the scene for the next one, where the primary
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objective will be to analyse why the firms have chosen their new 
locations and to what extent they have been influenced in doing so by 
the government policy and incentives. Already this chapter permits us 
to eliminate one or two possible reasons for the firms' location 
decisions. Thus it is clear that the relative locations of the firms' 
sources of materials and product markets were not a particularly 
important factor, as by and large the sample firms are operating in 
nation-wide urban markets and not local ones. Equally it is now clear 
exactly what the firms were facing in terms of infrastructural 
conditions when they took their location decision. Finally it is now 
possible to point to a number of issues which seem to require closer 
attention, such as the firms'' view of the labour characteristics in 
their new environment and' possibly their views on the disbursement of 
government incentives.
Footnotes:
1 In the remaining tables relating to the sample firms in this Chapter
the column for Sholingur has been omitted as it contains only
one firm which is not central to the case study. However, the data
for this firm have been included in the Totals column of each table. 
Thus the Totals columns will always add up to 82 cases even though 
the body of the Tables only add up to 81 cases.
2 Much of the debate has been collated in one volume entitled 'Studies
in the Development of Capitalism in India' (Patnij&k, Bana , Rudra, 
Thorner, Chattopadhyay et al.1978) which brings together 16 
contributions from the EPW and the 'Social Scientist'. Without going 
into the intricacies of the debate, it should be noted here that most 
of the participants attempted to describe their view of Indian 
agrarian relations in terms of only one mode of production. However, 
in one of the few substantial reviews of the debate, Harriss (1980) 
suggests that throughout it there are problems with understanding the 
relations of production in agriculture in terms of one mode only, 
particularly as there is little point in doing so if it then
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impossible to conceptualise the relationship between agriculture and 
the rest of the economy. Instead, he argues, a conceptual framework 
involving an articulation of several modes of production would be 
more useful in the Indian case as. it would cover the existence of 
both capitalist and pre-capitalist modes in agriculture as well as in 
industry.
3 Other authors have also noted this trend and have suggested that it 
indicates an increased class polarisation (Alexander, 1975) and the 
emergence of capitalist farming in Tamil Nadu (Anonymous 1976). 
Bdteille (1965) documents the emergence of a class system in the 
agrarian relations of Thanjavur District and Gough (1980) concludes 
that the capitalist mode of production has become dominant in the 
same area especially with the mechanisation of agriculture since the 
mid-19 60s.
265
CHAPTER 8 
THE CHOICE OF FACTORY LOCATION
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THE CHOICE OF FACTORY LOCATION
1. Identifying Explanatory Variables
This penultimate chapter discusses the returns of the second part of 
the industrial survey introduced above. This deals with the managers' 
opinions of the government industrial dispersal policy and their 
reasons for choosing their factory location. For the sake of greater 
clarity these returns are discussed in two stages. First, the 
aggregated opinions of the firms' managers are broken down by location,
following the pattern established in the last chapter. Thus any major
differences of opinion which result from the firms' different locations 
should be identified. The second part of the chapter will take this
exercise further, attempting, through a series of crosstabulations, to 
isolate other characteristics or differences between firms which appear 
to help explain the opinion their managers voiced during the survey 
interviews.
The order in which the various issues are discussed is essentially that 
adopted in the original survey questionnaire.
1.1 Views of Government Industrial Location Policy
The interviewees were first asked their opinion of the three main 
elements of the government industrial location policy and their answers 
recorded on a five point scale from excellent to very bad. The
resultant scores .demonstrated a very high .level of support for the 
government policies- and particularly in the two locations of Hosur and 
M.M.Nagar (Table 1). 70% or more of firms declared each of the policies 
were either good or excellent. The general policy of dispersal was the 
one that received most support with nearly 83% of firms in favour of 
it. Support for the growth poles was slightly lower and for. the ban on 
industrial development in cities lowest with 69.5% support.
Ranipet and Dharmapuri firms are on average more negative about the 
policies but they still follow the general pattern of response, though
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support for growth poles not surprisingly drops very low among 
Dharmapuri firms. The response from the Dharmapuri firms is also 
affected by the fact that 4 of the 1,2 did not reply to the opinion 
survey questions. That Ranipet firms are slightly less keen on the 
policies than Hosur firms may be an indication of a growing acceptance 
of the policies amongst industrialists, as the latter group have on 
average taken their dispersal decisions some years after the former. 
The higher support for the more abstract principle of dispersal is 
understandable, particularly as most Indian industrialists would 
consider it very poor public relations to be caught opposing the 
dispersal of industry to ■ rural parts of the country, as this is a 
widely accepted premise of development planning in India. The ban on 
industrial development in cities is a much more concrete restriction on 
their activities however, one which is more than likely to be 
financially disadvantageous. Hence the lower level of support for the 
ban. There were also a few interviewees "who expressed dissatisfaction 
with it being a blanket restriction which allowed for no flexibility in 
dealing with firms perhaps more suited to an urban location. On the 
other hand there were those that felt that this was precisely its major 
quality as an absolute ban is easier to enforce than a partial one.
Finally the policy of establishing growth poles in backward areas is 
also reasonably innocuous and easy to support as it implies more help 
to industry from government than the latter might otherwise get round 
to giving. Objections to it mostly focussed around the concentration of 
workers in one place that growth poles create. This, it was frequently 
argued, encouraged trade union activity and 'labour problems'. This 
view was usually expressed by managers of larger units or of firms 
which had had recent strikes and industrial disputes in their main 
factories in Madras. Though smaller firms were also concerned about 
industrial unrest and its spreading from factory to factory in growth 
poles, they were usually more in favour of concentration as this could 
be useful in dealing with eventual problems of other sorts, such as the 
provision of facilities and in dealings with government bodies which 
were felt to be more likely to be successful if backed by several 
firms.
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Table 1: Opinion of Main Elements of Government Industrial Location
Policy
No. Firms from: Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total
No. %
A - Ban on Industrial Development in Major Cities:
Very Bad Policy - - - - -
Bad Policy 9 7 1 1 18 22.0
Unsure 1 - 1 2 2.4
Good Policy 16 24 6 5 52 63.4
Excellent Policy 1 2 1 1 5 6.1
No Reply 1 - 4 - 5 6.1
Dispersal of Industry to Backward Areas:
Very Bad Policy - - - - - -
Bad Policy 5 1 - 1 7 8.5
Unsure 2 - - - 2 2.4
Good Policy 17 32- 7 5 62 75.6
Excellent Policy' 3 - 1 2 6 7.3
No Reply 1 - 4 - 5 6.1
Growth Poles for Industrial Location in Backward Areas:
Very Bad Policy 1 - - - 1 1.2
Bad Policy 5 3 2 - 10 12.2
Unsure - 2 - 2 2.4
Good Policy 17 25 5 8 56 68.3
Excellent Policy 4 3 1 - 8 9.8
No Reply 1 - 4 - 5 6.1
It was also interesting that some of the managers felt' the policies 
were in the national interest but not necessarily in theirs, so they 
felt a certain duty to comply with ' them. Others also questioned the
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precise value of the policies in terms of the developmental effect they 
would have on the receiving 'backward areas'.
Given the usual view the public in general and government officials 
have of industrialists, their high degree of support for the government 
industrial location policies is somewhat surprising and leaves room for 
thought. Either industrialists do indeed have a higher sense of 
'national duty* than they are given credit for, or they would at least 
like people, and particularly researchers, to think they do. 
Alternatively there are more advantages for them in these industrial 
location policies than is at first apparent; or in other words they may 
in fact be keen on dispersal for their own reasons, in which case the 
government policy is doing no more than facilitating or prompting a 
trend that already exists.
1.2 Dispersal to Backward Areas
The interviewees were asked what their ideal location would be if no 
government industrial location policy existed. The pattern of replies 
was fairly predictable with. 51% of managers saying Madras, and in 
Ranipet and M.M.Nagar this rose, to 71 and 75% respectively (Table 2). 
Bangalore came out as a rather poor overall second with 16% in favour 
of it and not too surprisingly these were nearly all Hosur firms and 
one Dharmapuri firm. In all about 80% of the firms specified an urban 
location as being preferable, while only 11% felt they would still have 
chosen the same location or another growth pole in a backward area. 
This proportion was particularly high in Ranipet (14%), while none of 
the j Hosur firms said they would have gone there without government 
prompting. Dharmapuri firms had no distinct preferences and were spread 
fairly evenly over the whole range of different replies.
Although this pattern of response does suggest a fairly high degree of 
conflict between the government's policies and the aspirations of 
firms, there are nevertheless a number of exceptions. Thus there are 
the 11% of firms which would have dispersed of their own accord and 
among the Dharmapuri firms there is a fairly high level of preference
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among those that responded for dispersed rural locations. These 
exceptions do suggest that the industrial dispersal policy is not 
simply a principle favoured by government planners but has some real 
support in certain industrial circles as well.
Table 2: Firms' Ideal Locations in Absence of Government Policy
Ideal Locations Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total
Suggested by No. %
Firms: Madras 20 14 2 6 42 51.2
Bangalore 1 11 1 13 15.9
Urban (unspecific) 1 7 2 10 12.2
Same Loc./G. Pole 4 2 2 9 11.0
Rural 1 1 1.2
Semi-urban - 1 1 1.2
No Reply 1 1 4 6 7.3
Table 3: Operating in a Dispersed Backward Area Location
Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total
No. %
A Lot More Difficult 4 7 2 1 14 17.1
More Difficult '* 14 14 4 5 38 46.3
No Real Difference . 4 5 9 11.0
Eas ier 5 7 1 2 15 18.3
A Lot Easier - -
No Reply 1 ■ 4 5 6.1
In an attempt to assess just how difficult operating in a backward area
location was for f i rms, several questions were asked about the
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difficulties involved, whether it was uneconomic without the government 
incentives and whether the incentives were adequate to meet the costs. 
From this it emerged that most firms did indeed find or expect to find 
it more difficult, though surprisingly 11% of them felt there was or 
would be no real difference and over 18% felt it was or would be easier 
than operating in an urban location (Table 3). The main difficulties 
specified involved, above all, the lack of various facilities: housing, 
infrastructure, medical and educational facilities were frequently
referred to, especially by Hosur managers. There were also other 
problems relating to the operation of firms: the lack of skilled labour 
(particularly Hosur firms again), difficulty in getting technical and 
managerial staff to work in remote locations and the cost and problems 
of transport. A few also complained about the inefficiency of
government agencies in providing facilities and the lack of ancillary 
and repair workshops in the area, though others especially in Ranipet 
said these were begining to appear. Finally, there were a number of
complaints about the lack of an 'industrial culture' among the local
inhabitants, by which was meant absenteeism among local labour and the 
unreasonably high expectations of local labour with respect to wages 
and conditions. In general, however, such comments about wage levels 
were made by managers recently involved in pay disputes with their 
workers.
Oh the whole these complaints are predictable both in their nature and 
in the frequency with which they were raised. The absence of a whole 
variety of facilities that would be available in an urban setting is 
extremely important to firms, and the feeling that the government 
agencies should be doing more about.such lacunae was common. Transport 
is apparently the most crucial problem, as many firms in both Ranipet 
and Hosur complained about this. Communications, on the other hand, is 
a problem more closely associated with Hosur and presumably the new 
telephone exchange will do a lot to relieve that. The lack of social 
facilities has considerable repercussions on the -recruitment of skilled 
personnel and a high level of government investment and coordinated 
effort would be required to alleviate this with the speed 
industrialists would like. A unitary agency on the lines of a British
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New Town Development Corporation would seem to be one way of tackling 
the coordinated planning and implementation required to solve this type 
of problem. However, the cost of developing a full new town would be 
high and there is a danger of creating a new isolated industrial 
township rather than actually developing the 'backward area' as 
originally intended.
On the question of the adequacy of government incentives, 61% of firms 
felt they were inadequate to meet the costs of locating in a backward 
area, and this proportion rose to 87% amongst M.M.Nagar firms who were 
not eligible for the Central Subsidy (Table 4). In Hosur there was a 
markedly higher level of acceptance of the adequacy of the incentives 
than elsewhere, but it is unclear why this should be the case as the 
feeling is not shared by the Dharmapuri firms located in the vicinity.
Table 4: Firms Views on the Adequacy of Incentives
Are Incentives Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total
Adequate to Meet Costs No. %
of Backward Area?
No 17 18 7 7 50 61.0
Yes 8 14 1 1 24 29. 3
Unsure 2 1 3 3.7
No Reply 1 4 5 6.1
As to whether operating in a backward area would be uneconomic without 
the government incentives, 69% of the firms not unexpectedly replied
Yes and 24% No. But the distribution of these varied greatly from place
to place (Table 5). Ranipet firms were strongest in their insistence 
that government incentives were necessary with 89% replying Yes and 
only 7% No. At the opposite end of the spectrum Dharmapuri firms, again
not surprisingly, insisted that backward area operation was economical
in a ratio of 50% replying No and only 17% Yes. Hosur and M.M.Nagar
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firms were much closer to the average replies.
Table 5: Economics of Backward Area Location
Is Backward Area Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total
Location Uneconomic No. %
Without Incentives?
No 2 9 6 2 20 24.2
Yes 25 23 2 6 56 68.3
Unsure 1 1 1.2
No Reply 1 4 5 6.1
The most remarkable aspect of these replies is really the strong 
feeling among' Ranipet firms that backward areas are uneconomic. The 
nearly 90% replying Yes here contrasts with Hosur's mere 70%. This too 
at a time when the Ranipet firms are more established and therefore 
more likely to b e .economically secure than the Hosur firms which for 
the most part are just starting, up. The difference could be explained 
in two ways. First one might argue that the Ranipet firms with their 
longer experience are more realistic about the problems and costs of 
operating in a backward area. Alternatively one might argue that this 
difference is another sign of an increasingly positive perception of 
backward areas as viable and advantageous locations for industry. Thus 
the Hosur firms which took the decision to disperse later than their 
Ranipet counterparts were keener to do so than the latter which moved 
much more reluctantly. But this argument could be countered by the fact 
that Hosur is not an average backward area, given its proximity to 
Bangalore and that therefore the Hosur firms' perception of what a 
backward area location involves is likely to be more positive than that 
of firms which have experienced a more remote backward area.
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1.3 Growth Poles for Industrial Location in Backward Areas
Growth poles were certainly seen as easier locations in backward areas 
by most firms (73%) but fewer firms felt that they were their preferred 
location in a backward area (Tables 6). Hosur firms were much more in 
favour of growth poles than their Ranipet counterparts. In view of 
their opinion that fewer of them felt backward areas were uneconomic 
than Ranipet firms this more positive reaction to growth poles is a 
little surprising. This could be interpreted as a more general support 
for the government's industrial location policy on the part of the 
Hosur firms while those in Ranipet are keener on the cash incentives.
Table 6: Growth Poles as Backward Area Locations
Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total
Is a Growth Pole 
Easier as a Backward 
Area Location?
No
Yes
Unsure
7
20
4
28
■1
No.
16
60
1
19.5
73.2
1.2
No Reply 6.1
Is a Growth Pole the 
Preferred Location in 
a Backward Area?
No 7
Yes 20
Unsure
7
25
1
21
54
2
25.6
65.9
2.4
No Reply 6.1
Alternatively it could again have a temporal explanation, with Ranipet 
firms more aware of the disadvantages of growth poles and the limited
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degree to which they really mitigate the difficulties of operating in a 
backward area. For the firms that did not like growth poles their main 
reason appeared to be that the concentration of factories encouraged 
labour unrest and industrial disputes. 13 or one third of the firms 
commenting on their reasons for disapproval stated this as their main 
reason. Obviously the avoidance of industrial unrest is seen as one of 
the main advantages of a really remote location.
As to whether the growth pole policy could be improved, only 5% of 
firms felt no improvement was possible while all the others felt 
improvements were possible and most of these gave details as to how 
this might be done. The suggestions were numerous and varied but most 
of them could be grouped into four categories. Infrastructural 
improvements received the most mention. Financial and incentive 
improvements were not mentioned frequently and when they were it was 
usually in terms of advocating more of the same. No new incentives were 
suggested. Improvements to the government administration of growth 
poles were frequently referred to, often in comparison with other 
States like Maharashtra. Finally, changes in actual policy were 
suggested. The main infrastructural improvements that were suggested 
were social facilities: housing, education and medical facilities.
However, other improvements, all more related to the operational side 
of industry were also raised. These included better provision of 
electric power, roads, rail connections, sewage plants for industrial 
effluent (especially popular among the chemical firms in Ranipet), 
public transport, technical training facilities, etc.
Administrative improvements referred to, involved for the most part 
pleas for faster and more efficient work by government agencies but 
also included frequent suggestions that SIPCOT should be more dynamic 
and enterprising in its style of operation and here SICOM and GIDC (cf. 
Chapter 6) were usually cited models. This is not to say that SIPCOT 
came off poorly in comparison with other industrial promotion agencies 
in the country. On the whole it was seen as one of the best, but 
usually managers felt that it could still learn from its Maharashtra and 
Gujarat counterparts. Once or twice the idea of a unitary agency to
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develop both the industrial side of growth poles and the residential 
and social aspects was mooted. Alternatively a single agency office on 
site with powers to handle all the different sanctions and approvals 
required by different government departments was suggested.
Changes to the policy of growth pole development were not too
frequently raised but a few are worth mentioning: smaller growth poles 
and more of them; restrictions on Large Scale Industry so they would 
not dominate growth poles; an initial development boost provided by the 
installation of a large public sector plant; more industry specific 
growth poles and locating them further away from large cities (than 
Hosur from Bangalore) were all suggested. One or two firms also felt 
that the ban on development in cities should only apply to LSIs which 
should 'open up' backward areas with MSIs following them at a later 
stage.
Overall then the picture is one of general approval of the growth pole
policy and the .lines on which it is being run. The complaints about
government inefficiency are far from surprising and indeed might have 
been expected to occur more often. The area which needs the most
improvements is the whole field of urban infrastructure provision. The 
idea of setting up a unitary agency to deal with such development 
seemed a popular one although it was not the subject of a specific 
question in the questionnaire.
The question about whether a selection procedure for industries going 
to .growth poles should be instituted, did not meet with any particular 
enthusiasm or even give rise to interesting replies. Opinion seemed to 
be fairly evenly split on the issue and all the suggestions made as to 
what type of procedure was possible were standard mundane replies, many 
of them contradicting each other. Apparently industrialists have no 
better ideas about the operation of industrial development processes 
than planners in industrial promotion agencies do!
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1.4 Formation of Industrial Links
The questions on the industrial links firms were proposing to establish 
with other units in their respective Complexes or in the neighbouring 
districts resulted in little extra conclusive information. However, it
did emerge that only about two thirds of the firms in each place
expected to establish links and also that they anticipated no major
difficulties in doing so.
Of greater interest were the replies to a question on the time firms 
expected it to take for them to establish the local links they
required. This yielded the information that one third of the firms 
expected to have formed the necessary links inside the first year from 
the commencement of production, 50% by the first year and a half and 
75% after 2.5 years (Table 7). The number of firms expecting it to take
Table 7: Years Firms Required to Establish Links
No, of Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total Cumulative
?ars No. % No. %
0 13 9 7 29 35.4 29 35.4
1 5 10 2 4 21 25.6 50 61.0
2 3 5 1 9 11.0 59 72.0
3 1 2 1 4 4.9 63 76.9
4 2 2 1 5 6.1 68 83.0
5 2 1 2 1 6 7.3 74 90.3
6 1 1 1.2 ■ 75 91.5
7 75 91.5
8 1 1 2 2.4 77 93.9
9 2 2 5 6.1 82 100.0
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longer dropped away rapidly after the two year limit. Thus one can 
reasonably expect that after two to three years a new firm in the area 
should have established the links it requires. Expanding this to the 
level of the whole industrial growth pole, it would seem that from the 
time the first firm goes into production, and providing there is a 
steady rate of new firms starting up, five to ten years should see a 
well established network of industrial linkages in and around a 
successful growth pole. It will of course take another few years before 
the full force of the multiplier effects through these initial links 
and then secondary links come to be felt throughout the area around the 
growth pole. Thus after about ten years of operation it should be 
possible to assess the impact' a growth pole will have on the local 
economy of its region.
1.5 The Effect of the Ban on Madras Industry
In an attempt to gauge how managers visualised the future of industry 
in big cities after the ban on industrial development in major urban 
areas, they were asked a few questions about industry in Madras. Few 
felt that the ban would have any serious effect on the health of 
industrial development in general.. If firms were going to be set up or 
expand, such a ban was not going to stop them, and only one or two 
managers were able to think of cases of proposals for new industrial 
projects which had been shelved because of the ban.
Asked what type of industry they felt was suited to cities such as 
Madras and should perhaps be exempted from the ban, managers gave a 
very wide range of replies. Despite this variety and the impossibility 
of identifying one coherent view of what industry industrialists felt 
should be allowed in cities, it was interesting to note a fair degree 
of consensus around environmental considerations and pollution. 
Possibly this is a sign of a broader concern with industrial congestion 
in cities; certainly it relates to an increasing awareness amongst 
upper class sections of Indian society with the quality of their 
environment. Congestion is seen as one of the most important problems 
of Indian cities and apparently some industrialists at least realise
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that they may directly contribute to its reduction through the 
intelligent location of their factories.
The other consideration that was frequently raised here was the use of 
infrastructure available in Madras. Many managers felt that firms which 
had a particular need for certain facilities available in Madras and 
not elsewhere should be allowed to locate in or near the city. Import 
or export oriented firms were an obvious example. Scientific 
laboratories and testing facilities was another example, though 
Bangalore was usually referred to in this context. Also firms which 
were direct auxiliaries to already existing Madras firms were 
mentioned. Finally selection on the basis of the technology employed 
was suggested, and although different firms raised some completely 
contradicting ideas here, the general principle seemed to be that the 
rational expansion of Madras's existing industrial base should be 
allowed.
 ^Firms' Views of the Government Incentives
There is little doubt that the most popular incentives provided by the 
government are' the financial ones and in particular the outright cash 
grant of the Central Government 15% Subsidy on fixed capital investment 
(Table 8). The incentive schemes relating to production (Sales Tax Loan 
& Income Tax Relief) came second. Physical infrastructure was next, 
with development advice services and administrative assistance in 
dealing with . Central Government being of little importance. In all, 
therefore, a pattern of preference much as one would expect emerged. 
There was also little variation in the response from firms in the 
different locations, though M.M.Nagar firms which are not eligible for 
the Central Subsidy did not put it in first place. Nor did the 
Dharmapuri firms for that matter, even though they are eligible; they 
tended to prefer the Income Tax Relief scheme. This latter deviation 
from the overall pattern is very probably linked to the high level of 
capital investment among Dharmapuri firms, as the Central Subsidy has a 
ceiling of Rs 1.5 million on it and therefore becomes of little 
consequence to projects of over Rs.15 to Rs.20 million.
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Table 8: Importance of Government Incentives in Firms' Location
Decisions
No, of Points (1-8) Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Total
Given by Firms to: No. %
Concessional Finance 78 93 8 45 224 34.1
Central 15% Subsidy 159 195 33 395 60.2
Sales Tax Loan 154 118 30 25 333 50.8
Cheap Electricity 92 61 28 23 209 31.9
Assistance with Govt.
Permi ts 20 17 7 2 46 7.0
Industrial Devlpmt.
Advice 7 2 9 1.4
Site & Infrastructure 72 103 26 201 30.6
Income Tax Relief* (15) 100 39 (0) 162 24.7
(Income Tax Relief
Adjusted) (324 49.4
The Firms ranked the 8 incentives from 1 to 8, these ranks were thei
used as point scores for this table , thus total possible: 656 or 100%
* Due to an error in the questionnaire, the first 38 interviewees 
mostly in Ranipet and M.M.Nagar, were not asked about the Income Tax 
Relief, thus the scores for these two places are not truly 
representative and in the last row of the table the score of the 
Income Tax Relief has been adjusted upwards, extending the response 
pattern of firms who were asked.
On the question of what other sort of incentives! could be provided, 
responses tended to confirm the above pattern. Financial incentives 
were the most frequently mentioned, physical infrastructure coming 
second. Interestingly, however, in addition to about 6% of firms which 
gave no reply to this question, 19.5% felt that no more incentives were
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required and another 15% that all that was required was to improve 
existing incentives, by which they usually meant improve the 
administration, efficiency and speed with which incentives were 
granted. Some firms felt that the industrial promotion agencies were 
not as forthcoming with the incentives as they should be, and 
frequently that the attitude of the administrative officers was to 
ensure that they released as little cash as possible rather than to 
encourage firms facing difficulties with a new project in a remote 
location.
Thus although there are frequent complaints about the level of 
incentives and the way they are administered, there are also a fair 
number of industrialists, one third of this sample, who feel that the 
government agencies are doing a reasonable industrial promotion job.
1.7 Firms1 Reasons for Location Decision
From the response to this multiple choice question it would appear once 
again that the government financial incentives are the most important 
deciding factor in the sample firms' decision making (Table 9). 
Overall, proximity to a city was the second most important reason and 
the provision of infrastructure came third. Although this is true 
overall as it is true among the two largest groups in the sample, the 
Ranipet and Hosur firms, it does not hold among the M.M.Nagar and 
Dharmapuri firms. These seem to have somewhat different priorities. 
Obviously if M.M.Nagar firms had been in need of money, they would have 
chosen Ranipet and Hosur where the Central Subsidy is available. Not 
surprisingly therefore they attached more importance to a developed 
site with infrastructure and the proximity of Madras. Indeed M.M.Nagar 
is the nearest place to Madras where industrial development is 
permitted. Similarly Dharmapuri firms seemed to be primarily concerned 
about two things; proximity to Bangalore (they couldn't get nearer and 
remain, in Tamil Nadu, which most of them have to because their licences 
are State specific if not District specific), and the desire to avoid 
industrial unrest, for which they feel as remote a location as possible 
is best. That Dharmapuri District should also have a good climate and
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be a backward area with government incentives available are added 
advantages, but arguably no more than that given the rating they 
received in this question.
Table 9: Importance of Factors Influencing Location Decision
Adjusted Weighting* Ranipet Hosur Dharmapuri M.M.Nagar Tota!
of Importance of
Following Factors: % % % % %
Near to Existing Operations 30 48 50 ‘ 35
Developed Site 57 5'5 6 62 51
Climatic Factors 4 51 50 28
Near Materials & Fuel 26 23 6 50 ■ 25
Govt. Financial Assistance 83 91 50 56 80
Availability of Labour 9 8 12 31 11
Nearness to Market 11 22 19 50 20
Low Cost of Site 37 47 31 37 41
Ban on Urban Industry 20 50 31 50 37
Less Industrial Disputes 17- 17 75 37 26
Proximity to a City 31 73 75 56 60
Other 1 17 23 12 12 20
Other 2 2 3 3
No. Firms not Replying 1 1. 4 6
Total Score Possible (100%) 54 64 16 16 152
* To make all'columns comparable scores were adjusted to percentages of 
Total Score Possible. Responses were weighted (influential: xl; very 
important:' x2) to give scores.
The ranking of the three most important reasons for firms' location 
decisions produced essentially the same pattern of response with one or 
two minor differences in emphasis. The importance Dharmapuri firms
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attached to the avoidance of industrial disputes rose slightly to 
become the most important factor in their decision making. The 
importance the Ranipet and Hosur firms gave to the ban on industrial 
development in cities also increased to become the third most important 
factor for both groups. Apparently the ban was instrumental in the 
decision by many firms to disperse, though it never became the most 
important reason.
1.8 Opinion of Location of Existing Growth Poles
The final questions in the questionnaire related to how firms viewed 
the actual location of the growth pole they had chosen or had located 
near. Had SIPCOT made a good choice of site? Support for all three 
locations (Ranipet, Hosur and M.M.Nagar) was generally high, though 
markedly less for Ranipet than for the other two, and given the replies 
to previous questions this can probably be mostly attributed to its 
greater distance from a major urban centre. Certainly when this 
question was followed by asking managers why they thought the site of 
their growth pole had been well chosen, most of them referred to its 
being on a National Highway and those in Hosur nearly always referred 
to the proximity to Bangalore.
1.9 Location as an Explanatory Variable
Of the three main elements of the government industrial location 
policy, the decision to disperse industry from major urban-industrial 
centres to designated rural 'backward areas' was the one that received 
the most support from the industrialists in the sample. 83% of them 
supported the policy, yet in further questioning it emerged that 80% of 
them would also ideally locate' in an urban centre if there were no 
government dispersal policy. The contradiction is fairly blatant yet 
probably remains a fair representation of their views. In an ideal 
world industrialists would no doubt prefer an urban location, but they 
are also fully aware of their current position. Several recognised that 
arguably they ■ had a certain 'developmental responsibility to the 
nation1 and had to adhere to the dispersal policy. Others realised that
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urban pollution and congestion might be reduced if industry could be 
dispersed. There were also 11% of managers who said they would have 
chosen the same location even in the absence of government dispersal 
policies. In some ways then the absolute ban placed on industrial
development in cities was a very shrew^d measure in that it placed all 
industrialists in the same boat, leaving little room for abuse or
giving certain firms a differential advantage over others; many 
managers, though rueful about the problems the ban caused them 
personally, were prepared to admit the wisdom of it. Finally of course 
-there were a number of firms which actually wanted to disperse for 
their own reasons and for them, that others should be forced to do so 
as well was no disadvantage.
Despite this overall approval of the dispersal policy, there was also a 
good deal of anxiety about its implications and the difficulties it
created for industrialists. Certainly the bulk of them would be 
extremely unlikely to go to a backward area if they were not receiving 
any government assistance. The overall attitude appears to be one of 
resignation in the face of something that has to be done to develop the 
nation and managers are adamant that the state has a clear 
responsibility to help them iri this. There are variations in the 
support for the policy however, thus Ranipet and Dharmapuri firms are 
less keen on it than the others. Ranipet firms were also those who
thought the incentives were the most necessary and the least adequate. 
Dharmapuri firms, though recognising the difficulties of operating in a 
backward area, seemed to think it was possible. On the other hand the 
Hosur firms gave an impression of much greater optimism.
Although these differences in opinion do vary from place to place and 
might be causally associated with the places in which the firms are 
locating, the variations are not sufficiently clear cut to be really 
satisfactorily explained on this basis. It may also be that the firms' 
different views are associated with a temporal explanation. Thus the 
Hosur. firms' optimism might be a result of ignorance of how difficult 
operating in a backward area growth pole is going to be, whereas the 
Ranipet firms are more realistic because they have on average more
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experience of the problems. However, clearer explanations must still be 
looked for in the next section of this chapter. The one exception to 
this is with the Dharmapuri firms, whose particular reasons for 
choosing their location provide a certain rationale for their managers' 
opinions of the government policy. Even with these firms however, more 
precise details of their character should emerge in the subsequent 
analysis.
Returning to the views of government policy expressed in the first part 
of this chapter, support for the growth poles policy was also 
widespread. Certainly improvements were possible, particularly in
providing for the housing, medical, educational and other social needs 
of firms' employees. The lack of these facilities caused problems for 
firms by making the recruitment of their more highly qualified 
personnel difficult and the lives of all their employees more
problematic and expensive. Other infrastructural shortcomings, in 
transport and communications especially, made the actual operation of 
firms more difficult. Managers obviously felt that the government 
agencies could be providing a much wider range of services with greater 
speed, efficiency, coordination and less red tape and bureaucracy. The 
idea of a unitary planning and' implementation agency with a remit to 
develop a whole range of urban facilities as well as industrial 
infrastructure appealed to many. Growth poles did also have their 
opponents; however, the chief, objection raised to them being the labour 
unrest and demands for higher wages that were supposed to result from 
the concentration of so many workers in one place.
It was quite clear that the financial incentives offered by the
government were the most popular ones, though firms in different
locations had slightly different preferences among them. It also 
emerged that these financial incentives were one of the most decisive 
factors in firms choosing these new dispersed locations. Other factors 
such as the availability of physical infrastructure, the ban on develop­
ment in cities and the desire to escape from poor industrial relations 
in existing major industrial centres were also extremely important but 
never as generally important as the financial incentives proffered.
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Finally the information that most managers expect to have formed the 
industrial links they require in the 2 or 3 years after going into 
production, but that only about two thirds of the sample firms intend 
to establish such links, gives us additional information on the likely 
impact of the policies on further industrial growth and development in 
the areas surrounding the new factories and the time this process can 
be expected to take.
2. Alternative Explanations
In an attempt to avoid oversimplistic explanations of firms1 behaviour 
and their managers' opinions,,a lot of different crosstabulations of 
the survey variabl.es were carried out. In essence virtually all the 
behavioural and opinion variables were crosstabulated against all the 
factual variables about the characteristics of the firms. There were of 
course exceptions to this general pattern in cases where it seemed
extremely unlikely or logically impossible for two variables to have 
any effect on each other's behaviour. Also much of this crosstabulation 
produced little of value or interest, but equally a number of 
unexpected patterns did emerge. Such a crosstabulation exercise does 
not, of course, permit one to draw strong conclusions about causal 
relationships, but it does serve to indicate what explanations are
plausible and possible and which ones are entirely erroneous. Such 
inferences can also be used to check whether the known causes of a 
particular firn^s behaviour seems to be replicated in others. But in 
all cases it is tendencies and patterns of behaviour which appear to be 
explainable .by such and such factors which are being sought, and no 
attempt was made to formulate hypotheses for more advanced statistical 
testing, it being deemed that the detection of such wider tendencies
was sufficient to back up the direct impressions of firms1 behaviour
gained from personal interviewing.
The. first variable for which the crosstabulation exercise was carried 
out was the behavioural one of the' spatial distribution of firms1 
offices and possible other factories. Following that, the opinion 
variables from the questionnaire are dealt with one by one in the same
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order as in the first part of the chapter where they are crosstabulated 
purely against location.
2.1 The Spatial Distribution of Firms
The basic pattern of behaviour of firms described by this variable was 
outlined in the previous chapter (Chap. 7 Section 3.2), where it was 
noted that the two main conclusions that could be drawn from the data 
collected were first that a very high proportion of firms had offices 
in Madras, particularly Registered Offices but also administrative 
offices. Secondly there were no cases recorded of firms splitting up 
their production operations ohto different sites with, for example, 
assembly in one place and manufacturing in another. These tendencies 
were both tentatively explained in terms of the lack of adequate 
communications and transport facilities.
By crosstabulating these data with various other characteristics of the 
sample firms, further conclusions emerge(Table 10). First and most 
important there appears to be a marked link between the location of 
firm's offices and the NIC (National Industrial Classification) group 
the firm belongs to. In addition this link seems to correspond fairly 
well to the existing bases of established South Indian industry, thus 
confirming the earlier hypothesis that the sample firms had strong 
links with established industry (Chap.7 p.9). Thus the sample firms in 
the NIC categories Chemicals & Products or in Transport Equipment 
virtually all have their offices in Madras where these two industries 
are principally based in South India. Machinery firms on the other hand 
have their offices more evenly distributed between Madras, Bangalore 
and Coimbatore. Cotton Textile mills have offices in Madras, Coimbatore 
or elsewhere in Tamil Nadu. Fruit and Vegetable Products firms are 
entirely centred on Bangalore. This result is not really surprising but 
it does emphasise the importance of the links between the sample firms 
and established South Indian industry.
Interestingly, there appears to be little difference between Small, 
Medium and Large Scale Industry in their distribution of offices,
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though there is definitely a higher proportion of LSIs with Head 
Offices and Main Factories elsewhere, than MSIs or SSIs. This would 
indicate that most of the high capital investment firms in the sample 
are part of larger groups of companies or even subsidiaries, whereas 
independent firms are more likely to be found among MSXs and SSIs. This 
fact is confirmed by crosstabulating separately firms1 scale by their 
corporate identity.
More of the firms classified as Members of Company Groups have their 
offices on site or in cities close by, than firms classified as 
Subsidiaries or Branches, many of which have their offices further 
away, and even in Northern India. This is even true of the Managing 
Director's Offices, which suggests that control and decision making for 
Subsidiaries tends to be more removed from the actual factory than in 
the case of Members of Company Groups. Incidentally this indicates 
that, despite the reservations expressed above (Chap.7 p.211 & Table 
3), there is some accuracy in the classification of corporate identity 
used.
There is also a higher proportion of firms with Madras offices among 
those already in production than among those which have not yet 
started. This demonstrates that at first it was Madras firms which were 
most involved in the industrial dispersal programme, while firms from 
outside the State were only attracted at a later stage.
Finally it would seem that the distribution networks, whether for 
materials or products, in which the firms operate do not affect much 
the location of firms' offices. Selling to North Indian or Overseas 
markets for instance does not necessarily mean a firm will not have 
offices on site, and firms with Madras offices buy materials and sell 
products to all the different market areas.
These crosstabulations suggest that the main determining factors in the 
location of the sample firms' various offices and other elements are 
the individual firms' origins and their connections with other existing 
industrial concerns. Firms are obviously still keen on maintaining
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offices in major urban centres, very probably because of still 
.inadequate communications and transport facilities, but the choice of 
urban centre is not necessarily related to a firm's sources of raw 
materials or markets. Even firms with very distant markets in India and 
abroad sometimes have their offices on site, so this is by no means 
entirely impossible despite the preference for offices in urban 
locations. Such a conclusion corroborates the evidence about the raw 
material and product markets the sample firms do operate in, and the 
fact that these markets appear to have little influence on firm's 
decisions to set up factories in remote locations (Chapter 7 Section 
3).
2.2 Explaining Firms' Views of the Location Policy
At the beginning of the chapter it was noted that there was a very high A 
degree of support among the sample firms for the three main tenets of 
the government industrial location policy: the ban on urban location,
industrial dispersal and the industrial growth poles in backward areas;, 
with particularly high support for the principle of dispersal. It also 
seemed to be the case that the newer firms in Hosur were more in favour 
of the policies than older firms in other centres. Although further 
crosstabulations produce a rather confused picture it does indeed seem 
to be the case that the age of firms is related to their view of the 
policy (Table 11). It emerged for instance that new independent firms 
were keener on them than firms with links with established industry, 
but the - correlation seemed to be even stronger when firms had received 
incentives. Thus those that had received both the Sales Tax Loan and 
the Central Subsidy were strong supporters, those that had only got the 
Central Subsidy were critical, while those new firms which had as yet 
received neither, and were therefore expecting to get them were once 
again strong supporters of the policies.
The size of firms also seemed to affect their opinion of the policies. 
Judging size by capital investment, support was highest amongst Medium 
Scale units and lowest amongst Small Scale firms, though there were one 
or two variations in this general pattern. Larger units were the most
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opposed to the growth pole policy and smaller units most opposed to the 
ban on industrial development in cities. Response was similar when size 
was judged by scale of employment. Although there was a good general 
level of support all round, this was most sustained among the medium 
scale employers, while the large employers were particularly keen on 
the dispersal policy and the growth poles, and the smaller employers 
particularly opposed to the urban ban.
No other possible and consistent explanations emerged from this series 
of crosstabulations. So one is left with the impression that the
managers' views of the government industrial location policies are 
principally determined by three criteria: the newness and scale of the 
project and whether or not they received all the government incentives. 
Thus it would appear that new firms are enthusiastic about the
policies, but become critical with experience and especially when they
do not receive any Sales Tax Loan. Moreover, given these replies, it
seems that the policies are best suited to the needs of medium scale 
firms (whether judged by capital investment or employment numbers), 
while smaller firms are critical of the urban ban and the larger firms 
(judged by scale of investment) are critical of growth poles, though 
the larger employers still support them.
2*3 Ideal Location in Absence of Industrial Location Policy
It was noted above that 80% of firms would have chosen an urban 
location as their ideal location in the absence of any government 
industrial location policy. Only 11% would choose the same location or 
a rural location. Further examination of this distribution showed that 
6 out of the 9 firms which would have chosen the same location are 
Large Scale Industries, indeed they make up 25% of the LSIs in the 
survey sample(Table 12). Dividing up the firms by scale of investment 
into even smaller categories shows that the medium scale investors are 
the most conservative in what they would choose as an ideal location, 
the big majority of them specifying Madras, Bangalore or at least an 
urban location. This tails away on either side of the medium scale 
categories, with particularly the largest but also to some extent the
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smallest investors having the most diverse opinion on what would be an 
ideal location. Judging scale by employment levels, the pattern is less 
clear but it would seem to be again the largest firms which are most 
likely . to choose the same location though some of the smallest 
employers will as well.
Looking for other explanations for firms', locational 'preferences, it 
emerged that firms under the tightest corporate control (Subsidiaries & 
Branches) were most likely to choose dispersed locations, as again were 
firms in three of the more established industrial sectors in Tamil 
Nadu: Chemicals & Products, Base Metal & Alloy Products and Transport 
Equipment. Both these pieces of information suggest that it is the 
firms with the most solid financial backing which are the ones that 
would have chosen a rural or backward area location without any 
government encouragement. Thus financial security seems to remain one 
of the most important concerns for firms contemplating a rural or
backward area location. Only those with sufficient established backing 
consider it possible without government assistance, a not too
surprising result but nevertheless an important one, as it demonstrates 
that dispersal is not yet an easy undertaking for firms.
It was also apparent that firms not yet,in production were more likely 
to be conservative in their view of what might be an ideal location, 
whereas those already in production seemed slightly more prepared to 
consider a dispersed location. This can possibly be interpreted as a 
positive sign, as it would suggest that once firms have taken the step
of dispersing they seem to find it less difficult than they had
initially expected.
Finally it was evident that the material and product distribution
networks in which firms operated . were not a crucial determinant of
their choice of ideal location, though at the same time no 
contradictory behaviour, with firms specifying ideal locations totally 
unsuited to’ their markets, was apparent. Thus firms dealing with 
overseas did prefer Madras, while those dealing with Urban South India
seemed to regard Bangalore as a good location. At the same time the
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firms dealing with wider regional markets all over India were the least 
concerned about an urban location.
The overall picture that emerges, therefore, is that the firms which 
are the largest, and have the soundest backing are the most likely to 
choose non-urban locations. Many of them would in fact have chosen the 
same dispersed location they are in even if no government dispersal 
policy existed. Medium scale firms, on the other hand, seem to be the 
most conservative in their view of what constitutes an ideal location 
and by and large prefer urban sites. Finally it appears that once in 
production firms become more, rather than less, likely to see a 
dispersed location as ideal.
2.4 Problems with Dispersal to Backward Areas
Confirming these conclusions, it once again appears to be the larger 
firms which are least worried about operating in a backward area 
(Table 13). They are also apparently quite aware of the difficulties, 
indeed they often think it will be more difficult than some of the 
smaller firms do, but on the other hand they regard the incentives 
provided by and large as adequate and believe that backward area 
operation would not be that uneconomic without them. Overall they thus 
seem to be more realistic in their approach than some of the smaller 
firms which seem to be taking much more of a gamble with what may 
easily be an inadequate understanding of the difficulties. Medium Scale 
firms, while they do not feel unduly worried about the problems of 
operating in a backward area location, are very clear that it would be 
uneconomic to do so without government incentives. Looking at firms by 
scale of employment, the larger an employer the easier they expect 
operation in a backward area to be and the more adequate they find the 
incentives. This is 'particularly true of employers of large numbers of 
unskilled workers, but firms that employ a lot of skilled labour are 
slightly more worried about backward area operation, presumably because 
they expect recruitment problems.
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TABLE 13: Crosstabulating Managers' Views of Backward Areas by
Different Groupings of Firms,
Firms Grouped By:
| IP of 
| Firms 
I in 
j Class
I (=100%)
Degree of Ease (+) 
or Difficulty (-) of 
operating in a 
dispersed location 
%
Points (100% = 
(-2 to +2) IP x 2)
Are Backward Area 
Locations uneconomic 
without Government 
incentives?
Points %
(-1 to +1)
Are Incentives | 
Adequate? |
Points % | 
(-1 to +1) |
SCALE
Snail (SSI) 
Medium (MSI) 
Large (LSI)
I 7 
1 48 
1 26
-8
-28
-14
-57.1
-29.2
-26.9
3
26
6
42.8
54.2
23.1
-4
-23
2
-57.1 I 
-47.9 I 
7.7
IP UNSKILLED WORKERS 
1 - 4 9  Markers 1 48 -36 -37.5 24 50.0 -24 -50.0 |
50 - 99 Markers 1 17 -13 -38.2 1 5.9 -6 -35.3 |
100 - 149 Markers 1 6 -3 -25.0 6 100.0 0
150 - 199 Markers I 1 1 50.0 1 100.0 0
200 - 249 Markers 1 2 . 0 -1 -50.0 1 50.0 |
250 plus Markers 1 6 2 16.7 4 66.7 4 66.7 I
Nat Known I 2 -2 -50.0 1 50.0 -1 -50.0 1
IP SKILLED WORKERS 
1 - 4 9  Markers ! 58 -36 -31.0 26 44.8 -26 44.8 |
50 - 99 Markers I 10 -9 -45.0 4 40.0 -6 60.0 I
100 - 149 Markers ! 4 -3 -37.5 2 50.0 2 50.0 |
150 - 199 Markers ! 2 -1 -25.0 0 2 100.0 I
200 - 249 Markers i 2 -2 -50.0 -2 -100.0 0
250 plus Markers 1 6 0 6 100.0 2 33.3 I
STAGE
Not. in Production 1 37 -22 -29.7 17 45.9 -10 -27.0 I
In Production 1 38 -24 -31.6 20 52.6 -13 -34.2 |
Trial- Production I 5 -*4 -40.0 -1 -20.0 -3 -60.0 |
Cancelled 1 2 -1 -25.0 0 0
RECEIPT OF INCENTIVES 
Sales Tax Loan: No 1 59 —44 -37.3 33 55.9 -20 -33.9 I
Yes f 23 -7 -15.2 3 13.0 -6 -26.1 I
Central Subsidy: No 1 36 -19 -26.4 16 44.4 -25 -69.41
Yes 1 46 -32 -34.8 20 43.5 -9 -19.6 |
Term Loan ■ Na 1 65 -44 -33.8 22 33.8 -26 -40.0 1
Yes 1 17 -7 -20.6 14 82.3 0
STATUS
Expansn Existing Firm 1 ' 4 -4 -50.0 2 50.0 0
Subsidiary or Branch 1 16 -10 -31.2 -1 -6.2 ■■ -4 -25.0 |
Member Company Group 1 32 -13 -20.3 14 43.7 -10 -31.3 I
Independent New Firm 1 23 -21 -45.7 17 73.9 -10 -43.5 I
Joint Sector (TIDG0) 1 5 -2 -20.0 3 60,0 -1 -20.0 |
Public Sector 1 2 -1 -25.0 1 50.0 -1 -50.0 |
TOTAL SAMPLE I 82 -51 -31.1 36 43.9 -26 -31.7 |
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Following the points made earlier (Section 1.2) that the Ranipet firms 
felt much more strongly than the Hosur firms that operating in a 
backward area was difficult and uneconomic without government 
incentives and that the incentives themselves were inadequate, it 
appears that this is also more generally the case with firms in 
production, while those not yet in production are on average slightly 
more optimistic and perhaps less realistic about the difficulties 
ahead.
Firms which have not received the Central Subsidy are particularly 
adamant that the incentives are inadequate. As these firms are unlikely 
to have received any of the financial incentives as yet, because the 
Subsidy is the first to be sanctioned, this is not too surprising. 
Those firms which have not received the Term Loan feel very strongly 
that backward areas are uneconomic without the government incentives. 
This would corrobora-te the point made earlier (Chap.7, p.214) that the 
few Term Loans that have been awarded (only 17 among the sample firms) 
are generally given to firms experiencing particular difficulties. 
Aside from these two points the crosstabulation of these questions on 
dispersal against whether or not firms were getting the incentives 
suggested nothing of interest. On the other hand one further cross­
tabulation showed that independent firms are clearly more apprehensive 
about backward area locations, the economics of locating in them and 
the adequacy of incentives than any of the other firms which are part 
of larger corporate structures or in the public sector.
In sum, while overall the majority of firms expect to find operation in 
a backward area difficult, uneconomic without the incentives and the 
incentives inadequate, some groups of firms seem to think it will be 
relatively easier than others. Essentially there are two ways these 
groups tend to be identifiable: first larger firms with higher capital 
investment or more employees and links with established industry expect 
to find it easier than smaller firms; secondly there is also a tendency 
for older firms already in production to believe it is more difficult 
than newer projects not yet in production. On the whole however, the 
first characterisation is the more accurate and useful one; moreover it
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fits in with the conclusions reached in the previous section (p.297) 
The second characterisation is more problematic as it seems to 
contradict the conclusion of the last section. The only explanation to 
reconcile these two tendencies would seem to be that although firms 
already in production are more aware of the difficulties involved in a 
backward area location they nevertheless are prone to conclude, if they 
are large well backed firms, that such a location can be quite 
acceptable.
2.5 Choosing a Growth Pole Location
A fairly clear picture of which firms prefer the growth poles most 
emerges with relative ease, and presumably it is these firms which find 
the growth poles most suited to their needs. They are essentially the 
medium scale firms both in terms of capital investment and in terms of 
employment numbers. On either side of the group, approval of growth 
poles diminishes as one moves towards smaller scale or large scale 
firms. It would also seem that newer firms are keener on the growth 
poles than older firms, that is firms which are not yet in production 
and those which have not yet received government incentives (Table
14).
Opinions on a possible selection procedure for firms coming to growth 
poles are more confused but on the whole it would seem to be the larger 
firms and those already in production which are most in favour of the 
idea. On the other hand small scale firms, those not yet in production 
and those not yet receiving incentives are much more doubtful. This 
would seem to be directly related to their perception of how they might 
themselves fare under such a selection procedure. Without it even being 
specified what criteria the selection procedure might be based on, 
these firms, whose common bond appears to be their greater 
vulnerability, react against the idea of yet another administrative 
obstacle to be overcome in setting up a project in a growth pole.
Attitudes towards the actual location of existing growth poles seemed 
to be primarily based on which growth pole is being referred to, with
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TABLE 14: Cross tabulating Managers1 Views on Growth Poles by
Different Groupings of Firms.
1
1
1
1
1
Firms Grouped By: |
i
N3 of 
Firms 
in 
Class 
(=100%)
Are Growth Poles
Easier for ) Preferred for 
B.A. Location? | B.A. Location?
Points % | Points % 
(-1 to +1) | (-1 to +1)
Could Growth 
Pole Policy be 
Improved?
Points % 
(-1 to +1)
I Is Selection | 
i Required for | 
| Growth Pole | 
| Industry? | 
| Points % | 
I (-1 to +1) |
SCALE ■ | 
Small (SSI) | 
Medium (MSI) | 
Large (LSI) j
7
48
26
1
31
11
1
14.3 I 
64.6 I
42.3 I 
i
1
27
4
14.3
56.3
15.4
7
37
21
100.0
77.1
80.8
1 -3 
1 4 
1 6
-42.91 
8.3 | 
23.1 I
If UNSKILLED WORKERS | 
1 - 4 9  Workers | 48 27
1
56.3 I 24 50.0 38 79.2 1 4 8.3 I
50 - 99 Workers j 17 9 52.9 I 6 35.3 13 76.5 I 5 29.4 I
100 - 149 Workers j 6 5 83.3 I 4 66.7 6 50.0 1 “6 -100.0 |
150 - 199 Workers | 1 1 100.0 | 1 100.0 1 100.0 1 -1 -100.0 I
200 - 249 Workers | 2 1 50.0 | 1 50.0 1 50.0 I 1 50.0 |
250 plus Workers | 6 2 33.3 I -2 -33.3 6 100.0 1 4 66.7 I
Not Known | 
1
2 -1 -50.0 I
1
-1 -50.0 1 50.0 1 -1 -50.0 |
tf SKILLED WORKERS | 
1 - 4 9  Workers | 58 31
_ r  
53.4 I 28 48.3 46 79.3 1 6 10.3 I
50 - 99 Workers j 10 6 60.0 j 6 60.0 9 90.0 I -2 -20.0 i
100 - 149 Workers | 4 2 50.0 I 2 50.0 4 100.0 1 4 100.0 i
150 - 199 Workers j 2 2 100.0 | 0 2 100.0 1 o
200 - 249 Workers | 2 2 100.0 | 1 50.0 1 50.0 1 “2 -100.0 I
250 plus Workers | 
1
.6 1 16.7 |
1
-4 -66.7 5 83.3 1 o
STAGE | 
Not in Production | 37 25
r
67.6 I 22 59.5 31 83.8 1 “2 -5.41
In Production | 38 16 41.1 I 9 23.7 29 76.3 | 7 18.41
Trial Production | 5 1 20.0 | 0 4 80.0 1 1 20.0 !
Cancelled | 
1
2 2 100.0 I 2 100.0 2 100.0 1 o
RECEIPT OF INCENTIVES) 
Sales Tax Loan: No | 59 37
1
62.7 | 32 54.2 88.1 1 "3 -5.11
Yes| 23 8 34.8 I 1 4.3 14 60.9 1 9 39.1 i
Central Subsidy: No | 36 24 66.7 | 20 55.6 33 91.7 1 o
Yes| 46 20 43.5 I 13 28.3 33 71.7 1 6 13.0 |
Term Loan No f 65 36 55.4 I 25 38.5 54 83.1 i o
Yes|
1
17 8 47.1 |
1
8 47.1 12 70.6 1 6 35.3 |
I
TOTAL SAMPLE | 82 44 • 53.7 |
1
33 40.2 66 80.5 1 6 7.3 I
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Hosur being more highly regarded than Ranipet. Otherwise Medium Scale 
firms seemed to be the most satisfied with the locations. Recipients of 
incentives and firms dealing with the wider regional markets in India 
(i.e. South, North, West & East India or All-India) were the only other 
two groupings which stood out as being particularly pleased with the 
locations and no groups were particularly critical of them.
<T
2.6 Patterns in the Formation of Industrial Links
Once again some fairly clear results are produced by this set of
crosstabulations (Table 15). It would seem that the formation of
industrial links can best be explained by two variables: the scale of 
the firms and the principal sources of materials and markets it deals 
with. Thus Large Scale industries are more likely to form links than 
either MSIs or SSIs, they also think it is easier to do so than the 
smaller firms, but they expect to take longer over the whole process of 
establishing all the links they need. Similarly it would seem that
firms that deal' predominantly with Urban South India including Madras 
and Bangalore specifically, are more likely to form links, do so more 
easily, but take longer over it, than firms dealing with wider regional 
markets in India which are much less likely to form links or those 
dealing with overseas which are very unlikely to do so. Interestingly 
those few firms which are dealing mostly with really local markets in
the Districts around the growth poles are not that likely to form
links. However, there are only about a dozen firms in this category so
their behaviour cannot be taken as too representative.
One or two other interesting facts emerged from these crosstabulations. 
First it would seem that the firms in production have actually formed 
fewer links than those not yet in production expect to in the future. 
On the other hand, they seem to go about it faster than the latter 
expect. Secondly, it was not possible to isolate any particular 
industrial classification group that was more likely to form links than 
any other, although there were a few minor variations in their
practice.
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TABIE 15: Crosstabulating Data on Formation of Industrial Links by
Different Groupings of Firms.
Firms Grouped By:
Firms
in
Class
(=100%)
Likelihood of Firms 
forming links with 
other Firms in:
Ccmplex Area 
% %
Ease or Difficulty 
Expected in 
Formation of Links 
with other Firms in: 
Complex Area 
% %
Average 
N-* of 
Years 
Required 
to Form 
Links
N5 of I 
Years i 
Required ( 
to Form | 
75% of i 
Links |
MATERIAL SOURCE 
Overseas 10 20.0 20.0 50.0 71.4 0.9 2 1
Complex
Nearby Districts 4 50.0 50.0 50.0 1.2 1 |
Local Area 1 -100.0 100.0 0 100.0 1.0 1 1
Madras 16 56.2 68.7 40.0 40.0 3.6 5 1
Bangalore . 2 0 0 100.0 100.0 3.0 6 I
Urban South India 8 87.5 87.5 85.7 85.7 2.0 2 1
South India 10 -50.0 -10.0 0 37.5 1.6 2 i
N.W. & E. India • 11 . 18.2 9.1 42.9 50.0 2.3 3 I
All-India 14 57.1 71.4 0 -14.3 2.2 4 !
No Reply 6 33.3 33.3 20.0 20.0 0.2 0 !
PRODUCT MARKET 
0\erseas 9 44.4 22.2 85.7 28.6 1.3 2 I
Complex 1 100.0 100.0 -100.0 -100.0 9 9 I
Nearby Districts 
Local Area 1 -100.0 -100.0 0 100.0 1 1 |
Madras 3 -33.3 -33.3 0 0 1.7 5 I
Bangalore 
Urban South India 8 37.5 87.5 0 57.1 3.5 4 I
South India 11 36.4 36.4 20.0 27.3 2.3 5 1
N.W. & E. India 21 28.6 47.6 27.8 27.8 1.9 2 I
All-India 22 27.3 31.8 50.0 56.2 1.8 2 j
No Reply 6 33.3 66.7 60.0 60.0 1.3 3 I
SCALE
Staall (SSI) 7 14.3 42.9 50.0 60.0 1.7 1 |
Medium (MSI) 48 10.4 31.3 29.7 33.3 2.0 3 I
Large (ISI) 26 63.4 61.5 37.5 39.1 2.3 3 I
STAGE
Not in Production 37 32.4 62.2 46.4 58.1 2.5 4 I
In Production 38 23.7 23.7 40.6 28.1 1.3 2 I
Trial Production 5 60.0 60.0 -40.0 0 1.4 1 1
Cancelled 2 0 0 -100.0 -100.0 0.5 1 1
TOTAL SAMPLE 82 29.3 42.7 34.8 38.2 2.0 4 I
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2.7 Explaining Firms' Views of the Government Incentives
The aggregate statistics on these views presented above (Table 8),
brought out the very clear preference the managers have for the 
financial incentives offered by the government. Among the incentives, 
the Central Government 15% Subsidy was the usual first choice except 
for firms from M.M.Nagar, which are not eligible for it, and for those
from Dharmapuri. This overall pattern remains in further
crosstabulations (Table .16), the preferences of the Dharmapuri firms 
coming out in the very largest category of firms (by capital 
investment) putting the Income Tax Relief Scheme as its first choice, 
the Sales Tax Loan second and the Central Subsidy only third. The 
broader category of Large Scale Industries also put the Sales Tax 
before the Central Subsidy but relegated the Income Tax Relief to 
fourth place even after the low electricity tariff. It was interesting 
to note that when LSIs were broken down into three categories by scale 
of investment it was only the very largest that didn't put the Central 
Subsidy first. This means that most firms with a fixed capital 
investment of up to Rs.30 million find the Central Subsidy attractive 
despite the ceiling of Rs.1.5 million, or only 5% of Rs.30 million, 
that it carries.
One curious point which emerged here was that the very smallest 
category of firms, those with a fixed capital investment of less than 
Rs.l million, actually preferred the Sales Tax Loan to the Central 
Subsidy. As there is no obvious explanation for this and as there is 
some discrepancy between the Small Scale Industries category under the 
two different systems of classification, this is probably a spurious
result indicative of a mistake in the classification.
The one other variable which produced interesting results here is the 
classification of firms by whether or not they are in production. While 
those firms which are already in production do conform to the general 
pattern of preferring the Central Subsidy above other incentives, those 
not yet in production don't. They prefer the Sales Tax Loan, and they 
also put a much higher emphasis on the availability of a site with
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infrastructure, again putting this ahead of the Central Subsidy. The 
greater importance attached to the site and physical infrastructure can 
be attributed to the immediate concerns of these firms which are 
struggling to get their project off the ground and operating, but the 
preference for the Sales Tax Loan is harder to explain. One can only 
suggest that it is again a result of the lower likelihood of firms 
getting a Sales Tax Loan than a Central Subsidy. Thus while the Sales 
Tax Loan seems a more attractive long term proposition at first sight, 
when firms actually get around to claiming it, they encounter 
difficulties and fast realise that the cash grant of the Central 
Subsidy, which by then they have safely in their pockets, is more 
valuable to them.
There being no other variable which brought out different information 
when crosstabulated with these attitudes to the government's 
incentives, one can only conclude that the sample firms' attitudes here 
can be largely explained. by their scale of investment and the stage 
which their project has reached.
2.8 Explaining Firms' Location Decisions
The high degree of uniformity in the firms' rationales for choosing 
their new locations, which was noted earlier (p.283) persisted despite 
most attempts to isolate particular groups of firms with different 
priorities (Table 17). Throughout, the financial incentives offered by 
the government remain the most important attraction of the locations 
considered, with proximity to a city second and the provision of 
infrastructure third. This having been said there are a number of minor 
variations which should be mentioned.
First, the two firms in the NIC group of Food Products put the 
availability of raw materials on a par with the financial incentives as 
their most important criteria and the two Cotton Textiles firms did 
likewise with climatic conditions. For the four Rubber, Plastic and 
Petroleum Products firms proximity to their existing operations was 
considered more important than the financial incentives.
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Second, firms not yet in production were considerably more bothered by 
the ban on industrial development in cities than firms already in 
production. This can be explained by the introduction of the urban ban 
fairly recently (1977), which means it did not affect earlier firms. 
Although the ban does not feature as an important reason for dispersal 
in the overall pattern of response, this last point indicates that it 
is a more important factor in forcing firms to consider backward area 
locations than the overall response suggests.
Finally, the one way that any different and systematic reordering of 
priorities emerged was when classifying firms by their size. While the 
primary position of the financial incentives remains throughout, 
different secondary ranking of priorities become evident. Thus Small 
Scale Indus.tries appear to be more concerned with the cost and 
convenience of their site, while MSIs, though still attaching some 
importance to these practical considerations, tend to emphasise more 
the need to be near a city. Larger Scale Industries on the other hand 
place much more importance on the distance to a city and bring a 
concern with industrial relations into third place. Moreover as the 
scale of the firms increases, the weighting given to the financial 
incentives goes down. Dividing the firms up into smaller categories by 
scale of investment, it appears that the top two categories of firms, 
namely those with fixed capital investments of over Rs.20 million, 
actually feel that proximity to a city is their most important concern 
and that financial incentives come second. They also place much more 
importance on the availability of labour and the need to avoid labour 
unrest by locating in a remote location than other firms do. They are 
therefore seeking to achieve a delicate balance between proximity to a 
large city and remoteness for good labour relations.
When these criteria for location decision making were tabulated against 
firms grouped by numbers of workers employed no different patterns 
emerged. Surprisingly, in view of the last point made, the firms 
employing large numbers of workers were not the ones most concerned 
with labour unrest, instead it was those employing between 50 and 99 
unskilled workers. This suggests that the concern of the high capital
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investment firms with labour unrest is not directly related to the 
number of workers they employ. Rather one must assume that this concern 
is derived from previous negative experience these firms have had on 
other sites. Certainly this is the case for a few of them, as several 
firms which had been subjected to prolonged strikes in recent years 
expressed the hope that in moving to a remote location they might be 
able to avoid such disputes.
3. Summary & Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned with trying to explain why a particular 
sample of firms which have followed the government industrial dispersal 
policy have chosen the locations they have. The characteristics of the 
firms and those of the environmental setting they are locating in were 
presented in the previous chapter. Here the firms' views of the 
government policy and their rationale for their location decisions are 
first described and then related to their characteristics.
The first overriding point which was noted was the very high degree of 
support that the government industrial dispersal policy commanded 
amongst the sample firms. At the same time it was noted that by and 
large firms would ideally still prefer to locate in or near an urban 
centre, but there was a minority exception to this. 11% of the sample 
firms insisted they would have chosen the same or another rural 
location even if the dispersal policy had not existed. Thus there 
exists both general support for industrial dispersal and a willingness 
on the part of some firms to, consider it without government 
encouragement or assistance. In essence the aim of this chapter was to 
try and explain why this support for the principle of dispersal exists 
and isolate the group or groups of firms most in favour of it.
Initially these questions were considered in terms of the locations the 
firms had chosen. It emerged that the firms locating in Dharmapuri 
District in the vicinity of Hosur but not actually in the Hosur Complex 
seemed to comprise a group with specific characteristics of their own 
which moreover seemed to have a different set of locational priorities
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than the rest of sample firms in Ranipet, Hosur and to a certain extent 
M.M.Nagar. The characteristics of the Dharmapuri firms were summarised 
in the Conclusions of the previous chapter (Chapter 7, Section 4) and 
their special behaviour and attitudes were again noted halfway through 
this chapter . Typically the Dharmapuri firms used more capital
intensive methods of production than other firms in the sample and had 
extremely close links with established Madras industry either as
Subsidiaries or as Members of Company Groups.
The first indication of capital intensive production methods is usually 
given by the scale of a firm's investment and in the second half of 
this chapter, the scale of a firm (Large/Medium/Small) has consistently 
been one of the factors which has affected their behaviour and
attitudes. Other characteristics have helped to explain certain
features of the sample firms' behaviour and attitudes but none as
consistently as their scale of investment.
The two behavioural characteristics examined in the chapter were first 
the spatial distribution of the firms' component parts, and secondly 
the industrial links they have or intend to form. It was concluded that 
the spatial distribution of the' firms' component parts was largely a 
result of their historical origins rather than of the market areas with 
which they dealt. It was also noted that firms with connections 
furthest away in northern India had a larger■proportion of Large Scale 
units among them. The propensity to form industrial links seemed to be 
most pronounced amongst firms dealing with Urban South India (including 
Madras and Bangalore specifically) markets, either for materials or for 
selling products, and lower among firms dealing with more distant 
markets. Equally, larger units are more likely to do so than MSIs or 
SSIs. Thus it would seem that Large Scale units dealing with Urban 
South India markets are those which can be expected to have the most 
pronounced effect on industrial development through industrial 
multiplier effects.
Turning to the sample firms' opinions of the government industrial 
location policy, it appears that their attitudes are largely determined
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by the newness of the project, its scale of investment and whether the 
firm has or has not received government financial incentives. Newer 
firms tended to be keener and so do Medium Scale firms, while SSIs are 
critical of the urban ban and LSIs of the growth pole policy. Those 
firms which have not received the Sales Tax Loan, even though they are 
in production and therefore should be eligible, are particularly 
crit ical.
In greater detail it seems that the actual policy to disperse industry 
to backward areas is particularly suited to the priorities of Large 
Scale firms and especially those with strong connections with 
established industry and therefore sound financial backing. This is 
partly because of the advantageous production related financial 
incentives the government offers, the Income Tax Relief Scheme and the 
Sales Tax Loan which they are in a particularly good position to 
benefit from, but also because of their desire for better industrial 
relations which they hope to find in remote locations. At the same time 
these large firms do not want to be too isolated from a major city, so 
the Dharmapuri-Hosur area is just about ideal from their point of view. 
Thus these large scale firms may in some ways be seen as trend-setters 
in that they have recognised that dispersed backward area locations 
have specific advantages other than simply the incentives the 
government provides to make them attractive, but also because the 
survey returns seem to indicate that the dispersal policy is becoming 
more popular with time. Certainly once firms have been operating in 
dispersed locations for a while they tend to become more rather than 
less- in favour of dispersal.
While the policy of dispersal is suited to the priorities of Large 
, Scale firms that of establishing growth poles in backward areas seems 
to be what makes dispersal possible for Medium Scale firms. Growth 
poles al.so appeal to newer firms, largely it would seem because it 
reduces their apprehension of the difficulties of operating in a remote 
backward area.
Again the scale of a firm's investment seems to affect its managers'
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opinion of the government incentives as well as their reasons for 
choosing a particular location. However, the views of the incentives 
are also affected by whether a firm is in production or not.
There is widespread agreement that the best incentives the government 
offers are the financial ones, and for most firms this is more 
specifically the Central Government 15% Subsidy. However, for larger 
firms the Sales Tax Loan and the Income Tax Relief are relatively more 
attractive, basically because of the Rs.1.5 million ceiling on the 
Central Subsidy. But it also seems likely that the LSIs are in a better 
position to benefit from these two production “related incentives, 
because they have a tendency to be financially sounder projects with a 
greater likelihood of achieving successful production and large volume 
production at that.
Various clues also suggested that firms were experiencing difficulties 
in getting a Sales Tax Loan sanctioned and this seemed to be a possible 
explanation for a sharp fall in the popularity of the incentive among 
firms in production and therefore presumably eligible to receive it. 
Large Scale firms, on the other hand, seemed to have little difficulty 
in obtaining it, possibly because of their greater political clout in 
government circles.
The government financial incentives are also undoubtedly the most 
influential factor on firms' locational decision making. But again, the 
scale of firms' investment in their new projects seemed to explain 
variations in their priorities. Generally the larger a firm the less
important the incentives seem to be, though they always remain an
important factor. In•more detail it seems that after the incentives, 
SSIs are most concerned with the cost and convenience of their site in 
terms of the facilities it offers. MSIs also find these considerations 
important but in addition they place more emphasis on proximity to a
city. For LSIs proximity to a city becomes even more important but they
also want to balance this with a certain remoteness in their search for 
good labour relations. With the really high capital cos.t projects, that 
is those involving more than Rs.20 million, this latter concern becomes
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even more important, but it is only amongst the Dharmapuri firms that 
it becomes the most important factor to the extent of- displacing the 
government financial incentives.
In sum it would seem that there does exists a certain group of Indian 
industrialists who are interested in setting up factories in remote 
backward area locations for reasons other than the government 
industrial dispersal policy. That the government should help them in 
doing so with a number of financial incentives is of course an added 
bonus, particularly because these industrialists have the financial and 
political muscle to ensure that they do benefit from all the incentives 
that are available. But their'main priority remains one of finding a 
site where the local labour is sufficiently docile to not disrupt the
operation of their factories with the strikes they are used to in their
old urban locations. This group of industrialists, however, remains 
small because while backward area locations are now possible to operate 
in from an infrastructural point of view given the development of 
India’s road and telecommunications network, they remain an expensive 
and risky choice which most industrialists are not yet in a position to 
contemplate. Thus it seems that the government industrial dispersal
programme, typified here by the ' package of incentives and
infrastructure offered by SIPCOT in Tamil Nadu State, provides the 
necessary backing which most industrialists lack and which makes the 
dispersal of their factories possible.
One of the essential elements of the package of assistance provided by 
SIPCOT to aid industrial dispersal is the establishment of the growth 
poles themselves. From the replies of the Medium Scale firms it is 
evident that these growth poles are indeed essential, but given the 
difference in popularity of Ranipet and Hosur and the way the latter 
seems to be eclipsing the former because of its site so near to 
Bangalore, one cannot help but feel that SIPCOT is playing into the 
hands of the Hosur firms. With the extremely high level of support 
industrialists maintain they give to the industrial dispersal policy, 
it seems likely that SIPCOT could easily have sited their second 
Complex a good deal further from Bangalore southwards down the road
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from Hosur to Krishnagiri without losing too many firms. The impact on 
the Dharmapuri District backward area might then have been greater and 
the lost secondary multiplier effects of incomes and wages spent in 
Bangalore less.
One of the initial aims of conducting the survey of the SIPCOT firms 
was to establish whether these firms were choosing their new dispersed 
locations because of the government industrial location policy and 
incentives package or whether they had other motives of their own. In 
the event, the survey has successfully identified a small group of 
firms which had other motives to disperse, even though it has also 
proved that for the majority of firms the government programme was 
essential to help them disperse.
For the first small group of firms the government dispersal therefore 
plays directly into their hands; for the majority of firms less so, but 
even for them the policy is not as harsh as it might appear. Thus 
SIPCOT's choice of Hosur as a growth pole site seems to have been made 
more on the basis of what industrialists would like rather than in 
terms of the possible developmental impact on the backward area.
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REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation has analysed the subject of industrial location 
trends and policy at four different levels. Initially the subject was 
tackled at a purely theoretical level, sufficiently general to be 
applicable in most Third World countries. The other three levels all 
dealt specifically with the Indian case, first at a national level in 
Chapters 3 and 4, then a regional one in Chapters 5 and 6 and finally 
at a local, firm-specific level in Chapters 7 and 8. This separation 
was necessary for various reasons. Thus while Indian industrial
location policy has been formulated at a national level it is 
implemented at a federal State’level. So Chapters 3 and 4 discussed its 
formulation and the national influences on it, as well as the general
characteristics and problems of Indian industry, while the next two
chapters described its implementation in the one State of Tamil Nadu. 
Equally, though it was possible to provide a sufficiently detailed 
analysis of the spatial distribution of industry in the State of Tamil 
Nadu (Chapter 5), this would have been a forbidding task at a national 
level. Finally, a survey of firms following the industrial dispersal 
policy and a proper examination of their reasons for doing so could 
only be conducted within a more' restricted local area. For the sake of 
clarity this final chapter summarises the findings at these four
different levels of analysis.
1. Theoretical Arguments
Chapter 2 pointed first to the basic difference between industrial 
location trends and industrial location policy. One of the central 
concerns of this thesis has been to consider whether in India, where 
the state has instituted an industrial dispersal policy, there also 
exists a distinct dispersal trend which would have occurred even if the 
policy had not been instituted. In order to answer this question a 
theoretical approach to the study of industrial location was suggested 
which explained the appearance of new location trends in terms of major 
restructuring of industrial capital in the face of new problems and 
opportunities. As industrial capital continues its process of
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accumulation it is continually involved in a certain degree of 
restructuring of its production (both its means and its methods of 
production) in order to maximise profits. While much of this 
restructuring simply involves small changes internal to a factory or on 
the same site, periodically the restructuring required is of sufficient 
scale and importance to warrant the need for a new site. The decision 
on the new location will then again be taken with the intention of 
maximising profits and the capitalist will seek to reduce any problems 
he might have been experiencing on his old site and take full advantage 
of any (new) opportunities which are available to him. Each time an 
industrialist takes such a location decision the context is slightly 
different. Industry in general' and his branch or sector in particular 
will be experiencing specific problems, many of which will be different 
as certain locations become congested or restricted by the actions of 
other bodies and as other new locations, previously inaccessible or 
problematic for other reasons, become possible. In addition the 
industrialist's knowledge and perception of these problems and 
opportunities cannot be perfect and to a certain extent therefore, he 
can be expected to imitate other industrialists who have recently taken 
location decisions in similar circumstances to himself. In this way 
trends in industrial location will emerge.
Actions taken by the state as part of an industrial location policy, 
and for that matter independently of such a policy, obviously impinge 
on location decisions and can therefore influence the direction of new 
industrial location trends. But the state's action, whether in terms of 
placing restrictions on certain locations or of improving the physical 
environment and providing incentives in other locations, is only one of 
the factors the industrialist takes into account in making his 
decision. The problem posed in the introduction to the thesis involved 
trying to clarify just how important the Indian state's actions were in 
influencing the direction of the Indian industrial dispersal trend of 
the 1970s. This therefore necessitated the identification of other 
possible influences on the trend and an examination of the state of 
development and current problems of Indian industrial capital, as well 
as a study of the environment and location choices it is faced with.
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In addition to this conceptualisation of the dynamics of industrial 
location trends it was also necessary to provide a framework within 
which the activities of the state could be interpreted and related to 
the process of capital accumulation. Thus for example, it is not 
adequate to conclude that state policy is the major influence on any 
new industrial location trend if industrial capital has persuaded the 
state to institute policies that suit it in the first place. For this 
study it was also important that the framework should incorporate some 
understanding of the nature of Third World economies and not apply 
simply to the Western capitalist economies in which industrial location 
is usually discussed. For this purpose a framework based on modes of 
production theory was adopted.-
Thus it was argued (Chap.2 p.48) that Third World social formations 
should be conceptualised as consisting of an articulation of different 
modes of production amongst which the capitalist mode of production 
could be expected to hold an important though not always dominant 
position. Moreover, this articulation could be expected to have a 
differential spatial distribution with the capitalist mode more 
important in urban centres where modern industry had developed and less 
so in underdeveloped .rural .areas with no industry and little 
commercialised agriculture. Within such a framework the role of the 
state is seen as providing the conditions for production and capital 
accumulation but, depending on the importance and strength of the 
different modes of production within the articulation, it need not 
necessarily be providing the conditions for capitalist production. The 
state will, of course, be responding to the demands of the more 
important classes and groups present in the social formation and in a 
social formation where the capitalist mode of production is dominant or 
at least powerful it may well accede to the demands of industrial 
capital. However, other groups.might also be of sufficient political 
strength to command attention, thereby involving the state in seemingly 
contradictory behaviour.
Regional policy of which industrial location policy is one element is 
an important part of the state's function of providing the conditions
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for production. The state may have a number of reasons for instituting 
an industrial dispersal policy and it may be trying to please a number 
of different parties in doing so, but clearly industrial capital will 
be one of those most affected. Indeed it was suggested that one of the 
most important features of an industrial dispersal and more 
particularly a growth pole policy in a Third World social formation, is 
that it represents a state organised attempt to encourage the spread of 
the capitalist mode of production to underdeveloped regions where it 
has hitherto not been the dominant mode or has even hardly existed.
The final value of the modes of production conceptualisation is that it 
provides some indication of what the effect of industrial dispersal
might be. Thus having argued that the crucial feature of this dispersal 
is that it represents the spread of the capitalist mode of production, 
it also suggests that the major impact will be in how the incoming
capitalist mode of production interacts with any other modes of 
production that previously existed in the area. Should the capitalist 
mode destroy these other modes, then the people involved in them can be 
expected to suffer. Those local inhabitants who are able to participate 
in the new capitalist mode, either through jobs in the incoming firms 
or through selling goods and services to those who obtain these jobs, 
can be expected to benefit most. Depending just how disruptive the new 
industry is of the old modes of production in the area and how many new
jobs are created, the dispersal policy can be expected to have both a
negative impact and a positive developmental value.
The adoption of this theoretical framework suggested a number of areas 
which had to be discussed with respect to the Indian case under study. 
It also helped to crystallise two hypotheses out of the initial 
questions about the Indian industrial dispersal policy posed in the 
Introduction. First, that the Indian industrial dispersal policy was 
instituted in part at least to serve the interests of industrial 
capital, and second, that the dispersed industry and the growth poles 
would not have the straightforward positive developmental effect 
expected of them.
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The areas for further study suggested by the theoretical framework 
included first a detailed examination of Indian industry, its extent 
and level of development, the current industrial investment climate and 
the problems of accumulation it was faced with, as well as the various 
options available for tackling these problems. Secondly they included 
various considerations relating to the Indian state, its relationship 
with industrial capital, the formulation and implementation of the 
industrial location policy and the rationale and influences that went 
into its establishment.
2. Analysis at the National Level
Chapters 3 and 4 introduced the Indian case at a national level. This 
proceeded from a description of the evolution of the industrial 
location policy, to a more analytical discussion of the trends in 
Indian economic and development planning policy combined with an 
account of the progress of industrial development.
The discussion of the evolution of the industrial dispersal policy 
presented in Chapter 3 shows first of all how, despite a long-standing 
commitment to regional development little has been done to institute a 
system of regional planning. In effect the industrial dispersal policy 
is the only national regional planning policy that exists at present 
and it only emerged in 1970 after 20 years of statements of intent. The 
aim of the dispersal policy is the development of backward areas but 
the way it has been designed and is being implemented is simply 
oriented to encouraging more industrialisation in these backward areas. 
Little or no attention is paid to the broader developmental impact this 
industry might have.
A number of changes were made from the original proposals in the 
formulation of the final policy package and in the process the 
developmental aim . of the policy was sacrificed to a more 
straightforward one of encouraging the maximum amount of industrial 
growth possible. At the same time the scope of the package was widened 
to cover a much larger number of districts and the differential
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advantages given to certain more backward States were reduced so that 
all States had a much more similar access to the incentives schemes. 
Effectively this watered down the policy, spreading its.possible impact 
much more thinly across the country, and ensured that its most 
important impact has been in the already more industrialised States 
whose 'backward areas' are often much less backward than the 'advanced 
areas' of the less industrialised States. It is also evident that much 
of the concessional finance provided to industry by the national public 
finance institutions and development banks is still going to help 
industry which is not in the designated backward areas. All these 
changes seem to indicate that the first priority of the Indian 
Government remains the encouragement of as much industrial growth as 
possible and the developmental impact of industry on backward areas is 
but a secondary consideration. Whether this is a result of pressure 
from particular groups such as industrial capital or the Chief 
Ministers of the Indian States is unclear at this stage, though it is 
likely that .these two groups in particular would have made some 
representation to the Government on this policy.
The links between the state and industrial capital were examined in the 
next Chapter: number 4. This was done in the context of a broader
discussion on the formulation of Indian Government economic and 
development planning policy and how it evolved over the 30 years since 
Independence. At the same time the overall growth and trends in India's 
industrial development were described and related to the state 
development policy. Among other things this discussion made it amply 
clear that the capitalist mode of production is well developed at least 
in the Indian industrial sector.
The analysis of the evolution of Indian government economic and 
planning policy identified above all a major change of approach which 
occurred in the mid-sixties and to some extent seems to have been 
related to the death of Jawaharlal Nehru. At this time there was a 
clear movement away from a development philosophy based on state 
directed development to one which gave a much greater importance to 
private enterprise backed up by the state. The industrial dispersal
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policy emerged shortly after this change of emphasis had taken place 
and this seems to provide a possible explanation for the confusion 
surrounding its aims. Thus while the objective of using industrial 
dispersal as a means to counter uneven regional development can 
originally be traced back to the development plans prepared during the 
Nehru era, the way the policy was finally formulated and established 
accords best with the new entrepreneurial style of the post Nehru 
years. At the same time the radical, even populist, developmental light 
in which the policy continues to be portrayed by the state possibly 
originated from its appearance at a point when Mrs Gandhi was 
introducing a number of radical measures in response to demands from 
the more radical political supporters she depended on at the time. Like 
some of these other measures the industrial dispersal policy thus 
acquired a more radical image than its actual content merited.
While there is no evidence that industrial capital directly persuaded 
the Indian government to institute the dispersal policy, there is 
little doubt that business interests were one of the main forces behind 
the overall switch in emphasis in the state's development planning 
policy and behind the establishment of the whole system of concessional 
public finance for private industry. Equally it is evident from the 
material covered in Chapter 4 that in conjunction with the changes in 
development planning philosophy of the mid-1960s there was also a move 
towards greater decentralisation of planning with the Chief Ministers 
of each State demanding a greater say in determining their own affairs.
The current development trends and accumulation problems of industrial 
capital were also discussed in Chapter 4. First it was noted that 
industrial growth during the 1970s had been limited compared to that 
during the two previous decades, which means that for the whole period 
of implementation of the dispersal policy the potential for investment 
in new dispersed factories was also limited. Three important trends 
which could all have contributed to encouraging dispersal were however, 
identified. First there was a tendency towards the use of more capital 
intensive production methods and therefore presumably a change in the 
nature of industry's labour requirements possibly involving a certain
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degree of deskilling. The second trend, which is likely to have been 
aggravated by the first, is the dramatic rise in industrial unrest and 
strikes during the early 1970s. At the same time there is also a third 
trend towards an increased proportion of industrial production being in 
the consumer durables and export sectors. Inside India both these 
sectors are highly competitive which would presumably result in 
industrialists trying to increase productivity levels and reduce 
production costs. Thus at a time when industrial unrest was increasing, 
causing productivity to fall, industrialists were anyway trying to 
improve productivity, let alone deal with any losses due to strike 
action, and were also trying to change their methods of production in a 
way likely to further displease their labour force. Arguably one of the 
very few solutions to this predicament was choosing new factory 
locations in areas where labour had previously no experience of 
industrial work and could therefore be trained to the required 
standards without fear of retribution from skilled labour, could be 
paid lower wages and had no experience' of organised labour unions.
There would therefore appear to be an argument based on pertinent 
economic considerions to suggest why Indian industrial capt/ral might 
have been interested in industrial dispersal away from major industrial 
centres during the 1970s. Equally it was noted that increasingly during 
this decade, a major element of new investment in industry was financed 
from public funds, which suggests that there was also a certain 
financial expediency for industrialists to keep on the right side of 
the state and comply with its policies where possible. Thus Chapter 4 
concluded that at a national level of analysis there appeared to be 
both an economic rationale for industrialists to choose new dispersed 
locations as a solution to some of the problems industrial capital was 
facing during the 1970s and a certain degree of financial expediency in 
complying with the state's policies in'this respect. At the same time 
however, the discussion in Chapter 3 made it clear that on the part of 
the Indian state the dispersal policy was watered down to include many 
less acutely underdeveloped areas, nearer to established industrial 
regions. Moreover the policy was established in conjunction with a 
major expansion of the availability of public funds for private
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industry, which suggests that it was to a certain extent the price that 
industrialists had to be seen to pay for a development philosophy which 
otherwise blatantly favoured their interests.
It is thus already apparent that the industrial d-ispersal policy is not 
simply a straightforward state attempt to force industrialists into 
backward areas in order to encourage the latter's development. Instead 
while the state gains valuable popular political support from 
establishing a policy which is considered to help backward areas at the 
expense of industrial capital, it is also able to increase its 
financial support to industrial capital as a result, in the full 
knowledge that dispersal is not the hardship it may seem for the 
industrialists involved, as it may in fact help solve some of their 
current problem.
3. Analysis at a Regional Level
Chapters 5 and 6 took the analysis down to the level of an individual 
State in the Indian Union: Tamil Nadu. This was necessary in order to
be able to go into the degree of detail required of the analysis. Given 
the wide variations in the levels of industrial development of India's 
States this focus on one of them, was not intended to be representative 
of all the others, particularly as Tamil Nadu is one of the most 
industrialised, but rather to act as a case study within which to 
examine the more detailed aspects of the policy.
The two chapters presented an analysis of the aims and methods of the 
industrial dispersal policy as it is being implemented in the State of 
Tamil Nadu. Thus Chapter 5 examined the nature and the extent of the 
development of industry in Tamil Nadu as well as the pattern of its 
spatial distribution, while Chapter 6 described the work of the 
industrial promotion agency, SIPCOT, charged with implementation of the 
dispersal policy. In doing so the chapters proyided the context for the 
even more specific discussion in the final section of the thesis, which 
deals with the survey of a sample of firms locating new factories in 
backward areas of Tamil Nadu State.
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Chapter 5 started by describing the major industries of Tamil Nadu and 
a number of important features of the State's industrial development, 
the availability of materials, levels of employment in the sector and 
the relative importance of the small scale industrial sector. It went 
on to examine the spatial distribution of industry in the State and 
showed that even in a relatively industrialised State, industry was 
extremely unevenly distributed with most of it still concentrated in 
the major cities which were already economically important before 
Independence. Thus in Tamil Nadu Madras is still by far the most 
important industrial centre with only one other town, Coimbatore, 
having any real national significance. A few other towns such as Salem, 
Madurai, Tiruchirapalli and Tuticorin have a number of factories each 
but otherwise there is very little industry dispersed around the State 
and hardly any in rural areas. It was thus quite clear that there does 
exist a real problem of industrial concentration in the State with 
which the Union Government industrial dispersal policy can legitmately 
concern itself.
The broad outlines of the State Government industrial development and 
location policy were also considered and the various areas designated 
as backward in the State were examined. On this point it was concluded
that while the State Government had certainly selected the most
backward districts for the distribution of their incentives, the areas
designated as backward for the purposes of the Central Government 15% 
Subsidy were not always those with the least industry. The chapter 
concluded with some observations on the latest trends in industrial 
location in the State and it was noted that while during the 1960s 
there was a definite trend towards greater concentration of industry in 
the State it would appear that this had been reversed during the 
1970s. With large and medium scale industry this has mostly been 
associated with the state's efforts. Thus a fair number of public 
sector and joint ’Sector factories have been started in dispersed
locations in the State, often associated with sources of particular 
mineral raw materials, but equally a certain amount of private sector 
industry has chosen dispersed locations and taken advantage of the
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government incentives to do so. The dispersal policy has therefore not 
been entirely ineffective. However, the chapter ends with the telling 
statistic that the 260 odd firms which had received the 15% Central 
Subsidy in Tamil Nadu by the end of March 1980 represented only about 
10% of the new factories established during the decade. Even though 
many of these other new factories are small ones and have not all 
located in Madras but have gone to the Coimbatore-Salem area as well, 
it is clear that there is plenty of scope for the dispersal policy to 
be a good deal more effective.
Chapter 6 went on to examine the operation of the dispersal policy in 
much more detail by focussing attention on the work of the State 
Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu (SIPCOT), the industrial 
promotion agency in charge of implementing the policy and administering 
the package of incentives in the State of Tamil Nadu. The chapter 
outlined the various aspects of the agency's policy, describing the 
incentives it offered and the backward area growth poles it had started 
where it provided infrastructural facilities for industry. The agency's 
work was then compared with that of other similar agencies in several 
of the other major industrial States of India.
On the whole SIPCOT comes out well of this comparison both in terms of 
the number of large and medium scale firms it has helped to set up new 
factories and in terms of the degree of dispersal it has succeeded in 
encouraging. However, this dispersal is still restricted to a small 
number of very specific pockets. The Ranipet-Vaniyambadi belt of 
North Aircot is one and the three western taluks of Ramanathapuram is 
another. Both were already the two most industrialised parts of the 
designated backward areas in the State. In addition SIPCOT established 
its first growth pole at Ranipet, thereby encouraging this 
concentration. The other place where there is a significant 
concentration of new factories assisted by SIPCOT is in and around its 
second growth pole at Hosur in Dharmapuri District. This pocket on the 
contrary, is in one of the most backward parts of Tamil Nadu which 
previously had virtually no industry at all. However, it is also just 
across the border from the major industrial city of Bangalore in
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Karnataka State and therefore in regional terms represents much less of 
a dispersal than it would seem.
Despite these reservations SIPCOT's achievement is not negligible. 
Although the firms it has helped have not established factories in
locations as dispersed as might have been hoped, they do represent
industrial development in places where it would have been unlikely to 
occur to the same extent otherwise.
4. The Contribution of the Survey Analysis
The final and most specific level of analysis of the thesis was that 
carried out in Chapter 7 and 8 on the returns of the industrial 
questionnaire survey. The survey was prompted by the need to obtain 
some fairly specific information with which to answer many of the
questions posed earlier in the thesis. It was particularly important to 
find out directly from a sample of industrialists why they had chosen 
to comply with the state industrial dispersal policy and at the same 
time to get a clearer indication of what type of firms were choosing 
dispersed locations for their new factories.
Chapter 7 first introduced the sample of firms surveyed, then described 
the environment of the Ranipet and Hosur areas of Northern Tamil Nadu 
that they are locating their new factories in, and finally examined the 
question of what type of firm is choosing, which type of location.
Chapter 8 tackled the returns of the second part of the survey which 
dealt with the firms' managers' opinions of the dispersal policy and 
its implementation, attempting first to see if these varied according 
to the location the managers had chosen and secondly whether there was 
any other way of identifying groups of firms whose managers had 
particular opinions of the dispersal policy.
The survey made it clear first of all that the firms setting up new 
factories in the SIPCOT growth poles at Ranipet and Hosur and in the 
area around Hosur were, by and large, well connected with established 
Tamilian and particularly Madras industry. This was evident from both
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the types of industries represented and from the corporate structures 
of the firms. Typically the firms were Medium Scale Industries in terms 
of capital' investment and employed less than 50 unskilled and 50 
skilled workers. There were however also a significant number of LSIs, 
some of which employed very few workers and were therefore, using 
relatively capital intensive production methods. By and large firms 
were dealing with South Indian sources of raw materials while at the 
same time they were selling their products to All-India urban markets 
with a natural tendency to sell somewhat more in urban markets nearer 
home than in those further away. Finally it was noted that of the main 
state financial incentives only the Central Government 15% Subsidy 
seemed to be reaching the majprity of those firms eligible to receive 
it.
The section of Chapter 7 which dealt with the Ranipet and Hosur 
environments described in detail the features they presented to 
incoming industrialists. It was noted that, while the economy of both 
areas was certainly backward there were major differences between the 
two. Thus the Ranipet area was more heavily populated, indeed it was 
fairly urbanised, while the population of the Hosur area was much more 
sparse and there were no other towns inside a 35 kilometre radius. On 
the other hand Hosur was much nearer to Bangalore than Ranipet was to 
Madras', making it a good deal more attractive for industry. Ranipet had 
some previous experience with industry, with the long standing presence 
there of the EID Parry ceramics factory and the important traditional 
leather and tanning industry around it in North Arcot, Hosur on the 
other hand had no industry to speak off. Finally agriculture in the 
Ranipet area was better developed, somewhat more prosperous and 
appeared to be a good deal more commercialised than around Hosur.
The attempt to see whether different types of firms were choosing 
different locations did not bring out too many important results, 
although it did show a number of minor points such as the fact that 
following SIPCOT policy chemical firms were indeed locating in Ranipet, 
the growth pole with the better water supply. However, the one 
important result that it did produce was that the firms locating in
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Dharmapuri District in the area around Hosur but not in the Hosur 
growth pole, appeared to form a reasonably homogenous group with 
distinct characteristics. They were relatively capital intensive 
production units, with particularly strong corporate links with 
established Madras industry, paying lower than average wages except to 
managerial staff and were by and large choosing remote locations away 
from the main National Highway, and well removed from Hosur town and 
even smaller settlements. As most of these firms had chosen their new 
location before SIPCOT announced the Hosur Complex, indeed their choice 
seems to have been an important factor in SIPCOT's choice of Hosur, 
their reasons for doing so are of prime interest to this thesis. 
Because this fairly similar group of firms is acting to a large extent 
independently of SIPCOT it was felt to be likely that they represent 
the type of firm most interested in industrial dispersal for their own 
reasons. Thus their responses to the opinion part of the questionnaire 
were examined with particular attentiveness in Chapter 8.
In effect this was one of the main aims of the first part of Chapter 8 
where the firms' behaviour, location choice rationale and opinions of 
the dispersal policy were analysed against the location they had 
chosen. While for the most part the results of this exercise were too 
diffuse to fit into general patterns, they did confirm the earlier view 
that the Dharmapuri firms constituted a special group. However, it is 
clear that the latter's choice of a common location is not an adequate 
explanation of. why they are special. Rather they share common 
characteristics, experiences and concerns which have pushed them into 
taking similar location decisions. Identifying these was the aim of the 
second part of Chapter 8 which broadened out the analysis and attempted 
to identify patterns of behaviour and opinion not only by location, but 
also by the whole range of the firms' other characteristics that the 
questionnaire had collected information on.
One of the main results of the- opinion survey was to demonstrate an 
extremely high level of support for the state industrial dispersal 
policy amongst the sample firms' managers. At the same time an equally 
high propor-tion still felt that the ideal location for their new
factory would have been in or near a major urban centre. The
industrialists' support for the policy is therefore based on a fair
degree of pragmatism about their own position vis & vis the state and 
the nation's developmental needs. However, there were also a small 
proportion (11%) of the firms who were not being purely resignedly 
pragmatic in their support for the policy. These maintained that even
if the dispersal policy had not existed they would have chosen the same
location, or at least another backward area or rural location for their 
factory. While this group were not all firms located in Dharmapuri 
there were a higher proportion in this latter location than elsewhere.
Throughout the analysis the firms' scales of investment proved to be 
one of the most useful explanatory variables for their priorities. Thus 
while Medium Scale Industries and new firms were the most in favour of 
the overall policy package, Small Scale Industries were' critical of the 
ban on industrial development in cities while remaining generally in 
favour of the dispersal principle and the growth poles, and Large Scale 
Industries didn't like the growth poles but were in favour of both the 
ban and dispersal. Other characteristics of the firms explained various 
other variations in their behaviour and priorities but none were as 
consistently useful as their classification by scale of fixed capital 
investment.
Putting all these various clues together the survey results demonstrate 
that the Indian industrial dispersal policy is particularly well suited 
to the priorities of Large Scale Industry and especially those firms 
which form part of larger company groups. These have the financial 
backing required to cope with the difficulties of operating in backward 
area locations; they are in a good position to take full advantage of 
the production related financial incentives offered by the state, which 
if production can be got going fast enough and on large enough a scale 
are the most advantageous of the incentives; they are also those who 
are keenest to find remote locations where they can escape the poor 
industrial relations they (or their managers as part of larger company 
groups) have experienced in established urban industrial centres. These 
firms thus have reasons of their own to disperse, the financial
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capability to do so on their own and would seem to have the financial 
and technical capability and experience as well as the political muscle 
to ensure that they both obtain and can take fullest advantage of the 
state financial incentives that are on offer.
Smaller and more independent firms (and there is a tendency among the 
firms for the larger ones to be more closely linked to established 
industrial capital and the smaller ones to be more independent) do not 
have the financial stature to handle dispersal on their own, they
therefore need (as opposed to simply benefitting from) the state
assistance, and the added structure, assistance and sense of security
they find in the growth poles'are important to them. They may also be 
concerned about labour relations, indeed they are very likely to 
consider the demands of labour as the greatest obstacle to the ultimate 
profitability of their firms, but they do not seem themselves as being 
in a position to do anything about this. Thus it is that these firms do 
not share their larger colleagues' independent reasons for choosing a 
dispersed location. Instead the assistance from the state, both 
financial incentives and physical facilities, becomes their overriding 
rationale for dispersal. Ironically, however, the SIPCOT data on 
sanctioning and dispersal of the financial incentives show that it is
these same firms which are the- least likely to obtain the incentives on 
offer and because many of them may experience difficulties and delays 
with going into full production they will also receive proportionately 
less from the production related incentives once they manage to obtain 
them.
Thus the scale of a firm's capital investment is only one important 
determinant of its problems, its priorities and options, its attitude 
towards the industrial location policy and ultimately of its choice of 
location. The other major determinant is its corporate status and 
related financial, security. While larger scale investments tend to be 
related to stronger connections with established industrial capital and 
firms involving less capital tend to be more independent, the two 
variables do not overlap precisely, thereby producing variations in 
firms' priorities and behaviour. Moreover, despite the importance of
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these two determinants in this survey, the effect of other factors on 
individual firms should not be dismissed, as the particular 
circumstances and characteristics of individual firms go a long way to 
explain variations from overall patterns of behaviour.
The group of Dharmapuri firms in the overall sample stands out 
precisely because it contains a high proportion of the specific type of 
firm, LSIs with strong links with established industrial capital, which 
benefit most from the dispersal policy and are prepared to disperse 
without too much assistance from the state. But they also stand out 
because they have chosen to concentrate in a fairly small area. As was 
discussed in Chapter 5 there are very few private enterprise firms of 
the same scale and corporate status locating in backward areas in Tamil 
Nadu outside the SIPCOT growth poles, and this group in Dharmapuri 
represent most of them. That they should all locate in such a small 
area is surprising and can be entirely related to the area's proximity 
to Bangalore. This was, after all, given as another major factor in 
their choice of location after the avoidance of industrial unrest. The 
area of Dharmapuri around Hosur therefore combines a number of 
advantages for these firms, a certain degree of remoteness, yet 
adequate accessibility to one of. South India's most dynamic established 
urban industrial centres and finally the backward area designation with 
the financial, advantages that brings.
The other major aim of the survey was to acquire sufficient information 
about the type of firms complying with the dispersal policy to make it 
possible to draw conclusions about the developmental impact they could 
be expected to have on the backward areas they were locating in. The 
survey results indicated that as the firms were for the most part 
dealing with the urban markets far removed from the backward areas for 
their materials and the sale of their products, and as overall they 
expected to form only a limited number of subcontracting links locally, 
the major area of their impact would be through employment generation, 
particularly as in general the firms expected to find most of their 
labour locally. It. was also concluded from the analysis of the 
respective economies of the Ranipet and Hosur areas that the creation
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of large numbers of industrial jobs could be expected to have a
different effect in each place.
Thus in Hosur with its smaller local population and a population which 
was considerably less urbanised and extremely unfamiliar with 
industrial work the sample firms were going to create between them 
about 5,000 jobs for skilled and unskilled labour to which must be 
added a further 1,300 jobs from the Dharmapuri firms, whereas in 
Ranipet only about 2,400 jobs were being created. On those grounds
alone the impact was likely to be very different. Given the fact that 
the urban population of the Ranipet area (Ranipet, Arcot, Walajahpet 
■and Vellore) was over 200,000 people in 1971 compared to Hosur's
16,500, this difference would be pronounced. The required industrial
labour would of course be made up in two different ways, from slack in
other areas of employment, principally agriculture, and through
immigration. There were already some signs of immigration in the Hosur 
area though none was reported in Ranipet. Both immigration and the flow 
of labour from agriculture to industry in the Hosur area can therefore 
be expected to be high and their impact considerable. If nothing else 
the population of Hosur town may easily double or treble in ten years.
But there is also the effect these new trends will have on the existing
local and largely agricultural economy. Given the different 
characteristics and levels of development of the farming systems in 
each area the impact can again be expected to be different in both 
Ranipet and Hosur.
In Chapter 2 it was suggested that one of the best ways of 
conceptualising such a relationship between an existing and an incoming 
economic system was to look at in terms of modes of production theory. 
What little evidence that could be found on the nature of the modes of 
production in existence in the Ranipet and Hosur areas was presented in 
Chapter 7. It led to the conclusion that pre-capitalist modes of 
production did exist in both areas and were particularly widespread 
around Hosur, While there is some evidence of capitalist production 
methods in both industry and agriculture in the Ranipet area the 
capitalist mode of production had not eliminated all other
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pre-capitalist modes.
Given the existence of these pre-capitalist modes it was concluded that 
incoming capitalist firms would gradually disrupt the traditional 
economy by increasing the commercialisation of the distribution systems 
and imposing the norms of a capitalist mode of production. The impact 
could be expected to be all the more dramatic in the Hosur area where 
the influx of capitalist firms was all the greater and as yet a 
capitalist mode of production hardly existed at all. With time the 
capitalist mode of production could be expected to become more dominant 
in both areas.
5. Conclusions
The thesis started from the dual presumptions that India's industrial 
dispersal policy operated to the advantage of those industrialists who 
complied with its prescriptions and that it would not have the purely 
positive developmental effect on the receiving backward areas that was 
predicted. The rationale behind these two hypotheses was first explored 
at a theoretical level.
The theoretical arguments suggested a way of conceptualising the 
process of industrial dispersal in Third World nations, which in turn 
suggested reasons why Third World industrial capital might, in certain 
conditions, consider it advantageous to locate factories away from 
traditional urban industrial centres in underdeveloped rural regions. 
Equally these arguments provided a framework within which to understand 
the activities of the state in the field of regional planning, its role 
in providing the conditions and appropriate environment for continued 
production, as well as the political pressures that would influence its 
policy formulation in this respect. Finally the theoretical model 
provided a way of understanding the effect dispersing capitalist 
industry might have on the receiving backward areas, it being argued 
that the crucial feature of such a industrial dispersal policy in a 
Third World context was that it represented a state organised attempt 
to encourage the penetration and spread of a capitalist mode of
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production to areas hitherto characterised by pre-capitalist modes.
Having advanced a theoretical model it was then necessary to test its 
value against the Indian case being studied. This was tackled first at 
a national level. The evolution and formulation of the industrial 
location policy was examined in detail, revealing a number of apparent 
inconsistencies between the stated aims of the policy and the way it 
had been formulated. It emerged for instance, that the policy appeared 
to be more oriented towards encouraging maximum absolute industrial 
growth than extending its developmental impact. Equally there was 
evidence that certain political pressures had influenced the final form 
the policy was to take.
A broader study of the Indian state's economic policy formulation and 
its relationship with industrial capital was also conducted. This 
revealed that a major shift in direction of India's development
philosophy took place during the 1960s shortly before the industrial 
location policy was formulated. From a philosophy which advocated a 
state led and directed development programme, the emphasis switched to 
the efforts of private capital and enterprise as the prime movers of 
development backed up by assistance from the state. It was argued that 
the industrial dispersal policy was an integral part of this new 
philosophy and indeed acted as one of its main legitimisers, by 
providing a seemingly harsh framework of conditions with which
industrialists had to comply if they were going to receive the
increased levels of state financial aid being made available.
The same chapter also examined the level of development of Indian 
industry and identified a number of accumulation problems that 
industrial capital was experiencing during the 1970s. It became clear 
that industrialists perceived deteriorating labour relations as one of 
their worst problems. In addition, with the difficult years that Indian 
industry was going through at the time, competition was severe and
productivity and production costs were prime considerations. A shortage 
of investment capital was also perceived as a major problem. To solve 
these problems only limited options were open to industrialists but it
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was argued that dispersal to underdeveloped rural areas was possibly
one of the most attractive, as industrialists would perceive it as
combining a chance to install more efficient machinery, employ cheaper 
and more malleable labour and escape from the powerful labour unions of 
Indian's main industrial centres.
It thus appeared that the state industrial dispersal policy could be
argued to have a number of major advantages for industrial capital and
could realistically be seen as an integral part of the Indian state's 
new, more entrepreneurial approach to development planning. That it 
could also be presented as a policy which placed restrictions on 
industry and encouraged the development of the nation's backward areas, 
made it much more viable on a broader political level and explains the 
manner in which it is presented by state agencies. So far it would seem 
that the theoretical model advanced initially is correct and has 
pointed the study in the right direction, but it was necessary to 
confirm its value more adequately with a detailed case study.
The case study examined the implementation of the policy in one State 
of the Indian Union: Tamil Nadu. The existing industry in Tamil Nadu
and its spatial distribution was described, showing how acute a problem 
industrial concentration in a few major cities is in India. In turn the 
State's backward areas were described to demonstrate the nature of the 
problem that the dispersal policy was intended to tackle. A further 
chapter examined how the dispersal policy was being implemented in the 
State. This indicated that although industrial dispersal was taking 
place the numbers of firms involved was still limited and only 
restricted parts of the designated backward areas were seeing any 
industrial development. As a rule these tended to be those parts of the 
backward areas which already had some industry.
Ultimately the case study was taken down to a level of even greater 
detail with a survey of firms establishing new factories in two 
•backward area growth poles in northern Tamil Nadu and also in the 
vicinity of one of them. The survey was intended to collect information 
not available from published sources about the firms involved in the
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dispersal programme: What sort of firms were complying with the policy
and why were they doing so? More detailed information on the specific
backward areas they were locating in was also provided. The results of 
the survey showed first of all that the firms could be expected to 
produce only limited multiplier, effects on the local economies of their 
new environments. By and large the firms were bringing their materials 
from well outside the area and selling their products in urban markets 
all over India rather than locally. Moreover, they only expected to do 
a small proportion of their subcontracting locally. The major local 
effect would therefore be through the jobs and industrial wages that 
they would provide. Furthermore it was suggested that the capitalist 
mode of production of the incoming firms would have a disruptive effect 
on the pre-capitalist modes which appeared to still exist in the two 
backward areas being studied. While industrial wages would give some 
local inhabitants access to higher standards of living, many others 
would not feel the benefits and would be relatively worse off.
However, the most important result of the survey was that it demon­
strated the existence of a group of firms that had chosen to comply 
with the dispersal policy for precisely the reasons postulated earlier 
in the theoretical section of the thesis and in the general study of 
Indian industrial development. Their main reason for choosing their new 
remote location was to try and find cheap, malleable labour as yet
unaffected by labour unions. That this groups of firms was small is not
surprising, only the largest companies with strong links with estab­
lished industrial capital and therefore financially secure could afford 
to take the risk still inherent in operating in a remote backward area 
environment. In a way this group should be perceived as trend setters, 
the first to realise the possible benefits of a backward area location. 
For the trend to expand and become well established, state assistance 
both financially and with infrastructure was essential to provide the 
backup and security for smaller less well-endowed firms. These are the 
ones keen on the new growth poles. In establishing these growth poles 
and providing the financial assistance these medium scale firms 
require, the Indian state is thus in effect fulfilling its regional 
planning role: establishing and maintaining the conditions and
appropriate environment for capitalist production.
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APPENDIX
QUESTION DESIGN & SURVEY METHODOLOGY
The questionnaire survey was conducted by the author between January
and June 1980 with the intention of obtaining detailed information on 
firms responding to the Indian Government industrial location policy. 
There is hardly any up to date and detailed data on the precise
location of industry in India, let alone on how much and what industry 
is moving to backward areas, yet without such information a critical
evali^tion of the dispersal policy is impossible. Equally it was
to set against information and interpretations supplied by government 
sources.
To achieve this goal a fairly straightforward questionnaire in two 
separate parts was prepared. The first part covered factual details 
about the characteristics of the individual firms being approached, 
while the second part consisted of a series of behavioural and opinion 
questions designed to form the basis of a structured interview with the 
managing director or other senior executive of the firm. This division 
is reflected in the way the two chapters (7 & 8) dealing with the 
survey results have been arranged. Chapter 7 covers the basic 
characteristics of the sample of firms surveyed. Chapter 8 outlines the 
information gathered from the opinion part of the questionnaire and 
then analyses the results of the full survey by attempting to relate 
the opinions of the managers to the characteristics of the firms.
1. Choice of Sample
The sample of firms chosen for investigation was taken from the files 
of the Tamil Nadu government industrial promotion agency SIPCOT. This 
was partly for reasons of convenience as the officers of SIPCOT were 
prepared to provide access to their registers and some of their files, 
biit this was also the most accurate way of obtaining a sample of firms 
moving to backward areas as virtually all firms doing so dealt with 
SIPCOT as was noted above. Again as the majority of firms going to 
backward areas in Tamil Nadu were locating in the two growth poles of
important to obtain some idea of the industrialists' view of the policy
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Ranipet and Hosur, the sample consisted primarily of all the firms 
going to these two centres. To this was added a number of firms 
locating factories in the area of Dharmapuri District around Hosur and 
a few firms in the joint SIPCOT-MMDA satellite town of Maraimalainagar 
(M.M.Nagar) just outside Madras. Finally, a number of major firms 
setting up new factories in other backward areas of Tamil Nadu were 
approached, but there were few of these (cf. Chapter 6 above) and even 
fewer responded. In all 114 firms were approached and information was 
collected on 82.
Although it was impossible to take a strictly random sample, this can 
nevertheless be taken as fairly representative of the major aspects of 
current trends in industrial location in Tamil Nadu. Thus 82 firms 
represent a large proportion of the organised sector industry which has 
located new factories in backward areas of the State since the 
inception of the dispersal programme. The concentration on Ranipet and 
Hosur is justifiable as they are by far the two most important 
locations chosen by these firms and because they constitute such an 
important element of the SIPCOT programme.
2. Questionnaire Design
As explained at the beginning of the Appendix two very different types 
of information was sought from the firms. First factual data about the 
type of firm and industry involved, including such characteristics as 
its size, capital and labour involvement and output levels. Secondly, 
attitudinal and behavioural information about the management's views of 
the government policies and the reasons for their backward area 
location choice.
For the second type of information an interview with the managing 
director or other senior executive party to the location decision 
making was obviously essential, but the first type of information could 
be more usefully collected on a simple questionnaire form to be 
completed by more junior administrative staff. Thus the questionnaire 
was divided into two parts:, a single sheet factual information form
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sent in advance with the request for an interview with the M.D. and a 
longer questionnaire to be completed personally in the interview. 
Ideally it was intended that the first sheet would be complete and 
ready for collection on the day of the interview with the Managing 
Director, so that it could be rapidly checked for completeness and
accuracy in his presence. On the whole this system worked well,
although as could be expected firms required varying degrees of
persuasion and pushing before they compijled fully. Some firms also 
refused to participate in the survey and there was a good deal of
variation in the time they were prepared to devote to it. The minimum 
interview time was about half an hour, but most lasted an hour and a 
number of managers insisted on ,going on much longer than necessary. The 
questionnaire was designed with sufficient open ended questions and 
space for extra comments to cope with most of the extra information and 
opinions that managers offered, though subsequently it was not always 
possible to include such information in the systematic analysis.
The first part of the questionnaire (SECTION I; cf. questionnaire 
reproduced at end of Appendix) thus contained questions on the 
corporate status of the firm; the stage the project had reached; the 
expected date of commencement of production; the location of the 
princip/l offices, factories, and research and development work of the 
firm; the labour employed: its numbers, wages, training, origins and
places of residence for each of five categories of employees: unskilled 
and skilled workers, clerical, technical and managerial staff; the 
capital employed, both fixed and working capital; the materials used, 
their value, quantity and provenance; the products, again with their 
value, quantity and market distribution; and finally the nature of the 
transport facilities used.
The second part was more complex. It first contained a question 
(SECTION II, Question 1) on direct attitudes to the three main elements 
of the government policy: the ban on industrial development in cities; 
the dispersal of industry to backward areas; and the promotion of 
growth poles for industrial location in backward areas. Attitudes to 
these three policies were recorded on a five point scale from excellent
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to very bad. Section II then broadened out with a series of questions 
on the effect these policy measures were likely to have on industry. 
Where possible a Yes/No/Unsure answer was requested here, but space for 
comments was also provided. This series of questions enquired into the 
firm's ideal location; the difficulties of operating in backward areas; 
the adequacy of government incentives and the desirability and value of 
locating in one of the government growth poles.
Section II then continued with a series of questions on the managers 
views of the developmental value of the location policy. This 
concentrated mostly on whether or not firms would be forming links with 
other industries but also included questions on whether the firm 
considered it had a 'developmental responsibility' or not and whether 
it was necessary to be selective in the choice of firms encouraged to 
come to growth poles. The Section was concluded with several questions 
on the likely effect the dispersal of industry would have on
established industrial centres such as Madras.
Section III dealt more specifically with the managers' views of the 
growth poles. First there was a question on which of the financial and 
material incentives provided by SIPCOT had been most instrumental in
persuading them to choose their new location, and they were then asked 
to suggest any other incentives they would like to have seen provided. 
The next question gave a series of possible reasons which might have 
caused them to choose their new .location, managers were asked which 
ones had been influential and to rank the most important reasons. The 
final question asked them whether they felt their particular SIPCOT 
Complex was well situated or not and why.
Inevitably, administering the questionnaire revealed a number of 
problems in its layout and wording. Some of these it proved possible to 
correct as they became apparent in the first few interviews and would 
not affect the statistical validity of the responses, others just had
to be left. A quick pilot survey was also conducted which led to a
number of major improvements in the final version of the questionnaire.
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3. Survey Coverage & Response
As stated earlier 114 firms were approached. This number included all 
the firms listed as either already operating in or definitely intending 
to operate in the two principle growth poles of Ranipet and Hosur at 
the time of the survey, that is February to May 1980. As well as this 
all the five firms already operating or at least constructing their 
factories in M.M.Nagar were approached and a further 10% random sample 
of all the other firms listed as negotiating for a place in M.M.Nagar 
were included. Then all the dozen or so firms listed by SIPCOT as 
operating in Dharmapuri District in the area around the Hosur Complex 
were approached. Finally a few major projects elsewhere in Tamil Nadu 
were approached, this producing one interview with a firm starting a 
plant in a small backward area town in North Tamil Nadu called 
Sholingur. In all, therefore, the lists from which the sample was drawn 
included 154 firms (Table 1).
TABLE 1: Response 
Location:
Rate to Survey 
Ranipet Hosur M.M.Nagar Dharmapuri Other Total
Total N^ of Firms: 37 63 38 14 2 154
N^ approached: 35 50 14 13 2 114
Respondent s: 28 33 8 12 1 82
- Full
respondents: 18 27 2 6 1 53
- Partial 
response: 10 6 6 6 — 28
Mailed: no 
response: 6 6 _ 1 13
Non respondents: 6 9 ~ 1 - 16.
Cancel led 
projects: 3 2 1 , - 6
343
In Hosur in particular, where many of the projects were extremely new, 
(indeed some of them were only being announced during the course of the 
survey) it often proved very difficult to contact the project promoters 
or to get detailed information on projects which had only just been 
formulated, which is why the response rate in Hosur is poorer than in 
Ranipet. The 'Mailed: no response1 category in Table 1 applies to firms 
that did not yet have offices on site and whose offices were so far 
away and by themselves that they did not warrant a special trip. Most 
of the interviews were conducted on site or at the firms offices in and 
around Madras and Bangalore.
The full responses in Table 1 represent a 50% sample survey in Ranipet, 
43% in Hosur, 5% in M.M.Nagar and 43% in Dharmapuri (outside the Hosur 
Complex). However, the partial responses all contain useful information 
which adds to the accuracy of the data collected when in aggregate 
form. These returns have therefore also been added to the data analysed 
and in doing this the above coverage rates rise to 75% for Ranipet, 52% 
for Hosur, 21% for M.M.Nagar and 85% for Dharmapuri. Finally if one 
excludes from the Hosur 'Total No. of Firms' of 63 those projects which 
were only announced during the course of the survey, the final coverage 
rate for Hosur rises to 66%. These coverage rates are taken to be 
fairly representative sampling rates for the population surveyed given 
the various circumstances just described.
4. Statistical Analysis of Survey Returns
Most of the analysis of the survey returns was done by computer at the 
University of London Computer Centre. The main programme used was SPSS 
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences), but for one set of 
calculations on the data about the values and quantities of materials 
used and products manufactured by the firms as well as their respective 
sources and destinations, a short FORTRAN programme was specially 
des igned.
The SPSS analysis consisted largely of straightforward but extensive 
and time consuming crosstabulations. It was found that these produced
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the most appropriate and valuable form in which the data could be used. 
Other simple statistical tests such as a chi-square test were attempted 
but were found to be inappropriate for the distribution of the data 
collected. Thus for instance for the chi-square test the data 
distributions often involved fairly large numbers of categories many of 
which, with a particular variable, registered no values thereby 
violating one of the assumptions of the chi-square test (Norcliffe, 
1977, p.93).
However, it was found that the crosstabulations produced by SPSS with 
their absolute and percentage (by row, column and full table) values 
proved adequate for most purposes. This does of course, mean that the 
analysis of the survey results and the conclusions drawn from it should 
not be attributed greater significance than is warranted by such simple 
statistical work. The level of significance that can be attached to 
these results is however, deemed to be adequate for a study of this 
nature which has sought to identify trends and tendencies rather than 
prove their absolute or relative statistical validity.
3. Copy of Survey Questionnaire
Survey of Industrialists Opinions of Government Industrial Location 
Policy
James W. Mackie.
Geography Department
School of Oriental & African Studies
University of London Madras, Feb. 1980
Name of firm:      Address:..........................
....................  Site at:............  Site No:....
Please answer questions on the dotted lines provided or, in the case of 
multiple choice answers, by ticking in the appropriate space or 
circling the appropriate answer.
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SECTION I: Factual Information about Firm
Are you a subsidiary of a larger firm? Yes, No
Is your unit in the SIPCOT Complex - already in production: Yes
or - still under construction: Yes 
Actual or expected date of commencement of production:
Month:..........  19.. .
For firms with one year of production already completed please answer 
questions, if possible, with actual average figures for this last year. 
If not possible and for those firms who have not yet started or are 
only in trial' production please give estimated figures for expected 
full production levels.
If you are answering questions with estimates please tick here: .....
I.1 Location of functions:
On Site Madras Bangalore Other(name)
If you are a subsidiary,
where is your Head Office: ’* " “ ...........
& Main Factory: ” ' ” " ...........
For all firms,
where do/will you carry out the following functions
Manufacture (of parts): “ “ "..... ...........
Assembly (of parts): ” " ”..... ...........
Research & Development: “ ” "..... ...........
Purchase & Sales Office ” " “..... ...........
Director's Office: “ " ’* ...........
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*•2 Labour: (Persons you employ/expect to employ at your site in the
SIPCOT Complex)
 workers_____  other employees________
unskilled skilled clerical technical managerial
Number................. ......  ....  .....  ......  .......
Wages/Salaries
(Total, in Rs. )....... ......  ....  .....  ......  .......
How many hired
locally?.............. ....... ....  .....  ......  .......
If you are a subsidiary,
How many brought
with firm? ......  ....  .....  ......  .......
Of those hired 
locally, is their 
level of training
usually adequate? Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
Do you provide any 
training? Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
For firms already in production only:
How many of each group of your employees currently live in:
- Nearby villages: .....  .....  .....  .....  .....
- Other:........ : .....  ........................ ....
Do you provide any daily bus service for your employees? Yes, No 
If Yes, To your site from where: ...............................
I.3 Capital Investment 
Fixed Capital .... Working Capital
I
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1.4 Production:
Raw materials used by your firm: 1 2  3 4 5
Names of raw materials: ...................................
Input, per annum:
- Quantity (units?): ...................................
- Value (Rs . lakhs): ....  .......... ................
Markets where products are sold: (please give % sold in each place)
- Inside SIPCOT Complex:  % ..... %  %' %  %
- In nearby District(s):  % ..... %  % %  %
- In Madras (city): .....%  % %  %
- In Bangalore:............... %..... %  % %  %
- Elsewhere: (please specify place name, State or country)
- .:  %  %  %  %  %
-  :  %  %  %  %  %
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Products which your firm produces:
1 2 3 4 5
Names of products: ....................................
Output per annum:
- Quantity (units?): .......................................
- Value (Rs. lakhs): .......................................
Used for further production (P)
or public consumption (C) ?: P/C P/C P/C P/C P/C
Places where raw materials come from: (please give % brought from each
place)
- From inside SIPCOT Complex:  %  % %  %  %
- From nearby District(s):  %  % %  %  %
- From Madras (city):  % ...%  %  %  %
- From Bangalore:  % ......  %  %  %
- From elsewhere (please specify place name, State or country):
-  :  %  %  %  %  %
-  :  %  %  %  %  %
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I.5 Transport:
What percentage of your transport of materials and products goes 
through or to and from:
Madras: .... % and Bangalore: .... %
Do you have your own transport facilities to transport your materials 
and products?
Yes, No, Some
For firms moving to Ranipet and Maraimalainagar only:
What percentage of your transport of materials and products to your 
site was/will be by:
Rail: and by Road:  %
Do you have any comments you would like to make on this Section of the 
questionnaire or its subject matter?
Thank you for your cooperation and patience.
Survey of Industrialist's Opinions of Government Industrial Location 
Policy
James W. Mackie
Geography Department
School of Oriental & African Studies
University of London Madras, Feb. 1980
Name of firm: .................. Address:...........................
....................  Site at:............  Site.......
Date of interview: ................  1980
Name of person interviewed:    Designation:..........
Please insert answers to questions in the space provided or, in the 
case of questions with multiple choice answers, please circle the 
appropriate answer.
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SECTION II: Attitudes to Industrial Location Policy in General
11.1 The government policy for industrial location regulation consists 
of the following three main elements; what do you think of each of 
them?
A. - The Policy banning industrial expansion in Madras,
is it a excellent, good, unsure, bad or very bad policy?
B. - The policy of dispersing industry from big urban centres to
backward areas,
is it a excellent, good, unsure, bad or very bad policy?
C. - The policy of promoting growth centres for industrial location in
backward areas,
is it a excellent, good, unsure, bad or very bad policy?
Let us now discuss the effect of these policies in more detail. There 
now follows a list of questions to guide the discussion but please feel 
free to add any comments.
Firstly the effect these policies are likely to have on your firm and 
on industry in general.
11.2 If there were no government industrial location policy where
. would you have chosen to invest? Town: .................
11.3 Are you finding/expecting to find it more difficult or easier to 
make your firm prosper in this backward area than you would in 
Madras?
A lot more difficult, more difficult, no real difference, easier, 
a lot easier.
Briefly, why?:
11.4 The government recognising that there are certain difficulties 
for firms moving to backward areas offers them concessions and 
incentives to help them. Do you think these are adequate to make
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up for the difficulties encountered by firms locating in backward 
areas?
Yes, No, Unsure
II.6
II.7
II.8
II. 9
Without such incentives would you find it uneconomic to run your 
firm in a backward area?
Yes, No, Unsure
The policy of promoting growth centres as well as offering 
incentives is intended to make location in backward areas even 
easier for firms, do you think it does?
Yes, No, Unsure
So, if you are going to locate in a backward area you would 
prefer to do so in a government growth centre than in any other 
spot ?
Yes, No, Unsure
Yes: Even though you would thus have a more restricted choice of 
location?
Yes, No, Unsure
No: Why?: .....................................................
Do you feel that growth centre policy as implemented at the 
moment in Tamil Nadu could be improved?
Yes, No, Unsure
Yes: Any particular way?
Do you think that because of the ban placed on industrial 
expansion in Madras and the attempt by government to force to 
move to backward areas there have been firms who have simply 
decided not to expand?
Yes: ( - 10, 10-50, 50- ), No, Unsure 
Do you know of any personally?
Yes: ( - 10, 10-50, 50- ), No
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Secondly the effect these policies are likely to have on the backward
areas the firms are going to locate in and on Madras where they are 
moving from.
You will be aware the main justification for these industrial dispersal 
poicies is that government planners feel that industrial firms can have 
a positive effect on the general economic development of the area in 
which they locate.
(Aware? Yes, No)
11.10 Do you think that government planners are expecting too much 
from firms in this respect?
Yes, No, Unsure
Comments?:
11.11 Are there any ways in which you think your firm is/will be 
encouraging the local economy of the area surrounding your new 
factory?
XX.12 Do you think that government planners should be more selective
in the type of firms they want to locate in backward areas?
Yes, No, Unsure
11.13 What characteristics should they be looking for in such firms?
I-I.14 Do you think that the firms SIPCOT has managed to encourage to 
locate in this growth centre (Complex) are going to have the 
desired effect in terms of developing the local economy of this 
area?
Yes, No, Unsure
353
11.15 Have you/Would you hope to establish industrial links with other 
firms in:
- this Complex? Yes, No, Unsure
- the surrounding area? Yes, No, Unsure
11.16 Have you found it/Are you expecting to find it easy to establish 
the links you want in:
- this Complex? Yes, No, Unsure
- the surrounding area? Yes, No, Unsure
11.17 Do you expect these links to form only after some time?
Yes, No, Unsure
If Yes, How many years do you think it will take your firm to 
integrate with the local economy in this way?
............ years
11.18 Do y'ou have any other observations you would like to make about 
the formation of industrial links?
i
Turning now to the effect these industrial dispersal policies are 
likely to have on Madras.
11.19 Do you think that they will help slow down the growth of Madras 
and thereby help solve the congestion and resulting urban 
problems of the city?
■ Yes, No, Unsure
Comment s ?:
11.20 Do you think that banning industrial expansion in Madras might 
have a serious effect on the city's economy and its future 
development prospects?
Yes, No, Unsure
■Comments?:
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IX.21 It is ‘sometimes argued that industrial employment is needed in 
Madras and that therefore government planners should allow 
certain firms to expand in or |ear the city. Would you agree 
with this?
11.22 Assuming the need for some industrial growth in or near Madras
what type of industrial activity and firms do you think should
be allowed to expand in or near the city?
11.23 Given the importance of the 'informal sector' in employment
terms in the Madras economy, do you think the government should
II.24 Do you have any other observations you would like to make about
government industrial location policies in general?
SECTION III: Attitudes to Government Growth Centre Policy
III.l Of the following types of incentives SIPCOT provides to firms
which locate in their growth centres, which ones influenced your
Yes, No, Unsure
be trying to encourage the further expansion of this particular 
sector?
Yes, No, Unsure
Comments?
decision to.locate here?
Financial Assistance (Loans, Loan Guarantees,
Seed Capital 
Financial Incentives (Subsidy on Assets, Sales
Tax Loan)
Concessional Tariffs on Power and Water 
Assistance in dealing with Central Government
(Licences, etc. ) 
Industrial Development Advisory Services 
Equipped Sites and Infrastructure 
Income Tax Relief
Yes, No 
Yes, No 
Yes, No 
Yes, No
Yes, No 
Ye s , No
Yes, No
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Could you now please rank those factors which you have given as 
influential, giving me the most important one first.
111.2 Are there any other incentives you would like to see SIPCOT 
provide to firms locating at its growth centres?
111.3 On a more general level, how important were the following 
factors in influencing your decision to move to this growth 
centres ?
(please tick where appropriate) very
important influential
. Nearness to residence &/or 
present operations:
Availability of developed 
area:
Climatic factors:
Availability of raw materials, 
fuel & power:
Financial assistance provided/ 
arranged by SIPCOT:
Easy availability of skilled/ 
unskilled labour:
Nearness to market:
Low cost of equipped sites:
Ban on industrial development in 
Madras:
Probability of fewer industrial 
disputes than in Madras:
Proximity to Madras/Bangalore:
Other; ...........  :
Other: ..................... :
Of these factories which were to three most important ones?
not 
import ant
356
III.4 Do you think this SIPCOT Complex is well located?
Yes, No, Unsure
For any particular reasons?
Would you have any suggestions for an alternative location?
That is the end of the questionnaire, unless you have any further 
comments you would like to make about the movements and location 
decisions of large and medium scale industries in the Madras region?
Thank you very much indeed for your cooperation and patience.
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LIST OF COMMON ABBREVIATIONS
Gol .Government of India
GoTN Government of Tamil Nadu
IDBI Industrial Development Bank of India
IFCI Industrial Finance Corporation of India
ICICI Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation of India
SIPCOT State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu
TIDCO Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation
TIIC Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation
SIDCO Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation
SICOM State Industrial & Investment Corporation of
Maharashtra
MIDC • Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation
GIDC Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation
GIIC Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation
WBIDC West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation
WBIIDC West Bengal Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation
KSIIDC Karnataka State Industrial Investment & Development
Corporation
KIADB Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board
IIC Indian Investment Centre
FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry
NIC National Industrial Classification
ASI Annual Survey of Industries
LSI Large Scale industry
MSI Medium Scale Industry
SSI Small Scale Industry
MRTP Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969
FERA Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973
MMDA Madras Metropolitan Development Authority
CMDA Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority
M.M.Nagar Maraimalainagar
Tiruchy Tiruchirapalli
EPW Economic & Political Weekly
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Introduction
The aim of th is  paper is  to make more w ide ly  a v a ila b le  in d u s tr ia l 
d is tr ib u tio n  data drawn from an in fre q u e n tly  used source: the Chief 
Inspector of Factories L is t fo r Tam ilnadu. I t  is  not intended to 
comment a t any leng th  on the data bu t merely to p rov ide  a sample of 
some of the aggregated tab les and s ta tis tic s  th a t can be derived  from 
the L is t, present these in  map form and add a few comments on the 
conclusions they perm it and on the lim ita tio n s  and advantages o f the 
data base.
The main source of in d u s tr ia l s ta tis tic s  in  In d ia  is  the Annual Survey 
of In d u s tr ie s . U n fo rtuna te ly , a lthough the Survey is  a ve ry  de ta iled  
source of in fo rm a tion , i t  is  v i r tu a l ly  useless fo r w ork on the loca tio n a l 
d is tr ib u tio n  of in d u s try  as its  p r in c ip a l means o f gu a rd in g  the con­
f id e n t ia l i t y  of the in fo rm a tion  collected is  to not disclose the loca tion  
of in d u s try  below the leve l of the State.
There are several advantages in  the use of the Chief Inspector of 
Factories L is t fo r in d u s tr ia l loca tion  stud ies. F irs t,  obv ious ly  i t  avoids 
the p r in c ip a l problem of the AS1 by p ro v id in g  a comprehensive l is t in g  
of a l l  fac to ries  in  the State. For each fac to ry  i t  l is ts  the precise 
loca tion  and address as w e ll as the in d u s tr ia l c la s s ific a tio n  (NIC) code 
and the number o f workers employed in  the fa c to ry  (Factory  as defined 
in  the Factories Act, 1948, see below ). Its  o ther m ajor advantage is  
the speed w ith  which the data is  a va ila b le  and the frequency w ith  
which i t  is  co llected. A lthough the data is  on ly  pub lished  in  aggre­
gated form a fte r several yea rs , i t  is a v a ila b le  d ire c t from the Chief 
In sp e c to r's  Office w ith in  about a year of the co llec tion  date. The L is t 
is  compiled fo r the 1st o f January each yea r. U n f o r t u n a t e ly  e a r lie r  
years to the one in  process of com pila tion  are not as re a d ily  accessible, 
m aking i t  much more d if f ic u lt  to ob ta in  data fo r time series studies over 
several yea rs . The data base used in  th is  paper is  the L is t fo r the 
1st of January , 1979.
The fac to ries  from which the L is t is  compiled are those reg is te red  under 
The Factories Act, 1948 w hich regula tes w ork ing  cond itions in  fac to ries  
in  In d ia . Under the Act on ly  fac to ries  w ith  ten or more w orkers and 
power or tw enty or more workers and no power need re g is te r ( fu l l  
d e fin itio n s  g iven  in  Appendix I ) .  Thus the L is t is  of l i t t le  use fo r the 
study o f sm all scale in d u s tr ie s ; however, w ith  the exception of a few 
c a p ita l in tens ive  firm s which d e lib e ra te ly  in s ta l l  p la n t re q u ir in g  less 
than ten w orkers to operate, i t  covers v i r tu a l ly  a l l  medium and la rg e r 
scale fac to ries . The lik e lih o o d  o f' firm s being missed out is  ve ry  sm all 
indeed. There is however one major area where e rro rs  do creep in  and 
th a t is  th a t The Act requ ires facto ries to be lis te d  even i f  they have 
on ly  been in  opera tion fo r one day in  the preceding twelve months.
This means th a t fac to ries  which have closed down d u rin g  the year may 
remain on the L is t fo r up to two years a fte r they have closed. Also 
fac to ries  w hich on ly  operate in te rm itte n tly  or seasonally are lis te d  in  
the same way as those in  continuous opera tion . Th is is  fre q u e n tly  the 
case w ith  p la n ts  processing a g r ic u ltu ra l products such as cashew nuts 
fo r instance, such p lan ts  can employ several thousand workers fo r on ly  
a couple o f months or even a few weeks in  the year and in  doing so 
they g ross ly  exaggerate the leve l of in d u s tr ia l employment in  the ta lu k ,
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p a r t ic u la r ly  i f  i t  is  a ru ra l ta lu k  w ith  few fac to rie s .
For th is  study the data were co llected fo r each ta lu k  (the sm allest 
a d m in is tra tive  area in  In d ia )  by N ationa l In d u s tr ia l C la ss ifica tio n  code 
to three d ig its . For each NIC code the number of fac to ries  by grouped 
employment sizes was lis te d . The groups used be ing : fac to ries  
em ploying 10 to 49 w orkers, 50 to 99, 100 to 149, 150 to 199, 200 to 249 
and 250 or more. For fac to ries  in  the la s t 250 or more category the 
actua l number of workers employed was recorded and u su a lly  the name 
of the fac to ry  as w e ll.
Apart from two ta lu k s , w hich were m iss ing , in fo rm a tion  was co llected 
fo r a ll  the ta lu ks  in  the State and a l l  the d iv is io n s  of Madras C ity .
The two m issing ta lu ks  are Kodaikana l in  M adura i D is tr ic t and 
G rathanadu in  T h a n ja vu r D is tr ic t .
I P resentation o f Data
The data  presented here is  on ly  a sm all p roportion  of a l l  the 
in fo rm ation  th a t could be de rived  from the L is t. However, i t  inc ludes 
some of the m ajor aggregated s ta tis tic s  of genera l in te re s t such as the 
to ta l number of facto ries and number of people employed in  fac to ries  in  
each ta lu k , also a breakdown of fac to ries  in  each ta lu k  by scale of 
employment and the p ropo rtion  of w orkers employed in  la rg e  fac to ries .
In  a d d itio n  a few tab les showing the number of fac to ries  and people 
employed in  selected in d u s tr ie s  in  each ta lu k  have been p repared. For 
th is  some of the major Tam ilnadu in d u s tr ie s  such as Cotton T e x tile s , 
Chemicals and T ransport Equipment were chosen.
A ll the tables prepared are also presented on maps. These maps have 
been p lo tted  by computer on a sp e c ia lly  p repared base map of the 
a d m in is tra tive  areas of Tam ilnadu. The Computer mapping was done 
w ith  the package programme "CHORO" at the U n ive rs ity  of London 
Computer Centre. “ CHORO" is a package designed p u re ly  fo r choropleth 
mapping and is p a r t ic u la r ly  su ited  fo r th is  type of work where a la rg e  
number of d iffe re n t data series have to be run  on the same base map. 
The programme was o r ig in a lly  compiled fo r the U n ive rs ity  of Manchester 
Regional Computer Service by M .J. Blakemore and D.E.Reeve.
As w e ll as p lo tt in g  the maps "CHORO" w i l l  a c tu a lly  categorise the data 
i t  is p rov ided  w ith . I t  a llow s fo r three d iffe re n t types o f data 
ca tego risa tion : equal in te rv a l,  'n ' t i l e  and standard  score. In  a d d itio n  
users may also s im ply specify th e ir  own categories. A fte r some e xp e ri­
m entation i t  was decided th a t the data in  th is  cu rre n t study could 
best be presented using both equal in te rv a l and decile  ca tego risa tion  
and to avo id any confusion these two methods have been used th rough ­
out. Thus each map is  presented tw ice, the data being categorised 
in  equal in te rv a ls  in  the f i r s t  and in  deciles in  the second.
The choice of these two methods of ca tego risa tion  was la rg e ly  d ic ta ted  
by the nature of the data being d ea lt w ith . These data series tend 
to have a la rg e  number of cases concentrated at the bottom of th e ir  
range, fo r example a lo t of ta lu k s  w ith  on ly  ten or so fac to rie s , and 
a few cases w ith  ve ry  h igh  va lues such as Madras C ity  and Coimbatore
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w ith  lo ts of fa c to rie s . The equal in te rv a l ca tego risa tion  thus 
d iffe re n tia te s  fa i r ly  nea tly  between d iffe re n t h igh  va lues a t the top of 
the scale bu t then groups as many as tw enty or th i r t y  cases in  the 
bottom categories o f the scale w hich is  of l i t t le  use. The decile  
ca tego risa tion  on the other hand puts about the same number o f cases 
in to  each ca tegory, thereby g iv in g  a more de ta iled  breakdown of 
d ifferences a t the bottom of the scale though i t  obscures those a t the 
top of the scale. Thus the two systems of ca tego risa tion  should be 
seen as complementary. The equal in te rv a l system is va lu a b le  fo r 
d if fe re n t ia t in g  between the h ig h  va lues and the decile  system fo r the 
low va lues.
As w e ll as the da ta  maps based on the Chief Inspector o f Factories L is t, 
two others have been inc luded  w ith  a d d itio n a l re le va n t in fo rm a tio n . A 
map g iv in g  the code numbers assigned to each ta lu k , and a map 
showing the 'backw a rd  a reas ' designated by the Government o f In d ia  
as su ita b le  loca tions fo r in d u s tr ia l loca tion  and where ce rta in  
incen tives to encourage in d u s tr ia lis ts  are p rov ided .
Notes on the Tables and Maps
Number o f Factories by T a lu k : There are a few ta lu k s  w ith  ve ry  la rg e  
numbers of fa c to rie s , M adras, Saidapet and Coimbatore, a t the top of 
the data series. These are fo llow ed by a b ig  gap before the secondary 
leve l of in d u s tr ia l ta lu ks  is reached in c lu d in g  such places as Salem, 
Pa lladam , M adura i South, T iru ch y  and S a ttu r. Comparison of the 
equal in te rv a l and decile  maps fo r th is  series b rin g s  th is  out c le a r ly .
The decile  map also suggests the form ation of fa i r ly  w ide areas or 
pockets o f in d u s tr ia l development: the tra d it io n a l one around M adras, 
also the Coimbatore area which seems to be expanding in to  an indus­
t r ia l  b e lt s tre tch ing  from Coimbatore th rough Erode to Salem. The 
importance o f th is  b e lt should not however be exaggerated as a g lance 
back a t the equal in te rv a l map w i l l  show. There are o ther sm all 
pockets centred on such towns as M adura i, T iruchy  and even T h a n ja vu r. 
Las tly  there is  evidence of a fa i r  amount of in d u s tr ia l development in  
the T u tic o r in -T iru n e lv e li-S a ttu r  area. The Sattur peak of course rep­
resent s the concentra tion  of match and fire w o rk  fac to ries  in  the ta lu k , 
many of which operate w itho u t power.
The ta lu ks  where there is  l i t t le  in d u s tr ia l development are mostly in  
the east though they are d iv id e d  in to  two d is t in c t areas by  a b e lt of 
more in d u s tr ia lis e d  ta lu ks  along the Cauvery r iv e r .  The southern area 
consists of most of Ramanathapurarn, and the southern p a rts  o f 
T iruchy  and T h a n ja vu r D is tr ic ts . The northern  area covers North and 
South A rcot, D harm apuri, no rthern  T iru chy  and a b e lt o f C h ing lepu t 
D is tr ic t around and s u rp r is in g ly  near Madras and Saidapet. There are 
of course also the h i l ly  areas of northern  Coimbatore, the N ilg ir is  and 
western M adura i which have, not s u rp r is in g ly , l i t t le  in d u s try .
These areas of l i t t le  in d u s tr ia lis a t io n  compare more or less w ith  the 
C entra l Government's backw ard areas, though South Arcot is  com pletely 
excluded and some of the designated area in  M adura i D is tr ic t  and 
North Arcot seems to have more in d u s try  than the term 'B ackw ard
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A rea ' would perhaps im p ly .
Number o f Factory Workers: These two maps are unde rs tandab ly  ve ry  
s im ila r  to the la s t set, bu t in  com paring the two sets a few in te re s tin g  
po in ts emerge. They show fo r instance th a t there is  a h igh e r ra t io  of 
number of fac to ries  to numbers employed in  Madras than in  the other 
major in d u s tr ia l centre of Coimbatore. Madras has a h ig h e r p ro po rtio n  
o f fac to ries  em ploying few people, w h ile  Coimbatore has a h ig he r 
p ropo rtion  of la rge  employers. A glance at the raw  data  f i le  shows 
th a t these are mostly concentrated in  the cotton in d u s try  b u t there are 
also a few in  m achinery m an u fac tu ring . Whether M adras' sm alle r 
employers are mostly also low c a p ita l investm ent sm all scale in d u s try  
in  the tra d it io n a l sense or c a p ita l in tens ive  firm s em ploying few w orkers 
cannot of course be to ld  from these s ta tis t ic s , bu t an in te ll ig e n t guess 
would suggest a fa i r ly  h igh  p ro po rtio n  of the former and perhaps 
increas ing  numbers of the la t te r .
The pockets of in d u s tr ia lis a t io n  o u tlin e d  in  the la s t section are not so 
w e ll marked on th is  decile map bu t stand out neverthe less. The le ve l 
of in d u s tr ia l employment is perhaps a s l ig h t ly  b e tte r in d ic a tio n  than 
the number of fac to ries  in  an area of the effect of in d u s tr ia lis a t io n  on 
the loca l economy and leve l o f development so th is  map should p robab ly  
be taken as a more precise in d ic a tio n  of the existence of these pockets.
Number of Factories w ith  d if fe re n t Numbers o f W orkers: These s ix  maps 
show the d is tr ib u t io n  o f fac to ries  d iv id e d  in to  three categories according 
to the number of w orkers they employ: less than 50, 50 to 249, and 
more than 249 w orkers. They confirm  the much h ig h e r concen tra tion  of 
sm all employers in  Madras h in ted  a t above and show how the la rg e  
employers are p r in c ip a l ly  concentrated in  Coimbatore and S a ttu r ta lu ks  
and then on the o u ts k ir ts  of Coimbatore and Madras in  Pa lladam  and 
Saidapet. There are also a number of ta lu ks  along the K era la  border 
which have b ig  employers: P o lla ch i and Udumalpet where th is  is  in  the 
Cotton T e x tile  in d u s try  and V ilavancode in  the South where the la rge  
employers are cashew nut processing p la n ts .
F in a lly  these maps demonstrate th a t fo r the most p a r t the Coim batore- 
Salem in d u s tr ia l b e lt is  made up. of sm all employers. The same is  true  
of the T iru n e lv e li-T u tic o r in  area and M adura i. T iru chy  has a more 
even d is tr ib u t io n  of la rg e  and sm all employers.
Number Employed in  Factories w ith  more than  249 W orkers: Only in  
Coimbatore, Madras and S a ttu r are there re a lly  la rg e  numbers of 
w orkers employed in  la rge  fa c to rie s . In  fa c t from the decile  map i t  is 
apparent th a t 90 per cent of ta lu k s  w ith  la rg e  employers have less 
than 12,000 workers in  th e ir  la rg e  fa c to rie s , and there are on ly  76 
ta lu ks  which have fac to ries  em ploying more than 249 w orkers.
Percent Employed in  Factories w ith  more than  249 W orkers:U dayarpalayam  
stands out as being the on ly  ta lu k  w ith  100 per cent o f its  fa c to ry  
workers employed in  a fac to ry  w ith  more than 249 w orkers. In  e ffect 
the ta lu k  has on ly  th is  one fa c to ry  reg is te red , a cashew fa c to ry  
em ploying 250 w orkers. Other ta lu k s  w ith  h igh  scores here are also 
ru ra l ta lu ks  w ith  ve ry  few fa c to ries  in  them.
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Looking a t the major in d u s tr ia l c itie s  i t  is  w orth  no ting  th a t T iru ch y  
and Coimbatore have a fa i r ly  h igh  p roportion  of w orkers in  la rge  
fac to rie s , between 63-5 per cent and 67*1 per cent in  fa c t. Whereas 
Madras and M adura i have cons ide rab ly  less, 54.1 per cent to 63-2 per 
cent, and Salem has ve ry  few indeed: between 25*3 per cent and 17.3 
per cent.
D is tr ib u tio n  o f Selected In d u s tr ie s : For each o f the fo llo w in g  in d u s tr ie s  
fou r maps have been prepared. The f i r s t  two show the number of 
fac to ries  from the app rop ria te  NIC categories w hich e x is t in  the ta lu k  
w ith , as usua l, an equal in te rv a l and then a decile  d is tr ib u t io n . The 
second two maps show the to ta l number of w orkers reg is te red  as being 
employed in  these fac to ries  in  the ta lu k , aga in  by equa l in te rv a l and 
then decile  d is tr ib u t io n . The three in d u s tr ie s  chosen are Cotton 
Tex tiles  (NIC categories 230-239)» Chemicals and Chemical Products 
(NIC categories 310-319) and T ransport Equipment and Parts (NIC 
categories 370-379)» a l l  three chosen fo r th e ir  re la t iv e  im portance in  
the Tam ilnadu in d u s tr ia l economy.
1. Cotton T ex tiles  The Cotton T e x tile  in d u s try  is one o f the most w ide­
spread in  Tam ilnadu, though as the fou r maps show i t  is  most im port­
ant in  the Western p a rt o f the State around Coimbatore and then in  
p a rts  of Ramanathapuram and T iru n e lv e li D is tr ic ts . Madras though 
s t i l l  em ploying f a i r ly  la rg e  numbers of w orkers in  Cotton T e x tile  m ills  
has a c tu a lly  ve ry  few of them indeed. I t  should be remembered th a t 
these fig u re s  predate the closure of B in n y ' s Buckingham and C arna tic  
M ills  w hich employed 11,100 out of the to ta l o f 11,300 w orkers employed 
in  the Cotton T ex tile  in d u s try  in  Madras C ity .
As there are 27 ta lu k s  w ith  on ly  one Cotton T e x tile  fa c to ry  the decile  
map fo r the number o f fac to ries  is  somewhat d is to rte d  w ith  these 27 in  
one group and on ly  fou r to f iv e  ta lu ks  in  the other nine groups. I t  
is  w orth  no ting  th a t these 27 ta lu ks  are n e a rly  a l l  in  the Eastern 
pa rts  of the State, the d is tr ib u tio n  o f Cotton T e x tile  fac to ries  thus 
corresponding fa i r ly  c lose ly to the cotton g row ing areas of the State.
2. Chemicals and Products The s p a tia l d is tr ib u tio n  of the Chemical 
in d u s try  in  Tam ilnadu has a number o f in te re s tin g  features to i t .
This is p a r t ly  because the NIC categories 310 to 319 inc lude  such 
th ings  as matches, fire w o rks  and explosives which are t ra d it io n a lly  
ve ry  im portan t and h e a v ily  loca lised  in d u s tr ie s  in  Tam ilnadu b u t also 
because i t  is  an in d u s try  where there has been a f a i r ly  h igh  leve l of 
c a p ita l investm ent in  recent years, and a lo t of i t  in  la rg e  scale p u b lic  
sector p la n ts  w hich are fre q u e n tly  located in  areas w ith  t r a d it io n a lly  
l i t t le  in d u s try .
In  most ta lu k s  there are ve ry  few Chemicals firm s . Aga in  th is  is 
b rough t out by the decile  map where 19 ta lu ks  are shaded as on ly  
ha v ing  one fa c to ry  in  them and 12 w ith  on ly  two fa c to rie s . The two 
m ain centres of the chem ical in d u s try  are Madras and the S a ttu r/N o rth  
T iru n e lv e li D is tr ic t area. The peak of 209 firm s em ploying
42,000 w orkers in  S a ttu r is  of course e n tire ly  a re su lt of the concen­
tra t io n  of the match and fire w o rk  in d u s try  in  the ta lu k ;  a ve ry  ,h igh  
p ropo rtion  of these firm s (58 per cent) do not use power and many of
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them are p robab ly  on ly  seasonal in  th e ir  opera tion . The match 
in d u s try  also spreads over in to  the ne ighbouring  ta lu k s  o f K o v ilp a tt i,  
S r iv i l ip u t tu r  and S a n ka ra n a in a rko il. A fte r S a ttu r w ith  209 and K o v il­
p a tt i w ith  71 fac to ries  the next la rg e s t is  Saidapet w ith  69 and 6,200 
w orkers.
I t  is  in te re s tin g  to note th a t the Madras concentra tion  of Chemical 
fac to ries  is on the o u ts k ir ts  o f the c ity  in  Saidapet ra th e r than in  the 
Madras C ity  C orporation area its e lf ,  in d ic a tin g  the much more recent 
growth of the chemical in d u s try  re la t iv e  to the cotton in d u s try  which 
had its  fac to ries  located near the centre of the modern c ity .
Other im portan t centres fo r employment in  Chemicals are T u tic o r in , 
T iruchendu r, M adura i, Coimbatore and c u rio u s ly  the N ilg ir is .  This 
la s t c h a ra c te r is tic  is a re su lt m a in ly  of the H industan Photo F ilm s and 
a p u b lic  sector Cordite Factory located in  Ootacamund and Coonoor 
ta lu k s  respec tive ly .
3- T ransport Equipment Though Tam ilnadu is fa i r ly  w e ll known fo r 
its  T ransport Equipment in d u s try  as ra ilw a y  ro ll in g  stock and most 
types of road tra n sp o rt veh ic les are m anufactured in  the State, th is  
in d u s try  is fa i r ly  h e a v ily  concentrated around Madras as these four 
maps demonstrate c le a r ly . Saidapet ta lu k  is  in  fa c t the most im por­
ta n t ta lu k  fo r the in d u s try  as i t  conta ins Am battur where most o f the 
TVS groups of firm s is  located as w e ll as Ennore, the home of Ashok 
Leyland and E n fie ld  In d ia . Most o f the other tra n s p o rt equipment 
fac to ries  are associated w ith  the la rg e r  c it ie s  and towns w ith  the two 
exceptions in  Ramanathapuram Dt. of T iru p a t tu r  where the new E n fie ld  
motorcycle p la n t is  located at S ingam uneri and a sh ip ya rd  in  Ramana­
thapuram  ta lu k  i ts e lf .  The la rg e  numbers of w orkers employed in  the 
in d u s try  in  Arkonam and T iru c h ira p a ll i  are o f course associated w ith  
la rg e  ra ilw a y  workshops.
The data fo r the number of T ransport Equipment fa c to ries  in  each 
ta lu k  could on ly  be grouped in to  e ig h t d if fe re n t va lue  ca tegories, so 
no decile  map was p repared , instead a map w ith  these e igh t d if fe re n t 
categories replaces i t .
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APPENDIX I
E x trac ts  from the Factories Act, 1948 -  Government o f In d ia
Chapter I :  Section 2
D e fin itio ns :
'F a c to ry ' means any premises in c lu d in g  the p rec inc ts  thereof
( i)  whereon ten or more workers are w o rk ing  o r were on 
any day of the preceding twelve months and in  any p a rt of 
which a m anufactu ring  process is  being c a rr ie d  out w ith  the 
a id  of power, or is  o rd in a r ily  c a rr ie d  on
or
( i i )  whereon tw enty or more w orkers are w ork ing  or were on 
any day of the preceding twelve months and in  any p a rt of 
w hich a m anufactu ring  process is  being c a rr ie d  on w ithou t 
the a id  of power, or is  o rd in a r ily  c a rr ie d  on
bu t does not inc lude  a mine subject to the opera tion  o f the 
Mines Act, 1952 or a mobile u n it be long ing to the armed 
forces o f the Union a ra ilw a y  ru n n in g  shed or a ho te l, 
re s ta u ra n t or ea ting  p lace.
'M a n u fa c tu rin g  Process' means any process fo r
(1) m aking, a lte r in g , re p a ir in g , ornam enting, f in is h in g , 
packag ing , o il in g , w ashing, c lea n ing , b re ak in g  up, demo­
lis h in g  or otherw ise tre a tin g  or a dap ting  any a r t ic le  or 
substance w ith  a view to its  use, sa le , tra n s p o rt, d e liv e ry  
or d isposa l,
or
( i i )  pumping o i l ,  w ate r, or sewage or any other substance 
or device by which the motion o f a prim e mover is  tra n s ­
m itted to
( i i i )  g ene ra ting , trans fo rm ing  or tra n s m ittin g  power or
( iv )  composing types fo r p r in t in g , p r in t in g  by le tte r  press, 
lith o g ra p h y , photogravure  or other s im ila r  process o r book 
b in d in g ; or
(v ) cons tru c ting , recons truc ting , re p a ir in g , re f i t t in g ,  
f in is h in g  or b reak ing  up ships or vessels, or
(v i)  p rese rv ing  or s to ring  any a r t ic le  in  cold storage.
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APPENDIX 11 - Statistical Tables
Number of Factories & Number of Factory Workers .in Tamilnadu by Taluk
Tota l Number o f:  Number of Factor ies  w ith :  No. of Workers
Taluk up to 49 50-249 249 plus in Factor ies  of
Factories workers Workers Workers Workers 249 plus workers
Code Name
1 Ponneri 7 350 5 2 - -
2 T ir u v a l lu r 18 1,277 15 2 1 627
3 Madras City 998 94,671 776 180 42 51,341
4 Saidapet 795 80,268 589 159 51 45,168
5 Sriperumbudur 38 13,436 23 5 9 11,896
6 T ir u t t a n i 9 793 8 - 1 453
7 Arkonam 13 2,486 8 2 3 2,096
8 Kanchipuram 25 1,216 21 3 1 361
9 Chingleput 25 1,911 16 8 1 - 281
10 Haduranthakam 8 678 5 2 1 378
11 Cheyyar 4 120 4 - - _
12 Arcot 5 150 5 - - -
13 Walajahpet 84 5,445 66 16 3 1,865
14 Gudiyatham 72 3,655 58 13 1 490
15 V e l lo re 47 2,780 37 8 2 800
16 Arni 42 1,495 39 3 _ -
17 Wandiwash 2 60 2 - - -
18 Tindivanan 14 785 9 5 - -
19 Gingee - - - - - -
20 Polur 3 90 3 - - -
21 Vaniyarabadi 130 6,665 106 21 3 1,110
22 T iru p p a ttu r 7 210 7 - - -
23 Chengam 2 60 2 - - -
24 Tiruvannamalai 27 810 27 - - -
25 T i ru k o i lu r 7 210 7 - - _
26 Villupuram 22 1,218 17 4 1 408
27 _
28
Pondicherry
- - - - - -
29 Cuddalore 45 4,997 35 5 5 3,497
30 Chidambaram 18 820 14 4 - -
31 Vridhachalam 23 4,741 12 8 3 3,156
32 K a l la k u r ic h i 12 1,119 8 2 2 754
33 Harur 14 565 13 1 - -
34 Uthangarai 2 105 1 1 - -
35 K r is h n ag ir i 10 345 9 1 - -
36
37
Hosur
Denkanikota
8 375 5 3 - -
38 Oharsapuri 14 783 13 - 1 393
39 Hettur 29 10,650 15 6 8 9,675
40 Omalur 11 760 7 4 - -
41 Salem 402 16,225 373 22 7 2,975
42 A ttu r 110 3,440 108 2 - -
43 Perarabalur 3 310 2 - 1 250
44 A r iy a lu r 2 105 1 1 - -
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Code Name
Total Number of: Number of Factories w ith : No. of Workers
Taluk up to 49 50-249 249 plus in Factories of
Factories workers Workers Workers Workers 249 plus workers
45 Udayarpalyam 1 250 - - 1 250
46 Kumbakonam 55 5,745 39 27 7 2,250
47 Mayuram 33 2,005 21 11 2 500
48 S i r k a l i 12 720 4 _ -
49 Karaikal - - - - - -
50 Nannilant 54 3,030 14 7 - -
51 Nagapattinam 14 785 7 7 -
52 Tiruthuraipoondi 24 2,860 12 6 2,000
53 Mannargudi 14 1,575 5 7 2 750
54 Papanasam 10 345 9 1 - _
55 Thanjavur 63 5,210 36 22 4 2,000
56 Lalgudi 43 4,850 5 36 2 1,500
57 Thuraiyur 6 680 1 4 1 250
58 Namakkal 76 2,510 72 4 - -
59 Rasipuram 148 4,895 139 9 - -
60 Tiruchengode 166 7,946 156 8 2 2,516
61 Sankari 38 3,839 35 2 1 449
62 Bhavani 11 1,575 5 5 • 1 1,000
63 Gobichettipalayam 34 3,610 12 14 7 1,750
64 Coonoor 95 9,780 18 39 5 2,750
65 Ootacamund 38 4,990 8 24 6 2,500
66 Gudalur 17 1,980 1 14 2 500
67 Avanashi 70 12,100 15 40 15 7,500
68 Erode 217 9,955 142 61 9 3,250
69 Karur 57 6,300 35 17 5 4,000
70 Musiri 6 680 1 4 1 250
71 K u l i th a la i 1 30 1 - - -
72 T i r u c h i r a p a l l i 281 42,770 119 134 28 27,500
73 Kulathur 8 565 3 5 - -
74 Orathanadu - - - _ - -
75 P a t tu k o t ta i 21 1,170 14 6 1 250
76 Arathangi 6 400 5 - 1 250
!  f
78
Tirumayam 3 635 1 1 1 500
79 Alangudi 30 3,725 10 11 9 2,500
80 Manapparai 8 1,300 5 1 - -
81 Vedasanthur 1 30 1 - - -
82 Palani 39 5,310 22 12 5 3,500
83 Dharapuram 49 2,900 • 30 18 1 500
84 Palladam 469 38,985 236 178 51 26,500
85 Coimbatore 796 111,835 365 321 108 72,500
86 P o llach i 173 19,665 78 57 38 12,000
87 Udumalpet 45 7,245 15 19 11 5,020
88 Kodaikanal - - - - - -
89 Dindigul 123 8,710 67 43 13 4,250
90 Melur 8 1,003 6 1 1 698
91 T iru p a t tu r 46 2,567 41 3 2 962
92 Tiruvadanai 6 375 5 1 - -
93 Sivaganga 22 2,075 13 6 3 1,135
94 Madurai North 75 4,361 65 7 3 1,836
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Taluk
Total Nuaber o f: Number of F actor ies  w ith: No. o f woi 
in Factori  
249 plus tFactories workers
up to 49 
Workers
50-249
Workers
'249  plus  
Workers
Code Name
95 Madurai South 251 21,097 222 19 10 12,562
96 N i la k o t t a i 14 2,000 4 4 6 1,500
97 Periyakulara 44 5,000 15 17 9 2,500
98 Uthanapalayam 29 2,595 9 19 11 500,
99 U s i la a p a t t i 11 330 11 - - -
100 Tirutnangalara 24 2,002 19 2 3 1,282
101 Arupukottai 21 3,450 5 12 4 2,250
102 Paramakudi 9 415 8 1 - -
103 Raraanathapuran
v 17 1,178 12 4 1 318104 Paebaa Is land  (pars R)
105 Mudukulathur 3 330 1 2 - -
106 V i la th ik u la a 8 240 8 - - -
107 S attu r 371 54,062 58 209 104 32,250
108 S r i v i l i p u t t u r 110 12,900 35 58 17 6,000
109 Sankaranainarkoil 77 3,095 69 7 1 250
110 K o v i lp a t t i 145 10,096 97 45 3 1,676
111 T u t ico r in 148 6,222 136 9 3 1,467
112 Srivaikuntam 23 735 22 1 - -
113 T ir u n e lv e l i 120 5,909 102 15 3 1,524
114 Tenkasi 32 1,055 31 1 - -
115 Shenkottai 17 705 16 1 - -
116 Anbasatnudraa 42 4,945 35 6 1 3,345
117 Vilavancode 116 22,892 45 37 34 15,297
118 Kalkulara 54 5,189 37 9 8 2,879
119 Thovalai 4 215 3 1 - -
120 Tiruchendur 20 1,798 16 2 2 1,018
121 fianguneri 20 1,369 18 1 1 604
122 Agastheeswaran 55 2,379 48 6 1 289
APPENDICES 15
Number of Factories and Persons Employed in Selected Industries in
Tamilnadu by Taluk
NIC 230-239 M anufacture of Cotton Textiles
310-319 M anufacture of Chemicals and Chemical Products 
(except Coal and Petroleum based)
370-379 M anufacture of T ransport Equipment and Parts
Cotton T e x t i le s Chemicals £ Products Transport Equipmen
T aluk Numbe r of Number of Number of
Factories £ Persons Factories £ Persons Factories £ Person
Code Name
1 Ponneri _ _ 1 75 _ —
2 T ir u v a l lu r - - - - 1 30
3 Madras City 7 11,283 37 2,348 30 18,905
4 Saidapet 5 465 69 6,188 78 20,989
5 Sriperumbudur - 7 1,030 4 4,248
6 T ir u t ta n i 1 453 1 30 - -
7 Arkonam - - 1 30 2 1,395
8 Kanchipurara 4 451 - 1 30
9 Chingleput - - - -  ■ 1 30
10 Maduranthakam - - - - - -
11 CHeyyar - - - - _ -
12 Arcot - - - - - -
13 Walajahpet 1 225 6 552 - -
14 ' Gudiyatham 3 480 15 705 - -
15 V ellore 1 426 1 30 - -
16 Arni 2 205 - - - -
17 Wandiwash - _ - - - -
18 Tindivanam 1 225 1 75 - -
19 Gingee - - - - - -
20 Polur - - - - - -
21 Vaniyambadi 1 30 2 60 - -
22 T iruppattu r - - 1 30 - -
23 Chengam - - - - - -
24 Tiruvannamalai - - - -
25 T iru k o i lu r - - - - - ...
26 Villupuram 1 175 2 65 - -
27
28
Pondicherry
29 Cuddalore 1 30 2 105 - -
30 Chidambaram 2 205 - - - -
31 Vridhachalam - - 1 1,150 - -
32 K a lla ku r ich i 1 303 - _ - -
33 Harur - - 1 30 - -
34 Uthangarai - - 2 110 - -
35 K rishn ag ir i - - 2 110 -
36 Hosur - - - - - -
37 Denkanikota - - - - - -
38 Dharmapuri - - 2 60 - -
39 Mettur 10 2,671 5 1,494 - -
40 Omalur - - 1 30 - _
41 Salem 33 2,083 7 210 - -
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Taluk
Cotton T e x t i le s  
Number of  
F actories  8 Persons
Chemicals
Number
Factories
£ Products 
of
8 Persons
T ransport  
Number 
Factories
Equipment
of
£ Persons
Code
42
Maene
Attu r 1 125
-
43 Perambalur 2 60 - - - -
44 A r iy a lu r - - - - - -
45 Udayarpalyara - - - - - -  ,
46 Kumbakonam - - 5 385 1 30
47 Hayuran 1 250 - - 1 250
48 S i r k a l i - - - - - -
49 Kara ika l - - - - - -
50 Nannilam - - 1 75 1 30
51 Nagapattinam - - - _ 1 30
52 Thiruthuraipoondi - - - - - _
53 Hannargudi 1 250 - - - -
54 Papanasara - - - _ - -
55 Thanjavur 3 1,530 4 170 1 75
56 Lalgudi 1 75 - - - - -
57 Thuraiyur - - 3 355 - -
58 Namakkal - - 2 155 - -
59 Rasipuram 8 240 - - - -
60 T iruchengode 117 3,961 - - - -
61 Sankari 27 810 - - - -
62 Bhavani 4 305 - - - -
63 Gobichettipalayam 11 1,255 - - - -
64 Coonoor - - 1 2,000 - -
65 Ootacamund - - 3 2,280 - -
66 Gudalur - - - - - -
67 Avanashi 33 9,870 5 2,750 - -
68 Erode 60 5,695 2 60 - -
69 Karur 12 1,995 - - 2 150
70 H u s ir i - - 3 355 - -
71 K u l i t h a la i - - - - - -
72 T i r u c h i r a p a l l i 5 1,785 9 640 1 2,000
73 Kulathur 1 75 1 30 - -
74 Orathanadu - - - - - -
75 P a t tu k o t ta i - - - - - -
76 Arathangi 1 250 - - - -
77 T irumayam 1 500 - - - -
78 .  * 1 500 - - - -
79 Alangudi - - - - -
80 Hanapparai 1 1,000 - - - -
81 Vedasenthur - - - - - -
82 Palani 10 3,325 - - - -
83 Dharapuram 7 865 - - - -
84 Palladam 137 28,850 2 375 - -
85 Coimbatore 134 56,520 21 1,275 34 5,070
86 P o llach i 38 5,720 7 395 - -
87 Udumalpet 24 10,475 1 75 - -
88 Kodaikanal - - - - - -
89 Dindiqul 13 3,575 3 230 1 30
90 Melur 1 698 2 155 _ -
91 T i ru p a t tu r 2 776 2 105 15 831
APPENDICES 17
Taluk
Code Name
Cotton T e x t i le s  
Number of 
Factories £ Persons
Chemicals £ Products 
Number of 
Factories £ Persons
Transport Equipment 
Number of  
F actories  £ Persons
92 Tiruvadanai 1 225 - - - -
93 Sivaganga 6 1,460 2 60 - _
94 Madurai North 10 2,046 3 90 2 60
95 Madurai South 43 9,394 15 570 5 1,811
96 N i la k k o t ta i - - 1 250 - -
97 Periyakulam 19 1,805 • 1 30 - -
98 Uthamapalyam 7 525 - - - -
99 U s ilam p att i 2 60 1 35 - -
100 Tirumangalam 6 652 6 455 - -
101 Aruppukottai 5 2,200 1 250 - _
102 Paramakudi 1 125 - - -
103 Ramanathapuram 1 318 - - 2 255
104 Pambam I .  (Pars R .) 1 318 - - 2 255
105 Mudukulathur - _ - - - -
106 V i la th iku lam 4 120 1 30 - -
107 S attu r 15 1,735 209 41,995 - -
108 S r i v i l i p u t t u r 70 11,915 13 1,450 - -
109 Sankaranainarkoil 59 2,045 10 810 - -
110 K o v i lp a t t i 37 2,620 71 5,976 - -
111 T u t ic o r in 9 1,262 5 625 - -
112 Srivaikuntam 4 120 - _ - -
113 T ir u n e lv e l i 8 670 5 250 - -
114 T enkasi 1 30 - - - -
115 Shenkottai 1 225 1 30 - -
116 Ambasamudram 9 3,725 - - - -
117 Vilavancode - - - - - -
118 Kalkulam - - - - - -
119 Thovala 1 30 - - - -
120 Tiruchendur 1 487 4 771 - -
121 Nanguneri 1 225 - - -
122 Agastheeswaram 1 125 - - - -
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APPENDIX III - Maps
1 T a luk Boundaries and Code Numbers
2 C entra l Government Declared 'B ackw ard  Areas'
3 Number of Factories per T a luk  (equa l in te rv a l)
4 ( decile)
5 Number of Factory Workers per T a luk  (equa l in te rv a l)
6 (dec ile )
7 Number of Factories w ith  up to 49 Workers by Ta luk (equa l in te rv a l)
8 (dec ile )
9 Number of Factories w ith  50-249 Workers by T a luk  (equa l in te rv a l)
10 (dec ile )
11 Number o f Factories w ith  249 p lus  Workers by T a luk  (equa l in te rv a l)
12 (dec ile )
13 Number Employed in Factories w ith  249 p lus Workers by T a luk
(equal in te rv a l)
14 Number Employed in Factories w ith  249 p lus Workers by Ta luk
(decile )
15 Percent Employed in Factories w ith  249 p lus  Workers by T a luk
(equal in te rv a l)
16 Percent Employed in Factories w ith  249 p lus Workers by T a luk
(decile )
17 Number of Cotton T ex tile  Factories by T a luk  (equa l in te rv a l)
18 (dec ile )
19 Number Employed in Cotton T e x tile  Factories by T a luk
(equal in te rv a l)
20 Number Employed in Cotton T ex tile  Factories by T a luk  (dec ile )
21 Number o f Chemicals and Products Factories by T a luk
(equa l in te rv a l)
22 (dec ile )
23 Number Employed in Chemicals Factories by T a luk  (equa l in te rv a l) .
24 (dec ile )
25 Number of T ransport Equipment Factories by Ta luk (equa l in te rv a l)
26 (dec ile )
27 Number Employed in T ransport Equipment Factories by Ta luk
(equal in te rv a l)
28 Number Employed in T ransport Equipment Factories by Ta luk
(dec ile )
APPENDICES
TALUKS AND CODE NUMBERS LISTED BY DISTRICT
19
C h in g le p u t :
P o n n e r i 1
T i r u v a l l u r  2
M adras C i t y  3
S a id a p e t 4
S r ip e ru m b u d u r 5
T i r u t t a n i  6
K a nch ip u ram  8
C h in g le p u t  9
M aduranthakam  10
D h a rm a p u r i:
H a ru r  33
U th a n g a ra i 34
K r i s h n a g i r i  35
H osur 36
D e n k a n ik o ta  37
D h a rm a p u ri 38
Than j  a v u r :
Kumbakonam 46
Mayuram 47
S i r k a l i  48
N a n n ila m  50
N a g a p a ttin a m  51
T ir u th u r a ip o o n d i5 2  
M a n n a rg u d i 53
Papanasam 54
T h a n ja v u r  55
O ra th a n a d u  74
P a t t u k o t t a i  75
A ra n th a n g i 76
M a d u ra i:
V e d a s e n th u r 8 l
P a la n i 82
K o d a ik a n a l 88
D in d ig u l  89
M e lu r  90
M a d u ra i N o r th  94
M a d u ra i S o u th  95
N i la k k o t t a i  96
P e r iy a k u la m  97
U tham apalayam  98
U s i la m p a t t i  ' 99
T iru m an g a la m  100
N o r th  A r c o t : : S ou th  A r c o t :
Arkonam 7 T in d iv a n a m 18
C heyya r 11 G ingee 19
A rc o t (p .W a la ja h )  12 T i r u k o i l u r 25
W a la ja h p e t 13 V il lu p u ra m 26
G ud iya tham 14 C u d d a lo re 29
V e l lo r e 15 Chidam baram 30
A r n i 16 V r id h a c h a la m 31
W andiwash 17 K a l la k u r ic h i 32
P o lu r 20
V a n iya m b a d i 21
T ir u p p a tu r 22 PONDICHERRY 27 & 28
Chengam 23
T iru v a n n a m a la i 24
T i r u c h i r a p a l l i : 
P e ra m b a lu r 43
S a lem : A r iy a lu r 44
M e ttu r 39 U daya rp a layam 45
O m alur 40 L a lg u d i 56
Salem 41 T h u ra iy u r 57
A t t u r 42 M u s ir i 70
Nam akkal 58 K u l i t h a l a i 71
R as ipu ram 59 T i r u c h i r a p a l l i 72
T iru c h e n g o d e 60 K u la th u r 73
S a n k a r i 61 Tirum ayam  77 &
A la n g u d i
M a n ap p a ra i
78
79
80
KARAIKAL 49 K a ru r 69
N i l g i r i s : C o im b a to re :
C oonoor 64 B h a va n i 62
Ootacamund 65 G o b ic h e t t ip a la y a m 63
G u d a lu r 66 A v a n a s h i
E rode
D harapuram
67
68 
83
R am anathapuram : P a lla d a m 84
C o im b a to re 85
T i r u p a t t u r 91 P o l la c h i 86
T iru v a d a n a i 92 U dum a lpe t 87
S iva g a n g a 93
A ru p p u k o t ta i 1 01
P aram akud i 102
Ram anathapuram 103 T i r u n e l v e l i :
Pamban I . ( p . R ) 104 V i la t h ik u la m 106
M u d u k u la th u r 105 S a n k a r a n a in a r k o il 109
S a t tu r 107 K o v i l p a t t i 110
S r i v i l i p u t t u r 108 T u t i c o r in 111
K a n y a k u m a r i: S r iv a ik u n ta mT i r u n e l v e l i
112
113
V ila v a n c o d e 117 T e n k a s i 114
K a lk u la m 118 S h e n k o t ta i 115
T h o v a la 119 Amb a s amudr am 116
A gastheesw aram 122 T iru c h e n d u r 120N a n g u n e ri 121
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OCCASIONAL PAPERS
1. The role of farmers' associations in agricultural development: 
A case study from Northeast Thailand - Harvey Demaine
2. American rubber planting in the Philippines 1900-1930 - Voon 
Phin-keong.
OCCASIONAL PAPERS (New series)
1. Drought, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia - M. Fitzgerald.
2. Germany's model colony in Africa: Togo, 1884-1914 - B.W. Hodder.
3. The. northern area integrated agricultural development project: 
Social and economic impact of planning for rural change in 
northern Sierra Leone - J. Karimu and P. Richards.
